[EAI Myanmar Special Commentary] ④ Interactive Experiences of the Myanmar Pro-Democracy Movement and South Korean Civil Society

* This report was prepared based on communications with members of the Democracy Foundation's network (Myanmar nationals, Myanmar expatriates in the United States, and leaders of civil society organizations in Asia).

1. Irreversibility of the Pro-Democracy Movement and the Civil War Situation

The pro-democracy movement in Myanmar, triggered by the military coup, has reached its one-year mark. According to a January 16, 2022 article, 1,469 people have died and over 11,554 have been arrested, with 1,966 individuals being sought (OhmyNews, 2021/01/16). However, those on the ground widely agree that the number of casualties is much higher than these figures suggest. Unfortunately, the situation does not appear to be improving after more than a year. Myanmar's citizens face numerous difficulties in isolation.

At the EAI conference "After the Coup, the Future of Democracy in Myanmar" held on April 16, 2021, the author characterized the current Myanmar pro-democracy movement with four aspects: irreversibility, comprehensiveness, convergence, and interactivity (East Asia Institute, 2021/04/16). Since the wave of openness began in 2010, Myanmar had been rapidly developing based on its people's desire for change. Like other developing countries, the spread of the internet and mobile phones enabled Myanmar's citizens to grasp global trends and become global citizens living in the same era. The dissemination of information served as a driving force for development, but it also acted as a factor that led the military, fearing the flow of time and change, to carry out a coup that went against history. Nevertheless, the people of Myanmar can no longer return to the era of military dictatorship. Their life-or-death struggle over the past year attests to this. A Myanmar network member from the Democracy Foundation stated: "What the people of Myanmar are demanding now is no longer simple democracy. It is the end of the military regime. Even if the military takes conciliatory actions to stop the pro-democracy movement and tries to revert to the previous state, we will not accept it. Because of the imperfect constitution of 2008, citizens are only granted half of the power. Then, such an incident could happen again at any time. Our fight will continue until the military is gone." For the citizens of Myanmar, today's struggle is no longer a slogan demanding democracy from the military, but a fight for their lives.

Following the coup and the military's continued violence against civilians, the democratic forces, including the National League for Democracy (NLD), formed alliances with major ethnic groups, and the situation evolved into a nationwide civil war. On April 16, the democratic government launched the National Unity Government (NUG) in alliance with major ethnic groups and established the People's Defense Force (PDF). Externally, this was intended to unite the Myanmar democratic forces, represent Myanmar in the international community, and undermine the legitimacy of the military regime. Internally, it was a desperate measure to protect the safety of citizens in response to the military's violence, which showed signs of terrorism and massacre beyond mere suppression of protests, especially in a situation where peaceful demonstrations became impossible even in major cities like Yangon, and support from the international community based on internet communication could not be expected.

Armed conflict began within the Chin ethnic group and has spread to the Kayah, Rakhine, and Karen ethnic groups, with civil wars already underway in various states. In response to the armed struggles of ethnic groups, the military is deploying fighter jets and conducting airstrikes using helicopters. Gunshots and explosions in villages inhabited by ordinary citizens have become a daily occurrence. The military is attempting to dismantle the armed resistance forces by using its overwhelming military power to conduct airstrikes on armed areas and carry out searches and arrests. The Chin ethnic group is considered to have the strongest military power among the major ethnic groups, and the Chin Self-Administered Zone, which was the first to engage in armed conflict, has largely been suppressed. For instance, in a village of about 1,600 households in the Tantalan region, over 1,300 households were reportedly destroyed by military bombing.[1]Furthermore, sporadic guerrilla protests and brutal responses continue across the country. There are also reports of the military ramming a vehicle into a small group of about 40 protesters in December, resulting in 8 deaths. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a local organization that has supported political prisoners and their families since the 1988 pro-democracy movement, the death toll had already exceeded 1,400 by September of last year.

2. The Military's Comprehensive Suppression and the Crisis of Interactivity

Since the de facto civil war began, it has become impossible to ascertain the extent of the damage in Myanmar except through occasional news reports from foreign media. The situation requires piecing together the truth from fragmented news articles and on-the-ground testimonies. Since April 2021, it has become increasingly difficult to hear directly from Myanmar due to the military's control over the internet and mobile phones. Citizens have resorted to using SIM cards from neighboring countries to bypass phone restrictions. While the state cannot completely block all phone usage, it is evident that extensive censorship of SNS activities is underway. Approximately 100 days after the coup, individuals who were relaying real-time information about pro-democracy protests and casualties via Facebook and Twitter have deleted their posts and disappeared due to military surveillance. They are now using untraceable mobile applications, rather than SNS, to transmit news from Myanmar to the outside world.

In contrast, the military's power remains formidable. Internally, the military suppresses the populace through crackdowns, while externally, it seeks recognition as a legitimate government through diplomatic approval from the international community. In this context, ASEAN, at its summit in October 2021 (chaired by Brunei), disallowed the attendance of Myanmar's Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing and urged the implementation of agreements for a peaceful resolution of the Myanmar crisis. Unfortunately, Cambodia, this year's chair, has adopted a very conciliatory stance towards the Myanmar military regime. Prime Minister Hun Sen made a surprise visit to Myanmar in January and issued a joint statement with Commander-in-Chief Hlaing containing provisions for a peaceful resolution (Yonhap News, 2022/01/16). While this news might initially appear as a simple foreign news report about Prime Minister Hun Sen, who recently passed leadership to his son, seeking to secure his regime's stability through solidarity with the neighboring Myanmar military, it carries a more poignant meaning. It signifies that diplomatic sanctions against the military through regional bodies like ASEAN will be difficult in 2022, with Cambodia holding the chairmanship. This is a cause for concern from the perspective of Asian civil society as a whole. Indeed, the visit by Prime Minister Hun Sen came as a considerable shock to the citizens of Myanmar. For them, ASEAN's refusal to allow Commander-in-Chief Hlaing's attendance at the 2021 summit was highly encouraging, but the official visit by the current chair's leader made the NUG's lack of diplomatic leverage and inability to gain ASEAN's support a stark reality. Protests, including burning and trampling on photos of Prime Minister Hun Sen, have occurred in Myanmar. South Korean civil society, in solidarity with Myanmar residents in Korea, issued a statement condemning the visit, but the impact was minimal.

3. A Multifaceted Disaster and the Battle Against Uncertainty

The UN remains engaged and is monitoring the situation. Through persistent appeals by experts and special envoys, the UN urges the military to cease violence, calls on corporations to cut off funding to the military, and appeals for active international assistance. However, these actions cannot be considered direct condemnation or sanctions against the military. In September 2021, UN Secretary-General Guterres submitted a report calling for international humanitarian access and assistance for the Myanmar crisis, as well as the immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint. This report was approved with 119 countries in favor, 36 abstentions (including China), and 1 vote against (Belarus). In November, the Security Council presented a call to end violence in Myanmar, but the focus appeared to be on ensuring the safety of Rohingya refugees rather than ending the violence perpetrated by the military. It was also stated that ASEAN should play a crucial role in improving the situation in Myanmar. However, as mentioned above, despite objections from some member states, ASEAN has shown behavior bordering on division, failing to exert meaningful diplomatic pressure on the military. In December, a statement from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights denounced the conviction of Aung San Suu Kyi as a 'sham trial,' but this also appears to be a declarative action with little practical impact.

According to data released by the UN Network for Myanmar in October 2021, the number of people requiring immediate humanitarian assistance due to various factors such as conflict, food crisis, natural disasters, and COVID-19 reaches 3 million (UN News, 2021/10/19). Testimonies from the ground also indicate a severe situation. Industries and commerce have collapsed, and the supply of essential resources such as electricity and water is unstable. The military is exploiting all these circumstances as tools to oppress the people. Instead of restoring collapsed medical facilities, they are terrorizing and arresting/detaining doctors, lawyers, journalists, and intellectuals to break the citizens' will to resist. Influential figures such as social leaders and celebrities who communicated with citizens via SNS have reportedly been indiscriminately detained or disappeared. Despite this, young people are abandoning cities and heading to the mountains in various regions to join the armed struggle. Those remaining in the cities are also selling their assets to support those in the mountains. Unlike the 1988 pro-democracy struggle, which was led by university students, intellectuals, and older generations, the current pro-democracy movement involves individuals under 30, those in their 20s, and even adolescents as young as 17 or 18, both male and female, participating in armed conflict. Young adolescents, still in high school, are going into the mountains to learn how to use firearms and manufacture explosives to engage in combat with the military. An acquaintance who relays news from Myanmar to the author has also closed down all their businesses and is sending financial support to the armed resistance forces every month. Although they are currently able to send money and remain in the city, they are prepared to go into the mountains themselves for armed struggle and fight for their lives when the time comes.

Amidst the unending turmoil, the people of Myanmar are sending messages of gratitude, acknowledging the support from South Korean society. In a situation where international civil society's attention is waning, South Korea and Japan are reportedly among the few countries consistently providing attention and support to Myanmar. In particular, South Korean civil society is actively engaged in solidarity with Myanmar residents and students in Korea, fostering exchanges among organizations. They are undertaking various activities such as issuing statements and campaigns, and actively conducting fundraising efforts. However, despite funds being channeled to Myanmar through various means, there are limitations and concerns due to the blockage of official support channels.

Synthesizing opinions gathered through various channels, one thing is clear: the experience of South Korea's civil revolution is acting as an 'interactive experience' for Myanmar's civil society. Just as past Korean student movements drew courage from overseas pro-democracy movements, South Korea's democratization history, along with its economic and social development, serves as a significant source of inspiration for Asian countries striving to overcome authoritarianism and promote democracy. The fact that South Korean civil society recalls the pain of Gwangju and the memories of standing in the square with candles while observing the Myanmar pro-democracy movement, and continues to offer support and encouragement, empowers Myanmar's citizens to not abandon hope amidst despair. In an era when information exchange was not as active, when South Korean society went through dark times, international solidarity provided strength to students and citizens across time and space through means other than direct support via international organizations, such as books and songs. Today, civil society solidarity, propelled by information, acts as a driving force and variable that supports pro-democracy movements worldwide. And this exerts a greater influence than we might imagine.

4. Conclusion

Regrettably, civil society support for Myanmar is currently a battle against persistent uncertainty, despite a clear objective. It is difficult to determine where to focus our support. It is unclear whether it is appropriate to approach this issue from the general realm of civil society, to concentrate on the immediate humanitarian crisis, or to provide even indirect support for the armed struggle (in fact, the special representative of the NUG in Korea has officially requested arms support for the Myanmar civil war (Kookmin Ilbo, 2022/01/10)). Furthermore, it is not possible to hastily determine whether it is appropriate to reach a consensus within civil society on these matters. Yet, we cannot simply stand by in distress. A multifaceted disaster is unfolding, with many lives directly threatened. Our civil society continues its own fight for our neighbors who are shedding blood. We will continuously inform them that the international community is holding their hands, provide support through all possible means, and maintain a steadfast solidarity that does not let go of hope through civil society. And, on the day Myanmar's doors open again, the current solidarity will become a new driving force for the development of Myanmar's civil society.

After the EAI's April 16 Conference, I had a brief opportunity to speak with Myanmar students who attended. One student tearfully asked, "If we lose this fight, will Koreans abandon us?" That question gave me a clue as to what South Korea and international civil society should do for Myanmar. "Democracy is not a fight to be won or lost, but an 'endless process' of finding citizens' rights and building a society together. Koreans do not believe their efforts for democracy have ended. Koreans will never turn their backs on the citizens of Myanmar for that reason." ■

References

Kookmin Ilbo. 2022. “The Year of Expelling Military Dictatorship Will Be a Year of Success... Arms Support Needed from the International Community.” January 1, 2022. (http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924226788&code=11141200&cp=du).

East Asia Institute. 2021. "EAI Conference 'After the Coup, the Future of Democracy in Myanmar.'" April 4, 2021 (http://eai.or.kr/new/ko/event/view.asp?intSeq=20478&board=kor_event&keyword_option=board_title&keyword=%EB%AF%B8%EC%96%80%EB%A7%88&more=).

Yonhap News. 2022. "ASEAN Puts Brakes on 'Pro-Myanmar Military Regime' Chair Cambodia." January 1, 2022. (https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220116023100084?input=1179m).

OhmyNews. 2021. "1,469 Citizens Dead Since Myanmar Coup... Solidarity Rallies Worldwide in February." January 1, 2021 (http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0002803184&CMPT_CD=RDAUM&utm_campaign=daum_news&utm_source=daum&utm_medium=related_news).

UN News. 2021. "Myanmar: Three million in urgent need of life-saving assistance, protection." October 10, 2021. (https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/10/1103482).

[1]Due to communication difficulties, there may be errors in specific place names and numbers.

■ Author: Lee Hyun-yoonHolds a Master's degree in Sustainable International Development from Brandeis University. Participated in a civil society capacity-building project in Malaysia for the Korea Democracy Foundation & Asia Democracy Network. Involved in projects such as producing children's storybooks for Myanmar with the Korea Democracy Foundation & Tabye, the KORAMTOOL Eye Hospital and Optometrist Training Project in Bangladesh with the Heart-to-Heart Foundation, the Karen Refugee Children's School Program with the BMWEC (Burmese Migrant Workers' Education Committee) supported by the Heart-to-Heart Foundation & Samsung Dream Scholarship Foundation, and the Legal Aid Program for Asian Immigrant Women in the Greater Boston Area with ATASK. Previously served as an Assistant Trainer for Gender Education in Grenada for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Hurricane Katrina Recovery Project.

■ Responsible Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun,EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr