[EAI Myanmar Special Commentary] ⑦ The 2021 Myanmar Crisis and International Human Rights

1. The Intersection of Human Rights-Friendly and Unfriendly International Communities

The coup d'état by the Myanmar military on February 1, 2021, was a major international shock. It occurred during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, shortly after the inauguration of U.S. President Biden, whose administration was seen as pivotal for future changes in international politics. For those who expected a new international order following the Trump era, the military coup in Myanmar, where democracy was imperfectly taking root, and the indiscriminate massacre of innocent citizens represented a significant challenge to the liberal international order. However, from the perspective of international human rights, the Myanmar situation was not an entirely new development. The geopolitical landscape surrounding human rights in 2021 was a period where both human rights-unfriendly and human rights-friendly environments coexisted.

First, as an unfriendly environment, liberal values such as human rights, the rule of law, and democracy have retreated in various regions globally. The European refugee crisis resulting from the Syrian civil war, Brexit, and the rise of populism centered around strongmen with authoritarian tendencies in countries like Hungary, Poland, and the Philippines have occurred. Notably, Trump's policies, including strict immigration controls, his close engagement with dictators like Putin and Kim Jong-un, and the withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council, exacerbated the human rights situation in the United States. Furthermore, human rights were used as a tool to attack China in the U.S.-China conflict, while China, in turn, attacked the universality of human rights by emphasizing their relativity and particularity. In the lead-up to and following COVID-19, nations have been rushing to revert to national interest-centric, self-centered approaches, and mercantilism has re-emerged in trade and commerce.

However, this unfriendly environment was not the sole aspect of international politics. Upon taking office, Biden declared the restoration of American democracy as his top priority and abolished inhumane immigration policies. Internationally, value-oriented diplomacy, which emphasizes human rights, was evident through the U.S. return to the UN Human Rights Council, the lifting of personal sanctions against the International Criminal Court prosecutor who initiated an investigation into war crimes in Afghanistan, and the declassification of information related to the murder of Saudi dissident journalist Khashoggi. Moreover, independent of both the U.S. and China, the international community has seen the development of international human rights and humanitarian norms, as well as international humanitarian and criminal law, including human rights, transitional justice, and the responsibility to protect. This clearly signifies a human rights-friendly environment, different from the past, meaning that numerous mechanisms are in place to sufficiently improve the situation in Myanmar if the international community has the will. The Myanmar crisis was thrown into the midst of these two currents.

2. The Protracted Struggle and the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus

As of January 2022, the death toll from the coup in Myanmar has reached 1,398. Notably, 102 people died on March 27, 2021 alone (Assistance Association for Political Prisoners [AAPP] 2022). The military has engaged in indiscriminate shootings against unarmed protesters, civilians, children, and women resisting the coup, followed by mass arrests, detentions, and torture. To date, 8,376 people have been arrested, and 507 have been convicted (AAPP 2022). Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing has labeled the unarmed protesters as engaging in "terrorism that undermines the nation's stability and security," and the military has threatened through state television that protesters "must learn that they can be shot in the head and back" (MRTV, March 26, 2021).

The Myanmar crisis shows no signs of resolution even after a year. The most significant agreement was the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus adopted in Jakarta last April. This consensus includes an immediate cessation of violence, the commencement of constructive dialogue for a peaceful resolution of the situation, mediation by the ASEAN Chair's special envoy, humanitarian assistance, and visits by the special envoy and delegation to Myanmar. Given that Myanmar is an ASEAN member and ASEAN plays a crucial role in regional politics, this agreement holds considerable significance. In line with this, Myanmar pardoned 1,316 political prisoners and released 4,320 detainees in October (Human Rights Watch 2021). However, the amnesties were insufficient, and no further meaningful progress has been made to date. During this process, ASEAN has shown divisions, leading to skepticism about its role.

As the Myanmar crisis has dragged on, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) against the military has continued, and in April, the National Unity Government (NUG) and the People's Defence Force (PDF) were formed. The international community has also pressured the military by urging a resolution to the Myanmar crisis in multilateral forums, including the UN. Although the UN Security Council was unable to adopt a resolution due to the opposition of China, Russia, India, and Vietnam, it held four presidential statements, two Arria-formula meetings, and several consultative meetings. The UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council also pressured the Security Council by adopting resolutions. The United States led a joint statement by the chiefs of staff of 12 countries condemning the coup, as well as joint statements by G7 nations. In October, along with South Korea, Timor-Leste, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union urged Myanmar to immediately implement the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus.

3. From Condemnation and Solidarity to Seeking Strategy Beyond Non-Interference

Nations have responded diversely to the Myanmar crisis. The United States, for instance, swiftly condemned the coup and urged an end to the indiscriminate assault and killing of protesters. The U.S., which had long imposed sanctions on Myanmar, reinstated them following the coup. U.S. policy can be broadly divided into four categories. First, statements condemning the military for undermining democracy and violating human rights were issued in the names of the President, Secretary of State, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Second, financial sanctions and entry bans into the U.S. were imposed on individual military officials who led the coup, along with restrictions on withdrawing their assets from U.S. banks. This expanded the individual sanctions previously imposed after the 2017 Rohingya genocide. Third, as a relatively effective measure, a significant portion of Official Development Assistance (ODA) was redirected to support Myanmar's civil society. Fourth, efforts were made to achieve joint statements and meaningful resolutions in multilateral forums such as the UN. However, these policies, presented as value-oriented diplomacy, have not yet proven highly effective or decisive.

Myanmar is a strategically and economically important country for China, evidenced by President Xi Jinping's state visit in January 2020, just before COVID-19. Xi Jinping met with both Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing and then-State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, maintaining a balanced approach. Reflecting this, China immediately asserted non-interference in internal affairs after the crisis erupted, urging "both sides to resolve differences." On the same grounds, China obstructed the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions and diluted the coup's violence and the military's responsibility in other documents such as presidential statements and press releases. In April, Foreign Minister Wang Yi outlined "three supports and three rejections" regarding the Myanmar situation, opposing "inappropriate intervention" by the Security Council or "incitement of chaos by external forces" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2021). Following the adoption of ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus, China has supported its "gradual implementation," seeking to maintain the status quo. However, China also has friction with the Myanmar military over ethnic minority issues and ideological conflicts.

South Korea has voiced relatively swift and strong criticism of the Myanmar situation. Following the coup, the President, Prime Minister, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued multiple statements condemning the military. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice engaged in several meetings with the Myanmar ambassador and Myanmar residents in South Korea, represented by high-ranking officials such as ministers and vice ministers. Following the indiscriminate killing of children and women on March 28, the government "strongly condemned the barbaric violence that continues despite repeated calls from the international community" and "once again strongly urged an immediate halt to the unacceptable acts of violence against its own citizens." Concurrently, relevant ministries jointly announced coercive sanctions. These included suspending new exchanges and cooperation in defense and security sectors, prohibiting the export of military supplies and strictly scrutinizing the export of strategic industrial materials, reviewing development cooperation projects other than those directly related to people's livelihoods or humanitarian aid, and planning special humanitarian stay measures for Myanmar nationals residing in South Korea.

4. The Dilemma of International Human Rights Cooperation: The Myanmar Military Adheres to Sovereignty and Non-Interference

The Myanmar crisis, showing no signs of resolution even a year after its outbreak, has significant implications for international human rights cooperation. Key factors influencing a state's acceptance of external human rights pressure include the government's need for domestic and international justification, the acceptability of relevant norms in developed countries, and the clarity and universality of these norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The Myanmar military, more than any other government, needed to secure domestic and international legitimacy after the coup. Furthermore, the human rights violations condemned by the international community—indiscriminate massacres of innocent civilians, detentions, assaults, and torture—are clear, universal norms respected in developed countries. However, despite these favorable conditions, the Myanmar military has not yielded to external human rights pressure for nearly a year.

This demonstrates the different priorities of the Myanmar military. The Myanmar military has justified the coup and human rights violations domestically and internationally by focusing on federal integration and social stability rather than human rights protection. Similar attempts have been made in ASEAN countries such as Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia, and as seen in the case of Thailand, there was a precedent accepted within ASEAN. Furthermore, the model pursued by the Myanmar military is not Western Europe, which guarantees citizens' rights and respects democratic institutions and procedures, but rather China, which suppresses and disregards human rights and democracy while focusing on preventing social chaos and achieving economic development. In this context, the norms that resonate more clearly and universally with the Myanmar military are not human rights principles but the principles of sovereignty or non-interference in internal affairs. These principles are generally accepted within ASEAN and are strongly felt in the region, actively supported by China.

Moreover, the Myanmar military has managed to withstand the situation better than expected due to two factors. First, despite limited national capacity, its material and social foundations, which should be vulnerable, are sustainable due to the presence of ASEAN and China. Singapore and China, its largest trading partners, continue to trade with Myanmar. ASEAN member states like Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, which maintain authoritarian governments, indirectly provide legitimacy to the Myanmar military. The attendance of Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand at the Myanmar military's Armed Forces Day celebration in March, amidst ongoing civilian massacres, demonstrates this. Second, comprehensive sanctions have not yet been imposed on military-owned enterprises (Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, Myanmar Economic Cooperation), which are a critical source of funding for the military. Notably, the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), a key financial source for the military, has avoided sanctions due to lobbying and pressure from multinational corporations based in the United States, Europe, India, and South Korea, such as Chevron, Shell, Total, and POSCO.

However, the stagnation of Western policy toward Myanmar is not solely due to corporate lobbying. Fundamentally, domestic political factors inherent in foreign policy are strongly at play. Even looking at the United States, Biden won by a narrow margin against Trump, and the election results led to disputes over election fraud and the Capitol riot. There is a significant base of support for American nationalism, termed "Trumpism," within the U.S., and this force influences Biden's foreign policy. Biden's stated "foreign policy for the American middle class" also makes it difficult to focus on Myanmar, which is not closely linked to national interests. Furthermore, the troubled withdrawal from Afghanistan in August exposed the vulnerability of U.S. foreign policy in democracy promotion. This has been observed in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, and recently in Hong Kong; it is difficult to achieve easily and can be a double-edged sword, potentially leading to political chaos and regional instability.

5. The Possibility of International Human Rights Cooperation: Starting with Unforeseen Shocks!

As evidenced by the sharp decline in media coverage of the Myanmar crisis, international attention is waning. The situation could worsen for two reasons. First, the protracted nature of the crisis and the entrenchment of the status quo. The Myanmar military is accustomed to prolonged international sanctions and continues to maintain relations with major trading partners such as China, Thailand, India, and Singapore. In addition to oil and gas, the cash flow generated from abundant timber, gems, and drug trafficking is not negligible. The military's self-sufficiency may increase, and its resilience to international sanctions may strengthen, prolonging the crisis and entrenching the current situation. The military has already extended the elections, initially promised within a year of the coup, to at least two and a half years later.

Second, the outbreak of civil war and the resulting explosive outflow of refugees to neighboring countries. Simultaneously, the traditional strategy of cutting off the flow of funds, food, information, and personnel to the insurgents, known as the "four cuts," has already resumed. In September, the NUG declared a defensive war against the military, and airstrikes, bombings, and arson by the military have occurred in ethnic minority areas linked to them, leading to a rapid increase in refugees. If the situation in Myanmar deteriorates like that in Syria, armed conflict among various political factions and the refugee issue will become prominent. The focus may shift from the democratization of Myanmar or the legitimate CDM to "all parties" involved in the conflict, potentially eroding the legitimacy of the civil movement.

However, even if the situation is difficult, human rights cooperation surrounding the Myanmar crisis is not entirely impossible. Change generally occurs due to unforeseen shocks. This can happen in two ways. First, shocks resulting from human rights abuses. The international community's intervention in the Bosnian or Kosovo wars in the 1990s, or the rapid policy shift of European countries towards Syrian refugees in the 2010s, were all triggered by unexpected shocks. In the case of Bosnia, the reality of concentration camps reminiscent of Nazi extermination camps was revealed, and for Syrian refugees, there was the case of "Aylan Kurdi," a child found dead face down on a beach. Myanmar is also increasingly experiencing massacres, and the methods are becoming more brutal, making this possibility quite plausible. Second, shocks from the military itself. As seen in the case of Libya, when Gaddafi referred to protesters as "cockroaches," it was perceived by the international community as a precursor to genocide, prompting action from the Security Council. Similarly, the Myanmar military's policies and statements could cause shock. Recent incidents, such as vehicles ramming into protesters causing casualties, or the discovery of 35 charred bodies, including children, clearly demonstrate the brutality of the military.

6. In the Midst of Shock: The Role of Public Opinion, Civil Society, and Transnational Solidarity

In a situation of shock, two factors play a crucial role. First, the role of public opinion and civil society. Even a former Singaporean diplomat, pessimistic about a peaceful resolution to the Myanmar crisis, identified public opinion, both domestic and international, as a turning point in U.S. foreign policy (Kausikan 2021). Shocking events like the Bosnian camps or Kurdi's death mobilize public opinion. This, in turn, influences politicians, governments, or parties sensitive to public opinion, leading to policy shifts. It also galvanizes civil society organizations, including NGOs. NGOs provide information and strategies to civil society domestically and pressure governments to change policy directions. Internationally, they provide information to international organizations like the UN and advise on policy. The response of East Asian countries to the Myanmar crisis thus far has involved not only government efforts but also the significant role of public opinion and civil society.

Second, the active participation of other relevant countries, including the European Union, Japan, India, Singapore, and Australia, in addition to ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, South Korea, and the United States, which have already raised their voices regarding the Myanmar crisis. India, bordering Myanmar and serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, already plays a crucial role. Japan has also exerted informal influence by leveraging its close relationship with the Myanmar military and has applied pressure through ODA. The European Union and Australia have also participated in joint statements led by the United States. Their roles will be even more critical in the future. The accusation that the U.S. strategically uses human rights, a legacy of the Trump era, places a significant burden on the Biden administration. Therefore, the European Union and Asian democracies could pressure Myanmar, with the U.S. supporting their actions. In this scenario, the existence of numerous international tools, such as human rights, transitional justice, and the responsibility to protect, is also a positive factor.■

References

Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP). 2022. “Political Prisoners Post-Coup,” https://aappb.org/(Accessed: January 4, 2022).

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52(4): 887-917.

Human Rights Watch. 2021. “Myanmar: Prisoner Releases Fall Short: Deposed Political Leaders and Journalists Remain Detained,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/21/myanmar-prisoner-releases-fall-short(Accessed: January 4, 2022).

Kausikan, Bilahari. 2021. “The Dangerous Impasse in Myanmar: For the United States, Patience Is the Least Bad Option,” Foreign Affairs, April 9, 2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/burma-myanmar/2021-04-09/dangerous-impasse-myanmar(Accessed: January 6, 2022).

Myanmar TV Channels(MRTV), March 26, 2021.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, “Wang Yi on Myanmar Situation: 'Three Supports' and 'Three Avoids.'https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1866713.shtml(Accessed: January 4, 2022).

■ Author: Kim Heon-jun_Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University. He graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in International Relations and obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota. He served as an Associate Professor and Senior Researcher at Griffith University in Australia and as a Visiting Assistant Professor at St. Olaf College in the United States. His related works include The Massacres at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth-Seeking in South Korea, Transitional Justice in the Asia Pacific, and “The Prospect of Human Rights in US-China Relations: A Constructive Understanding.”

■ Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun _EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr