[EAI Ukraine Issue Briefing] ① After the Failure of Deterrence Against Russia: Implications of the Ukraine Crisis for East Asia

On February 24, 2022, Russia's invasion of Ukraine began with simultaneous artillery and missile attacks on eastern, southern, and northern Ukraine, the largest scale since World War II. This occurred just two days after Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the recognition of the independence of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) in the Donbas region and the commencement of peacekeeping operations, and nine days after German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated during a summit meeting that Russia had begun withdrawing its troops from the Ukrainian border. Russia, which had been threateningly deploying over 100,000 troops to the border areas since April and November of the previous year under the pretext of military exercises, demanding an end to NATO's expansion into former Soviet states and NATO military activities in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, ultimately chose war in Ukraine.[1]

Since November of last year, as the Ukraine crisis escalated, numerous leading domestic and international policy research institutions have published extensive analyses on Putin's intentions, strategic calculations, future prospects, and their implications for Northeast Asia.[2]However, research that views this crisis as a failure of the extended deterrence strategy by the United States and NATO and discusses its causes and implications is rare. This issue brief examines the implications of the Ukraine crisis for East Asia from the perspective of the weakening of U.S. deterrence. Focusing on the "fait accompli" strategy and the "feasibility of punishment" discussed in recent international security theory, it explains the background behind Russia's bold provocation, which, following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, once again involved bypassing several steps on the "Escalation Ladder."[3]It further explores the possibility that the failure of U.S. deterrence against Russia could lead China and North Korea in East Asia to miscalculate and engage in provocations.

I. Russia's Fait Accompli Strategy and Deterrence Failure

The current Ukraine crisis, in several aspects, is reminiscent of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. At that time, Putin also emphasized that he would not attempt to resolve the issue through military force, yet he annexed the Crimean region through a referendum, utilizing an illegitimate government established by pro-Russian separatists within Crimea. During that process, Russian forces sided with the separatists and seized key Ukrainian government facilities, airports, and military bases, while claiming these were local armed militias.[4]In the current crisis, sparked by Ukraine's bid to join NATO, Russia again emphasized the exclusion of military force and resolution through negotiation, even staging a troop withdrawal, before abruptly recognizing the separatist forces in the Donbas region as independent states and deploying Russian troops into Ukrainian territory under the pretext of peacekeeping.

This behavior by Putin aligns with what Mearsheimer calls a "limited aims strategy." It is a tactic that minimizes damage by surprise occupation of only a portion of the enemy's territory, thereby avoiding full-scale war, while forcing the adversary to engage in a war of attrition that demands significant sacrifices to respond.[5]Dan Altman refers to this as a "fait accompli strategy." In a paper analyzing 151 international disputes over territorial issues between 1918 and 2018, he argues that conflicts aiming for the complete occupation of enemy territory have sharply decreased since World War II, with this trend becoming even more pronounced after 1975. For example, 39% of the 151 disputes involved attempts to occupy 'uninhabited areas,' and 41% involved attacks on 'areas not defended by the opposing regular forces.' When examined by period, these proportions were 28% and 31% respectively before 1980, and both surged to 60% thereafter. This indicates that Putin's attempts to alter the status quo through fait accompli are becoming a rather common phenomenon in 21st-century international disputes.[6]

When a challenger employs such a fait accompli strategy while the defender has established a redline and maintains a deterrence posture, the defender faces significant burdens in formulating a response. For instance, during the 1948 Berlin Blockade crisis, the Soviet Union blockaded the roads to Berlin and deployed "tripwire" forces to pressure the United States, Britain, and France to abandon their jurisdiction over West Berlin. At that time, the U.S. devised a clever solution by airlifting supplies, neutralizing the Soviet redline. For the Soviet Union to prevent this, they would have had to shoot down Western Allied transport planes, an action difficult to take without a resolve to engage in full-scale war. Altman argues that when a challenger adopts this fait accompli strategy, the defender's 'will' to punish the challenger's attempt to alter the status quo becomes less critical, and the challenger's "threats to retaliate for clear-cut uses of forces" become the decisive variable.[7]

II. Cause of Deterrence Failure: Absence of Punitive Capability

The fait accompli strategy offers a way for the challenger to bypass the defender's deterrence posture. From the defender's perspective, this ultimately boils down to whether the defender possesses adequate punitive capabilities to respond to the challenger's meticulously calculated attempts to alter the status quo. Based on Altman's research, deterrence failures are mostly not due to a weak 'will' of the defender to maintain the status quo, but rather because the defender lacks the sophisticated 'ability' to punish the challenger's provocative actions that cleverly circumvent the deterrence posture.

Recent research refers to this 'ability' as "ability to follow through"[8] or "feasibility of punishment."[9] For a defender to possess this ability, it requires "rapid projection capability" on the military dimension and "policy execution capability" on the political dimension. In other words, when a challenger attempts to alter the status quo in a gray zone area, very close to the redline set by the defender but not clearly crossing it, the defender must have the 'power projection capability' to swiftly repel such provocations with effective punitive measures commensurate with the level of provocation, and the 'political power' to overcome domestic political opposition and immediately implement punitive policies. Only then can the defender maintain stable deterrence.

If either rapid projection capability or policy execution capability is lacking, the defender cannot actually impose the 'unacceptable costs' publicly declared during the deterrence strategy phase on the challenger after deterrence failure. In such cases, the challenger can easily seize the strategic assets they targeted without incurring any costs, even when employing a fait accompli strategy. Therefore, if the defender signals to the challenger during the deterrence strategy phase that there are issues with rapid projection capability and policy execution capability, to prevent the security crisis from escalating into a more serious problem, the challenger may be emboldened to attempt to alter the status quo.

The current Ukraine war can also be explained in this context. U.S. President Joe Biden sent strong warning messages to Putin on three occasions. He clearly warned that Russia's invasion of Ukraine would incur "strong economic and other measures" from the United States,[10] that it would face a "swift, severe, and united response" from the U.S. and its allies,[11] and that it would "respond decisively and impose swift and severe costs."[12] This clearly demonstrates that the United States employed a deterrence strategy to prevent Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

When the head of state repeatedly sets redlines in public statements, the high "audience cost" incurred when these are later reversed enhances the defender's resolve to punish in case of deterrence failure. Particularly, when leaders of democratic countries, whose heads of government are determined by elections, intentionally impose high audience costs, the credibility of the threat is enhanced, and the likelihood of deterrence strategy success increases.[13] From this perspective, President Biden's efforts to deter Russia's invasion of Ukraine can be assessed as having been made to the best of his ability. This is because, with the need to minimize the economic repercussions of the Ukraine crisis within the U.S. ahead of the midterm elections, the Biden administration had limited policy options available.[14]

Then why did Putin ignore Biden's warnings and proceed with the invasion of Ukraine? Many of the aforementioned reports suggest that Russia's geopolitical security interests in Ukraine are immense; Putin, facing declining approval ratings due to international economic sanctions and the impact of COVID-19, desperately needed to recover domestic support by reversing the trend; and from Putin's perspective of pursuing Russian great power status, it was necessary to assert Russia's presence to the U.S. and NATO. If so, was the Russian invasion of Ukraine an overdetermined event? Was it an event that could not have been prevented, regardless of U.S. policy, due to Putin's strong will?

From the perspective of punitive capability, the situation does not seem to be entirely so. First, the Biden administration early on excluded the use of military force. On December 9, 2021, when asked by reporters whether the U.S. had plans to deploy troops unilaterally, independent of NATO allies, to deter a Russian invasion—the first clear warning signal to Russia—Biden clearly stated, "not on the table."[15]The fact that Ukraine's defense was not a critical national security interest for the U.S., the prevailing domestic political sentiment against overseas troop deployment, and Biden's own history of consistently opposing military interventionism likely all contributed to the early abandonment of military solutions.[16]Biden himself stated that deploying U.S. troops against a global military power like Russia could escalate into a "world war."[17]In this context, the Biden administration's decision can be evaluated as based on careful consideration across multiple dimensions, but it resulted in abandoning strategic ambiguity towards Russia.[18]It was, in effect, a declaration that the U.S. would not possess the rapid projection capability necessary to strengthen its deterrence against Russia.

Second, Ukraine was not provided with military means to prevent a Russian invasion or to effectively retaliate. Reports published in the two months preceding Russia's invasion of Ukraine indicated that Russia had deployed close air support aircraft Su-25SM, strategic bombers Tu-22M, and S-400 surface-to-air missiles near the border, foreshadowing large-scale artillery and air support operations before the ground invasion.[19]It was emphasized that Ukraine lacked the necessary forces to counter this and that the U.S. and NATO should promptly provide various weapon systems, including air defense, anti-tank, and anti-ship weapons.[20]In fact, these policy recommendations had been made several times since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, but the U.S. government consistently refrained from adopting a policy of arms support to Ukraine for various reasons, including the potential to provoke Russia, the risk of transferred military technology falling into Russian hands, and Ukraine's lack of capacity to operate advanced weaponry.[21]Alexander Vindman, former Director for European Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council (NSC), points out that even if it were true that Ukraine could not effectively utilize U.S. advanced weapons, the mere presence of such weapons would have altered Russia's calculations (Vindman 2022).

Third, the Biden administration has consistently demonstrated a lack of political power since taking office. A poll conducted on January 20 showed that the Biden administration's approval rating was 43%, with 36% expressing strong dissatisfaction with government policies. This appears to be due to simultaneous criticism from the progressive camp for being too slow in enacting change and from the conservative camp for deviating from American values and leaning too far left.[22]The containment policy, focused on increasing COVID-19 vaccination rates, was rendered ineffective by the Omicron variant outbreak. The ambitious large-scale social welfare project "Build Back Better" has stalled due to opposition from two senators within the Democratic Party, and the President has repeatedly failed to persuade them. Amidst repeated media coverage of gaffes made since the election campaign, and survey results showing half the public concerned about the elderly president's mental health, dissatisfaction with the Biden administration among Americans is growing.[23]. It is difficult to scientifically verify how important Putin considers the low policy execution capability of the Biden administration, which is evaluated as slow to make decisions and lacking in momentum, but it is clear that this factor undermines the credibility of the overall U.S. deterrence posture.

Therefore, the efforts by the Biden administration to strengthen deterrence to prevent Russia's invasion of Ukraine have shown clear limitations in terms of establishing punitive capabilities to prevent Russia from pursuing its strategy of fait accompli. However, the United States is not limiting its deterrence strategy to Ukraine. Consequently, the limitations of U.S. deterrence highlighted by this incident are bound to be perceived as significant changes by potential challengers in other regions who are in a state of confrontation with the United States, whether the U.S. desires it or not.

III. After Deterrence Failure: China, North Korea, and the United States

What are the implications of the Ukraine crisis for East Asian countries? First, it is self-evident that China will consider Taiwan when observing this incident. Just as Ukraine has actively pursued NATO membership, how will the Chinese government respond if Taiwan declares independence, which China has designated as a red line? If Russia swiftly achieves its strategic objectives, as it did in the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and NATO and Western countries do not respond decisively, thereby allowing Putin's fait accompli strategy to become the new status quo, then China is highly likely to attempt a similar approach to Taiwan as Russia's invasion of Ukraine.[24]. For example, it could employ a fait accompli strategy by first occupying islands such as the Dongsha Islands, Penghu Islands, or Matsu Islands in the periphery of Taiwan's territory.[25].

North Korea could draw similar conclusions to China. In particular, since the limitations of the Biden administration's policy execution capabilities are not issues that can be overcome in a short period, North Korea is likely to engage in more audacious provocations to enhance its strategic objectives and bargaining power on the Korean Peninsula. Of course, unlike Taiwan, there are few areas in South Korea that North Korea could successfully seize through a fait accompli tactic without initiating a full-scale war. However, if North Korea becomes convinced that the United States will not retaliate militarily due to its weakened punitive capabilities, it may carry out provocations of a qualitatively different nature to demonstrate internal unity and its advanced military capabilities. For instance, it could launch intercontinental ballistic missiles, conduct additional nuclear tests, shell border islands like Yeonpyeong, or attack or seize maritime boundary assets such as the Cheonan or Pueblo. Even if North Korea were to engage in such threatening provocations, there are limited additional retaliatory measures the United States could impose on North Korea, which is already subject to high-intensity economic sanctions.

However, Taiwan and South Korea are different from Ukraine. For comparison, looking solely at defense spending, in 2020, the United States spent approximately 7.7 trillion, China 2.5 trillion, Russia 60 billion, South Korea 45 billion, Taiwan 12 billion, and Ukraine 6 billion. This shows a power distribution ratio of roughly 77 : 25 : 6 : 4.5 : 1.2 : 0.6 among these six countries.[26] While the gap in military power between China and Taiwan may be larger than that between Russia and Ukraine, Taiwan is the United States' ninth-largest trading partner (compared to Ukraine's 67th) and occupies a crucial position in the global value chain. Although Taiwan, like Ukraine, is not a formal U.S. ally, unlike Ukraine, the United States maintains strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan through the unique framework of the Taiwan Relations Act (Haas 2022/02/22). South Korea, on the other hand, is a military ally of the United States, hosts U.S. military bases, and possesses advanced intelligence assets, air defense systems, and rapid deployment capabilities. Furthermore, just as the disastrous outcome of the Bay of Pigs invasion led the John F. Kennedy administration to demonstrate a firm resolve to respond during the subsequent Cuban Missile Crisis, the failure of deterrence in the Ukraine crisis could lead to a more resolute U.S. response in the Indo-Pacific region.[27] Above all, even considering only the indigenous capabilities of Taiwan and South Korea, excluding U.S. deterrence, they possess rapid deployment capabilities and policy execution power that are incomparable to Ukraine's.

The issue is whether China and North Korea accurately assess the magnitude of deterrence provided by the U.S. alliance system in East Asia. Therefore, it is crucial to send clear signals to prevent China and North Korea from engaging in reckless provocations in Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula by misjudging the deterrence maintained by the U.S. alliance system in East Asia based on the weak deterrence of the United States and NATO in Eastern Europe, as confirmed by the Ukraine crisis. In this context, South Korea, in cooperation with regional U.S. allies, must consider scenarios of fait accompli strategies that China and North Korea might pursue, prepare punitive capabilities commensurate with each level of provocation, and publicly demonstrate these capabilities.

Separately, the degree of success of Russia's military operations in Ukraine will also significantly influence the future military strategies of China and North Korea. While Ukraine, with only one-tenth of Russia's military spending, is defending against the Russian invasion far better than expected, the onset of spring and the subsequent thaw will make the infamous rasputitsa (mud season) further impede the advance of Russian armored forces, and urban warfare in key strongholds will inevitably become a war of attrition (Wasielewski and Jones 2022, 10). In other words, the failure of deterrence is unlikely to necessarily lead to the failure of defense, and Russia may end up failing to achieve its objectives despite incurring enormous costs. If this happens, China and North Korea, which are closely watching this situation, will be less likely to engage in hasty provocations. It is clear that the Ukraine crisis is not merely an issue happening in a faraway land.[28]. ■

[1] Sullivan, Becky. 2022. “Russia’s at war with Ukraine. Here’s how we got here.” NPR, February 24; Park Jeong-ho, Jeong Min-hyun, and Kang Bu-gyun. 2022. “The Ukraine Crisis and Russia-U.S. Conflict: Key Issues and Implications.” 『KIEP World Economy Focus』, February 4; <Maeil Business Newspaper>. 2022. “Russia-Ukraine Invasion Crisis,” February 22.

[2] Schneider, William. 2021. “Deter Russia by Arming NATO Allies.” Wall Street Journal, December 9; Jones, Seth G. and Philip G. Wasielewski. 2022. “Russia’s possible Invasion of Ukraine.” CSIS; Cordesman, Anthony H and, Grace Hwang. 2022. “NATO and the Ukraine: Reshaping NATO to Meet the Russian and Chinese Challenge.” CSIS; Kagan, Robert. 2022. “What we can expect after Putin’s conquest of Ukraine.” The Washington Post, February 21; Hass, Ryan. 2022. “Learning the right lessons from Ukraine for Taiwan.” Brookings Institution; Shim Sung-eun. 2021. “Current Status and Prospects of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict.” 『National Assembly Research Service』, Issue No. 1907; Hong Wan-seok. 2022. “Geopolitical Conflict between Russia and the U.S. over Ukraine: Causes, Nature, and Implications.” The Sejong Institute. Park Jeong-ho, Jeong Min-hyun, and Kang Bu-gyun. 2022. “The Ukraine Crisis and Russia-U.S. Conflict: Key Issues and Implications.” 『KIEP World Economy Focus』, February 4.

[3] Kahn, Herman, 1965, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. New York: Praeger.

[4] Ko Jae-nam. 2014. “Key Issues and International Implications of the Ukraine Crisis.” 『Analysis of Major International Issues』 11. Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security; Shin Sung-won. 2014. “The Impact of the Ukraine Crisis on the International Order and Northeast Asia.” 『Analysis of Major International Issues』 20. Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security.

[5] Mearsheimer, John J. 1983. Conventional Deterrence. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs 79-2. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

[6] Altman, Dan. 2020. “The Evolution of Territorial Conquest After 1945 and the Limits of the Territorial Integrity Norm.” International Organization 74, 3: 516. Cambridge University Press.

[7] Altman, Dan. 2018. “Advancing without Attacking: The Strategic Game around the Use of Force,” Security Studies 71, 1: 73.

[8] McManus, Roseanne W. 2017. Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[9] Kim, Yang Gyu. 2019. “After Deterrence: Policy Choices during Crises of Conventional and Nuclear Direct Deterrence Failure.“ Ph.D. Diss., Florida International University. 4338.

Kim, Yang Gyu and Félix E. Martín. 2021. “At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,” All Azimuth 10, 2: 125-147.

Kim, Yang Gyu. 2021. “The Feasibility of Punishment and the Credibility of Threats: Case Studies on the First Moroccan and the Rhineland Crises.” The Korean Journal of International Studies 19, 3.

[10] Gomez, Justin. 2021. “Biden warns of ‘severe consequences’ if Putin moves on Ukraine.” ABC News, December 9.

[11] Liptak, Kevin. 2022. “Biden predicts Russia ‘will move in’ to Ukraine, but says ‘minor incursion’ may prompt discussion over consequences.” CNN, January 19.

[12] Powell, Tori B. 2022. “Biden warns Putin U.S. will ‘impose swift and severe costs on Russia’ if Ukraine is invaded.” CBS News, February 12.

[13] Fearon, James D. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” The American Political Science Review 88, 3, American Political Science Association.

[14] Mitchell, Lincoln. 2022. “Russia and Ukraine’s conflict isn’t Biden’s fault. But many voters won’t see it that way.” NBC News, February 25.

[15] Gomez, Justin. 2021. “Biden warns of ‘severe consequences’ if Putin moves on Ukraine.” ABC News, December 9.

[16] Usher, Barbara Plett. 2022. “Ukraine conflict: Why Biden won't send troops to Ukraine.” BBC News, February 25.

[17] Finn, Teaganne. 2022. “Biden warns Americans in Ukraine to leave, says sending troops to evacuate would be 'world war.'” NBC News, February 11.

[18] Vindman, Alexander. 2022. “America Could Have Done So Much More to Protect Ukraine.” The Atlantic, February 24.

[19] Atlantic Council. 2022. “Russia Crisis Military Assessment: What would a ground offensive against Ukraine look like? Watch the skies.”

[20] Jones, Seth G. and Philip G. Wasielewski. 2022. “Russia’s possible Invasion of Ukraine.” CSIS;

Schneider, William. 2021. “Deter Russia by Arming NATO Allies.” Wall Street Journal, December 9.

[21] Dilanian, Ken, Dan De Luce and Courtney Kube. 2022. “Why didn't the U.S. and allies provide Ukraine with a better air defense system?” NBC News, February 24.

[22] Milligan, Susan. 2022. “Why is Joe Biden So Unpopular?” U.S. News, January 21.

[23] Ball, Molly and Brian Bennet. 2022. “How the Biden Administration Lost Its Way.” Time, January 20.

[24] Baev Pavel K. et al. 2022. “Around the halls: Implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.” Brookings Institution;

Osnos, Evan. 2022. “What Is China Learning from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine?” The New Yorker, February 24.

[25] Blackwill, Robert D. and Philip Zelikow. 2021. “Three Scenarios for A Military Conflict over Taiwan.” The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War: 32-33. Council on Foreign Relations.

[26] Da Silva, Diego Lopes, Nan Tian, and Alexandra Marksteiner. 2021. “Trends in World Military Expenditure 2020.” SIPRI.

[27] Jervis, Robert and Snyder Jack L. 1991. Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland. 36-39. Oxford University Press;

Baev Pavel K. et al. 2022. “Around the halls: Implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.” Brookings Institution.

[28] Ko Dong-wook. 2022. “[Ukraine Invasion] Lee Jae-myung: ‘Although it is another country’s affair on the opposite side of the globe, it is a danger to our economy’.” Yonhap News, February 24.

■ Author: Kim Yang-kyu_Senior Research Fellow, East Asia Institute; Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He holds a bachelor's degree in French Education and Diplomacy and a master's degree in Diplomacy from Seoul National University, and a Ph.D. in International Politics from Florida International University. He served as an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Florida International University and as a Visiting Scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. He has received the Fulbright Graduate Study Award and the Smith Richardson Foundation’s World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship. His main research areas include coercive diplomacy, nuclear strategy, power transition, US-China relations, North Korean nuclear issues, and international politics and security theory. His recent research includes “At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis” and “The Feasibility of Punishment and the Credibility of Threats: Case Studies on the First Moroccan and the Rhineland Crises.”

■ Editor: Lee Seung-yeon _EAI Research Fellow, Jeong Ji-yoon _EAI Intern Scholar

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