Comparative Analysis of Key Features of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un's Rule

Each time power is transferred in North Korea, the regime emphasizes 'legacy rule,' meaning immutability and continuity. However, significant differences exist in the objectives, systems, and methods of governance before and after the power successions from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il, and from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un. This analysis compares Kim Jong-il's 'military-first' politics (1994-2011) with Kim Jong-un's rule (2011-present) based on three criteria: first, external security strategy; second, the regime system; and third, the ruling power base.

External Strategy

The core of the external security strategy during the 'military-first' era was tension de-escalation based on provisional compromises with South Korea and the United States. North Korea achieved three benefits: first, a reduction in security threats from South Korea and the U.S.; second, the acquisition of aid and funds necessary for nuclear/missile development and domestic regime consolidation; and third, by prolonging negotiations, it enjoyed the benefits of threat reduction and aid acquisition while delaying talks and refusing to finalize agreements, thereby buying time. Under this strategic approach, the 1993 Agreed Framework, the 2000/2007 Inter-Korean Summits, the policy of utilizing tension de-escalation towards South Korea from 2000-2007, and the Six-Party Talks from 2003-2008 were pursued.

The core of Kim Jong-un's external security strategy is to enhance nuclear/missile capabilities, regardless of internal and external costs. The objectives are threefold: first, to establish military superiority on the Korean Peninsula based on the completion of a credible retaliatory strike capability against the U.S.; second, to construct a security order on the Korean Peninsula that is structurally advantageous to North Korea, using its enhanced nuclear and missile capabilities as leverage; and third, to compel South Korea and the U.S. to accept North Korea's maximal demands. North Korea threatens that over time, its nuclear and missile capabilities will increase, thereby making the security situation more unfavorable for South Korea and the U.S.

State Governance System

The 'military-first' governance system was characterized by three features: first, the National Defense Commission (NDC) replaced the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea as the center of state affairs. The NDC's primary mission was to maintain current and future military deterrence (including nuclear/missile development) and prevent internal subversion of the military and the state. The NDC controlled state affairs and major resources. Second, the 'military-first' system prioritized the military over administration. Instead of Central Party organs, the NDC was the nucleus of state affairs, with military commanders ranking above military political officers, and enterprise managers ranking above Party secretaries within organizations and enterprises. Third, the governance system was organized and operated in a more decentralized manner, with significantly expanded operational space and autonomy for lower-level units compared to the past. This was a product of reluctant but necessary regime consolidation. North Korea faced a situation where its overall control over lower levels and the populace had weakened. The consolidation was aimed at establishing a defensive line against further retreat while acknowledging the weakening of regime control. Under this strategic approach, the 'military-first' governance system was formally established through the 1998 constitutional amendment. Economically, the July 2002 economic improvement measures were implemented, and the 'military-first economic line' was launched in September of the same year. Furthermore, market expansion, utilization of economic relations with the South, and trade expansion were permitted and managed.

Kim Jong-un's governance system is based on three principles that contrast with that of the 'military-first' era: first, central Party organs such as the Politburo, the Party Central Military Commission, and the plenary sessions of the Central Committee are positioned at the center of state affairs. Second, a Party-state governance system that prioritizes the Party over administration has been restored. Central Party organs become superior to the State Affairs Commission and the Cabinet, military political officers become superior to military commanders, and enterprise Party secretaries become superior to enterprise managers. Third, the Party-state governance system aims to strengthen centralization and enhance political-organizational, administrative, and ideological control and mobilization of the lower levels. Market expansion and decentralization must cease. Instead, strengthened state economic control, intensified political surveillance and ideological control, the activation of surveillance and mobilization bodies like the Three Revolutions Squads, and mass labor mobilization based on the organizational coercion of the Party and state should become the driving force for increased production.

Ruling Power Base

During the 'military-first' era, the ruling power base was the military. The 'military-first' politics operated in a manner that benefited the military in three ways: first, military personnel were appointed to key positions in the Party and state. In the past, Party cadres had been appointed to key positions in the state and military. Second, the National Defense Commission (NDC) controlled and operated the national economy. The NDC managed the national economy and distributed economic benefits based on the principle of prioritizing defense construction and military interests. The military never released military grain reserves. Third, the military was the biggest beneficiary of market expansion. Trading companies affiliated with the military occupied key privileges in the export of minerals, fishery products, and timber, which are major export items. Military units possessed relative competitiveness in the production and distribution of these raw materials compared to other power organs. The military surpassed other organizations in its ability to mobilize labor and transportation, and it could refuse legitimate or illegitimate crackdowns and interference from the Ministry of State Security or the Ministry of People's Security.

In Kim Jong-un's rule, the ruling power base is the Party and Party cadres. Kim Jong-un's rule is operating in a manner that benefits them: first, key Party cadres are being appointed to key positions in the state and military. Second, nominally, the Cabinet functions as the core of economic management, but in reality, it is a subordinate organ of the Central Party. Trading privileges previously managed by the military have largely been transferred to the Cabinet. When Kim Jong-un issues an order, the military must release grain reserves. Third, the biggest beneficiaries of Kim Jong-un's rule are the various cadres involved in organized ideological, administrative, and surveillance activities at all levels, targeting administrative organizations and the populace, and managed by the Party, state, and security organs.

Conclusion

Comparing Kim Jong-il's 'military-first' politics with Kim Jong-un's rule reveals both continuity and discontinuity/change. This is because the internal and external security challenges faced by each leader, their respective grand strategies for regime security, governance systems, and ruling power bases differed. Relatively speaking, Kim Jong-il's rule was pragmatic, moderate, and flexible. Kim Jong-un's rule is dogmatic, hardline, and rigid. In the last three years of his rule (2009-2011), Kim Jong-il made at least superficial efforts to expand openness and economic cooperation with China and to re-establish a compromise on the nuclear issue with South Korea and the U.S. (the February 29 Agreement). Kim Jong-un began his rule by directly rejecting both of these strategic choices made by his father. Currently, Kim Jong-un is 37 years old, while the average life expectancy for North Korean men is 72.6 years. We will likely be coexisting with the Kim Jong-un regime for at least the next 35 years. 

※ This commentary is the Korean translation of the original text, “A Three-Way Comparison Between Songun Politics and Kim Jong Un’s Rule”.

■ Park Hyung-jung_Distinguished Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Marburg, Germany. He has served as a consultant for the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Intelligence Service, the National Unification Advisory Council, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in the U.S. and the Institute for Security & Development Policy in Sweden. His main research areas include North Korea's political economy, inter-Korean relations and policies towards South and North Korea, and comparative authoritarianism/socialism. His recent papers include "North Korea's Policy Towards South Korea in the First Decade of Kim Jong-un's Rule" and "Kim Jong-un's State Governance Strategy and Reorganization of Personnel/Organizational Systems."

■ Editor and Manager:Lee Seung-yeon_EAI Research Fellow

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