Reading Chairman Kim Jong Un’s Mind

Instead of delivering a New Year’s address to mark the new year, Chairman Kim Jong Un outlined North Korea’s direction for the year in his speech at the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea held at the end of last year, titled “On the Direction of Party and State Affairs in 2022.”

Self-Assessment of 2021

In his speech, he first assessed 2021 as “a year of great victory that opened the prelude to a grand transformation toward the all-round development of socialist construction amidst harsh trials.” Specifically, he pointed out that in the economic sector, progress was made in agriculture, major construction projects were undertaken to showcase the development and potential of our-style socialism, and improvements and achievements were made in fulfilling the tasks of the first year of the five-year economic plan. Second, in the political and ideological sphere, he assessed that a turning point was achieved in party establishment and that the all-people ideological consciousness for socialist development was strengthened. Third, in the defense industry sector, he summarized that the continuous development of cutting-edge weapon systems according to precise development plans showcased the advancement and modernity of military capabilities, occupying a very important position among this year’s achievements.

In 2020, North Korea experienced its worst economic recession since the “Arduous March” of the 1990s, facing a triple hardship of continued international economic sanctions due to nuclear weapon and missile development, border closures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and natural disasters. Entering 2021, the endeavor towards the goal of all-round development of socialist construction amidst the continued “harsh trials” of the triple hardship was an undeniably arduous journey.

Setting the Direction for 2022

He emphasized that the struggle in 2022 is a “decisive battle for the all-round development of our-style socialism and the happiness of the people.” First, in the economic sector, the main front of socialist construction, he stressed the need to concentrate efforts on revitalizing production, vigorously pursuing consolidation and reinforcement projects, putting the national economy on a normal track, and providing the people with a stable and improved livelihood. Second, he presented important tasks to drive the all-round development of socialist construction by innovating work in the fields of science, education, public health, and culture. Third, he stated, “The increasingly unstable military environment on the Korean Peninsula and the trends in international affairs demand that the strengthening of national defense capabilities be pursued even more vigorously without a moment’s delay.” Therefore, efforts should be made to continuously expand the achievements made in accordance with the decisions of the 8th Party Congress, and to systematically achieve the goals of self-reliance, modernization, and scientization of the defense industry. Fourth, he presented “principles and a series of tactical directions to be maintained in inter-Korean relations and external affairs in response to the complex and changing international political situation and surrounding environment.” Fifth, he presented tasks to strengthen the Party and enhance its leading role in order to successfully carry out the crucial tasks for new victories in socialist construction.

Reading the Mind

While North Korea’s socialist capacity building faces severe triple hardship, South Korea is heading towards a presidential election, and the United States is cautiously handling its North Korea policy, the 2022 direction speech, in contrast to its detailed explanation of tasks in key areas for strengthening domestic capabilities and building our-style socialism, summarizes inter-Korean relations and external affairs in a single sentence without revealing specific details. However, it is necessary to reveal these unstated details to properly forecast and guide inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. relations in 2022. The first priority is to avoid falling into subjective optimism or pessimism by interpreting others' minds at will. Next, to understand how Chairman Kim Jong Un internally conceptualizes the current inter-Korean and international situation, it is necessary to move beyond simple content analysis or big data analysis and conduct hermeneutic analysis of his words and actions to find a deeper horizon of conceptualization. In accordance with these principles, it is necessary to carefully re-read Chairman Kim Jong Un’s report at the 8th Party Congress in early January 2021, his policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in late September, and his speech at the National Defense Development Exhibition in October, as these best reflect his current mindset.

Inter-Korean Relations

In his report at the 8th Party Congress, Chairman Kim Jong Un emphasized three principles for inter-Korean relations. First, “We must adopt a stance and attitude of resolving fundamental issues in inter-Korean relations, cease all hostile acts against the other party, and take inter-Korean declarations seriously and implement them faithfully.” Accordingly, he emphasized the cessation of importing advanced military equipment and joint military exercises with the United States, instead of cooperation in epidemic prevention, humanitarian cooperation, and individual tourism. Second, if South Korea continues to pressure North Korea from a “dualistic and unfair perspective,” North Korea will have no choice but to deal with South Korea differently. Third, he analyzed that depending on South Korea’s attitude, inter-Korean relations could return to a new starting point of peace and prosperity like the spring three years ago in the near future.

In his policy speech at the end of September, Chairman Kim Jong Un stated regarding the declaration of an end-of-war, which South Korea presented as a fundamental issue: “Before declaring an end to the war, respect for each other must be guaranteed, and prejudiced views, unfair dualistic attitudes, and hostile views and policies toward the other party must first be withdrawn. This is our unchangeable demand, which we have consistently stated, and it is a crucial task that must be resolved first to mend inter-Korean relations and open a bright future ahead.”

The central focus of North Korea’s perspective on inter-Korean relations lies in the second principle. Therefore, regarding the end-of-war declaration proposed by South Korea as a fundamental issue for resolving inter-Korean problems, North Korea presents the withdrawal of dualistic attitudes and hostile policies toward North Korea as a prerequisite. However, amidst high mutual distrust between the two Koreas, from South Korea’s perspective, North Korea must also fulfill the preconditions it has set for itself. Currently, it remains at a stage where these dualistic dilemmas cannot be resolved simultaneously. Therefore, for the end-of-war declaration to be a genuine end-of-war declaration, it must first begin with a frank mutual acknowledgment of the significant differences in the perspectives of the two Koreas and a search for practical measures to share these perspectives.

North Korea-U.S. Relations

The report of the 8th Party Congress presented three principles for external relations. First, it established the supreme mission of diplomacy as defending dignity, enhancing national prestige, and safeguarding national interests, while firmly upholding the principle of self-reliance in external activities. Second, it focused on subjugating the United States, the main obstacle and greatest enemy to the development of the revolution, stating that the U.S.’s reality and the true intentions of its policy toward North Korea remain unchanged; therefore, a strategic approach to the U.S. should be established, and solidarity with anti-U.S. self-reliance forces should be expanded. Third, it asserted that the key to establishing new North Korea-U.S. relations lies in the withdrawal of the U.S.’s hostile policy toward North Korea, and that in the future, the U.S. will be dealt with on the principle of strength against strength and 선대선 (goodwill against goodwill).

In his policy speech, Chairman Kim Jong Un pointed out that the U.S. administration’s military threats and hostile policies toward North Korea over the past eight months have not changed at all; rather, the forms and methods have become more insidious. He further stated that the U.S.’s claims of “diplomatic engagement” and “dialogue without preconditions” are merely a facade to deceive the international community and conceal its hostile actions. Therefore, he emphasized the need to prepare tactical measures to implement the strategic design for dealing with the U.S. based on rigorous research and analysis of the U.S. administration’s trends toward North Korea, the prospects of U.S. political dynamics, and the interrelationships of rapidly changing international forces in the external affairs sector.

It is difficult to have excessive expectations for North Korea-U.S. relations in 2022. The failure of the Hanoi Summit in 2019 and the subsequent breakdown of working-level talks in Stockholm clearly demonstrated that the calculations of both sides are completely different. Therefore, unless both sides meet with new calculations, it is unlikely that another summit will be held even if working-level talks progress. Since the Biden administration took office, the official stance has been a “calibrated practical approach.” However, the maximum extent of calibration that the U.S. can accept is a nuclear freeze that demonstrates sincerity toward complete denuclearization. North Korea’s parallel development policy, however, has not yet made a strategic decision for complete denuclearization. The limit of calibration proposed by North Korea, based on the calculations from the Hanoi Summit, is partial denuclearization, involving the abandonment of the Yongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for phased sanctions relief and simultaneous actions. It is difficult to find common ground between the U.S.’s demand for a “sincere freeze” and North Korea’s proposal for “partial denuclearization.”

North Korean Denuclearization

In his commemorative speech at the National Defense Development Exhibition in October, Chairman Kim Jong Un stated that the danger posed by the military tensions around the Korean Peninsula is different from that of the past ten, five, or even three years. He strongly criticized the joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises and South Korea’s recent military modernization. He asserted that although the U.S. has frequently sent signals that it is not hostile toward North Korea recently, there is no credible behavioral basis for this. He emphasized, “Under the unstable current situation created on the Korean Peninsula, continuously strengthening our military power in response is the demand of the times for our revolution and a terrestrial duty we bear before our revolution and future.” Therefore, he stressed the need to further accelerate the development and production of essential strategic and tactical means for national security by strengthening the quality and quantity of the defense industry, in accordance with the second five-year plan for defense industry revolution (2021-2025) presented at the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea.

Chairman Kim Jong Un boasted that the completion of the “great historic feat of nuclear armament construction,” achieved in 2017, four years after pursuing the parallel development line of economic construction and nuclear armament construction at the 8th Party Congress, was an unprecedented miracle and a historic contribution to future generations. Therefore, Chairman Kim Jong Un will continue efforts to strengthen nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, missiles, in terms of both quality and quantity during the second five-year plan period for the defense industry.

However, these efforts will soon face two major challenges. First, the parallel development line of economic construction and nuclear armament construction under the Kim Jong Un regime will increasingly experience contradictions rather than complementarity over time. Partial denuclearization alone will make it difficult for North Korea to secure the level of international economic sanctions relief it desires, thus placing North Korea in a dilemma of choosing between two options. Second, the global military order is undergoing a period of upheaval due to the revolutionary development of cutting-edge technologies. The United States has begun to pursue a new path of integrated deterrence beyond nuclear deterrence and is creating a new complex warfare space that emphasizes cyber and space domains beyond traditional domains, thus the political and military utility of North Korea’s nuclear forces will rapidly diminish.

Therefore, to formulate a new strategy for survival and prosperity in the 21st century, North Korea must move beyond the outdated parallel development line and devise new calculations. To this end, the informatization of North Korea, which can properly conceptualize the changes in the rapidly changing external world within Chairman Kim Jong Un’s internal world, his mind, must become a core task. ■

※ This commentary is the Korean translation of the original text, "Reading Chairman Kim Jong Un’s Mind."

■ Ha Young-sun_Chairman of EAI, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington and has served as a professor in the Department of Diplomacy at Seoul National University, a visiting researcher at the Princeton University Center for International Studies, a visiting researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Director of the Institute for International Affairs at Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for American Studies, President of the Korean Peace Studies Association, Co-Chair of the Korean side for the Joint Research Committee for a New Era of Korea-Japan Relations, member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Council, and member of the Elder Advisory Council for the Preparation Committee for the Inter-Korean Summit. He currently serves as Chairman of EAI and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. His recent books and edited volumes include <The World Politics of Love: War and Peace>, <A Correct View of Korean Diplomatic History: Tradition and Modernity>, <The Competition Between China and the U.S. in Constructing the Asia-Pacific Order>, and <International Politics of Four Travels: Analysis of Joseon Missions to Qing China and Their Records (16th-19th Centuries)>. He also wrote a column titled “Ha Young-sun Column” for Chosun Ilbo and JoongAng Ilbo for seven years.

■ Managed and Edited by:Lee Seung-yeon_EAI Researcher

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