[EAI Global NK Commentary] The Pros and Cons of North and South Korea's Simultaneous UN Entry

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Korea's Diplomatic Journey to UN Membership: '8 Applications, 9 Rejections'

This year marks the 30th anniversary of North and South Korea's simultaneous entry into the UN (United Nations) in 1991. South Korea was recognized by the UN as the sole legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula in 1948. Having attended the UN General Assembly as an observer that year, South Korea began its efforts to join the UN in January of the following year. Subsequently, between 1948 and 1991, the South Korean government applied five times and its allies three times, for a total of eight applications, but it took 42 years to achieve its goal.

To become a UN member state, approval from the Security Council, composed of five permanent members (US, Russia, UK, France, China) and ten non-permanent members, is required. This is because, according to the UN Charter, for a Security Council resolution to be adopted, none of the permanent members can exercise their veto power. Although South Korea's recommendations for UN membership or requests for reconsideration received the support of a majority of member states over several attempts, the Soviet Union was consistently an obstacle. Furthermore, after the People's Republic of China replaced Taiwan as the representative of China in 1971, the barrier to membership became even more formidable.

During the Cold War, divided nations claimed to be the sole legitimate government and sought international recognition. Therefore, they not only made efforts for their own UN membership but also engaged in all-out diplomatic efforts to oppose the other side's membership. However, a significant shift in South Korea's UN membership policy occurred with the announcement of President Park Chung-hee's "Special Statement on the Foreign Policy for Peaceful Unification," also known as the June 23rd Declaration, in 1973. The declaration, issued the day after the simultaneous entry of East and West Germany into the UN was passed by the Security Council, stated in Article 5 that South Korea would not oppose simultaneous entry as long as it did not hinder unification. However, North Korea's Kim Il-sung denounced this as a "scheme to create two Koreas" and demanded UN membership under the single name of the "Federal Republic of Koryo."

In 1975, the South Korean government requested reconsideration of its application twice, prompted by the applications of North and South Vietnam for UN membership, but failed in the Security Council adoption process. Thus, out of the total eight applications by South Korea, four were blocked by Soviet vetoes, and the other four failed because the Security Council took no action. Nevertheless, South Korea continued its efforts to persuade member states of the validity of its bid and concentrated its diplomatic efforts on creating a favorable environment for membership by actively participating in various UN activities.

Particularly after the launch of the Roh Tae-woo administration in 1988, active "Nordpolitik" led to the successful hosting of the Seoul Olympics, in which many communist countries, including the Soviet Union and China, participated. This event also led to the spread of international public opinion supporting South Korea's UN membership. A more decisive turning point was the establishment of diplomatic relations with Eastern European countries, starting with Hungary in February 1989, followed by diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in September 1990 and an agreement to establish trade representative offices with China in October.

In his New Year's press conference in 1991, President Roh Tae-woo declared his intention to pursue even solo entry, but Kim Il-sung denounced this as a "sin unforgivable for eternity, dividing one Korea into two" and proposed simultaneous entry with a single seat for both North and South Korea. However, North Korea's argument for solidifying division lacked persuasiveness, as North Yemen and South Yemen, which joined the UN in 1947 and 1967 respectively, unified in May 1990 to become a single member state, Yemen, and East and West Germany also represented the UN as one country after their unification in 1990. Ultimately, with 71 member states supporting South Korea's membership and no one responding to North Korea's single-seat proposal, North Korea also expressed its intention to join the UN in May 1991. On August 8, 1991, the Security Council unanimously recommended the admission of both North and South Korea, and on September 17, in the General Assembly, North Korea (D.P.R.K.) became the 160th member state and South Korea (R.O.K) the 161st, according to alphabetical order in English.

The reasons commonly cited for South Korea's UN membership, after a long diplomatic journey of 42 years, are the structural changes in international relations due to the end of the Cold War and securing Soviet support through diplomatic ties with the USSR. Of course, the all-out diplomatic efforts by the South Korean government at a pan-governmental level were also effective. However, China's "supporting role" was also a decisive driving factor. According to the memoirs of Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, who accompanied Premier Li Peng on a visit to North Korea in May 1991, China exerted pressure on North Korea, akin to a final ultimatum, stating that "if South Korea joins first, it will be difficult for North Korea to join." Simultaneously, however, China played a crucial role in alleviating Kim Il-sung's concerns that South Korea's application might be approved while North Korea's could be rejected, by explaining the dynamics of the Security Council at the time.

North and South Korea's Simultaneous UN Entry: A Masterstroke or a Blunder?

Although they joined with separate seats, resulting in "incomplete membership," the simultaneous entry of North and South Korea was met with high expectations as a monumental event that would end the Cold War structure in East Asia and set the Korean Peninsula on a path toward peaceful coexistence. However, while it took East and West Germany 17 years to consolidate their UN seats, 30 years later, the gap in national strength between North and South Korea has widened, and instability on the Korean Peninsula has increased due to North Korea's nuclear armament. In this context, it is necessary to reflect on at least the following two points when evaluating the simultaneous entry.

First, by becoming full members of the UN, North and South Korea became distinct sovereign states with different systems and ideologies in the international community, and both sides implicitly acknowledged this fact. Furthermore, by joining the UN, which prohibits war, both sides agreed to the international legal understanding that neither could pursue unification by force. However, there were also criticisms that this decision, made through the compromise of major powers without any basic agreement between North and South Korea, solidified the division.

In the case of East and West Germany, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, who came to power in 1969 and advocated for his "New Ostpolitik," which centered on European peace policy and the peaceful management of the divided system, concluded the Basic Treaty between East and West Germany in 1972. Along with this, by abandoning the Hallstein Doctrine (a foreign policy that recognized only West Germany as the legitimate German state and severed diplomatic relations with countries that recognized communist East Germany), East and West Germany publicly announced to the domestic and international community that they had a special relationship. Subsequently, they promoted increased human and material exchange between the two Germanys, leading to their simultaneous UN entry.

In contrast, the North and South Korean case proceeded without such procedures. In particular, North Korea's agreement to simultaneous entry in May 1991 was a sudden decision by Kim Il-sung, leading to UN entry without prior coordination between the two Koreas. Although a Basic Agreement defining their relationship as special and aiming for unification was adopted three months after simultaneous entry, and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was signed, these post-entry agreements, made without internal institutional and legal preparations, proved ineffective amidst the roller-coaster-like inter-Korean relations that have swung between tension and détente. Moreover, while South Korea established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China before and after its entry, North Korea has yet to achieve improved relations with the US and Japan.

In summary, comparing the simultaneous entry of the two Germanys and North and South Korea, there were similarities in that both occurred during periods of structural transformation in international relations – détente in the 1970s and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s – and in the achievements of West Germany's Ostpolitik and South Korea's Nordpolitik. However, the simultaneous entry of North and South Korea differed significantly in that there were no prior agreements like those concluded between the two Germanys, nor was there cross-recognition by neighboring countries, thus revealing limitations in improving inter-Korean relations or overcoming the division.

Second, 30 years after their simultaneous entry, the report cards for North and South Korea show a stark difference. South Korea, having achieved its long-cherished goal of UN membership, has achieved tangible results as a "prepared" member state, achieving both the enhancement of national interests and contributions to the world. It has served twice as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, produced UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, been elected to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) five consecutive times, and is currently ranked 11th globally in development cooperation and will be ranked 9th in 2022 in terms of financial contributions to the UN. In contrast, North Korea, despite starting from the same point, has taken a completely opposite path in terms of its standing in the international community. It is subject to continuous sanctions and condemnation on the UN stage regarding its nuclear program and human rights issues, and ranks in the 130s in terms of UN contributions.

However, for North Korea, UN membership provided an opportunity to directly communicate and interact with the international community and to "pioneer" its own diplomatic position. Kim Il-sung, who had maintained a revolutionary line against South Korea with the support of the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War, became concerned about absorption by South Korea following the dissolution of the Cold War order and the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union, and decided to pursue UN entry as a survival strategy for his regime. Subsequently, North Korea attempted to use the UN as a bridgehead to improve relations with Western countries, including the United States, and was able to significantly alleviate its economic and food shortages through UN agencies such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Food Programme (WFP).

According to Professor Joo Jae-woo of Kyung Hee University, North Korea's entry into the UN was a diplomatic triumph, allowing it to station its mission in New York, the "country it most wanted to communicate with," and gain opportunities for direct dialogue with the US. Before joining, North Korea had sought channels of communication with the US through the Soviet Union, China, and third countries, and particularly after the normalization of US-China relations in the mid-1970s, it often relied on the Chinese channel. As a quid pro quo, China's influence over North Korea increased during that period, but after joining the UN, North Korea actively utilized its own diplomatic leverage, leading to a decrease in the influence of neighboring countries, including China. In fact, North Korea seems to be using the UN as a platform to protest international pressure, disregarding Security Council warnings and sanctions regarding human rights issues or its nuclear development.

Между тем, в отношении северокорейской ядерной проблемы следует отметить, что, несмотря на растущие разногласия и конкуренцию между США и Китаем, Соединенные Штаты подчеркивали, что данный вопрос является областью, в которой возможно сотрудничество с Китаем. Китай также сотрудничал с США, присоединяясь к санкциям в рамках ООН в отношении ядерной программы и провокационных действий Северной Кореи. Возможность начала процесса денуклеаризации и установления мира на Корейском полуострове, начиная с новогоднего послания Ким Чен Ына в 2018 году, стала реальной благодаря тому, что две сверхдержавы объединились под общей целью денуклеаризации Северной Кореи и ввели против нее жесткие санкции.

However, with President Biden strengthening pressure on China through the construction of a democratic multilateral alliance network in response to issues such as the trade war, technological competition, the South China Sea dispute, the Taiwan issue, and global supply chains, a shift in China's attitude is being observed. President Xi Jinping, who has increased the frequency of exchanging letters with Kim Jong-un to showcase the North Korea-China blood alliance, submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council calling for the easing of sanctions against North Korea, along with Russia, in October 2021. Around the same time, the Panel of Experts under the Security Council's Sanctions Committee revealed that the sanctions committee was not functioning properly due to China's non-compliance and obstruction of sanctions. North Korea, in turn, is actively defending China, criticizing the US, which advocates for the "China threat theory," as the real culprit destroying regional stability through unilateral and unfair bloc-based foreign policies in the Indo-Pacific region.

In the future, North Korea will continue to remain a member state of the UN, vehemently criticizing the UN and the US for ongoing sanctions resolutions by the Security Council and the General Assembly, without declaring withdrawal. This is because, for North Korea, which is isolated in the international community, the structural limitations of the UN, which is still swayed by the power dynamics of major countries, are calculated to be more advantageous than disadvantageous. ■

■ Author: Lee Shin-hwa_Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University and President of the Korean Association of UN Studies. After graduating with a degree in English Language and Literature from Ewha Womans University, she earned a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Maryland. Following a postdoctoral fellowship at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs (CFIA), she served as an Africa regional officer at the UNHCR, a special advisor to the UN Independent Inquiry on Rwanda, and a visiting professor at Princeton University. Her major works include Human Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in East Asia; South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia; and "Foreign Policy Dilemma in South Korean Democracy."

■ Editor: Lee Seung-yeon_EAI 연구원

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