[EAI Presidential Election Special Commentary] ② Conditions for Presidential Success: Cooperate, Disperse, Respect

[Editor's Note]

Ahead of the 20th presidential election scheduled for March 9, 2022, the East Asia Institute (EAI) is conducting the project "Conditions for the 2022 President's Success," targeting presidential candidates, election campaigns, politicians, media, and influencers. As part of this initiative, EAI is serializing the "EAI Presidential Election Special Commentary Series." This second report in the series features an article by Professor Lee Dae-geun of Woosuk University, former editorial writer for The Kyunghyang Shinmun.

The author notes that President Moon Jae-in, despite taking office amidst national consensus, engaged in divisive politics by excluding the opposition and disrespecting the National Assembly. While divisive politics may appear to strengthen power due to its intensity, it actually obstructs dialogue and compromise between ruling and opposition parties. It fosters a good-versus-evil dichotomy, discourages the development of 'alternatives,' increases the cost of political participation, and diminishes the vitality of democracy. Therefore, the author advocates for 'cooperation' instead of political 'division' and emphasizes a government where power is shared among various political actors, including the National Assembly, rather than concentrated in the hands of the president.

I. President Moon as a Negative Example

All past presidents have experienced misfortune. Perhaps because of this, many consider modern Korean political history to be a history of failed presidencies. However, if all state affairs were a series of failures, it would be impossible to explain industrialization, democratization, the advancement of human rights, and the improvement of living conditions. The idea that failed presidents brought about success sounds as strange as a hen laying a duck egg. Past presidents did not ruin everything. Nevertheless, if asked to name successful presidents, one cannot readily point to anyone. This leads to the suspicion that the problem lies not with the presidents, but with the citizens themselves, who are demanding, impatient, and never seem satisfied.

While it is unclear whether the perception that 'presidents have universally failed' stems from excessive public demands, insufficient state achievements, or a combination of both, another administration is nearing its end. We are under the unavoidable pressure of time to evaluate the current government and choose the next one. Do citizens believe President Moon Jae-in should be added to the list of failures?

Based on approval ratings at the end of their terms, President Moon is the most popular among presidents since democratization. However, looking at other figures as of November, a different picture emerges. At the end of their terms, the opposition party leads in party support, presidential candidate support, and support for a change of government. All three indicators reflect the public's assessment of President Moon Jae-in. While the ruling party candidate's support also reflects the candidate's individual competitiveness to some extent, it also incorporates an assessment of the current administration. These figures indicate that citizens are, at least at this point, disappointed with President Moon. Five years ago, an overwhelming majority of citizens protested, overthrowing one government and establishing a new one. They then gave their overwhelming support to the new administration. The Moon Jae-in administration received the unprecedented gift of taking office amidst national consensus. What happened to such a government? While it will take more time to soberly assess whether this administration truly failed, the public's gaze at the end of its term is not warm.

President Moon's five years offer valuable lessons for the success of the next president. Whoever takes office in the next administration must learn from the Moon Jae-in government to escape the cycle of expectation and disappointment.

II. From Arrogant 'Sacred Power' to Reflective 'Secular Power'

Many of the problems concerning President Moon stemmed from the arrogance of power. Perhaps the overwhelming support President Moon Jae-in's government received at its inception was not a blessing but a misfortune. The narrative of the 'Candlelight Revolution' led the Moon Jae-in administration to complacency. Coupled with the pride of being the driving force of democratization, the sense of having received a mandate from the candlelight protesters led them to believe they were sacred beings saving the world. The arrogant ruling elite, as if receiving divine oracle, likely viewed the opposition party as an obstacle to their sacred mission. The opposition was not a partner to cooperate with on major issues, but a taboo to be avoided. This was the demonization of the opposition party.

The power entrusted to the Moon Jae-in administration is legitimate not because of the mythologized and abstract sanctity of the candlelight protesters, but because it represents the delegation of interests from actual citizens. Real citizens are not candlelight protesters. They are beings with desires and complex entities in conflict over interests. Nevertheless, the administration, unable to control the structure of soaring housing prices, insulted citizens who wanted to buy homes (citizens who, in their eyes, did not act like candlelight protesters) and shifted the blame onto the citizens. Although the Moon Jae-in administration prided itself on being the agent of reform, there were no visible reform achievements to offer at the altar of sanctity.

The Moon Jae-in administration did not wield its power in accordance with its self-perception as a benevolent power. The Moon Jae-in administration did several things that could only have been done under the assumption that because they were inherently righteous, anything they did was permissible. Power resources that should have been used for the public interest of the majority of citizens were instead depleted for the benefit of the president's close associates and specific individuals with whom the president had personal connections. The excessive 'defense of Cho Kuk' divided the Moon Jae-in government's potential supporters, pitting them against Cho Kuk, and accelerated the exodus of intellectuals from the Moon Jae-in government. By narrowing the reasons for supporting or criticizing the Moon Jae-in government not to values, ideology, policy, or even the citizens' lives, but to the issue of Cho Kuk, which had no connection to the citizens' lives, the administration made the citizens appear incredibly insignificant. Despite this reality, the Democratic Party won the general election by benefiting from the limitations of the opposition. However, the first act of the ruling elite after the general election was the 'Movement to Restore Han Myeong-sook's Honor.' Power delegated by the citizens was wasted for the honor of an individual, Han Myeong-sook, who had served two years in prison for corruption. This was an act of betraying the citizens' trust.

Power is not a fixed entity; it is constantly re-evaluated and re-delegated by the citizens. It is fluid. Therefore, responding to the interests, demands, and sentiments of the citizens is never easy. To be a successful holder of power, one must always maintain a posture of tension, reflection, and responsiveness to changing public demands.

III. From 'Divisive Politics' to 'Cooperative Politics'

President Moon abandoned the easy path of leading state affairs through the broad coalition that naturally formed during President Park's impeachment, and instead chose the difficult path. Under the banner of a 'Democratic Party government,' he adopted a minority strategy that excluded the opposition. The exclusion of the opposition was justified by difference and discrimination. Difference was highlighted not by ideology, policy, or issues, but by evoking vague negative emotions towards the other side. This negative emotion naturally led to the contamination of political language with hate speech. Differences are not so large as to preclude cooperation. The notion that there are significant differences in ideology, policy, and issues between the ruling and opposition forces is a fallacy. This is evident from the numerous instances where the Moon Jae-in administration adopted policies it opposed when in opposition and abandoned policies it advocated when in opposition. Nevertheless, the ruling party's willingness to engage in intense and radical confrontation and create division was to provide the illusion of difference to its supporters. Division is not evidence of difference, but evidence of its absence.

Divisive politics necessitated intra-party cohesion. Believing that unity meant survival and division meant death, the ruling party, convinced that the failure of the Uri Party was due to internal division, suppressed internal dissent and did not allow for alternative viewpoints. Externally, they organized fervent presidential supporters to serve as the basis for state affairs. If the ruling party were a peach, the president would be the seed to be protected, the fervent supporters the hard shell protecting the seed, and the party the flesh enveloping the fervent supporters.

While divisive politics may appear to strengthen power due to its immediacy, intensity, and visibility, it imposes significant burdens, as confirmed at the end of the term. Firstly, the situation of divisive politics, where the president, party, and supporters are mobilized into two camps and confront each other, prevents dialogue and compromise between the ruling and opposition parties. The Democratic Party's attempt to force through amendments to the Media Arbitration Act, which included punitive damages for fabricated articles, despite criticism of media control, is a prime example. When the ruling party hesitated due to opposition from the opposition party and media organizations, it faced pressure from fervent supporters not to compromise. Compromise was regarded as an act of betrayal. The same issue arose with livelihood bills such as the "three-party lease" real estate policy, which the ruling party pushed through unilaterally despite opposition from the opposition. Had these been introduced after sufficient consultation and deliberation with the opposition, criticism would not have been so intensely focused on the government, even if some side effects had occurred.

Divisive politics also weakens government accountability, as it reduces the incentive to readjust state affairs according to public demands and refine policy alternatives when the government believes it can govern solely by relying on its mobilized supporters. While intra-party cohesion within the Democratic Party avoided internal conflicts like those of the Uri Party, it came at the cost of reduced responsiveness to public demands due to rigidity. This rigidity also eliminated opportunities for autonomous correction and self-regulation through mutual checks.

Divisive politics fosters a good-versus-evil dichotomy, leading citizens to make misguided choices between good and evil, and normalizing disrespectful attitudes and language. This, in turn, transforms politics from a competition between viable alternatives into a life-or-death struggle, increasing the cost of political participation and diminishing the vitality of democracy. Politics fought with one's life can kill democracy. The Moon Jae-in administration might argue that the operation of the ruling-opposition-government consultation body is evidence of dialogue. However, the essence of political dialogue lies in substance, not form. Although past administrations have operated such consultation bodies, they have never developed into genuine dialogue with the opposition. The ritualistic meetings between the president and opposition leaders, held occasionally within a state of ongoing division, cannot function as genuine dialogue. They serve as a means to conceal divisive politics, an excuse to shift blame for division onto the other party, and a form of confrontation through other methods. Events that conclude with each side presenting irreconcilable demands, followed by mutual accusations of refusal, are futile. The president must engage in substantive consultations with opposition leaders beyond mere rituals and forms. It is necessary to institutionalize cooperative politics through regular consultations with opposition leaders before and after major state affairs, listening to their advice, and reflecting it in policy.

The National Unity Committee, which the People Power Party presidential candidate once considered establishing, is similar. Establishing a unification committee, as done by the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations, is an outsourcing of divisive politics and a delegation of risk. Outsourcing is a political declaration of disinterest in unification. Unification is the responsibility of those in charge of state affairs, not something to be entrusted to individuals recruited from competing parties.

If political division stems from social division, one might question whether 'it is fair to hold only the ruler accountable.' Politics is a system of representation. Divisive politics represents a divided society. However, politics is not a mechanical reflection of society. Politics must also represent society's expectations, hopes, and future. Politics bears the responsibility of persuading and guiding society toward a better direction. If politicians rely on a fatalistic view that 'political division is unavoidable due to social division,' they are unfit to govern. There is also no basis to conclude that political division is a result of social division. Political division can also be the cause of social division. It is well-known that the public is heavily influenced by the discourse and logic of political elites. While it is difficult to determine causality, it is clear that political division and social division form a vicious cycle, mutually reinforcing and amplifying each other. It is also a clear fact that politics has led to political polarization, where two competing political forces have coalesced and become antagonistic. Therefore, the responsibility to halt political division and break the cycle of this vicious loop lies with political leaders.

Political leaders must demonstrate their ability to handle disagreements during the election process, or precisely because of it. This is also a measure of their governing capacity. While the loud voices of some factions with strong partisan leanings may create the illusion of majority public opinion, it should not be forgotten that a significant number of citizens expect mutual respect and courtesy.

IV. From Concentration of Power to Dispersion of Power

There is a constant stream of people protesting in front of the Blue House demanding to meet with the president. Citizens typically demand that the president directly address and resolve their grievances with government policies or actions. In November, the Blue House abruptly dismissed the Senior Economic Secretary, observed as a consequence of the urea solution shortage. Given that the Blue House has made decisions and taken responsibility for numerous major and minor state affairs, it might seem natural for the Senior Economic Secretary, rather than the minister or vice-minister of the relevant ministry, to be held accountable. In reality, the world no longer pays attention to State Council meetings or ministerial meetings on current issues. It is believed that the presidential secretary meeting, presided over by the president, is the center of state affairs.

The presidential system was originally designed for the dispersion of power, not its concentration. Nevertheless, in Korea, due to the expansion of the bureaucracy and a culture of conformity, power has become concentrated in the executive branch and its head, the president. As a result, the executive branch has been placed above the legislative and judicial branches, disrupting the balance of power among the three branches. In fact, since democratization, all governments without exception have controlled the legislature and undermined the independence of the judiciary through measures such as appointing judges to high-level executive positions. This is in addition to the control exerted over the prosecution and the Board of Audit and Inspection, which, despite being executive agencies, are supposed to guarantee neutrality and independence.

The Moon Jae-in administration also recruited high-ranking judges as presidential secretaries and attempted to control the Board of Audit and Inspection through personnel exchanges between the Board and the Blue House. The special inspector general, tasked with monitoring the president's family and associates, was not appointed for the entire five years. The prosecution reform lost its direction. While prosecution reform was intended to decentralize the prosecution, which had become powerful, President Moon's reform was distorted into protecting presidential power. Ultimately, the prosecution reform ended in a clash of power between the established prosecutorial power and political power. Both the legitimacy of presidential power and the legitimacy of prosecution reform were undermined.

The partially synchronized proportional representation system for a multi-party system was a form of decentralized system. Political parties are also decision-makers or veto players regarding national policy. If the number of major parties increases from two to three to five, there are more decision-makers, thus achieving a greater dispersion of power. However, like the distortion of the presidential system and prosecution reform, the synchronized proportional representation system also resulted in the concentration of power, not its dispersion, as the ruling party used satellite parties for electoral purposes to claim the share that should have gone to smaller parties.

Diamonds are forever, but power is not. Under democracy, with its elections and single terms, the concentration of power is only temporary. The outcome of state affairs pursued through unilateral force, relying solely on concentrated power, is clear. One must maintain a state where power can be checked and led the nation with constant tension between checks and balances. State affairs must be conducted within a multidimensional surveillance network, both internal and external to power, such as the judiciary, the National Assembly, the Board of Audit and Inspection, the prosecution, the media, and the Blue House special inspector general. Internal dissenting factions within the party should not be suppressed but respected. Democracy is a system that institutionalizes dissent. Organized opposition is unavoidable. In a democracy, minorities do not remain minorities forever. Without a willingness to compromise with opposing forces and dissenting groups, state affairs cannot be successfully led.

V. From 'With the People' to 'With the National Assembly'

While there may be debate as to whether the Moon Jae-in administration was truly a 'government with the people' as its slogan proclaimed, there is no room for debate that it was not a 'government with the National Assembly.' At the start of the Moon Jae-in administration, the National Assembly was characterized by a minority ruling party facing a majority opposition (yeosoyadae). This condition necessitated cooperation from the opposition parties to lead state affairs smoothly. The National Assembly, as an institution elected by the citizens and representing them, receives legitimacy for power alongside the president. The nation can only move forward when these two wheels of power, the president and the National Assembly, turn together. However, President Moon pursued 'governance bypassing the National Assembly,' meaning rule by presidential executive order, before the 21st general election.

Even when the Moon Jae-in administration won the 21st general election, presenting an opportunity to shift its relationship with the National Assembly, it persisted with the idea of a 'government with the people.' Whether facing a minority ruling party in a majority opposition assembly or a majority ruling party in a minority opposition assembly, it governed without the National Assembly, excluding the opposition. The ruling party, for the first time since democratization, monopolized all standing committee chairmanships in the National Assembly, showing no hesitation in clashing with the opposition. Public distrust in the National Assembly generally stems not from the content of legislation but from the legislative process. Citizens are highly negative towards the majority party pushing through legislation without persuading the minority parties. The fact that the ruling party's legislative actions are commonly referred to by terms such as forced passage, railroading, and unilateral passage illustrates this point. The decision-making methods of the National Assembly have gradually evolved from a majority system, where the majority party's will prevails, to a consensus-based system that presupposes consultation with minority parties. The next administration must not ignore this clear reality.

If the ruling party wins the next presidential election, a situation similar to the latter half of the Moon Jae-in administration, with a majority ruling party and minority opposition, will continue. The ruling party must resist the temptation of unilateralism by recalling the Moon Jae-in administration's inability to cooperate with the opposition. If the opposition party wins the election, it will face a minority ruling party in a majority opposition assembly, similar to the first half of the Moon Jae-in administration. If the next administration wishes to avoid the side effects and confusion caused by the Moon Jae-in administration's bypassing of the National Assembly, it must engage with the National Assembly and seek the cooperation of the opposition. It must share positions allocated to the opposition and bear the burden together with the opposition.

A 'government with the people' carries the risk of authoritarianism or populism, where the ruler governs in the name of the people. It is highly ominous when the ruler invokes the abstract noun 'the people' and governs in the name of the people, who have no representatives. Respecting the National Assembly, to which the people have sent their representatives, must come first.

VI. Between Optimism and Pessimism

Shortly after taking office, President Moon vowed at the memorial service for former President Roh Moo-hyun, "I will return as a successful president." Watching that scene, I harbored a hope that it would indeed happen. It was because I thought, 'Isn't it time we had such a government?' Yet, a lingering doubt remained in a corner of my heart. 'Will something that has never happened before truly occur?'

We are now standing before the same question again. Will the next administration achieve something that everyone will recognize as a success? Unfortunately, the situation does not allow for optimism. Even the Moon Jae-in administration, which started with favorable conditions for success, has failed to meet the expectations it set at its inception as it nears the end of its term. Therefore, it is not surprising that the next administration, born out of an election process filled with division, confrontation, hatred, and anger, will face even greater challenges. Unfortunately, neither of the two major party candidates has experience in mediating complex conflict situations or in engaging in dialogue and compromise with opposing forces.

However, there is no need to be overly pessimistic. Max Weber said that a politician is someone who can say 'Nevertheless' in the face of any difficulty. A government born out of pessimism, which remains vigilant, may be less prone to failure than a government that became complacent after starting with optimism.

If there is one thing the next president should learn from past governments, it is this: nuclear fusion energy is greater than nuclear fission energy. ■

■ Author: Lee Dae-geun_Professor at Woosuk University. He graduated from Korea University with a degree in Political Science and International Relations and holds master's and doctoral degrees in Political Science from Korea University Graduate School. He previously served as Editor-in-Chief and Chief Editorial Writer at The Kyunghyang Shinmun before moving to Woosuk University. His writings cover various aspects of Korean politics. His sharp critiques of presidential governance are well-known. His analyses of how the choices of political parties and elites have diverged from public expectations are also incisive. His writings on foreign policy, including Korea-US and Korea-Japan relations, and on North Korea and inter-Korean relations, his area of specialization, have a unique flavor. However, if his work were limited to these areas, it would be difficult to maintain a strong interest in reading it. His writings leave a deep impression largely due to his attitude towards humanity and politics. His published works include "Why Does the North Korean Military Not Stage a Coup?", "For Waikiki Brothers," and "Real Progressivism" (co-authored).

■ Responsible Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun_EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr