[EAI Myanmar Special Commentary] ⑦ The 2021 Myanmar Crisis and International Human Rights

1. Intersection of Human Rights-Friendly and Unfriendly International Society

The coup by the Myanmar military on February 1, 2021, was a major international shock. It occurred during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic and shortly after the inauguration of U.S. President Biden, whose administration was expected to shape the future of international politics. For those who anticipated a new international order after Trump, the military coup in Myanmar, where democracy was imperfectly taking root, and the indiscriminate massacre of innocent civilians represented a significant challenge to the liberal international order. However, from the perspective of international human rights, the Myanmar situation was not an entirely new trend. The geopolitical landscape surrounding human rights in 2021 was a period where an environment unfriendly to human rights coexisted with one friendly to it.

Firstly, as an unfriendly environment, liberal values such as human rights, the rule of law, and democracy have retreated in various regions globally. The European refugee crisis resulting from the Syrian civil war, Brexit, and the rise of populism centered around strongmen with authoritarian tendencies in countries like Hungary, Poland, and the Philippines have emerged. Notably, Trump exacerbated the human rights situation in the U.S. through strict immigration control policies, close engagement with dictators like Putin and Kim Jong-un, and withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council. Furthermore, human rights were used as a tool to attack China in the U.S.-China conflict, while China, in turn, attacked the universality of human rights by emphasizing their relativity and particularity. Both before and after COVID-19, nations have rushed to revert to national interest-centric, self-centered approaches, and mercantilism has re-emerged in trade and commerce.

However, this unfriendly environment was not the sole aspect of international politics. Upon taking office, Biden declared the restoration of American democracy as his top priority and abolished inhumane immigration policies. Internationally, value-oriented diplomacy, which emphasizes human rights, was prominent, including the U.S. rejoining the UN Human Rights Council, lifting personal sanctions against the International Criminal Court prosecutor who initiated an investigation into war crimes in Afghanistan, and releasing information related to the murder of Saudi dissident journalist Kashoggi. Moreover, independent of both the U.S. and China, the international community has seen the development of international human rights and humanitarian norms, as well as international humanitarian and criminal law, encompassing areas like human rights, transitional justice, and the responsibility to protect. This clearly signifies a human rights-friendly environment, different from the past, and indicates that numerous mechanisms are in place to sufficiently improve the situation in Myanmar if the international community so wills. The Myanmar crisis was thrown into the nexus of these two currents.

2. Protracted Struggle and ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus

As of January 2022, one year after the coup, Myanmar has suffered 1,398 fatalities. Notably, on March 27, 2021, 102 people were killed in a single day (Assistance Association for Political Prisoners [AAPP] 2022). The military has engaged in indiscriminate shootings against unarmed protesters, civilians, children, and women resisting the coup, followed by mass arrests, detentions, and torture. To date, 8,376 individuals have been arrested, and 507 have been convicted (AAPP 2022). The Commander-in-Chief, Min Aung Hlaing, defined the unarmed protesters as "terrorism that undermines the nation's stability and security," and the military threatened through state television that protesters "must learn that they are at risk of being shot in the head and back" (MRTV, 2021.3.26.).

The Myanmar crisis shows no signs of resolution even after a year. The most significant agreement is the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus adopted in Jakarta last April. This consensus includes an immediate cessation of violence, commencement of constructive dialogue for the peaceful resolution of the situation, mediation by the Chairperson's special envoy, humanitarian assistance, and visits to Myanmar by the special envoy and delegation. Given that Myanmar is an ASEAN member state and ASEAN plays a crucial role in regional politics, this agreement holds great significance. Myanmar did release 1,316 political prisoners and 4,320 detainees in October following this agreement (Human Rights Watch 2021). However, the amnesties were insufficient, and no further meaningful progress has been made to date. During this process, ASEAN appeared divided, leading to skepticism about its role.

As the Myanmar crisis has dragged on, the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) against the military has continued, and in April, the National Unity Government (NUG) and the People's Defence Force (PDF) were formed. The international community has also pressured the military by urging the resolution of the Myanmar situation in multilateral forums, including the UN. Although the UN Security Council was unable to adopt a resolution due to the opposition of China, Russia, India, and Vietnam, it held four presidential statements, two Arria-formula meetings, and several consultative meetings. The UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council also pressured the Security Council by adopting resolutions. The United States led joint statements by the chiefs of staff of 12 countries condemning the coup and joint statements by G7 nations. In October, along with South Korea, Timor-Leste, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union urged Myanmar to immediately implement the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus.

3. From Condemnation and Solidarity to Non-Interference and Strategic Exploration

Nations have responded to the Myanmar crisis in various ways. Firstly, the United States quickly condemned the coup and urged an end to the indiscriminate assault and killing of protesters. The U.S., which had long imposed sanctions on Myanmar, reinstated them following the coup. U.S. policy can be broadly divided into four categories. First, statements condemning the military for undermining democracy and violating human rights were issued in the names of the President, Secretary of State, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Second, financial sanctions and entry bans into the U.S. were imposed on individuals involved in the coup, along with restrictions on withdrawing assets from U.S. banks. This expanded upon the individual sanctions imposed after the Rohingya genocide in 2017. Third, as a relatively effective measure, a significant portion of Official Development Assistance (ODA) was redirected to support Myanmar's civil society. Fourth, efforts were made to adopt joint statements and meaningful resolutions in multilateral forums such as the UN. However, these policies, ostensibly driven by value-oriented diplomacy, have yet to demonstrate significant effectiveness or decisiveness.

Myanmar is a strategically and economically important country for China, and President Xi Jinping made a state visit in January 2020, just before the COVID-19 pandemic. Xi Jinping met with both Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing and then State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, maintaining a balance. Reflecting this, China immediately asserted non-interference in internal affairs and called for "resolving differences between the two sides" after the crisis erupted. On the same grounds, China obstructed the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions and diluted the coup's violence and the military's responsibility in other documents such as presidential statements and press releases. In April, Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented "three supports and three rejections" regarding the Myanmar situation, opposing "inappropriate intervention" by the Security Council or "incitement of chaos by external forces" (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021). Following the adoption of ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus, China has supported its "gradual implementation," seeking to maintain the status quo. However, China also has friction with the military over minority issues in Myanmar and ideological conflicts.

South Korea has voiced relatively swift and strong criticism of the Myanmar situation. Immediately after the coup, the President, Prime Minister, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued multiple statements condemning the military. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice held several meetings with the Myanmar ambassador and Myanmar residents in South Korea, involving high-ranking officials such as ministers and vice ministers. Following the indiscriminate killing of children and women on March 28, the government "strongly condemned the continuation of barbaric violence despite repeated demands from the international community" and "strongly urged an immediate halt to the unacceptable acts of violence against their own citizens." Concurrently, a joint task force of relevant ministries announced coercive sanctions. These included suspending new exchanges and cooperation in defense and security sectors, prohibiting the export of military goods and strictly reviewing the export of strategic industrial materials, re-examining development cooperation projects except for those directly related to people's livelihoods or humanitarian aid, and planning special humanitarian stay measures for Myanmar nationals residing in South Korea.

4. The Dilemma of International Human Rights Cooperation: The Myanmar Military Adheres to Sovereignty and Non-Interference Principles

The Myanmar crisis, showing no signs of resolution a year after its outbreak, has significant implications for international human rights cooperation. Key factors influencing whether human rights-violating states accept external human rights pressure include the government's need for domestic and international justification, the acceptability of relevant norms in developed countries, and the clarity and universality of the norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The Myanmar military, more than any other government after the coup, needed to secure fragile legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, the human rights condemned by the international community—the prohibition of indiscriminate massacre, detention, assault, and torture of innocent civilians—are extremely clear, universal norms respected in developed countries. However, despite these favorable conditions, the Myanmar military has not yielded to external human rights pressure for nearly a year.

This demonstrates the different orientation of the Myanmar military. The Myanmar military has justified the coup and human rights violations domestically and internationally by focusing on federal integration and social stability rather than human rights protection. Similar attempts have been made in ASEAN countries such as Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia, and as seen in the case of Thailand, there were precedents accepted within ASEAN. Moreover, the model pursued by the Myanmar military is not Western Europe, which guarantees citizens' rights and respects democratic institutions and procedures, but rather China, which suppresses and disregards human rights and democracy while focusing on preventing social chaos and economic development. In this context, the norms that resonate more clearly and universally with the Myanmar military are not human rights principles but the principles of sovereignty or non-interference in internal affairs. These principles are norms generally accepted within ASEAN and actively supported by China, making them strongly felt within the region.

Furthermore, the Myanmar military has managed to withstand the situation unexpectedly well due to two factors. Firstly, despite limited national capacity, its material and social foundations, which should be vulnerable, are sustainable due to the presence of ASEAN and China. Singapore and China, its largest trading partners, continue trade with Myanmar, and ASEAN member states like Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, by maintaining authoritarian governments, indirectly provide legitimacy to the Myanmar military. The fact that Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand attended and congratulated the Myanmar military's Armed Forces Day ceremony in March, amidst ongoing civilian massacres, demonstrates this. Secondly, full-fledged sanctions on the military-owned enterprises (Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited, Myanmar Economic Cooperation), which are crucial to the military's finances, have not yet been imposed. Notably, the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, a key financial source for the military, is evading sanctions due to the lobbying and pressure from multinational corporations based in the U.S., Europe, India, and South Korea, such as Chevron, Shell, Total, and POSCO.

However, Western policies towards Myanmar are not solely stagnated due to corporate lobbying. Fundamentally, strong domestic political factors inherent in foreign policy are at play. Even looking at the United States, Biden won by a narrow margin against Trump, and the election results led to disputes over election fraud and the Capitol riot. Within the U.S., there is a significant base of support for "America First" nationalism, known as Trumpism, and this force influences Biden's foreign policy. Biden's declared "foreign policy for the American middle class" also makes it difficult to focus on Myanmar, which has little connection to national interests. Furthermore, the troubled withdrawal from Afghanistan in August exposed the vulnerabilities of U.S. foreign policy in democracy promotion. This has been seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, and recently in Hong Kong; it is a double-edged sword that is difficult to succeed and can lead to political chaos and regional instability.

5. The Possibility of International Human Rights Cooperation: Starting with Unforeseeable Shocks!

As can be seen from the sharp decline in media coverage of the Myanmar situation, international attention is waning. The situation could worsen for two reasons. First, the protracted nature of the crisis and the entrenchment of the status quo. The Myanmar military is accustomed to prolonged international sanctions and continues to maintain relations with major trading partners such as China, Thailand, India, and Singapore. In addition to oil and gas, the cash income generated from abundant timber, gems, and drug trafficking is also significant. The military's self-sufficiency may increase, and its resilience to international sanctions may strengthen, leading to a protracted crisis and entrenchment of the current situation. The military has already extended the election, initially promised within a year of the coup, to at least two and a half years later.

Second, the outbreak of civil war and the resulting explosive outflow of refugees to neighboring countries. Simultaneously, the traditional "four cuts" strategy of severing the flow of funds, food, information, and personnel to the rebels has already resumed. In September, the NUG declared a defensive war against the military, and airstrikes, bombings, and arson by the military have occurred in ethnic minority areas associated with them, leading to a rapid increase in refugees. If the situation in Myanmar deteriorates like Syria, armed conflict among various political factions and refugee issues will become prominent. The focus will likely shift from the democratization or legitimate CDM of Myanmar to "all parties" involved in the conflict, potentially eroding the legitimacy of the civil movement.

However, even if the situation is difficult, human rights cooperation surrounding the Myanmar crisis is not entirely impossible. Change generally occurs due to unforeseeable shocks. This is possible in two areas. First, shocks resulting from human rights abuses. The international community's intervention in the Bosnian or Kosovo wars in the 1990s, and the sharp policy shift of European countries towards Syrian refugees in the 2010s, were both triggered by unexpected shocks. In the case of Bosnia, the reality of concentration camps reminiscent of Nazi extermination camps was revealed, and for Syrian refugees, there was the case of "Alan Kurdi," a child who drowned and washed ashore. Myanmar is also experiencing frequent massacres, and their methods are becoming increasingly brutal, making this possibility quite real.

Second, shocks from the military itself. As seen in the case of Libya, when Gaddafi referred to protesters as "cockroaches," it was perceived by the international community as a precursor to genocide and prompted the Security Council to act. Similarly, the policies and statements of the Myanmar military could cause shock. The recent incident where a vehicle rammed into protesters, causing casualties, and the discovery of 35 burnt bodies, including children, clearly demonstrate the military's brutality.

6. In the Midst of Shocks: The Role of Public Opinion, Civil Society, and Transnational Solidarity

In a situation of shock, two factors play a crucial role. First, the role of public opinion and civil society. Even a former Singaporean diplomat, pessimistic about the peaceful resolution of the Myanmar crisis, identified public opinion, both domestic and international, as a turning point in U.S. foreign policy (Kausikan 2021). Shocking events like the Bosnian camps or Kurdi's death move public opinion. First, they influence politicians, governments, or parties sensitive to public opinion, thereby changing policy direction. Furthermore, they mobilize civil society organizations. NGOs provide information and strategies to civil society domestically and pressure governments to change policy orientations. Internationally, they provide information to international organizations like the UN and advise on policy. The response of East Asian countries to the Myanmar crisis thus far shows that not only government efforts but also the roles of public opinion and civil society have been important.

Second, the active participation of other relevant countries, including the European Union, Japan, India, Singapore, and Australia, in addition to ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, South Korea, and the United States, which have so far raised their voices on the Myanmar situation. India, as a bordering country and a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, already plays a significant role. Japan has also exerted informal influence by leveraging its close relationship with the Myanmar military and has applied pressure through ODA. The European Union and Australia have also participated in joint statements led by the United States. Their role will be even more crucial in the future. The accusation that the U.S. is using human rights strategically, a legacy of Trump, places a significant burden on the Biden administration. Therefore, the EU and Asian democratic countries can pressure Myanmar, and the U.S. can pursue a policy of supporting their actions. If the international community moves in this way, the existence of numerous international instruments such as human rights, transitional justice, and the responsibility to protect is also a positive factor.■

Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP). 2022. “Political Prisoners Post-Coup,” https://aappb.org/(Accessed: 2022.1.4.)

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” International Organization 52(4): 887-917.

Human Rights Watch. 2021. “Myanmar: Prisoner Releases Fall Short: Deposed Political Leaders and Journalists Remain Detained,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/21/myanmar-prisoner-releases-fall-short(Accessed: 2022.1.4.)

Kausikan, Bilahari. 2021. “The Dangerous Impasse in Myanmar: For the United States, Patience Is the Least Bad Option,” Foreign Affairs , April 9, 2021. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/burma-myanmar/2021-04-09/dangerous-impasse-myanmar(Accessed: 2022.1.6.)

Myanmar TV Channels(MRTV), 2021.3.26.

中国 外交部，“王毅谈对缅甸局势的“三个支持”“三个避免.” https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1866713.shtml(Accessed: 2022.1.4.)

■ Author: Kim Heon-junProfessor of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University. He graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in Diplomacy and obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota. He has served as an associate professor and senior researcher at Griffith University in Australia and as a visiting assistant professor at St. Olaf College in the United States. His related works include The Massacres at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth-Seeking in South Korea, Transitional Justice in the Asia Pacific, and “The Prospect of Human Rights in US-China Relations: A Constructive Understanding.”

■ Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun_EAI 연구원

    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr