[EAI Myanmar Special Commentary] ③ Myanmar and ASEAN After the 2021 Military Coup

1. Introduction

In February 2021, the Myanmar military once again seized power through a coup. The coup occurred on the very day a new parliament was to be convened based on the November 2020 elections, overthrowing the civilian government that had been in place for just over five years since 2015 and reversing Myanmar's situation to before the military's political reforms in 2011. A year has passed since then. In the interim, approximately 1,500 people have been killed by the military, and over 11,000 have been imprisoned. About 100 people have died due to torture in prison ("The Irrawaddy 2022/01/05). The actual numbers are expected to be higher. Despite the resistance from numerous Myanmar citizens opposing military rule, the National Unity Government (NUG), and the People's Defence Force (PDF), the Myanmar military remains unfazed. Criticisms from regional organizations like ASEAN, regional countries, and Western nations including the United States and Europe have failed to bring about a change in the situation.

2. Myanmar and ASEAN in 2021

In the over 70 years since Myanmar's independence in 1948, the periods not under military rule amount to a maximum of 14 years (1948-1962) and 5 years (2015-2020), totaling 19 years. Myanmar has experienced 54 years of military rule. Despite international pressure and persuasion, the Myanmar military, which had been unyielding, suddenly initiated political reforms and liberalization measures in 2011. Four years after these liberalization measures, in the 2015 elections, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi took power, raising expectations for political liberalization and democratization in Myanmar. In the elections held again in November 2020, five years later, the NLD won again, and a new parliament was scheduled to convene on February 1, 2021. On the very day before the inauguration of the second civilian government, the military staged a coup, reverting Myanmar's political liberalization to square one.

Since Myanmar became a member of ASEAN in 1997, it has been a political burden for the organization. ASEAN hoped that the political liberalization in Myanmar, achieved with difficulty, would continue and resolve this political burden. The February 2021 coup completely shattered these hopes. Reactions from ASEAN and individual ASEAN member states poured in. On the day of the coup, ASEAN issued a Chairman's Statement calling for a return to normalcy and a peaceful resolution through dialogue, referencing the ASEAN Charter's principles of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and freedom (ASEAN 2021, 1). Malaysia and Singapore also issued statements appealing for a return to normalcy and the restoration of the democratization process (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore 2021/03/02). Subsequently, other ASEAN member states, including Brunei (February 24), Indonesia (February 8), Thailand (March 1, March 11), the Philippines (February 9, March 3), and Cambodia (March 9), issued statements expressing concern over the situation in Myanmar ("Al Jazeera 2021/02/01). Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi sought ASEAN-level responses through discussions with key ASEAN foreign ministers and also met with the Myanmar Foreign Minister visiting Thailand on February 24 to convey ASEAN's concerns (Erwida and Koya 2021/02/24).

It was nearly three months after the coup, on April 24, that ASEAN as a whole began to act beyond individual state responses. ASEAN leaders convened at the ASEAN Secretariat and adopted the Five-Point Consensus to resolve the Myanmar issue. Despite opposition from Myanmar's democratic forces, the leader of the coup, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces Min Aung Hlaing, also attended the summit. At this meeting, the leaders issued a Chairman's Statement containing the Five-Point Consensus: 1) immediate cessation of violence and restraint from all parties, 2) constructive dialogue to seek peaceful solutions, 3) appointment of an ASEAN Chair's special envoy to facilitate dialogue, 4) ASEAN humanitarian assistance, and 5) allowing access for the ASEAN special envoy to all political parties (ASEAN 2021/04/24).

While ASEAN's effort to reach an agreement on resolving the Myanmar issue can be appreciated, this Chairman's Statement reflects ASEAN's tendency to avoid confronting internal conflicts and tensions, rather than openly addressing them. The ASEAN Chairman's Statement does not mention Myanmar in its title. The Five-Point Consensus is attached as an appendix. The Chairman's Statement, consisting of nine points, also covers general matters such as ASEAN centrality, expectations and evaluations of Brunei's role as ASEAN Chair, assessment of ASEAN community building, COVID-19 response, and cooperation with dialogue partners, before mentioning the Myanmar issue in points 8 and 9. Point 9, in particular, is limited to the situation in Myanmar's Rakhine State, which is encapsulated by the Rohingya issue, and does not address the coup itself.[1] The Myanmar coup and the resulting issues are confined to point 8 and the Five-Point Consensus in the appendix.

The implementation of the Five-Point Consensus reached at the April summit was even more problematic. Upon Min Aung Hlaing's return to Myanmar after attending the April summit, the Myanmar military issued a statement effectively disregarding the agreement. This statement asserted that while the Myanmar military would "take into full consideration ASEAN's constructive proposals," its top priorities were "restoring law and order" and "domestic peace and stability" (Bhavan 2021/04/27). The appointment of an ASEAN special envoy was intended to stabilize the situation in Myanmar, but the Myanmar military indicated that it would only consider ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus after restoring domestic order. In June, Brunei's Second Foreign Minister Erywan Yusof, as ASEAN Chair, and ASEAN Secretary-General Lim Jock Hoi visited Myanmar but returned empty-handed. This visit was undertaken without a consensus within ASEAN regarding the ASEAN special envoy, further exacerbating confusion within ASEAN about whether they were acting in their capacity as special envoys (Editorial Board 2021/06/10).

Amidst this confusion, the appointment of a special envoy was officially made in August. ASEAN officially appointed Erywan Yusof as special envoy on August 4 (Tom 2021/08/05). Despite the appointment after much deliberation, the special envoy had limited capacity. ASEAN stipulated that it could not send a special envoy to Myanmar unless access to and meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi were permitted, which the Myanmar military refused (Grant 2021). The schedule for the ASEAN special envoy's visit, planned for October, was postponed. As the ASEAN special envoy's mission remained stalled, the ASEAN summit in the latter half of the year approached. International criticism of ASEAN's will and capacity to address the Myanmar issue intensified due to the various missteps surrounding the appointment of the special envoy. The international community criticized ASEAN, arguing that its past actions demonstrated neither the will nor the capacity to resolve the Myanmar issue. To avoid such criticism, ASEAN felt compelled to take some action. Ultimately, ASEAN decided not to invite Myanmar's representatives to the ASEAN summit held in late October via video conference ("ABC News 2021/10/16).

From ASEAN's perspective, it had to respond in some way to the criticism that it was being lukewarm in its efforts to resolve the situation in Myanmar, a member state. Excluding Myanmar from the summit was a highly unusual step for ASEAN. Logically, ASEAN cannot exclude Myanmar. ASEAN's decision-making follows the principle of consensus without objection (Rodolfo 2006). If ASEAN were to decide not to invite Myanmar to the summit, it would require Myanmar's consent as a member state. The Myanmar military would likely have objected, and Myanmar could have participated in the summit. ASEAN's decision to exclude Myanmar from the summit implies that Myanmar was excluded from the consensus within ASEAN regarding its exclusion. By extension, this means Myanmar was stripped of its rights as a member state in the decision-making process concerning its exclusion. This implicitly signifies a non-recognition of Myanmar's membership status. Technically, by excluding Myanmar from the summit, the decision implicitly carries a message that ASEAN does not recognize the current military regime in Myanmar as the legitimate government.

While the exclusion of Myanmar from the summit carries symbolic weight, its practical effect is limited. Whether the Myanmar military is excluded from the summit or ASEAN does not recognize Myanmar, the situation unfolding within Myanmar and the military's rule cannot be directly influenced. Although the military made a gesture of goodwill by releasing over 5,000 political prisoners before the ASEAN summit, this gesture did not weaken the military's rule or resolve the situation of democracy and human rights in Myanmar ("BBC 2021/10/18).

3. Two Patch-ups, One Third Failure

The Myanmar military coup of 2021 and ASEAN's subsequent burden were issues foreseen since the 1990s. The Myanmar military, which consolidated power after overturning the 1990 election results, began to approach ASEAN in pursuit of economic growth through external openness to gain legitimacy. Unlike Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, which joined around the same time, Myanmar's accession to ASEAN was not smooth. The process of Myanmar joining ASEAN, despite international pressure and concerns within ASEAN, marked the beginning of a troubled relationship between ASEAN and Myanmar. Myanmar's pursuit of ASEAN membership coincided with a period when the international community, particularly Western countries, was imposing significant economic pressure on Myanmar. The Myanmar military, which suppressed the 1988 pro-democracy movement, reluctantly held the 1990 general election to gain legitimacy but suffered a major defeat by the NLD. The military nullified the election results and maintained its rule, prompting strong international backlash and demands for the convening of parliament based on the election results and the military's withdrawal. The United States, Europe, and other international actors imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar. Myanmar's accession to ASEAN was pursued under these circumstances.

ASEAN faced international criticism that Myanmar's accession would not only legitimize the military regime but also hinder Myanmar's democratization. European opposition was particularly strong. The European Union banned Myanmar's delegation from participating in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996. In the same year, following the US precedent, the EU banned visits to Myanmar by all high-ranking officials and also prohibited Myanmar military officials from visiting Europe. Due to these measures, even if Myanmar became an ASEAN member, it could not attend ASEM meetings. Similarly, the EU could not participate in meetings hosted by ASEAN if Myanmar was a member (Alice 2009, 122-123). Canada also suspended cooperation projects with ASEAN, citing Myanmar's membership. The United States began imposing economic sanctions on Myanmar in earnest from 1997.

Despite this international pressure, ASEAN began making institutional preparations for Myanmar's accession from 1995 onwards (Stephen 2010, 336).[2] ASEAN developed a rationale for Myanmar's membership, commonly referred to as 'constructive engagement.' ASEAN argued that instead of abandoning countries like Myanmar, which were under military rule and faced issues of democracy and human rights, it was more desirable to bring them into ASEAN and induce change through dialogue and incentives (Rodolfo 2006, 131-135).[3] Of course, not all ASEAN countries shared the same position. The more liberal governments of the Philippines and Thailand at the time were reserved about Myanmar's accession, while Indonesia, under authoritarian rule, and Malaysia, which held the chairmanship in 1997, were more positive. Myanmar's accession to ASEAN was the first patch-up, a way to move on by managing the issue rather than resolving the troublesome problem of Myanmar.

The issue that was superficially resolved in the first instance created the conditions for a second controversy. ASEAN rotates its chairmanship alphabetically among member states. In 2006, nine years after joining ASEAN, it was Myanmar's turn to assume the chairmanship. Once again, a storm was brewing around Myanmar. By 2005, Myanmar's democracy and human rights situation had seen little improvement. The 1997 ASEAN rationale of bringing Myanmar in to foster change had become meaningless. The United States declared that if Myanmar assumed the chairmanship, it would boycott the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In 2005, then-UK Foreign Secretary Ian Pearson announced that if Myanmar became ASEAN Chair in 2006, the US and Europe would not attend any ASEAN-related meetings ("Al Jazeera 2005/07/26). ASEAN countries, through prior consultations with the Myanmar military, reached a rough settlement by having Myanmar voluntarily skip its turn as chair (Murray 2005). This was a temporary measure to appease external pressure while allowing Myanmar to save face. This marked the second instance where ASEAN superficially handled the Myanmar issue.

ASEAN's past failure to resolve and instead gloss over the Myanmar issue on two occasions led to ASEAN's difficult situation in 2021. In 2021, not only ASEAN's conduct but also its fundamental principles came under scrutiny. Doubts were raised about 'ASEAN Centrality,' the principle that ASEAN, based on its long-standing regional cooperation experience, should occupy a central position in regional international relations and multilateral cooperation. The question arose: 'How can a regional organization that cannot effectively handle a coup within its member states occupy a central position in multilateral cooperation involving larger regional powers?' (Aaron 2021). ASEAN, caught between major powers, has sought its raison d'être in the region based on the discourse of ASEAN Centrality. Furthermore, the internal disagreements within ASEAN over the Myanmar issue have even shaken 'ASEAN Unity.'

The principle underlying ASEAN's response to the Myanmar issue in 1997, 2005, and 2021 is the 'ASEAN Way.' This tradition, characterized by ASEAN's reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of its member states, has served as a safety net, allowing ASEAN member states to avoid criticism on the ASEAN stage for their domestic issues. ASEAN countries have preferred to compromise and reach behind-the-scenes agreements rather than expose and frankly discuss internal problems and seek immediate solutions, even if painful. ASEAN member states lack incentives to discard these safety nets and modes of operation and move towards a higher level of regional cooperation. This attitude on the part of ASEAN led to compromises regarding Myanmar in 1997 and 2005, and the Myanmar issue, unresolved at those times, has again posed fundamental challenges to ASEAN in 2021.

4. Conclusion

Following the Myanmar military coup in February 2021, ASEAN once again revealed its limitations in problem-solving. ASEAN, complacent in the 'ASEAN Way,' and individual ASEAN member states hiding behind the regional organization, failed to play a significant role in resolving the situation in Myanmar. The Five-Point Consensus reached at the April summit, held under international pressure, was not implemented. ASEAN member states were confused about appointing an ASEAN special envoy, and the envoy appointed after four months could not properly engage with the Myanmar issue. Blocked by the military, access to anti-junta forces was impossible. Amidst rising criticism, ASEAN responded by not inviting Myanmar to the late October summit. While ASEAN may have implicitly conveyed a message about Myanmar's membership status and standing by denying it the opportunity to participate in decision-making, it explicitly failed to condemn the Myanmar military regime or comment on Myanmar's membership status. Perhaps there is a pervasive sense within ASEAN that 'everyone's responsibility is no one's responsibility.' This lukewarm response ultimately burdens ASEAN. Key ASEAN principles, such as ASEAN Centrality and ASEAN Unity, have been severely damaged by the Myanmar crisis.

Of course, ASEAN cannot be solely blamed for the past year's events. The international outcry following the February 1 coup, the condemnation of the Myanmar military, and media attention significantly diminished within three to four months. The struggle against the military in Myanmar became solely the responsibility of the Myanmar people, and external support for them dwindled. The UN Security Council, blocked by permanent members China and Russia, was of little help. The international community shifted its focus away from Myanmar towards domestic COVID-19 responses and US-China competition. Meanwhile, criticism of ASEAN increased. While ASEAN's response was not ideal or effective, as time went on, the international community, instead of playing a direct role in the Myanmar situation, increasingly directed its criticism towards ASEAN, Myanmar's member state. We must consider whether the international community, which was powerless to resolve the Myanmar issue, is deceiving itself by making ASEAN a scapegoat and claiming to fulfill its moral and ethical responsibilities through criticism of ASEAN. ■

References

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Alice D. Ba. 2009. (Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Pp. 122-123.

Al Jazeera. 2005. “Myanmar to forgo Asean chairmanship.” Al Jazeera. July 26.

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[1] References to the Rohingya issue are also indirectly expressed as the 'situation in Rakhine State,' which is where the issue primarily occurs, rather than a direct mention of the Rohingya people, whom Myanmar avoids mentioning.

[2]ASEAN invited Myanmar to the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1994 and had it sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The following year, the Myanmar military junta lifted the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi and granted Myanmar observer status in ASEAN. In 1996, Myanmar was able to participate as a member state in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and finally joined ASEAN in 1997. Stephen McCarthy. 2010. “Burma and ASEAN: A Marriage of Inconvenience.” in Lowell Dittmer. Burma or Myanmar: The Struggle for National Identity. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. p. 336.

[3] For more details, see Rodolfo C. Severino. 2006. Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the former ASEAN Secretary-general. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pp. 131-135.

■ Author: Lee Jae-hyunGraduated from Yonsei University with a degree in Political Science and International Relations and holds a Master's degree in Political Science. He obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from Murdoch University in Australia. He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. He has served as a member of the ARF Eminent and Expert Persons’ Group (EEP), a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Advisory Committee for the New Southern Policy. He previously served as a full-time researcher at the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies and as a visiting professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. His related research includes “The Role of the New Southern Policy for Peace on the Korean Peninsula” (2018), “ASEAN Decision-Making Processes: Informality and Informalization” (2019), and “Global and Regional Order in the G-Zero Era and Middle Powers” (2020).

■ Editor: Jun Ju-hyeon,EAI Research Fellow

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr