[EAI Presidential Election Special Commentary] ③ The 20th Presidential Election and Transformative Leadership

[Editor's Note]

Ahead of the 20th presidential election scheduled for March 9, 2022, the East Asia Institute (EAI) is implementing the project <Conditions for a Successful Presidency in 2022>, targeting presidential candidates, their campaign teams, politicians, the media, and influencers. As part of this initiative, we are serializing the [EAI Presidential Election Special Commentary Series]. This third report in the series features an article by Professor Jang Hoon of Chung-Ang University.

The author identifies a problem where partisan electoral politics intensifies as democracy worldwide is compressed into electoral democracy. To escape this situation where crucial economic and social issues are relegated to the background, the author argues for the emergence of 'transformative leadership' in the upcoming presidential election. The author presents three concurrent trends as the background for the emergence of transformative leadership: the deepening cartel system of established political parties, the decline of the globalization trend characterized by 'US leadership and Chinese participation,' and the intensification of political tribalism due to hyper-connectivity and social media use. Notably, the author points out that the candidates from the ruling and main opposition parties are not figures who have conformed to the established political order but rather those who have challenged it, expressing hope that the election will select leaders who can bring about change in Korean society.

Amidst a global decline in democracy, the prevailing global trend is that democracy is increasingly shrinking into electoral democracy. Modern democracy, with its history of over 200 years, has historically absorbed diverse ideologies such as freedom, equality, human rights, and the environment, exerting an unparalleled appeal. While the triumphant march of democracy is not a distant memory, democracy has been in continuous retreat across Asia, Europe, and South America since around 2010.

The causes and manifestations of democratic decline are truly diverse. Among them, the most decisive trend is the contraction and shrinkage of democracy, which once encompassed values like freedom, equality, and human rights, into electoral democracy—a competition that garners the support of the majority of citizens. While the mechanism of elections, as a process of selecting representatives such as presidents and legislators and legitimizing power, is the only aspect that is superficially respected, the other institutions that uphold democracy are in decline across the globe, including in the United States, Brazil, Hungary, Poland, and Spain. The separation of powers is faltering, and the rule of law is in continuous descent.

As the contraction into electoral democracy proceeds worldwide, we face an election in the spring of next year to elect a new representative (president) with vast powers. As democracy is compressed into electoral democracy, electoral competition inevitably becomes existential and overheated. The more electoral politics, characterized as a so-called tribal war boiling towards a boiling point, intensifies, the more fundamental issues are pushed to the sidelines. Strategies for fundamental transformation of climate change and energy systems, and policies addressing deepening socioeconomic polarization, are sidelined as partisan struggles take center stage.

Nevertheless, this article aims to frame the upcoming presidential election as one that demands the emergence of transformative leadership. The president is the only leader elected by the participation of all citizens in a democratic system. Furthermore, it is a position where power is concentrated, transcending checks from the legislative and judicial branches. Therefore, we expect transformative leadership from the president that goes beyond the existing order. However, looking back at the history of the Korean presidency or the 200-year history of the US presidency, transformative leadership that fundamentally overhauls the old order and establishes a new one has been exceedingly rare. In the 200-year history of the United States, figures who fundamentally reshaped the structure of the existing political and economic systems and established a new, sustainable order during their term are extremely few, such as Lincoln and Roosevelt. (Only four presidents have memorial halls in Washington D.C., the capital of the United States: in order, the first president Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt.)

The presidential election in March next year is a juncture where transformative leadership must structurally emerge, irrespective of candidates' abilities or personal preferences. This is due to three reasons. First, the structural condition for a major transformation is the disintegration of the existing order. Second, the shift in the globalization trend, characterized by 'US leadership and Chinese participation,' is evident in the intensifying US-China strategic competition and core strategic industries. Third, the sufficient condition for transformative leadership is the anti-establishment nature of the leaders.

Let us first examine the disintegration of the existing order as a structural condition. While democratization in 1987, globalization in the late 1990s, and informatization since the 2000s have been the pillars of the core order that sustained our lives, these pillars have been simultaneously shaken at their foundations in recent years, leading to their collapse. The collapse of the old order naturally necessitates the search for and exploration of a new order.

While numerous analyses exist regarding the collapse of the 1987 democratization system, this discussion will focus on the core issue: the deepening cartel system of established political parties and the resulting powerlessness of political representation. Despite the emergence and disappearance of many political parties since democratization in 1987, a clear and unwavering trend has been the strong maintenance of a monopoly by established parties. The current ruling party, the Democratic Party of Korea, and the main opposition party, the People Power Party, have changed their names multiple times, but their roots lie in the first, second, and third parties at the launch of democratization in 1987. (The merger of the first and third parties at that time forms the root of the People Power Party.)

These parties have maintained their monopolistic, cartel system by using the Political Parties Act, which is designed to make new entry extremely difficult, and the election laws and political funding laws, which are highly disadvantageous to new political candidates, young politicians, and independent candidates, as defensive shields. Although there have been new parties challenging this system, most have disappeared within a few years or have been absorbed by the two major parties.

The perpetuation of the cartel party system has naturally led to a failure of representation, distancing the relationship between ordinary citizens and political parties. The two major parties do not represent new figures or ideas and ideologies that reflect the changes of the times. Only figures and ideas that conform to and are loyal to the existing conventions can enter the realm of institutional politics. As a result, extreme distrust and dissatisfaction with the established institutional politics have emerged.

A second perspective explaining the collapse of the established order is the retreat of the globalization trend, characterized by 'US leadership and Chinese participation,' which had continued since the late 1990s. The globalization of the Korean economy, initiated under the Kim Young-sam administration, has driven steady growth over the past two decades and has served as the foundation for Korea's emergence as one of the world's top ten trading nations.

However, for several years now, US-led globalization has been taking a significantly different direction than before. The deepening US-China strategic competition and the decoupling of core strategic industries demonstrate a shift in the logic, actors, and modalities of 20th-century globalization, which was an open system 'led by the US and supported by China.' The United States has begun reorganizing global supply chains with friendly democratic nations, while China is either responding to these reorganization efforts or seeking alternative solutions.

New networks for production, trade, finance, and digital connectivity are being established, indicating that the Korean economy, with its high external dependency, stands at a crossroads of numerous choices. At this juncture, wise choices are possible only through the perception and understanding of not only Korea's global corporations but also the numerous private actors in cooperative relationships with them, and political leadership.

Third, the informatization that began in earnest in the mid-2000s under the Kim Dae-jung administration was a new engine for the Korean economy and pushed Koreans into a life connected to digital networks 24 hours a day. Informatization is also undergoing fundamental changes these days. Social media, represented by Facebook, KakaoTalk, and Twitter, which enable 24-hour connectivity, have led to political polarization that amplifies economic polarization. While the reduction of life in digital networks to a space of constant connection with others or global information is a positive outcome of informatization, this hyper-connectivity has simultaneously given rise to political tribalism. Without even resorting to concepts like echo chambers or filter bubbles, individuals increasingly disconnect from those with different thoughts, tastes, and lifestyles, choosing to speak, listen, and write within their own political tribes and comfortable groups. As repeatedly observed in phenomena like Trumpism and Brexit, political polarization stemming from political tribalism poses a significant challenge to democracy. Korean society is no exception to this trend.

Digital hyperconnectivity, once considered only a blessing, is disrupting the balance between individual freedom and state power. In response to the global health crisis of COVID-19, digital monitoring (also referred to as digital surveillance depending on the country) has become commonplace, leading to a rapid contraction of individual freedoms and privacy, and a swift expansion of state power. The arduous task of upholding democracy in a context of shrinking individual freedoms is emerging as a challenge not only for us but for people worldwide.

The structural transformations in democratization, globalization, and informatization are thus urging experiments and decisions to phase out the old order and move towards a new (dis)order. This crossroads of transformation naturally calls for transformative leadership.

However, when structural conditions demand a major transformation, political leadership is not always able to respond accordingly. Experts who have studied presidential leadership argue that only individuals who have challenged the existing power structure and order, rather than those deeply involved in it, can achieve structural transformation. In other words, leaders who bring about transformation in an era of major transition are those who oppose the established political order, rather than those affiliated with it.

The candidates from the ruling and main opposition parties in next year's presidential election are, in common, figures who have challenged the established political order rather than conformed to it. Neither candidate has prior experience as a member of the National Assembly, nor have they been nurtured as leaders by their respective parties over a long period. Furthermore, it is difficult to consider either candidate as deeply affiliated with the mainstream policy ideologies or human networks of their own parties. Both candidates are, in effect, akin to presidential nominees outsourced by the major parties.

In other words, both candidates possess the background and character to attempt a major transformation. Ultimately, our interest converges on how these two candidates understand the current fragility of Korean society and the collapse of the old order. This is because the major candidates' perceptions of the collapse of the old order will ultimately determine the direction of their search for a new path. It is likely that citizens will head to the polls with full consideration that this presidential election is one to select leaders befitting the triple transition discussed above. ■

■ Author: Jang Hoon_ Professor at Chung-Ang University. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Seoul National University and a Ph.D. from Northwestern University in the United States. His areas of expertise include democracy, and democracy and diplomacy. He has served as president of the Korean Political Science Association (48th term), president of the Korean Association of Party Studies, and chairman of the board of the Korea Parliamentary Development Institute. In 2005, he was a Reagan-Parse Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy in the United States. His books, including <An Experiment of 20 Years> and <The Second Act of Globalization> (co-edited), have been selected as outstanding academic books by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. He currently writes a monthly column, "Jang Hoon's Column," for the JoongAng Ilbo.

■ Responsible Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun EAI Research Fellow

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