[EAI Myanmar Special Commentary] ③ Myanmar and ASEAN after the 2021 Military Coup

1. Introduction

In February 2021, the Myanmar military staged another coup and seized power. The coup occurred on the very day a new parliament was to be convened based on the November 2020 elections, overthrowing the civilian government that had been in place for just over five years since 2015 and reversing Myanmar’s situation to before the political reforms initiated by the military in 2011. A year has passed since then. During this time, approximately 1,500 people have been killed by the military, and over 11,000 people have been imprisoned. About 100 people have died due to torture in prison ( The Irrawaddy 2022/01/05). Of course, the actual numbers are expected to be higher. Despite the resistance from numerous Myanmar citizens opposing military rule, the National Unity Government (NUG), and the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the Myanmar military remains unfazed. Criticism from regional organizations like ASEAN, regional countries, Western nations including the United States and Europe, and the United Nations (UN) has also failed to bring about a change in the situation.

2. Myanmar and ASEAN in 2021

In the more than 70 years since Myanmar’s independence in 1948, the periods not under military rule have been, at most, 14 years from 1948 to 1962, and 5 years from 2015 to 2020, totaling 19 years. It has experienced 54 years of military rule. Despite international pressure and persuasion, the Myanmar military, which had been unyielding, suddenly undertook political reforms and liberalization measures in 2011. Four years after the liberalization measures, in the 2015 elections, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi took power, raising expectations for political liberalization and democratization in Myanmar. In the elections held again in November 2020, five years later, the NLD won again, and the parliament was scheduled to convene on February 1, 2021, based on the election results. On the very day before the inauguration of the second civilian government, the military coup returned Myanmar’s political liberalization to square one.

Since Myanmar became a member of ASEAN in 1997, it has been a political burden for ASEAN. ASEAN hoped that the political liberalization in Myanmar, hard-won, would continue, thereby resolving this political burden. The February 2021 coup completely shattered these hopes of ASEAN. Reactions from ASEAN and individual ASEAN member states poured in. On the day of the coup, ASEAN issued a Chairman’s Statement calling for a return to normalcy and a resolution of the issue through dialogue, referencing the principles of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and freedom enshrined in the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN 2021, 1). Malaysia and Singapore also issued statements calling for a return to normalcy and the restoration of the democratization process (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore 2021/03/02). Subsequently, other ASEAN member states such as Brunei (February 24), Indonesia (February 8), Thailand (March 1, March 11), the Philippines (February 9, March 3), and Cambodia (March 9) also issued statements expressing concern over the situation in Myanmar ( Al Jazeera 2021/02/01). Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi sought ASEAN-level responses through discussions among the foreign ministers of major ASEAN countries and also conveyed ASEAN’s concerns by meeting with the Myanmar Foreign Minister in Thailand on February 24 (Erwida and Koya 2021/02/24).

It was nearly three months after the coup, on April 24, that a move emerged at the ASEAN level, beyond the reactions of individual countries. ASEAN leaders convened at the ASEAN Secretariat and adopted the Five-Point Consensus to resolve the Myanmar issue. Despite opposition from Myanmar's democratic forces, Min Aung Hlaing, the commander-in-chief of the Myanmar military and the architect of the coup, also attended this summit. At this meeting, the leaders issued a Chairman’s Statement containing the Five-Point Consensus: 1) immediate cessation of violence and utmost restraint from all parties, 2) constructive dialogue to seek peaceful solutions, 3) appointment of an ASEAN Chair’s special envoy to facilitate dialogue, 4) humanitarian assistance from ASEAN, and 5) a visit by the ASEAN special envoy to all parties concerned (ASEAN 2021/04/24).

ASEAN's efforts to reach an agreement on resolving the Myanmar issue can be appreciated. However, this Chairman’s Statement, while acknowledging the problems in Myanmar, reflects ASEAN’s stance of avoiding internal conflicts and tensions and not bringing them to the forefront. The Chairman’s Statement does not mention Myanmar in its title. The Five-Point Consensus is attached separately as an appendix. The Chairman’s Statement, consisting of nine points, also discusses general matters such as ASEAN centrality, expectations and evaluation of Brunei's role as ASEAN Chair, evaluation of ASEAN Community building, COVID-19 response, and cooperation with dialogue partners, before mentioning the Myanmar issue in points 8 and 9. Point 9, in particular, is limited to the situation in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, which is encapsulated by the Rohingya issue, and does not address the coup itself.[1] The Myanmar coup and the resulting issues are confined to point 8 and the Five-Point Consensus in the appendix.

The implementation process of the Five-Point Consensus agreed upon at the April summit was even more problematic. Upon Min Aung Hlaing's return from the April summit, the Myanmar military issued a statement effectively disregarding the agreement. This statement stipulated that while the Myanmar military would “take into full consideration constructive proposals,” its top priorities were “restoring law and order” and “domestic peace and stability” (Bhavan 2021/04/27). The appointment of an ASEAN special envoy was intended to stabilize the situation in Myanmar, but the Myanmar military adopted a stance that it could only consider ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus after restoring domestic order. In June, Brunei’s Second Foreign Minister and ASEAN Chair Erywan Yusof and ASEAN Secretary-General Lim Jock Hoi visited Myanmar but returned empty-handed. This visit was undertaken without prior consensus within ASEAN regarding the special envoy, further exacerbating confusion within ASEAN about whether they were acting in their capacity as special envoys (Editorial Board 2021/06/10).

Amidst this confusion, the appointment of a special envoy was officially made in August. ASEAN officially appointed Erywan Yusof as special envoy on August 4 (Tom 2021/08/05). Despite the appointment after much difficulty, there was little the special envoy could do. ASEAN stipulated that it could not send a special envoy to Myanmar unless access to and meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi were permitted, which the Myanmar military refused (Grant 2021). The schedule for the ASEAN special envoy’s visit, planned for October, was postponed. As the ASEAN special envoy’s mission remained stalled, the ASEAN Summit in the latter half of the year approached. International criticism of ASEAN’s will and capacity to address the Myanmar issue intensified due to the various missteps surrounding the appointment of the special envoy. The international community criticized ASEAN, stating that based on its actions thus far, it lacked both the will and the capacity to resolve the Myanmar issue. To avoid such criticism, ASEAN had no choice but to take some action. Ultimately, ASEAN decided not to invite Myanmar representatives to the ASEAN Summit held via video conference at the end of October.ABC News 2021/10/16).

From ASEAN's perspective, it had to respond in some way to the criticism that it was being lukewarm in its efforts to resolve the situation in Myanmar, despite having Myanmar as a member state. Excluding Myanmar was a highly unusual measure for ASEAN. Logically, ASEAN cannot exclude Myanmar. ASEAN’s decision-making follows the principle of consensus without objection (Rodolfo 2006). If ASEAN were to decide not to invite Myanmar to the summit, it would require Myanmar’s consent as a member state. The Myanmar military would have protested this, and Myanmar would have been able to participate in the summit. ASEAN’s exclusion of Myanmar from the summit implies that Myanmar was excluded from the ASEAN consensus regarding its exclusion. By extension, this means that Myanmar was stripped of its rights as a member state in the decision-making process concerning its exclusion. This is tantamount to not indirectly recognizing Myanmar's status as a member. Technically, by excluding Myanmar from ASEAN, the decision implicitly carries a message that ASEAN does not recognize the current military junta in Myanmar as the legitimate government.

While the exclusion of Myanmar from the summit carries symbolic weight, its practical effect is limited. Whether the Myanmar military is excluded from the summit or ASEAN does not recognize Myanmar, it cannot directly influence the situation unfolding within Myanmar or the military’s rule. Although the military made a conciliatory gesture by releasing over 5,000 political prisoners before the ASEAN summit, this gesture did not weaken the military’s rule or resolve the situation regarding democracy and human rights in Myanmar.BBC 2021/10/18).

3. Two Patch-ups, a Third Failure

The 2021 Myanmar military coup and the resulting burden on ASEAN were developments foreseen since the 1990s. The Myanmar military, which consolidated power by overturning the 1990 election results, began to approach ASEAN, seeking economic growth through external openness to gain legitimacy. Unlike Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, which joined around the same time, Myanmar’s accession process to ASEAN was not smooth. The fact that Myanmar was admitted to ASEAN, despite international pressure and concerns within ASEAN, marked the beginning of a troubled relationship between ASEAN and Myanmar. Myanmar’s pursuit of ASEAN membership coincided with a period when the international community, particularly Western countries, was imposing significant economic pressure on Myanmar. The Myanmar military, which suppressed the pro-democracy movement in 1988, reluctantly held general elections in 1990 to gain legitimacy but suffered a significant defeat by the NLD. The military invalidated the election results and continued its rule, drawing strong backlash from the international community, which demanded the convening of parliament based on the election results and the military’s withdrawal from power. The United States, Europe, and other international actors imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar. Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN was pursued under these circumstances.

ASEAN faced international condemnation, arguing that Myanmar's accession would not only legitimize the military regime but also hinder Myanmar's democratization. European opposition was particularly strong. In 1996, the European Union banned the participation of the Myanmar delegation in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). In the same year, the EU, following the US precedent, prohibited visits to Myanmar by all senior officials and also banned the visits of Myanmar military officials to Europe. Due to these measures, even as a member of ASEAN, Myanmar could not attend ASEM meetings. Similarly, the EU could not participate in meetings hosted by ASEAN if Myanmar was a member (Alice 2009, 122-123). Canada also suspended cooperation projects with ASEAN citing Myanmar’s membership. The United States began imposing economic sanctions on Myanmar in earnest from 1997.

Despite this international pressure, ASEAN began making institutional preparations for Myanmar's accession from 1995 (Stephen 2010, 336).[2] It developed a rationale for Myanmar's membership. This argument, commonly known as ‘constructive engagement,’ posited that rather than leaving countries like Myanmar, which were under military rule and faced issues of democracy and human rights, to change on their own, it was more desirable to bring them into ASEAN and induce change through dialogue and incentives (Rodolfo 2006, 131-135).[3] Of course, not all ASEAN countries held the same position. The Philippines and Thailand, which were more liberal at the time, were hesitant about Myanmar's accession, while Indonesia, under authoritarian rule, and Malaysia, which held the chairmanship in 1997, were more positive. Myanmar's accession to ASEAN was the first patch-up, which was handled somewhat perfunctorily rather than resolving the troublesome issue of Myanmar.

The issue that was inadequately resolved and set aside in the first controversy soon bred a second controversy. ASEAN rotates the chairmanship alphabetically among its member states. In 2006, nine years after joining ASEAN, Myanmar’s turn to assume the chairmanship was approaching. Once again, a storm was brewing around Myanmar. By 2005, the situation of democracy and human rights in Myanmar had seen little improvement. The ASEAN rationale of bringing Myanmar in to foster change in 1997 had become meaningless. The United States declared that if Myanmar assumed the chairmanship, it would boycott the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In 2005, then-British Foreign Secretary Ian Pearson announced that if Myanmar became the ASEAN Chair in 2006, the US and Europe would not attend any ASEAN-related meetings ( Al Jazeera 2005/07/26). ASEAN countries, through prior consultation with the Myanmar military, reached a rough settlement by having Myanmar voluntarily skip its turn as chair (Murray 2005). This was a temporary measure to appease external pressure and save face for Myanmar. This marks the second instance where ASEAN dealt with the Myanmar issue superficially.

ASEAN's past failure to resolve and instead gloss over the Myanmar issue in two previous instances led to ASEAN's difficult situation in 2021. In 2021, not only ASEAN's behavior but also ASEAN's fundamental principles were called into question. Doubts were raised about ‘ASEAN Centrality,’ the principle that ASEAN, based on its long history of regional cooperation, should occupy a central position in regional international relations and multilateral cooperation. The question arose: ‘How can a regional organization that cannot effectively handle a coup within its member states occupy a central position in multilateral cooperation involving larger regional powers?’ (Aaron 2021). Caught between major powers, ASEAN has sought its raison d'être in the region based on the discourse of ASEAN Centrality. Furthermore, the disagreement within ASEAN over the Myanmar issue has even shaken ‘ASEAN Unity’.

Underlying the Myanmar issue and ASEAN's response in 1997, 2005, and 2021 is the principle of the ‘ASEAN Way.’ This tradition, characterized by ASEAN’s reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of its member states, has served as a safety net, allowing ASEAN member states to avoid criticism for their domestic issues on the ASEAN stage. ASEAN countries have preferred to compromise and reach behind-the-scenes agreements rather than expose and frankly discuss internal problems, and immediately resolve them despite potential pain. ASEAN member states lack the incentive to abandon this safety net and mode of operation and move towards a higher level of regional cooperation. This attitude of ASEAN led to compromises regarding Myanmar in 1997 and 2005, and the Myanmar problem, unresolved at those times, has again posed fundamental challenges to ASEAN in 2021.

4. Conclusion

Following the Myanmar military coup in February 2021, ASEAN once again revealed its limitations in problem-solving. ASEAN, complacent in the ASEAN Way, and individual ASEAN countries hiding behind the regional organization, failed to play a significant role in resolving the situation in Myanmar. The Five-Point Consensus reached at the April summit, held under pressure from international public opinion, was not implemented. ASEAN countries were in disarray regarding the appointment of an ASEAN special envoy, and the special envoy, appointed after four months, could not properly engage with the Myanmar issue. Blocked by the military, access to those opposing the military regime was impossible. Amidst increasing criticism, ASEAN responded by not inviting Myanmar to the summit at the end of October. While it may have conveyed an implicit message about Myanmar's membership status and standing by denying it the opportunity to participate in ASEAN decision-making, it did not explicitly condemn the Myanmar military or comment on Myanmar's membership status. Perhaps there is a pervasive sense within ASEAN that everyone's responsibility is no one's responsibility. This lukewarm response ultimately becomes a burden for ASEAN. Crucial ASEAN principles such as ASEAN Centrality and ASEAN Unity have been severely damaged by the Myanmar crisis.

Of course, ASEAN cannot be solely blamed for the events of the past year. The international outcry following the February 1 coup, condemnation of the Myanmar military, and media attention significantly diminished within three to four months. The struggle against the military in Myanmar became solely the burden of the Myanmar people, and external support for them dwindled. The UN Security Council also proved unhelpful, blocked by permanent members China and Russia. The international community shifted its focus away from Myanmar, towards domestic COVID-19 responses and US-China competition. In the meantime, criticism directed at ASEAN actually increased. Of course, ASEAN’s response was not ideal, nor was it effective. Nevertheless, as time went on, the international community, rather than playing a direct role in the Myanmar situation, increasingly focused its criticism on ASEAN, which has Myanmar as a member. We must consider whether the international community, powerless to resolve the Myanmar issue, is deceiving itself by making ASEAN a scapegoat and believing it is fulfilling its moral and ethical responsibilities through criticism of ASEAN. ■

References

Aaron Connelly. 2021. "The coup in Myanmar and the threat to ASEAN centrality." The International Institute for Strategic Studies. March 1.

ABC News. 2021. “ASEAN members elect not to invite Myanmar`s military leader Min Aung Hlaing to summit.” ABC News. October 16.

Alice D. Ba. 2009. (Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Pp. 122-123.

Al Jazeera. 2005. “Myanmar to forgo Asean chairmanship.” Al Jazeera. July 26.

Al Jazeera. 2021. “‘Serious blow to democracy’: World condemns Myanmar military coup.” Al Jazeera. February 1.

ASEAN. 2021. “Chairman’s Statement on the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting.” April 24 (https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf).

ASEAN. 2021. “ASEAN Chairman’s Statement on The Developments in The Republic of The Union of Myanmar.” January 1 (https://asean.org/asean-chairmans-statement-on-the-developments-in-the-republic-of-the-union-of-myanmar/).

BBC. 2021. “Myanmar to release 5,000 prisoners held over coup.” BBC. October 18.

Bhavan Jaipragas. 2021. “Myanmar’s junta to consider Asean’s five-point consensus after ‘stabilising’ the country.” South China Morning Post. April 27.

Editorial board. 2021. “Brunei’s disastrous mission.” The Jakarta Post. June 10.

Erwida Maulia and Koya Jibiki. 2021. “Indonesia and Myanmar foreign ministers meet in Bangkok.” Nikkei Asia. February 24.

Grant Peck. 2021. “Envoy aborts visit to Myanmar, straining ASEAN relations.” AP News. October 15.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore. 2021. “Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan’s Intervention at the Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 2 March 2021 at 1600hrs.” March 2 (https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2021/03/02032021-IAMM)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia. 2021. “LATEST SITUATION IN MYANMAR.” February 2 (https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/-/latest-situation-in-myanmar).

Murray Hiebert. 2005. “Myanmar Yields Asean-Chair Turn to Defuse Tension.” The Wall Street Journal. July 27.

Rodolfo C. Severino. 2006. Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the former ASEAN Secretary-general. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pp. 34-35.

The Irrawaddy. 2022. “Head of Myanmar’s Shadow Govt Vows to Continue ‘Second Struggle for Independence’” The Irrawaddy. January 5.

Tom Allard. 2021. “ASEAN appoints Brunei diplomat as envoy to Myanmar.” Reuters. August 5.

[1]Concern about the Rohingya issue is indirectly expressed as the "situation in the Rakhine State," where the issue primarily occurs, rather than directly mentioning the Rohingya people, whom Myanmar is reluctant to name.

[2]ASEAN invited Myanmar to the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1994 and had it sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The following year, Myanmar's military junta lifted Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest, and Myanmar obtained ASEAN observer status. In 1996, Myanmar was able to participate as a member state in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and finally joined ASEAN in 1997. Stephen McCarthy. 2010. “Burma and ASEAN: A Marriage of Inconvenience.” in Lowell Dittmer. Burma or Myanmar: The Struggle for National Identity. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. p. 336.

[3] 보다 자세한 내용은 Rodolfo C. Severino. 2006. Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the former ASEAN Secretary-general. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pp. 131-135.

■ Author: Lee Jae-hyunGraduated from Yonsei University with a degree in Political Science and International Relations and obtained a Master's degree in Political Science. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Murdoch University, Australia. He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. He has served as a member of the ARF Eminent and Expert Persons’ Group (EEP), a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a consultant to the Presidential Committee on New Southern Policy, a former Research Fellow at the Institute for East Asian Studies, and a visiting professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. His related research includes "The Role of the New Southern Policy for Peace on the Korean Peninsula" (2018), "ASEAN Decision-Making: Informality and Informality" (2019), and "Global and Regional Order and Middle Powers in the G-Zero Era" (2020).

■ Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun,EAI 연구원

    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr