[Global NK Commentary] The U.S. Position on the End-of-War Declaration

[Editor's Note]

President Moon proposed an end-of-war declaration in September 2021 and requested U.S. cooperation. In response, the Biden administration is pursuing diplomacy with North Korea based on a calibrated, practical approach, maintaining its stance that dialogue must be open without preconditions. The author assesses that the U.S. holds a negative view on the end-of-war declaration, raising questions about its timing, sequencing, and conditions. In the current situation where North Korea adheres to denuclearization, an end-of-war declaration could jeopardize the status of U.S. Forces Korea and inadvertently permit North Korea's military buildup. The author explains that given concerns about the weakening of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the legal status of the UN Command as an administrative body, there is no reason for the U.S. to be favorable towards it.

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The Biden administration is pursuing diplomacy with North Korea based on a calibrated, practical approach, maintaining its stance that dialogue must be open without preconditions. North Korea, in response, insists that the U.S. must abandon its hostile policy toward Pyongyang before practical negotiations can begin. As the positions of both sides clash sharply, the possibility of a North Korea-U.S. summit has gradually diminished. In this context, the South Korean government proposed an end-of-war declaration, essentially seeking a return to the Singapore agreement during the Trump administration, which involved two side agreements: the suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and an end-of-war declaration. In Singapore, both countries agreed on the establishment of new North Korea-U.S. relations and, consequently, on the necessity of an end-of-war declaration. At the ROK-U.S. summit in May of this year, both countries included the Panmunjom Declaration in their joint statement, which contained provisions for an end-of-war declaration. The U.S. had also agreed to an end-of-war declaration with North Korea.

South Korea maintained that the end-of-war declaration was merely a political statement and was not linked to U.S. Forces Korea or the UN Command. The U.S. also agreed with this position in principle. Furthermore, South Korea presented the end-of-war declaration as a gateway to denuclearization to break the deadlock in North Korea-U.S. dialogue. The logic was that if an end-of-war declaration was symbolically granted to North Korea, Pyongyang, which had been demanding the abandonment of hostile policies, would accept it, thereby allowing practical negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. to commence and address all issues.

However, North Korea began to attach conditions to the end-of-war declaration. North Korea demanded three substantive measures related to the end-of-war declaration: the suspension of joint military exercises, the lifting of sanctions related to people's livelihoods, and permission to export minerals and import oil. North Korea appears unwilling to resume practical negotiations. In reality, practical negotiations with the U.S. are an arduous game that North Korea finds difficult to accept. That is, through practical negotiations, the U.S. would demand phased denuclearization, and even for the first stage of freezing, North Korea would have to accept the verification demanded by the U.S. Considering that the Iran nuclear negotiations lasted for a year and a half, Kim Jong Un, who had hoped for a grand bargain through summit diplomacy with Trump, is thinking of obtaining something before negotiations rather than expecting practical negotiations.

As North Korea began to attach conditions, the U.S. clearly stated its opposition to the end-of-war declaration. National Security Advisor Sullivan raised questions regarding the timing, sequencing, and conditions of the end-of-war declaration. Firstly, while South Korea argues that the end-of-war declaration is a gateway to denuclearization, the U.S. position is that the declaration should be made in accordance with denuclearization measures. The U.S. lacks confidence that North Korea will denuclearize after the end-of-war declaration. In other words, it is uncertain whether the end-of-war declaration will positively impact the achievement of denuclearization goals. The U.S. side believes that while the end-of-war declaration may serve as a gateway to negotiations as South Korea hopes, it cannot agree to it if the sole purpose is to bring North Korea to the negotiating table, and it will not be very effective in achieving denuclearization goals.

North Korea's position is that an end-of-war declaration is possible only when the unfair double standards and the hostile policy toward North Korea are abolished. The U.S. views this as North Korea's attempt to highlight the abolition of U.S. hostile policies as a substantive measure for the end-of-war declaration, advocating for mutual disarmament between North Korea and the U.S., and ultimately seeking recognition of North Korea's nuclear armament.

Secondly, the U.S. is concerned about the weakening of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Currently, the U.S. views the suspension of joint military exercises, proposed by North Korea in relation to the end-of-war declaration, as its starting point. If an end-of-war declaration is made, North Korea will continue to demand the abolition of hostile policies from the U.S., which will lead to the suspension of joint military exercises, the suspension of strategic asset deployments to the Korean Peninsula, and ultimately, the reduction or withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea. The U.S. is concerned about North Korea's continuous military provocations and views its various new strategic weapon tests as undermining the defense systems of allies such as South Korea and Japan. In other words, the conditions for an end-of-war declaration are not being met. Therefore, if an end-of-war declaration is made, the status of U.S. Forces Korea will be jeopardized, and North Korea's military buildup will be inadvertently permitted. The end-of-war declaration would weaken U.S. deterrence.

The U.S., which recently seeks to strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance to counter China, is in a situation where strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance is even more urgent. The Indo-Pacific strategy is being developed based on various minilateralisms such as the Quad, AUKUS, and ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation, and the ROK-U.S. alliance serves as a crucial foundation for these mechanisms. Furthermore, U.S. military power based on its allies will become extremely important in the future for military conflict with China in areas such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, or for military deterrence against China. It is also possible that the U.S. may deploy intermediate-range missiles to bases in allied countries in the future to counter China. This is why the U.S. cannot abandon the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Thirdly, the UN Command remains an important basis for force provision that is available to the U.S. An end-of-war declaration could jeopardize the existence of the UN Command. Currently, the UN Command has the legal status of a UN administrative body responsible for the observance and enforcement of the Armistice Agreement, and if an end-of-war declaration is made, the reason for the UN Command's existence will disappear. China has consistently advocated for the dissolution of the UN Command and its rear bases after an end-of-war declaration. While it is expected that the U.S. will pursue legal measures to sustain the UN Command's military capabilities even if an end-of-war declaration is made, the military support from the 17 countries that send representatives to the UN Command to manage the armistice situation on the Korean Peninsula will cease, which would be a significant blow to the U.S.

Finally, an end-of-war declaration could fuel ROK-U.S. conflict. North Korea is well aware that adopting an end-of-war declaration is impossible due to the U.S.'s clear opposition. Therefore, it is imposing the task on South Korea, which is eager to improve inter-Korean relations, to persuade the U.S., and it knows that if this is not achieved, discord will arise between South Korea and the U.S. The U.S. does not desire such conflict between South Korea and the U.S., and therefore holds a negative stance on the end-of-war declaration.■

■ Author: Kim Hyun-wook_Professor and Head of the Americas Division at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy. He graduated from Yonsei University with a degree in Political Science and International Relations and holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Brown University. His major works include 'Prospects for the Biden Administration's China and Korean Peninsula Policies (2020)' and 'Outcomes and Tasks of the 51st ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) (2019)'. He has primarily researched ROK-U.S. alliance, North Korea-U.S. relations, and East Asian security.

■ Managed and Edited by: Min Ji-yoon_Head of External Cooperation, EAI

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