[EAI Myanmar Special Commentary] ① The 'Spring Revolution' Towards a New Myanmar and the Future of Asian Democracy

1. The National Unity Government (NUG), launched by the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)

It has been one year since Myanmar was engulfed in crisis. In the early morning of February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military, the Tatmadaw, referred to as the 'state within a state,' executed a coup d'état. This was the first coup in 33 years. The coup forces, led by Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, detained State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, along with National League for Democracy (NLD) party executives, and declared a state of emergency for one year. The rumors of a military coup that had been circulating since the November 8, 2020 election materialized, collapsing the NLD government led by Aung San Suu Kyi just before it was to enter its second term.

When the first NLD government (2016-2021) was inaugurated in March 2016, its pledges included amending the 2008 constitution, achieving peace through reconciliation with ethnic minorities, and escaping poverty through economic revitalization. The NLD government focused on amending the 2008 constitution, which guaranteed privileges for the Tatmadaw. Some rumors even suggested that the NLD government was seeking to leverage China's influence to gain the Tatmadaw's acceptance of constitutional amendments. When the NLD government took office in 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi's first visit was to China. As relations with the West soured due to the Rohingya human rights issue, Suu Kyi's pro-China stance became evident.

However, China, after hiding behind the principle of non-interference in internal affairs regarding the February 2 coup, ultimately adopted a stance of condoning the military regime. This betrayed the diplomatic trust with Aung San Suu Kyi, who had pursued a pro-China path. In particular, China's 'vulgar pragmatism,' which disregards the fundamental rights of its own citizens if it serves national interests, led to the blocking of a UN Security Council resolution condemning the military coup. Consequently, anti-China sentiment rapidly spread within Myanmar, with some even suggesting China was behind the coup.

Conversely, the Myanmar democratic forces responded swiftly to the coup. Immediately after the coup, the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hlutaw (CRPH), representing the elected members of parliament from the November 8 general election, was formed. Subsequently, in April, the National Unity Government (NUG), functioning as an interim government, was launched.

Currently, Myanmar can be considered to be in a state of civil war, as the NUG declared a resistance war against the Tatmadaw in September of last year. In this regard, the NUG, as an underground government existing within Myanmar's territory and engaged in full-scale war with the Tatmadaw, is distinctly different from the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), which was a government-in-exile 30 years ago. The NUG is organizing various political forces to replace the illegal group led by Min Aung Hlaing that overthrew the civilian government. Notably, it has declared the establishment of a genuine federal democracy to end the conflict with ethnic minorities that has persisted for 70 years. The Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), which has been leading the charge since the coup, has had a significant influence on this project of building a new Myanmar.

Having experienced a decade of reform and opening, the civic consciousness of the Myanmar people has been significantly elevated. This is clearly demonstrated by the ongoing CDM, which has persisted for a year since the February 2 coup. As the CDM has expanded nationwide, defections among officers and soldiers have followed, creating an opportunity for the youth-led People's Defense Force (PDF) to gain momentum. As part of the PDF, young people who received military training abroad have returned to the cities and begun armed struggle, threatening the military. A prime example is the concentrated attacks by the PDF on relay towers owned by Mytel, a telecommunications company known to be affiliated with the military. 'Organized violent revolt' has begun in self-defense. The PDF, which emerged from the CDM, is expected, along with Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), to become the future federal army replacing the Tatmadaw.

2. Myanmar People Angered by ASEAN's Incompetence and China's 'Vulgar Pragmatism'

The CRPH, formed by an emergency resolution of the elected members of parliament from the November 8 general election immediately after the coup, designated the military forces led by Min Aung Hlaing as a terrorist group in the early stages of the coup and requested the international community not to recognize them. The burden on the international community, particularly ASEAN, which includes Myanmar as a member state, was considerable in response to these requests from the Myanmar democratic forces.

Western countries such as the United States and the European Union (EU) imposed sanctions on Myanmar under military rule for about 20 years before the political opening began in 2011. These sanctions included halting arms trade, expelling military diplomats, denying visas to high-ranking military officials, and suspending all bilateral aid except for humanitarian assistance. The United States, in particular, characterized Myanmar under military rule as an 'outpost of tyranny.' In contrast, ASEAN, adhering to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, admitted Myanmar in 1997, despite Western opposition, under the framework of 'constructive engagement,' a form of 'change through inclusion.' However, the concept of 'flexible engagement,' proposed by the Thai Foreign Minister at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting the following year, went beyond ASEAN's principle of non-interference in internal affairs, suggesting that ASEAN member states' domestic policies that negatively affect other member states should be subject to public discussion.

However, following the military coup in Myanmar last year, these moves toward changing ASEAN norms failed to meet international expectations. Above all, ASEAN has been unable to effectively respond to the escalating crisis in Myanmar, which has worsened into a civil war. As a prime example, in April of last year, ASEAN invited Min Aung Hlaing, the architect of the coup, to Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, and secured his agreement on five points for restoring peace in Myanmar; however, none of these points have been implemented.

Ultimately, in October of last year, ASEAN took the strong measure of excluding Min Aung Hlaing from the summit, but the Myanmar military remained unmoved. In the new year of 2022, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, as the ASEAN chair, made a surprise visit to Myanmar and was warmly welcomed by Min Aung Hlaing. In response, some ASEAN countries, including Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines, expressed their opposition, prompting Hun Sen to adopt a somewhat tougher stance toward the Myanmar military government.

The Tatmadaw's strategy of disregarding international scrutiny is not new. When Western countries, including the United States, intensified sanctions against the Myanmar military after it overturned the results of the May 1990 general election, in which the NLD won a landslide victory, the military remained steadfast. This was also the case when Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in support of the struggle against the military junta.

This attitude of the Myanmar military is not unrelated to the international community's favorable disposition towards them. For instance, on March 27 of last year, on the occasion of the Armed Forces Day ceremony hosted by the coup-instigated military, major powers such as China and Russia, as well as ASEAN countries like Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos, sent diplomatic delegations. At the same time as the commemorative event, the military and police massacred innocent civilians participating in the CDM.

In particular, China's vulgar pragmatism, which appears to be in tacit communication with the Tatmadaw while overlooking their anti-humanitarian acts, has provoked the anger of the Myanmar people. If China truly intended to uphold the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, which it so strongly emphasizes, it should have severed ties with the Myanmar military Tatmadaw and adopted a policy of non-alignment, neither supporting the military nor the anti-military camp.

During the Cold War, China did not need to view the Myanmar under Ne Win's military rule as an adversary, as long as it pursued the non-aligned, isolationist path of 'Burmese way to socialism,' rather than aligning with the US or the Soviet Union. Therefore, even when the military under Ne Win abruptly nationalized industries and confiscated the property of overseas Chinese, the Chinese government patiently refrained from provoking them. The nationalization policy implemented by the military elite led by Ne Win was a typical autarky model. Their goals were clear: first, to end the economic dominance of foreigners who had established economic foundations in mining, industry, and commerce since independence, and to achieve the Burmanization of the economy. Second, to create a truly independent and self-reliant economy, free from foreign domination, by preventing the 'infiltration of neo-colonialism.' Although the military revolution elites who espoused 'Burmese socialism' declared a combination of Buddhism and socialism, distancing themselves from materialism, their revolutionary path was very similar to the communist model.

3. Asia's Illiberal Governance Structures and 'Creeping Sinicization'

Looking at Myanmar today, one can see how accurate Jeane Kirkpatrick's stark regime comparison theory, 'anti-communist right-wing dictatorships are better than totalitarian left-wing dictatorships,' was, a theory central to the far-right foreign policy of the Reagan administration.

In essence, the Tatmadaw's revolutionary path, proclaiming Burmese socialism, transformed Burma into a typical totalitarian regime dominated by the military politically, and led to an economy of shortage due to state failure economically. In contrast, the anti-communist ASEAN member states, centered around Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, although derided as a 'dictators' club,' achieved catch-up growth. For example, Singapore's ability to promote the discourse of 'Asian values' stemmed from the confidence derived from its economic miracle. The core of these 'Asian values' or 'Asianness' was a culture of obedience to state discipline and public acceptance and support for the triumphalism of illiberal governance based on economic performance. In the post-Cold War era, the discourse of Asian values challenged the liberal triumphalism expressed as 'the end of history.' The discourse of Asian values, advocating for illiberal governance, promoted 'more discipline, less freedom' as a virtue.

However, the difference between the illiberal governance forged by Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew or Malaysia's Mahathir and the illiberal governance of the Tatmadaw is stark. While the former achieved high economic performance based on open policies externally and an efficient bureaucracy internally, the latter led a country to extreme poverty by pursuing isolationism and rampant nepotism, granting privileges to the military elite.

The Thein Sein government (2011-2016), which pursued reform and opening-up policies beyond expectations, raised hopes for performance legitimacy. However, the discipline-flourishing democracy, where the military controls most administrative functions based on the 2008 constitution, became an obstacle to reform toward a merit-based governance structure. Although Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD government came to power, it was not easy to dismantle the illiberal governance structure of military rule, which had been entrenched for over 50 years. This was especially true given that the highest official in internal administration was the military under the 2008 constitution. Therefore, Myanmar's normalization was impossible without substantial reform of the 2008 constitution. This is why the Myanmar people have repeatedly given absolute support to Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD in elections, believing that there can be no peace and prosperity without amending the 2008 constitution.

Of course, this 'NLD Syndrome' was perceived by the Tatmadaw as a challenge to discipline-based democracy and an attempt to cross the 'red line' they had drawn. Ultimately, the Tatmadaw responded to this situation with an anachronistic military action: a coup d'état. The Tatmadaw, claiming to be the parent of the people, took reckless action, relying on the 2008 constitution, which enabled even a constitutional coup, to protect its group privileges.

Since the coup d'état a year ago, the CDM, or Civil Disobedience Movement, has become a term symbolizing the 'Spring Revolution.' The concept of civil disobedience originated in the West, which regards liberalism as a universal value. However, most Western powers exhibited a dual attitude, allowing liberalism only within their own borders while ignoring the rights of colonial subjects, thus giving rise to illiberal nationalist movements opposing colonialism. For instance, the extreme nationalist stance of the Tatmadaw, the main force in Myanmar's independence struggle, was formed during the fight against British colonialism, which practiced divide-and-rule policies. In Indonesia, an alliance was formed between Indonesian nationalists and Japanese fascist forces during the national independence struggle against the colonial ruler, the Netherlands. In Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, nationalists who fought against colonial powers like France and the United States, which espoused liberalism, adopted illiberal governance structures as an alternative. The origin of China's illiberal governance structure, which has a significant impact on ASEAN countries classified as non-democratic states, is also in this context. While the difference in the degree of acceptance of illiberal governance structures during the post-colonial era shares a common background of liberation from statism as internal colonialism, it has created a 'multi-speed Asia' with uneven progress toward liberal democracy.

The Chinese Communist Party authorities, in particular, have a history of brutally suppressing the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy protests on June 4, 1989, yet remain in power without facing significant challenges from civil society. Therefore, the Chinese communist model serves as a cautionary tale against democracy in Asia. China acts as a facilitator for the maintenance and expansion of illiberal governance structures in Asia. For example, when a coup occurred in Thailand in May 2014, China was among the countries that tacitly approved the military junta, despite criticism from Western countries like the United States. This is a phenomenon of 'creeping sinicization' that threatens democracy in Asia.

The Myanmar military Tatmadaw was also a key player in the anti-colonial movement, but it has now become another colonial power, reigning over its own people for over half a century. Prior to the Thein Sein reform and opening-up government in March 2011, the Myanmar people were trapped in 'military guardianship,' with their fundamental freedoms thoroughly violated.

However, following the February 2 coup, the Myanmar people are engaged in a full-scale war against the military, which seeks to revert the country to this nightmare state. The NUG, founded on the principles of CDM, which has its roots in liberal thought, has declared a federal democracy as a liberal governance structure that guarantees significant autonomy rights for ethnic minorities. The CRPH has promulgated the Federal Democracy Charter towards building a federal democracy and declared the abolition of the 2008 constitution. This federal democracy is distinctly different from the existing NLD-centric governance structure, which was confined to the charisma of Aung San Suu Kyi and failed to break free from Burman centralism. This transformation will be driven by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), which comprises representatives from the CRPH and NUG, various political parties, civil society organizations, the General Strike Committee (GSC), the CDM, and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). The NUCC, composed of diverse actors leading the 'Spring Revolution,' functions as both a revolutionary council and a constituent assembly. Furthermore, it is a forum for communicative politics where deliberative democracy is being experimented with, transcending the flaws of majoritarian democracy, such as the tyranny of the majority. It is the central organization that will build a new Myanmar, evoking the spirit of the Panglong Conference, which united in the struggle for independence from British colonial rule and agreed on the construction of a federal state after independence.[1]

4. The Horizon of 'New Asian Values' Begins with the 'Spring Revolution,' Which Holds Transnational Significance

Most countries implicitly allied with the Tatmadaw are under illiberal governance structures that control the right to resist. China leads this alliance. However, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the NUG, Tin Maung, emphasizes the importance of neighboring major powers' friendly attitude towards the Myanmar democratic forces and believes that China is attempting to maintain a balanced stance, without favoring either the NUG or the Tatmadaw.[2] This indicates that China views the NUG not as an exclusionary target but as a potential driver of change.

This active diplomacy warrants attention, especially considering that even countries under illiberal governance structures, such as Singapore, have shown 'cultivated pragmatism' by urging the Tatmadaw to cease violence immediately since the coup last year. Malaysia, although not fully under liberal governance, has also expressed a negative stance towards the coup. These two countries, despite operating under illiberal governance structures, have demonstrated pragmatic diplomacy by not shying away from criticizing governments that severely violate the fundamental rights of their citizens, even while pursuing national interests.

Meanwhile, it is perhaps natural that Indonesia, among ASEAN member states, which has stabilized and established liberal governance structures, has shown a relatively favorable attitude towards the Myanmar democratic forces. Thus, Singapore (S), Indonesia (I), and Malaysia (M) have taken the lead among ASEAN countries in pressuring the Tatmadaw.

SIM cards are crucial communication tools in the information age. In Myanmar, SIM cards only became widespread during the reform and opening period, fostering a public sphere that served as the foundation for democracy. The cumulative effect of this has erupted into a nationwide CDM following the February 2 coup.

For the SIM 3 countries to play a more significant role, akin to SIM cards, in restoring democracy in Myanmar, the diplomatic efforts of the NUG, which is resisting the Tatmadaw, are crucial. The NUG must exert diplomatic influence to persuade ASEAN and the SIM 3 countries not to recognize the coup government and to pressure the Tatmadaw to retreat to their barracks. It must be argued that Min Aung Hlaing's coup forces are destroying the ASEAN connectivity that ASEAN has achieved. Furthermore, leveraging the influence of the SIM 3 countries, a full-scale diplomatic effort must be made to persuade major powers like China and India to agree that these forces are the primary disruptors of the regional value chain.

<Figure 1> 'Post-Coup' and the Tatmadaw-Democratic Camp-International Community

The European Parliament has officially stated that the CRPH, representing the ousted members of parliament due to the February 2 coup, and the NUG they support, are the sole legitimate representative bodies reflecting the will of the Myanmar people. The United States, along with the European Union (EU), has imposed sanctions on the Tatmadaw leadership, centered around Min Aung Hlaing, who orchestrated the coup, and their collaborators, while also demanding the release of political prisoners such as Aung San Suu Kyi. South Korea, by imposing independent sanctions after the coup, is the only Asian country aligning its actions with the Western bloc.

In the above <Figure 1>, B1 includes Western countries such as the United States and the EU, as well as South Korea, which have decided to impose sanctions on the Tatmadaw. In contrast, B2 includes major powers like China, India, and Russia, which maintain friendly relations with the Tatmadaw. ASEAN is also divided into countries friendly to the Tatmadaw and those that are not.

For the changes from B1 to B1' and from B2 to B2' in the <Figure 2> below to be possible, the NUCC, the broadest political dialogue platform involving all political forces within the pro-democracy camp, must execute comprehensive diplomacy, persuasive diplomacy, and active diplomacy to reduce the influence of the international community that favors the Tatmadaw and, instead, increase the influence of the international community that favors the NUG, thereby at least shifting the current power imbalance between the Tatmadaw and the NUG towards a state of balance.

<Figure 2> Power Relations between the Tatmadaw and the Pro-Democracy Camp in the 'Post-Coup' Phase

The February 2 coup represents an irrational act by the Myanmar military Tatmadaw, willing to risk political chaos and economic ruin to revert to the totalitarian nightmare state that existed before the Thein Sein government. The entire population of Myanmar is united in resistance against this recklessness of the Tatmadaw, transcending differences in generation, gender, class, and ethnicity. In contrast, the absolute ruler Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw and concurrently Chairman of the State Administration Council (SAC), the highest decision-making body of the coup military, initially declared a one-year state of emergency and later changed his statement to extend the emergency rule until 2023. This reveals the military's intention to protect its rule by re-emerging on the political stage, as it did before the reform and opening phase in 2011, under the guise of upholding discipline-based democracy.

Following the coup led by General Ne Win, a leader of the anti-British and anti-Japanese struggle in 1962, the Tatmadaw entrenched internal colonialism by rejecting federalism, which guarantees equality and self-determination for ethnic minorities. Therefore, the Myanmar democratic forces, who are preparing a federal constitution and federal army based on the premise of ending discrimination against ethnic minorities, have no other path than resistance.

If the 'Spring Revolution' in Myanmar ends in failure, like the 8888 Democracy Uprising 34 years ago, Myanmar will revert to being a 'land where time has stopped,' as it was under Ne Win's military rule. Sinicization, which imparts the governance techniques necessary for illiberal regimes, will accelerate, hindering the establishment of liberal democracy in Asia. The future of Asian democracy hinges on the success or failure of the 'Spring Revolution' aimed at building a new Myanmar. The 'Spring Revolution' reveals the transnational significance of discovering a horizon of 'new Asian values' that transcends the existing paradigm of 'Asian values' as an illiberal path, embodying an 'Asian way.' ■

The Tatmadaw unilaterally changed the country's name from Burma to Myanmar the year after the 8888 Democracy Uprising in 1989. Until the NLD decided to participate in the April 1, 2012 by-election, the democratic forces maintained the name Burma in a gesture of non-recognition of the military government. This article will use both names, Burma and Myanmar, considering the historical context.

[1] The first people's assembly convened by the NUCC from January 27 to 29, 2022, was attended by 38 organizations and 388 individuals.

[2] Please refer to the keynote speech by Minister Tin Maung at the meeting organized by the NUG Representative Office in Korea on January 23, 2022.

■ Author: Park Eun-hong_Currently a professor in the Department of Political Science and the Graduate Program in Asian NGOs (MAINS) at Sungkonghoe University. Director of the Center for Asian NGO Information at the same university. His major works include 'East Asian Transitions: Beyond the Developmental State.' His papers related to Myanmar include 'Myanmar's 'Spring Revolution': The Narrative Leading to the Catastrophic Choice of Tatmadaw Guardianism,' 'Myanmar, 'Orderly Transition' Model: Evolution from 'Change Within the System' to 'System Change',' 'Myanmar 2018: The 'Rohingya Crisis' and the Crossroads of Democratic Consolidation,' 'National Revolution and Civil Revolution: Thailand and Myanmar,' 'The Coloniality of 'Our-Style Socialism' as a Post-Colonial Regime: Focusing on the Revolutionary Paths of Sukarno and Ne Win,' and 'South Korean Democracy and Human Rights Diplomacy: The Validity of Diplomatic Sanctions Against the Burmese Military Government.' He studied at the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Thailand. He was a visiting researcher at the Institute of Economic Research, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. He has served as a consultant for the Presidential Committee on Policy Planning. He also serves as an advisor to the NUG Representative Office in Korea.

■ Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun_EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr