[EAI Myanmar Special Commentary] ③ Myanmar and ASEAN After the 2021 Military Coup

1. Introduction

In February 2021, the Myanmar military once again seized power through a coup. The coup occurred on the very day a new parliament was to be convened based on the November 2020 elections, overthrowing the civilian government that had been in place for just over five years since 2015 and reversing Myanmar's situation to before the political reforms initiated by the military in 2011. A year has passed since then. During this time, approximately 1,500 people have been killed by the military, and over 11,000 people have been imprisoned. About 100 people have died due to torture in prison (The Irrawaddy 2022/01/05). Of course, the actual numbers are expected to be higher. Despite the resistance from numerous Myanmar citizens opposing military rule, the National Unity Government (NUG), and the People's Defence Force (PDF), the Myanmar military remains unfazed. Criticism from regional organizations like ASEAN, regional countries, Western nations led by the United States and Europe, and the United Nations (UN) has also failed to bring about a change in the situation.

2. Myanmar and ASEAN in 2021

In the more than 70 years since Myanmar's independence in 1948, the periods not under military rule have been, at most, 14 years from 1948 to 1962, and 5 years from 2015 to 2020, totaling 19 years. It has experienced 54 years of military rule. The Myanmar military, which had remained unmoved despite international pressure and persuasion, suddenly implemented political reforms and liberalization measures in 2011. Four years after these liberalization measures, in the 2015 elections, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi took power, raising expectations for political liberalization and democratization in Myanmar. In the elections held five years later in November 2020, the NLD won again, and the parliament was scheduled to convene on February 1, 2021, based on these election results. On the very day before the inauguration of the second civilian government, the military's coup reversed Myanmar's political liberalization back to square one.

Since Myanmar became a member of ASEAN in 1997, it has been a political burden for ASEAN. ASEAN hoped that the political liberalization in Myanmar, hard-won, would continue, thereby resolving this political burden. The February 2021 coup shattered these expectations of ASEAN. Reactions from ASEAN and individual ASEAN member states poured in. On the day of the coup, ASEAN issued a Chairman's Statement calling for a return to normalcy and a peaceful resolution through dialogue, referencing the ASEAN Charter's principles of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and freedom (ASEAN 2021, 1). Malaysia and Singapore also issued statements calling for a return to normalcy and the restoration of the democratization process (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore 2021/03/02). Subsequently, other ASEAN member states such as Brunei (February 24), Indonesia (February 8), Thailand (March 1, March 11), the Philippines (February 9, March 3), and Cambodia (March 9) also issued statements expressing concern over the situation in Myanmar ( Al Jazeera 2021/02/01). Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi sought ASEAN-level responses through discussions with foreign ministers of major ASEAN countries and also conveyed ASEAN's concerns by meeting with the Myanmar Foreign Minister in Thailand on February 24 (Erwida and Koya 2021/02/24).

It was nearly three months after the coup, on April 24, that a move at the ASEAN level, beyond individual state responses, emerged. ASEAN leaders met at the ASEAN Secretariat and reached a Five-Point Consensus to resolve the Myanmar issue. Despite opposition from Myanmar's pro-democracy forces, the leader of the coup, Myanmar Army Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, also attended this summit. At this meeting, the leaders issued a Chairman's Statement containing the Five-Point Consensus: 1) immediate cessation of violence and restraint from all parties, 2) constructive dialogue to seek a peaceful solution, 3) appointment of an ASEAN Chair's special envoy to facilitate dialogue, 4) humanitarian assistance from ASEAN, and 5) allowing access for the ASEAN special envoy to all political parties (ASEAN 2021/04/24).

While ASEAN's effort to reach an agreement on resolving the Myanmar issue can be appreciated, this Chairman's Statement reflects ASEAN's tendency to avoid confronting internal conflicts and tensions, rather than directly addressing them, even while acknowledging the existence of a problem in Myanmar. The ASEAN Chairman's Statement does not mention Myanmar in its title. The Five-Point Consensus is attached separately as an appendix. The Chairman's Statement, consisting of nine points, also discusses general matters such as ASEAN centrality, expectations and evaluations of Brunei's role as ASEAN Chair, the building of the ASEAN Community, COVID-19 response, and cooperation with dialogue partners, before mentioning the Myanmar issue in points 8 and 9. Point 9, in particular, is limited to the situation in Myanmar's Rakhine State, which is encapsulated by the Rohingya issue, and does not address the coup itself.[1] The Myanmar coup and the resulting issues are confined to point 8 and the Five-Point Consensus in the appendix.

The implementation of the Five-Point Consensus agreed upon at the April summit was even more problematic. Upon Min Aung Hlaing's return to Myanmar after attending the April summit, the Myanmar military issued a statement effectively disregarding the agreement. This statement stipulated that while ASEAN's "constructive proposals would be given full consideration," the Myanmar military's top priorities were "restoration of law and order" and "domestic peace and stability" (Bhavan 2021/04/27). The appointment of an ASEAN special envoy was intended to stabilize the situation in Myanmar, but the Myanmar military adopted a stance that they could consider ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus only after restoring domestic order. In June, Erywan Yusof, Brunei's Second Foreign Minister and ASEAN Chair, and Lim Jock Hoi, ASEAN Secretary-General, visited Myanmar but returned empty-handed. This visit was undertaken without prior consensus within ASEAN regarding the ASEAN special envoy, further exacerbating confusion within ASEAN about whether they were acting in their capacity as special envoys (Editorial Board 2021/06/10).

Amidst this confusion, the appointment of a special envoy was officially made in August. ASEAN officially appointed Erywan Yusof as special envoy on August 4 (Tom 2021/08/05). Despite the appointment after much difficulty, there was little the special envoy could do. ASEAN stipulated that it could not send a special envoy to Myanmar unless access to and meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi were permitted, which the Myanmar military refused (Grant 2021). The schedule for the ASEAN special envoy's visit, planned for October, was postponed. As the dispatch of the ASEAN special envoy remained in limbo, the ASEAN Summit in the latter half of the year approached. International criticism of ASEAN's will and capacity to address the Myanmar issue intensified due to the various missteps surrounding the appointment of the special envoy. The international community criticized ASEAN, stating that based on its past conduct, it lacked both the will and the capacity to resolve the Myanmar issue. To avoid such criticism, ASEAN had no choice but to take some action. Ultimately, ASEAN decided not to invite Myanmar's representatives to the ASEAN Summit held via video conference at the end of October ( ABC News 2021/10/16).

From ASEAN's perspective, it had to respond in some way to the criticism that it was lukewarm in its efforts to resolve the situation, despite having Myanmar as a member state. The exclusion of Myanmar was a highly unusual measure for ASEAN. Logically, ASEAN cannot exclude Myanmar. ASEAN's decision-making follows the principle of consensus, where decisions are made in the absence of specific objections (Rodolfo 2006). If ASEAN were to decide not to invite Myanmar to the summit, it would require Myanmar's consent as a member state. The Myanmar military would have likely protested this, and Myanmar could have participated in the summit. ASEAN's decision not to invite Myanmar to the summit implies that Myanmar was excluded from the consensus within ASEAN regarding its exclusion. Interpreted broadly, it means that Myanmar was stripped of its rights as a member state in the decision-making process regarding its exclusion. This is tantamount to not implicitly recognizing Myanmar's membership status. Technically, by excluding Myanmar from ASEAN, the decision implicitly conveys a message that ASEAN does not recognize the current Myanmar military regime as the legitimate government of Myanmar.

While the exclusion of Myanmar from the summit carries symbolic weight, its practical effect is limited. Whether or not the Myanmar military is excluded from the summit, or whether ASEAN recognizes Myanmar, it does not directly impact the situation within Myanmar or the military's rule. Although the military made a conciliatory gesture by releasing over 5,000 political prisoners before the ASEAN summit, this gesture did not weaken the military's rule or resolve the situation of democracy and human rights in Myanmar ( BBC 2021/10/18).

3. Two Patch-ups, a Third Failure

The 2021 Myanmar military coup and the subsequent burden on ASEAN were situations foreseen since the 1990s. The Myanmar military, which consolidated power after overturning the results of the 1990 elections, began to approach ASEAN in pursuit of economic growth through external openness to gain legitimacy. Unlike Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, which joined around the same time, Myanmar's accession process to ASEAN was not smooth. The fact that Myanmar was admitted to ASEAN, despite international pressure and concerns within ASEAN, marked the beginning of a troubled relationship between ASEAN and Myanmar. Myanmar's pursuit of ASEAN membership coincided with the period when the international community, particularly Western countries, was exerting significant economic pressure on Myanmar. After suppressing the pro-democracy movement in 1988, the Myanmar military reluctantly held the 1990 general elections, only to suffer a significant defeat by the NLD. The military nullified the election results and maintained its rule, leading to strong international backlash and demands for the convening of parliament based on the election results and the military's withdrawal from power. The international community, led by the United States and Europe, imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar. Myanmar's accession to ASEAN was pursued under these circumstances.

ASEAN faced international criticism that admitting Myanmar would not only legitimize the military regime but also hinder Myanmar's democratization. European opposition was particularly strong. The European Union banned the participation of the Myanmar delegation in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996. In the same year, the EU, following the US precedent, prohibited visits to Myanmar by all high-ranking officials and also banned visits to Europe by Myanmar military officials. Due to these measures, even if Myanmar became an ASEAN member, it could not attend ASEM meetings. Similarly, the EU could not participate in meetings hosted by ASEAN with Myanmar as a member (Alice 2009, 122-123). Canada also suspended cooperation projects with ASEAN citing Myanmar's membership. The United States began imposing economic sanctions on Myanmar in earnest from 1997.

Despite this international pressure, ASEAN began making institutional preparations for Myanmar's accession from 1995 onwards (Stephen 2010, 336).[2] It formulated a rationale for Myanmar's membership. Commonly referred to as 'constructive engagement,' the argument was that instead of abandoning countries like Myanmar, which faced issues of military rule, democracy, and human rights, to expect change, it was more desirable to bring them into ASEAN and foster change through dialogue and incentives (Rodolfo 2006, 131-135).[3] Of course, not all ASEAN countries shared the same stance. The more liberal governments of the Philippines and Thailand at the time were reserved about Myanmar's accession, while Indonesia, under authoritarian rule, and Malaysia, which held the chairmanship in 1997, were more positive towards Myanmar's membership. Myanmar's accession to ASEAN was the first patch-up, a way to move on by somewhat settling the issue rather than resolving the troublesome problem of Myanmar.

The issue that was hastily settled in the first controversy soon gave rise to a second controversy. ASEAN rotates its chairmanship alphabetically among member states. In 2006, nine years after joining ASEAN, Myanmar's turn to assume the chairmanship was approaching. Once again, a storm was brewing around Myanmar. By 2005, Myanmar's democracy and human rights situation had shown little improvement. The ASEAN logic of bringing Myanmar in to foster change in 1997 had become meaningless. The United States declared that if Myanmar assumed the chairmanship, it would boycott the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In 2005, then-British Foreign Secretary Ian Pearson announced that if Myanmar became ASEAN Chair in 2006, the US and Europe would not attend any ASEAN-related meetings ( Al Jazeera 2005/07/26). ASEAN countries, through prior consultation with the Myanmar military, reached a rough settlement by having Myanmar itself declare a deferral of its chairmanship turn (Murray 2005). This was a temporary measure to appease external pressure and save face for Myanmar. This marked the second instance where ASEAN dealt with the Myanmar issue superficially.

ASEAN's past failure to resolve and instead sweep the Myanmar issue under the rug on two occasions led to ASEAN's difficult situation in 2021. In 2021, not only ASEAN's conduct but also its fundamental principles came under scrutiny. Doubts were raised about 'ASEAN Centrality,' the principle that ASEAN should occupy a central position in regional international relations and multilateral cooperation based on its long history of regional multilateral cooperation (Aaron 2021). The question arose: 'How can a regional organization that cannot effectively handle internal coups within its member states occupy a central position in multilateral cooperation involving larger regional powers?' ASEAN, caught between major powers, has sought its raison d'être within the region based on the discourse of ASEAN Centrality. Furthermore, the divergence of opinions within ASEAN regarding the Myanmar issue has even shaken 'ASEAN Unity.'

Underlying the Myanmar issue and ASEAN's responses in 1997, 2005, and 2021 is the principle of the 'ASEAN Way.' This tradition, characterized by ASEAN's reluctance to interfere in the internal affairs of its member states, has served as a safety net, allowing ASEAN member states to avoid criticism for their domestic issues on the ASEAN stage. ASEAN countries have preferred to compromise and reach behind-the-scenes agreements rather than expose and frankly discuss internal issues, even if it causes immediate pain. ASEAN member states lack the incentive to abandon this safety net and mode of operation and move towards a higher level of regional cooperation. This attitude of ASEAN led to compromises regarding Myanmar in 1997 and 2005, and the unresolved Myanmar issue has once again posed fundamental problems for ASEAN in 2021.

4. Conclusion

Following the Myanmar military coup in February 2021, ASEAN once again revealed its limitations in problem-solving. ASEAN, complacent in the 'ASEAN Way,' and individual ASEAN member states hiding behind the regional organization, failed to play a significant role in resolving the situation in Myanmar. The Five-Point Consensus reached at the April summit, held under pressure from international public opinion, was not implemented. ASEAN member states were confused about appointing an ASEAN special envoy, and the special envoy, appointed after four months, could not properly access the Myanmar issue. Blocked by the military, access to anti-military factions was impossible. Amidst increasing criticism, ASEAN responded by not inviting Myanmar to the summit at the end of October. While this decision may have implicitly conveyed a message about Myanmar's membership status and standing by denying it the opportunity to participate in ASEAN decision-making, ASEAN did not explicitly condemn the Myanmar military regime or comment on Myanmar's membership status. Perhaps there is a pervasive sense within ASEAN that 'everyone's responsibility is no one's responsibility.' This lukewarm response ultimately becomes a burden for ASEAN. Key ASEAN principles, such as ASEAN Centrality and ASEAN Unity, have been severely damaged by the Myanmar crisis.

Of course, ASEAN cannot be solely blamed for the past year's events. The international public outcry following the February 1 coup, the condemnation of the Myanmar military, and media attention significantly diminished within three to four months. The struggle against the military in Myanmar became solely the responsibility of the Myanmar people, and external support for them dwindled. The UN Security Council was also of little help, blocked by permanent members like China and Russia. The international community shifted its focus away from Myanmar, turning its attention to domestic COVID-19 responses and US-China competition. Meanwhile, criticism of ASEAN actually increased. While ASEAN's response was not ideal, nor was it effective, as time went on, the international community increasingly criticized ASEAN, which has Myanmar as a member, rather than playing a direct role in resolving the Myanmar situation. We must consider whether the international community, which was powerless to resolve the Myanmar issue, is using ASEAN as a scapegoat and deceiving itself into believing it is fulfilling its moral and ethical responsibilities by criticizing ASEAN. ■

References

Aaron Connelly. 2021. "The coup in Myanmar and the threat to ASEAN centrality." The International Institute for Strategic Studies. March 1.

ABC News. 2021. “ASEAN members elect not to invite Myanmar`s military leader Min Aung Hlaing to summit.” ABC News. October 16.

Alice D. Ba. 2009. (Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Pp. 122-123.

Al Jazeera. 2005. “Myanmar to forgo Asean chairmanship.” Al Jazeera. July 26.

Al Jazeera. 2021. “‘Serious blow to democracy’: World condemns Myanmar military coup.” Al Jazeera. February 1.

ASEAN. 2021. “Chairman’s Statement on the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting.” April 24 (https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf).

ASEAN. 2021. “ASEAN Chairman’s Statement on The Developments in The Republic of The Union of Myanmar.” January 1 (https://asean.org/asean-chairmans-statement-on-the-developments-in-the-republic-of-the-union-of-myanmar/).

BBC. 2021. “Myanmar to release 5,000 prisoners held over coup.” BBC. October 18.

Bhavan Jaipragas. 2021. “Myanmar’s junta to consider Asean’s five-point consensus after ‘stabilising’ the country.” South China Morning Post. April 27.

Editorial board. 2021. “Brunei’s disastrous mission.” The Jakarta Post. June 10.

Erwida Maulia and Koya Jibiki. 2021. “Indonesia and Myanmar foreign ministers meet in Bangkok.” Nikkei Asia. February 24.

Grant Peck. 2021. “Envoy aborts visit to Myanmar, straining ASEAN relations.” AP News. October 15.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore. 2021. “Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan’s Intervention at the Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 2 March 2021 at 1600hrs.” March 2 (https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2021/03/02032021-IAMM)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia. 2021. “LATEST SITUATION IN MYANMAR.” February 2 (https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/-/latest-situation-in-myanmar).

Murray Hiebert. 2005. “Myanmar Yields Asean-Chair Turn to Defuse Tension.” The Wall Street Journal. July 27.

Rodolfo C. Severino. 2006. Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the former ASEAN Secretary-general. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pp. 34-35.

The Irrawaddy. 2022. “Head of Myanmar’s Shadow Govt Vows to Continue ‘Second Struggle for Independence’” The Irrawaddy. January 5.

Tom Allard. 2021. “ASEAN appoints Brunei diplomat as envoy to Myanmar.” Reuters. August 5.

[1] La mención del problema rohingya se expresa de manera indirecta, como "la situación en el estado de Rakhine", donde ocurre principalmente el problema, en lugar de una mención directa de los rohingya, a quienes Myanmar evita nombrar.

[2] La ASEAN invitó a Myanmar a la Cumbre de la ASEAN en 1994 e hizo que firmara el Tratado de Amistad y Cooperación en el Sudeste Asiático (TAC). Al año siguiente, la junta militar de Myanmar levantó el arresto domiciliario de Aung San Suu Kyi y obtuvo el estatus de observador de la ASEAN. En 1996, Myanmar pudo participar como miembro en el Foro Regional de la ASEAN (ARF), y finalmente se unió a la ASEAN en 1997. Stephen McCarthy. 2010. “Burma and ASEAN: A Marriage of Inconvenience.” en Lowell Dittmer. Burma or Myanmar: The Struggle for National Identity. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. p. 336.

[3] 보다 자세한 내용은 Rodolfo C. Severino. 2006. Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the former ASEAN Secretary-general. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pp. 131-135.

■ Autor: Lee Jae-hyunLicenciado en Ciencias Políticas por la Universidad de Yonsei y Magíster en Ciencias Políticas, obtuvo su Doctorado en Ciencias Políticas en la Universidad Murdoch de Australia. Actualmente es investigador principal en el Instituto Asan de Estudios Políticos. Ha sido miembro del Grupo de Personas Eminentes y Expertas (EEP) del ARF, asesor de políticas del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, asesor del Comité Especial de Políticas hacia el Sur, antiguo investigador a tiempo completo del Instituto Coreano de Estudios del Sudeste Asiático y antiguo profesor visitante en el Instituto de Estudios de Seguridad y Diplomacia de la Academia Diplomática Nacional. Sus investigaciones relacionadas incluyen "El papel de la Política hacia el Sur para la paz en la Península de Corea" (2018), "Toma de decisiones no lineal y no oficial en la ASEAN" (2019) y "El orden global y regional y las potencias intermedias en la era G-Zero" (2020).

■ Responsable y editor: Jeon Ju-hyun,EAI 연구원

    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr