[EAI Ukraine Issue Briefing] ① After the Failure of Deterrence Against Russia: Implications of the Ukraine Crisis for East Asia

On February 24, 2022, Russia's invasion of Ukraine began with simultaneous artillery and missile attacks on eastern, southern, and northern Ukraine, the largest since World War II. This occurred just two days after Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the recognition of the independence of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) in the Donbas region and the start of peacekeeping operations, and nine days after he stated during a summit with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz that Russia had begun withdrawing troops from the Ukrainian border. Russia, which had been threateningly deploying over 100,000 troops to border areas under the pretext of military exercises since April and November of the previous year, demanding an end to new NATO memberships for former Soviet countries and NATO military activities in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, ultimately chose war in Ukraine.[1]

Since November of the previous year, as the Ukraine crisis escalated, numerous leading domestic and international policy research institutions have offered extensive analyses of Putin's intentions, strategic calculations, future prospects, and their implications for Northeast Asia.[2]However, research examining this crisis as a failure of the extended deterrence strategy by the United States and NATO, and discussing its causes and implications, is rare. This issue brief examines the implications of the Ukraine crisis for East Asia from the perspective of the weakening of U.S. deterrence. Focusing on the "fait accompli" strategy and the "feasibility of punishment" recently discussed in international security theory, it explains the background that allowed Russia to undertake such bold provocations, bypassing several steps on the "Escalation Ladder"[3] following its annexation of Crimea in 2014, and explores the possibility that the U.S. failure to deter Russia in this instance could lead China and North Korea to miscalculate in East Asia.

I. Russia's Fait Accompli Strategy and Deterrence Failure

The current Ukraine crisis, in several aspects, is reminiscent of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. At that time, Putin also emphasized that he would not attempt to resolve the issue through military force, but he annexed the Crimean region after a referendum, using an illegitimate government established by pro-Russian separatists within Crimea. Despite Russian forces occupying key Ukrainian government facilities, airports, and military bases in support of the separatists, it was claimed that these were local residents armed and mobilized.[4] In the current crisis, which escalated over Ukraine's NATO membership issue, Russia again emphasized the exclusion of armed force and problem-solving through negotiation, even staging a troop withdrawal, before abruptly recognizing the separatist forces in the Donbas region as independent states and sending Russian troops into Ukrainian territory under the pretext of peacekeeping.

Putin's actions align with what Mearsheimer calls a "limited aims strategy." This is a tactic where a portion of the enemy's territory is occupied by surprise, avoiding full-scale war to minimize casualties, while forcing the opponent to engage in a war of attrition that requires significant sacrifice to counter.[5] Dan Altman refers to this as a "fait accompli strategy." In a paper analyzing 151 international disputes over territorial issues between 1918 and 2018, he argues that disputes aiming to occupy the entire territory of an enemy state have sharply decreased since World War II, with this trend becoming even more pronounced after 1975. For example, of the 151 dispute cases, 39% were attempts to occupy "uninhabited areas," and 41% were attacks on "areas not defended by the opponent's regular forces." When divided by era, these proportions were 28% and 31% respectively before 1980, and both surged to 60% thereafter. This indicates that Putin's attempts to alter the status quo through fait accompli are becoming a quite common phenomenon in 21st-century international disputes.[6]

When a challenger employs such a fait accompli strategy while the defender has established red lines and maintains a deterrence posture, the defender faces significant burdens in formulating a response. For instance, during the Berlin Blockade crisis in 1948, the Soviet Union blockaded the roads to Berlin and deployed "tripwire" forces to pressure the United States, Britain, and France to abandon their jurisdiction over West Berlin. At that time, the U.S. devised a clever solution by delivering supplies via air, neutralizing the Soviet red line. For the Soviet Union to prevent this, they would have had to shoot down Western Allied transport planes, an action difficult to take without a commitment to full-scale war. Altman argues that when a challenger adopts such a fait accompli strategy, the defender's "will" to punish the challenger's attempt to alter the status quo becomes less important, and the "threats to retaliate for clear-cut uses of forces" by the challenger become the decisive variable.[7]

II. Cause of Deterrence Failure: Absence of Enforcement Capability

The fait accompli strategy offers a way for the challenger to circumvent the defender's deterrence posture. From the defender's perspective, this ultimately boils down to whether the defender possesses adequate punitive capabilities to respond to the challenger's carefully calculated attempts to alter the status quo. Based on Altman's research findings, deterrence failures are mostly not due to the defender's weak "will" to maintain the status quo, but rather because the defender lacks the sophisticated "ability" to punish the challenger's provocative actions that cleverly bypass the deterrence posture.

Recent research refers to this "ability" as "ability to follow through"[8] or "feasibility of punishment"[9]. For a defender to possess this capability, it requires "rapid projection capability" on the military dimension (military feasibility) and "policy enforcement capability" on the political dimension (political feasibility). In other words, when a challenger attempts to alter the status quo in a gray zone area, very close to but not clearly crossing the red line set by the defender, the defender must have "power projection capability" to swiftly repel it with effective punitive measures commensurate with the level of provocation, and "political power" to immediately enforce the punitive policy, overcoming domestic political opposition to such crisis escalation. Only then can the defender maintain stable deterrence.

If either rapid projection capability or policy enforcement capability is lacking, the defender cannot actually impose the "unacceptable costs" publicly declared during the deterrence strategy phase upon the challenger after deterrence fails. In such cases, the challenger can easily seize the strategic assets they targeted without incurring any costs by employing a fait accompli strategy. Therefore, if the defender signals to the challenger during the deterrence strategy process that they lack rapid projection capability and policy enforcement capability, the challenger may be emboldened to attempt to alter the status quo more aggressively.

The current Ukraine war can also be explained in this context. U.S. President Joe Biden sent strong warning messages to Putin on three occasions. He clearly warned that Russia's invasion of Ukraine would incur "strong economic and other measures" by the United States,[10] that it would face a "swift, severe, and united response" from the U.S. and its allies,[11] and that it would "respond decisively and impose swift and severe costs."[12] This clearly shows that the United States employed a deterrence strategy to prevent Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

When the head of state repeatedly sets red lines in public, the high "audience cost" incurred when these are later reversed strengthens the defender's resolve to punish in case of deterrence failure. In particular, when leaders of democratic countries, whose heads of government are elected, intentionally impose high audience costs, the credibility of the threat is enhanced, and the likelihood of deterrence strategy success increases.[13] From this perspective, President Biden's efforts to deter Russia's invasion of Ukraine can be assessed as having been made to the best of his ability. This is because, with the need to minimize the economic repercussions of the Ukraine crisis domestically ahead of the midterm elections, the Biden administration had few policy alternatives available.[14]

Then why did Putin ignore Biden's warnings and proceed with the invasion of Ukraine? Many of the aforementioned reports answer that Russia's geopolitical security interests in Ukraine are immense, that Putin, facing declining approval ratings due to the impact of international economic sanctions and COVID-19, desperately needs to recover domestic support by reversing the trend, and that, as Putin pursues the goal of making Russia a great power, he needs to assert Russia's presence to the U.S. and NATO. If so, was Russia's invasion of Ukraine an overdetermined event? Was it impossible to prevent Russia's invasion of Ukraine regardless of U.S. policy, due to Putin's strong will?

From the perspective of feasibility of punishment, the situation does not seem to be entirely like that. First, the Biden administration ruled out the use of military force early on. When asked by reporters on December 9, 2021, the first time clear warning signals were sent to Russia, whether there were plans to deploy U.S. troops unilaterally, regardless of NATO allies, to deter Russia's invasion, Biden clearly stated, "not on the table."[15] The fact that Ukraine's defense is not a critical national security interest for the U.S., that the domestic political atmosphere in the U.S. is generally unsupportive of overseas deployment, and that Biden himself has a history of consistently opposing military interventionism, likely all contributed to abandoning the resolution of the issue through military means early on.[16] Biden himself stated that deploying U.S. troops against a global military power like Russia could escalate into a "world war."[17] In this context, the Biden administration's decision can be assessed as based on careful consideration at multiple levels, but it resulted in abandoning strategic ambiguity towards Russia.[18] It was tantamount to the U.S. itself declaring it would not possess the rapid projection capability necessary to strengthen deterrence against Russia.

Second, military means to prevent Russia's invasion of Ukraine or effectively retaliate were not provided. Reports published in the two months preceding Russia's invasion of Ukraine indicated that Russia had deployed Su-25SM close air support aircraft, Tu-22M strategic bombers, and S-400 surface-to-air missiles near the border, foreshadowing large-scale artillery and air support operations before the ground invasion.[19] It was emphasized that Ukraine lacked the necessary forces to counter this and that the U.S. and NATO should swiftly provide various weapon systems, including air defense, anti-tank, and anti-ship weapons.[20] In fact, these policy recommendations had been made several times since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, but the U.S. government consistently refrained from adopting a policy of arms support to Ukraine for various reasons, such as the possibility of provoking Russia, the risk of U.S. military technology falling into Russian hands, and Ukraine's lack of capacity to operate advanced weapons.[21] Alexander Vindman, former Director for European Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council (NSC), points out that even if it were true that Ukraine had difficulty utilizing advanced U.S. weapons, the mere presence of such weapons would have altered Russia's calculations (Vindman 2022).

Third, the Biden administration has consistently exhibited a lack of political power since taking office. A poll on January 20 showed a 43% approval rating for the Biden administration, with 36% expressing strong dissatisfaction with government policies, seemingly due to simultaneous criticism from the progressive camp for being too slow in enacting change and from the conservative camp for deviating from American values and leaning too far left.[22] The public's dissatisfaction with the Biden administration is growing, as epidemic control measures focused on increasing COVID-19 vaccination rates have been rendered ineffective by the Omicron variant, the ambitious large-scale social welfare project "Build Back Better" has stalled due to opposition from two senators within the Democratic Party, whom the president has repeatedly failed to persuade, and repeated media reports of the president's verbal gaffes, which were evident during the presidential campaign, have led to survey results showing that half of the public is concerned about the elderly president's mental health.[23]Es difícil verificar científicamente cuán importante considera Putin la baja efectividad de la política del gobierno de Biden, que se percibe como lenta y carente de impulso, pero es evidente que esto socava la credibilidad de la postura disuasoria general de Estados Unidos.

Por lo tanto, se puede observar que los esfuerzos de la administración Biden para fortalecer la disuasión con el fin de prevenir la invasión rusa de Ucrania fueron movimientos que mostraron claras limitaciones en términos de la capacidad de ejecución de sanciones para prevenir la búsqueda de hechos consumados por parte de Rusia. Sin embargo, el lugar donde Estados Unidos está ejerciendo su estrategia de disuasión no se limita a Ucrania. Por consiguiente, las limitaciones de la disuasión estadounidense puestas de relieve por este incidente son, le guste o no a Estados Unidos, un cambio importante que los potenciales adversarios que se enfrentan a Estados Unidos en otras regiones no pueden dejar de percibir.

III. Después del Fracaso de la Disuasión: China, Corea del Norte y Estados Unidos

¿Qué implicaciones tiene este incidente en Ucrania para los países de Asia Oriental? En primer lugar, es evidente que China pensará en Taiwán al observar este incidente. Al igual que Ucrania promovió activamente su adhesión a la OTAN, ¿cómo responderá el gobierno chino si Taiwán declara la independencia, que China ha establecido como una línea roja? Si Rusia logra rápidamente sus objetivos estratégicos, como ocurrió con la anexión de Crimea en 2014, y si la OTAN y los países occidentales no responden con firmeza, convirtiendo la estrategia de hechos consumados de Putin en el nuevo statu quo, es muy probable que China también intente un método similar al de la invasión rusa de Ucrania contra Taiwán.[24]Por ejemplo, podría emplear una estrategia de hechos consumados ocupando primero islas en las periferias del territorio taiwanés, como las islas Dongsha, las islas Penghu o las islas Matsu.[25].

Corea del Norte también podría llegar a una conclusión similar a la de China. En particular, dado que las limitaciones de la efectividad de la política de la administración Biden no son un problema que pueda superarse en un corto período de tiempo, es muy probable que Corea del Norte emprenda provocaciones más audaces para lograr sus objetivos estratégicos y mejorar su poder de negociación en la península de Corea. Por supuesto, a diferencia de Taiwán, Corea del Norte tiene pocas áreas en Corea del Sur que pueda ocupar con éxito mediante tácticas de hechos consumados sin provocar una guerra total. Sin embargo, si se convence de que Estados Unidos no tomará represalias militares contundentes debido a problemas con su debilitada capacidad de ejecución de sanciones, podría llevar a cabo provocaciones armadas cualitativamente diferentes a las anteriores para consolidar la unidad interna y exhibir su avanzada capacidad militar. Por ejemplo, podría recurrir a pruebas de lanzamiento de misiles balísticos intercontinentales, pruebas nucleares adicionales, ataques de artillería contra áreas insulares como las islas Yeonpyeong, o ataques y capturas de activos de vigilancia marítima como el Cheonan o el Pueblo. Incluso si Corea del Norte emprende provocaciones tan amenazantes, Estados Unidos no tiene muchas opciones de represalia adicionales contra Corea del Norte, que ya está sujeta a sanciones económicas de alto nivel.

Sin embargo, Taiwán y Corea del Sur son diferentes de Ucrania. Si consideramos únicamente el gasto militar para fines comparativos, en 2020, Estados Unidos gastó 7,7 billones de dólares, China 2,5 billones, Rusia 60 mil millones, Corea del Sur 45 mil millones, Taiwán 12 mil millones y Ucrania 6 mil millones. Esto muestra una distribución del poder nacional aproximada de 77 : 25 : 6 : 4.5 : 1.2 : 0.6 entre estos seis países.[26] Si bien se podría argumentar que la brecha de poder militar entre China y Taiwán es mayor que la de Rusia y Ucrania, Taiwán es el noveno socio comercial más importante de Estados Unidos (Ucrania es el 67º) y ocupa una posición central en la cadena de valor global. Aunque Taiwán no es un aliado oficial de Estados Unidos, al igual que Ucrania no es un aliado de la OTAN, a diferencia de Ucrania, Estados Unidos mantiene una ambigüedad estratégica con Taiwán a través de un mecanismo único llamado Ley de Relaciones con Taiwán (Taiwan Relations Act) (Haas 2022/02/22). Por otro lado, Corea del Sur es un aliado militar de Estados Unidos, con bases militares estadounidenses en su territorio, así como diversos activos de inteligencia avanzados, sistemas de defensa aérea y capacidades de proyección rápida. Además, al igual que el resultado desastroso de la invasión de Bahía de Cochinos llevó a la administración Kennedy a tener una firme voluntad de respuesta en el desarrollo posterior de la Crisis de los Misiles Cubanos, el fracaso de la disuasión en el incidente de Ucrania podría llevar a Estados Unidos a responder con mayor firmeza en la región del Indo-Pacífico.[27] Más importante aún, incluso considerando solo las capacidades de Taiwán y Corea del Sur, excluyendo la disuasión estadounidense, ambas mantienen capacidades de proyección rápida y efectividad política incomparables con Ucrania.

La cuestión es si China y Corea del Norte comprenden con precisión la magnitud de la disuasión que el sistema de alianzas de Estados Unidos ejerce en Asia Oriental. Por lo tanto, es crucial enviar una señal clara para que China y Corea del Norte no se embarquen en provocaciones imprudentes en Taiwán y la península de Corea, basándose erróneamente en la débil disuasión de Estados Unidos y la OTAN en Europa del Este, confirmada por el incidente de Ucrania, y malinterpretando la disuasión que el sistema de alianzas de Estados Unidos mantiene en Asia Oriental. En este contexto, Corea del Sur, en cooperación con los aliados de Estados Unidos en la región, debe considerar escenarios de estrategias de hechos consumados que China y Corea del Norte podrían intentar, preparar la capacidad de ejecución de sanciones adecuada para cada nivel de provocación y esforzarse por hacerla pública.

Por otra parte, el grado de éxito de las operaciones militares rusas en Ucrania en el futuro también influirá significativamente en la estrategia militar de China y Corea del Norte. Si bien Ucrania, que solo tiene una décima parte del gasto militar de Rusia, está resistiendo la invasión rusa mucho mejor de lo esperado, con la llegada de la primavera y el deshielo, el avance de las fuerzas blindadas rusas se verá aún más dificultado por el infame rasputitsa, y las batallas urbanas en los principales puntos estratégicos inevitablemente adoptarán un carácter de guerra de desgaste (Wasielewski and Jones 2022, 10). Es decir, es muy probable que el fracaso de la disuasión no conduzca necesariamente al fracaso de la defensa, y Rusia podría terminar sin lograr sus objetivos a pesar de incurrir en costos enormes. En ese caso, China y Corea del Norte, que están observando atentamente este incidente, también se mostrarán reacias a emprender provocaciones precipitadas. Está claro que el incidente de Ucrania no es simplemente "un asunto de otro país en el otro lado del mundo".[28]. ■

[1] Sullivan, Becky. 2022. “Russia’s at war with Ukraine. Here’s how we got here.” NPR, 24 de febrero;

Park, Jeong-ho, Jeong, Min-hyun y Kang, Bu-gyun. 2022. “La crisis de Ucrania y el conflicto Rusia-EE. UU.: Puntos clave e implicaciones.” 『KIEP World Economic Focus』 4 de febrero;

<Maeil Business Newspaper>. 2022. “Crisis de la invasión rusa de Ucrania” 22 de febrero.

[2] Schneider, William. 2021. “Deter Russia by Arming NATO Allies.” Wall Street Journal, December 9;

Jones, Seth G. and Philip G. Wasielewski. 2022. “Russia’s possible Invasion of Ukraine.” CSIS; Cordesman, Anthony H and, Grace Hwang. 2022. “NATO and the Ukraine: Reshaping NATO to Meet the Russian and Chinese Challenge.” CSIS;

Kagan, Robert. 2022. “What we can expect after Putin’s conquest of Ukraine.” The Washington Post, 21 de febrero;

Hass, Ryan. 2022. “Learning the right lessons from Ukraine for Taiwan.” Brookings Institution;

Shim, Sung-eun. 2021. “Estado y perspectivas del conflicto entre Rusia y Ucrania.” 『Servicio de Investigación Legislativa de la Asamblea Nacional』 No. 1907;

Hong, Wan-seok. 2022. “Conflicto geopolítico entre EE. UU. y Rusia en torno a Ucrania: Causas, naturaleza e implicaciones.” Instituto Sejong.

Park, Jeong-ho, Jeong, Min-hyun y Kang, Bu-gyun. 2022. “La crisis de Ucrania y el conflicto Rusia-EE. UU.: Puntos clave e implicaciones.” 『KIEP World Economic Focus』 4 de febrero;

[3] Kahn, Herman, 1965, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. New York: Praeger.

[4] Ko, Jae-nam. 2014. “Puntos clave de la crisis de Ucrania y sus implicaciones internacionales.” 『Análisis de Cuestiones Internacionales Clave』 11. Instituto de Investigación de Asuntos Exteriores y de Seguridad;

Shin, Sung-won. 2014. “Impacto de la crisis de Ucrania en el orden internacional y la región del Noreste Asiático.” 『Análisis de Cuestiones Internacionales Clave』 20. Instituto de Investigación de Asuntos Exteriores y de Seguridad.

[5] Mearsheimer, John J. 1983. Conventional Deterrence. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs 79-2. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

[6] Altman, Dan. 2020. “The Evolution of Territorial Conquest After 1945 and the Limits of the Territorial Integrity Norm.” International Organization 74, 3: 516. Cambridge University Press.

[7] Altman, Dan. 2018. “Advancing without Attacking: The Strategic Game around the Use of Force,” Security Studies 71, 1: 73.

[8] McManus, Roseanne W. 2017. Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[9] Kim, Yang Gyu. 2019. “After Deterrence: Policy Choices during Crises of Conventional and Nuclear Direct Deterrence Failure.“ Ph.D. Diss., Florida International University. 4338.

Kim, Yang Gyu and Félix E. Martín. 2021. “At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,” All Azimuth 10, 2: 125-147.

Kim, Yang Gyu. 2021. “The Feasibility of Punishment and the Credibility of Threats: Case Studies on the First Moroccan and the Rhineland Crises.” The Korean Journal of International Studies 19, 3.

[10] Gomez, Justin. 2021. “Biden warns of ‘severe consequences’ if Putin moves on Ukraine.” ABC News, December 9.

[11] Liptak, Kevin. 2022. “Biden predice que Rusia ‘entrará’ en Ucrania, pero dice que una ‘incursión menor’ podría generar discusión sobre las consecuencias.” CNN, 19 de enero.

[12] Powell, Tori B. 2022. “Biden advierte a Putin que EE. UU. ‘impondrá costos rápidos y severos a Rusia’ si Ucrania es invadida.” CBS News, 12 de febrero.

[13] Fearon, James D. 1994. “Audiencias políticas internas y la escalada de disputas internacionales.” The American Political Science Review 88, 3, American Political Science Association.

[14] Mitchell, Lincoln. 2022. “El conflicto de Rusia y Ucrania no es culpa de Biden. Pero muchos votantes no lo verán así.” NBC News, 25 de febrero.

[15] Gomez, Justin. 2021. “Biden advierte de ‘severas consecuencias’ si Putin se mueve sobre Ucrania.” ABC News, 9 de diciembre.

[16] Usher, Barbara Plett. 2022. “Conflicto de Ucrania: Por qué Biden no enviará tropas a Ucrania.” BBC News, 25 de febrero.

[17] Finn, Teaganne. 2022. “Biden advierte a los estadounidenses en Ucrania que se vayan, dice que enviar tropas para evacuar sería ‘guerra mundial’.” NBC News, 11 de febrero.

[18] Vindman, Alexander. 2022. “Estados Unidos podría haber hecho mucho más para proteger a Ucrania.” The Atlantic, 24 de febrero.

[19] Atlantic Council. 2022. “Evaluación militar de la crisis rusa: ¿Cómo sería una ofensiva terrestre contra Ucrania? Vigilen los cielos.”

[20] Jones, Seth G. y Philip G. Wasielewski. 2022. “La posible invasión de Ucrania por parte de Rusia.” CSIS;

Schneider, William. 2021. “Disuadir a Rusia armando a los aliados de la OTAN.” Wall Street Journal, 9 de diciembre.

[21] Dilanian, Ken, Dan De Luce y Courtney Kube. 2022. “¿Por qué Estados Unidos y sus aliados no proporcionaron a Ucrania un mejor sistema de defensa aérea?” NBC News, 24 de febrero.

[22] Milligan, Susan. 2022. “¿Por qué Joe Biden es tan impopular?” U.S. News, 21 de enero.

[23] Ball, Molly y Brian Bennet. 2022. “Cómo la Administración Biden perdió el rumbo.” Time, 20 de enero.

[24] Baev Pavel K. et al. 2022. “En los pasillos: Implicaciones de la invasión de Ucrania por parte de Rusia.” Brookings Institution;

Osnos, Evan. 2022. “¿Qué está aprendiendo China de la invasión de Ucrania por parte de Rusia?” The New Yorker, 24 de febrero.

[25] Blackwill, Robert D. y Philip Zelikow. 2021. “Tres escenarios para un conflicto militar sobre Taiwán.” Estados Unidos, China y Taiwán: Una estrategia para prevenir la guerra: 32-33. Council on Foreign Relations.

[26] Da Silva, Diego Lopes, Nan Tian y Alexandra Marksteiner. 2021. “Tendencias en el gasto militar mundial 2020.” SIPRI.

[27] Jervis, Robert y Snyder Jack L. 1991. Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland. 36-39. Oxford University Press;

Baev Pavel K. et al. 2022. “Around the halls: Implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.” Brookings Institution.

[28]Ko Dong-wook. 2022. “Lee Jae-myung: ‘Although it is another country’s affair on the opposite side of the globe, it is a danger to our economy’.” Yonhap News, February 24.

■ Author: Kim Yang-gyu_ Senior Researcher at the East Asia Institute, Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He holds a bachelor's degree in French Education and Diplomacy and a master's degree in Diplomacy from Seoul National University, and a Ph.D. in International Politics from Florida International University. He served as an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Florida International University and as a Visiting Scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. He has received the Fulbright Graduate Study Award and the Smith Richardson Foundation’s World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship. His main research areas include coercive diplomacy, nuclear strategy, power transition, US-China relations, North Korean nuclear issues, and international politics and security theory. His recent research includes “At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis” and “The Feasibility of Punishment and the Credibility of Threats: Case Studies on the First Moroccan and the Rhineland Crises”.

■ Management and Editing: Lee Seung-yeon _EAI Researcher, Jeong Ji-yoon _EAI Intern Scholar

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