[Global NK Commentary] The Pros and Cons of South and North Korea's Simultaneous UN Membership

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South Korea's Diplomatic Journey to UN Membership: An '8 Attempts, 9 Failures' Saga

This year marks the 30th anniversary of South and North Korea's simultaneous admission to the United Nations (UN) in 1991. South Korea was recognized by the UN as the sole legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula in 1948. Having attended the UN General Assembly as an observer that year, South Korea began its efforts to join the UN in January of the following year. Subsequently, the South Korean government applied for membership five times, and its allies applied three times, totaling eight applications. It took 42 years to achieve this goal.

To become a UN member state, approval from the Security Council (SC), composed of five permanent members (US, Russia, UK, France, China) and ten non-permanent members, is required. According to the UN Charter, a Security Council resolution can only be adopted if none of the permanent members exercise their veto power. While South Korea's numerous recommendations for membership or requests for reconsideration received the support of a majority of member states, the Soviet Union consistently posed an obstacle. Furthermore, after the People's Republic of China replaced Taiwan as the representative of China in 1971, the barrier to membership became even more formidable.

During the Cold War, divided nations claimed to be the sole legitimate government and sought international recognition. Consequently, they not only exerted diplomatic efforts for their own UN membership but also engaged in total diplomatic warfare to oppose the membership of their counterparts. However, a significant shift in South Korea's UN membership policy occurred with the announcement of President Park Chung-hee's "Special Statement on Foreign Policy for Peaceful Unification," also known as the June 23 Declaration, in 1973. Issued the day after the simultaneous admission of East and West Germany to the UN was passed by the Security Council, this declaration stated in Article 5 that South Korea would not oppose simultaneous admission as long as it did not impede unification. However, Kim Il-sung of North Korea denounced this as a "scheme to create two Koreas" and demanded UN membership under the single name of the "Confederated Republic of Koryo."

In 1975, the South Korean government requested reconsideration of its membership application twice, prompted by the applications of North and South Vietnam to join the UN. However, these attempts failed during the Security Council adoption process. Thus, out of the total eight applications by South Korea, four were thwarted by Soviet vetoes, and the other four failed because the Security Council took no action. Nevertheless, South Korea continued its efforts to persuade member states of the justification for its membership and focused its diplomatic power on creating a favorable environment for admission by actively participating in various UN activities.

Particularly after the launch of the Roh Tae-woo administration in 1988, active 'Nordpolitik' led to the successful hosting of the Seoul Olympics, attended by numerous communist countries including the Soviet Union and China. This event also fueled international public opinion supporting South Korea's UN membership. A more decisive turning point came with the establishment of diplomatic relations with Eastern European countries, beginning with Hungary in February 1989, followed by normalization of relations with the Soviet Union in September 1990, and an agreement to establish trade representative offices with China in October.

In his New Year's press conference in 1991, President Roh Tae-woo declared his intention to pursue solo membership, but Kim Il-sung condemned this as a "sin unforgivable for eternity, dividing one Korea into two" and proposed a plan for joint membership with a single seat for both Koreas. However, North Korea's argument for solidifying division lacked persuasiveness, as North Yemen and South Yemen, which joined the UN in 1947 and 1967 respectively, unified in May 1990 to become a single member state, Yemen, and East and West Germany also represented a single state at the UN after their unification in 1990. Ultimately, while 71 member states supported South Korea's membership, no country responded to North Korea's proposal for a single seat. Consequently, in May 1991, North Korea also expressed its intention to join the UN. On August 8, 1991, the Security Council unanimously adopted a recommendation for the admission of both South and North Korea as member states. On September 17, at the General Assembly, North Korea (D.P.R.K.) became the 160th member, and South Korea (R.O.K.) became the 161st, in alphabetical order.

The reasons commonly cited for South Korea becoming a UN member after a long diplomatic journey of 42 years include the structural changes in international relations due to the end of the Cold War and securing Soviet support through normalization of relations with the USSR. Of course, the comprehensive diplomatic efforts by the South Korean government were also effective. However, China's 'supporting role' was also a decisive driving factor. According to the memoirs of Qian Qichen, then Chinese Foreign Minister, who accompanied Premier Li Peng on a visit to North Korea in May 1991, China exerted pressure on North Korea, stating that if South Korea joined first, it would be difficult for North Korea to join. Simultaneously, China played a crucial role in alleviating Kim Il-sung's concerns by explaining the dynamics of the Security Council at the time and assuring him that South Korea's application could be approved while North Korea's could be rejected.

Simultaneous UN Admission of South and North Korea: A Masterstroke or a Blunder?

Although they joined with separate seats, resulting in 'incomplete admission,' the simultaneous entry of South and North Korea into the UN was met with high expectations as a monumental event that would end the Cold War structure in East Asia and set the Korean Peninsula on a path toward peaceful coexistence. However, while it took East and West Germany 17 years to consolidate their UN seats, 30 years later, the gap in national strength between South and North Korea has widened, and instability on the Korean Peninsula has increased due to North Korea's nuclear armament. In this context, it is necessary to reflect on at least the following two points when evaluating the simultaneous admission.

First, by becoming full UN member states, South and North Korea became distinct sovereign nations with different systems and ideologies in the international community, and both sides implicitly acknowledged this fact. Furthermore, by joining the UN, which prohibits war, both sides agreed to the international legal understanding that neither could pursue unification by force. However, there were also significant criticisms that this decision, made through the compromise of major powers without any basic agreement between the two Koreas, solidified the division.

In the case of East and West Germany, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, who came to power in 1969 and advocated for his 'New Ostpolitik,' which centered on European peace policy and the peaceful management of the divided system, concluded the Basic Treaty between East and West Germany in 1972. Concurrently, by abandoning the Hallstein Doctrine (a foreign policy principle that West Germany was the only legitimate German state and would sever diplomatic relations with any country recognizing communist East Germany), both Germanys publicly declared their special relationship domestically and internationally. Subsequently, they promoted increased exchanges of people and goods between the two Germanys, leading to their simultaneous UN admission.

In contrast, the case of South and North Korea involved no such procedures. Notably, North Korea's agreement to simultaneous admission was based on Kim Il-sung's sudden decision in May 1991, leading to UN entry without prior coordination between the two Koreas. Although a Basic Agreement defining their relationship as special and aiming for unification was adopted three months after their simultaneous admission, and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was signed, these post-admission agreements, made without internal institutional and legal consolidation, proved largely ineffective amidst the rollercoaster-like inter-Korean relations that have swung between cold and hot phases. Moreover, while South Korea normalized relations with the Soviet Union and China before and after its admission, North Korea has yet to achieve improved relations with the US and Japan.

In summary, comparing the simultaneous admission of the two Germanys and the two Koreas reveals similarities in terms of the structural transformation of the international situation during the détente of the 1970s and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, as well as the achievements of West Germany's Ostpolitik and South Korea's Nordpolitik. However, the simultaneous admission of the two Koreas differed significantly due to the absence of prior agreements between them and the lack of cross-recognition by neighboring countries, thereby revealing limitations in improving inter-Korean relations or overcoming the division.

Second, 30 years after their simultaneous admission, the performance reports for South and North Korea show a stark contrast. South Korea, having achieved its long-held aspiration of UN membership, has reaped tangible benefits as a 'prepared' member state, achieving both the enhancement of national interests and contributions to the world. It has served twice as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, produced UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, been elected five consecutive times as a member of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and has made significant contributions in the field of development cooperation. Its financial contributions to the UN currently rank 11th globally and are projected to reach 9th in 2022. In contrast, North Korea, despite starting from the same point, has taken a completely opposite path in terms of its standing within the international community. It remains a target of continuous sanctions and condemnation on the UN stage due to its nuclear program and human rights issues, and its UN assessed contributions rank around 130th.

However, for North Korea, UN membership provided an opportunity to directly communicate and interact with the international community, allowing it to 'pioneer' its own diplomatic standing. Kim Il-sung, who had maintained a revolutionary line against South Korea with the support of the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War, became concerned about absorption by South Korea following the dissolution of the Cold War order and the normalization of relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union. He thus decided to pursue UN entry as a survival strategy for his regime. Subsequently, North Korea attempted to use the UN as a bridgehead to improve relations with the West, including the United States, and was able to significantly alleviate its economic and food shortages through UN agencies such as the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Food Programme (WFP).

According to Professor Joo Jae-woo of Kyung Hee University, North Korea's entry into the UN was a diplomatic triumph, enabling it to establish a permanent mission in New York, the city where it most desired to communicate with the United States, and gain opportunities for direct dialogue with the US. Prior to its admission, North Korea had sought channels of communication with the US through the Soviet Union, China, and third countries. In particular, after the normalization of US-China relations in the mid-1970s, it often relied on the Chinese channel. As a reciprocal consequence, China's influence over North Korea grew. However, after joining the UN, North Korea actively utilized its diplomatic leverage, leading to a decrease in the influence of surrounding countries, including China. In fact, North Korea has disregarded UN Security Council warnings and sanctions regarding human rights issues and its nuclear development, instead using the UN as a platform to protest international pressure.

Meanwhile, regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, it is noteworthy that despite deepening disagreements and competition between the US and China, the US has emphasized that this issue is an area where cooperation with China is possible. China has also cooperated with the US by participating in sanctions against North Korea through the UN framework for its nuclear development and provocative actions.

However, with President Biden strengthening pressure on China through the construction of a network of democratic alliances in response to trade wars, technological competition, South China Sea disputes, the Taiwan issue, and global supply chain problems, a shift in China's attitude is becoming apparent. President Xi Jinping, who has increased the frequency of exchanging letters with Kim Jong-un to showcase the North Korea-China blood alliance, submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council for the easing of sanctions against North Korea, along with Russia, in October 2021. Around the same time, the Panel of Experts under the Security Council's Sanctions Committee reported that the sanctions committee was not functioning properly due to China's non-compliance and obstruction of sanctions. North Korea, in turn, is actively supporting China, criticizing the US, which advocates for the 'China threat theory,' as the true culprit destabilizing regional security through its unilateral and unfair 'us-vs-them' foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region.

In the future, North Korea will continue to remain a member state of the UN, vehemently criticizing the UN and the US for ongoing sanctions resolutions by the Security Council and the General Assembly, without declaring withdrawal. This is because North Korea, isolated in the international community, calculates that the structural limitations of the UN, which is still swayed by the dynamics of great power politics, will be more advantageous than disadvantageous. ■

■ Author: Lee Shin-hwa_Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University, and President of the Korean Association for the UN System. After graduating with a degree in English Language and Literature from Ewha Womans University, she earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Maryland. Following a postdoctoral fellowship at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs (CFIA), she served as an Africa Regional Officer at the UNHCR, a Special Advisor to the UN Independent Commission of Inquiry on Rwanda, and a Visiting Professor at Princeton University. Her major works include Human Security and Cross-Border Cooperation in East Asia; South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia; and "Foreign Policy Dilemma in South Korean Democracy."

■ Editor: Lee Seung-yeon_EAI Research Fellow

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr