[EAI Special Election Commentary] ① Tasks for the Next President to Restore Korean Democracy

[Editor's Note]

Ahead of the 20th presidential election scheduled for March 9, 2022, the East Asia Institute (EAI) is undertaking the project <Conditions for a Successful President in 2022>. The intended audience includes presidential candidates, their campaign teams, politicians, the media, and influencers. EAI is also preparing to publish a 'guidebook for the next president' that calls for the decentralization of power concentrated in the presidency and the Blue House, and for integration and coexistence beyond polarization.

Prior to this, we are pleased to present the [EAI Special Election Commentary Series], featuring contributions from leading intellectuals who have long offered insightful analyses of Korean politics. This first report in the series is by Professor Choi Jang-jip of Korea University. The author identifies 'democratic backsliding' as the greatest legacy the next president will inherit. He notes that the Moon Jae-in administration, which came to power after the candlelight protests, designated 'deep-rooted corruption eradication' and 'historical reckoning' as its core tasks, thereby cloaking 'protests' in the political rhetoric of 'revolution.' The author emphasizes that issues such as the expansion of state power, the reduction of individual freedoms, and the deepening of polarization emerged in pursuit of these goals, and proposes that the next president should critically reflect on the failures of the previous government and president to strive for the restoration of democracy.

I. The President's Legacy: Democratic Backsliding

Democratic backsliding, recognized as a global phenomenon, will be a significant challenge for the next president. In recent years, Korean democracy has regressed due to polarization, the expansion of state power, and the curtailment of individual freedoms. This is attributable to issues in the way the president and political leadership understood and managed democracy after the candlelight protests. The next president will inherit a difficult political landscape for pursuing pressing policy tasks—economic recovery, job creation, reduction of inequality, expansion of welfare, stabilization of real estate, and peace on the Korean Peninsula. This paper examines the state of Korean democracy since the candlelight protests, reflects on key issues including the current extreme polarization, and offers conditions for democratic restoration through a critical assessment of the failures of the past government and president.

II. From Candlelight Protests to Candlelight Revolution: Eradicating Deep-Rooted Corruption and Historical Reckoning

To rigorously evaluate the Moon Jae-in administration, it is necessary to revisit the 2016 candlelight protests, given the administration's own emphasis on their significance by referring to itself as a 'candlelight government.' Within the broader context of the history of democratic transition and consolidation in Korea, what meaning can be attributed to the candlelight protests? The 1987 democratization movement was a historical turning point in Korea's democratic transition. Democratic theorists characterize the democratization processes in various countries during the 1970s and 1980s as 'pacted transitions,' achieved through agreement without the use of violence between the authoritarian regime and the democratic forces. Korea's democratization is undoubtedly a prime example of this, as the transition to democracy was based on an agreement that allowed for the coexistence of conservative and progressive forces through the depoliticization of the military. Many Korean political scientists refer to the party system that emerged after democratization as the '1987 system.' The 'democratic constitution' was enacted in October of that year through an agreement between representatives of the old regime's parties and the democratic forces, and based on this, the transition to democracy was realized. The 13th presidential election (December 1987) and the subsequent 13th National Assembly election (April 1988) can be considered 'founding elections' that institutionalized the democratic transition, thereby establishing a framework for democratic competition between conservative and progressive forces.

The anti-government civil movement accompanying the 2016 candlelight protests led to the impeachment of the then-president (Park Geun-hye), marking a turning point in the competition between conservative and progressive forces. The Democratic Party administration, victorious in the 19th presidential election (2017) and the April 2018 general election, defined the candlelight protests as a 'revolution' and set 'eradication of the old regime,' namely, the elimination of deep-rooted corruption and historical reckoning, as its core tasks, thereby determining its future policy direction. The eradication of deep-rooted corruption defines the preceding era, dominated by conservative forces including the Park Geun-hye administration, as the old order and advocates for a broad reconstruction of democracy. Interpreting the candlelight protests as a 'second democratization movement,' the goal was set to restore democracy, which Korean politics had recently appeared to be regressing towards authoritarianism.

While there may be aspects of this narrative that are acceptable, the problem lies with the latter, historical reckoning. Historical reckoning did not limit its targets to the military authoritarianism and conservative elites of the pre-democratization era. It was an endeavor that linked the reckoning of colonial legacies and anti-Japanese movements with the judgment of military authoritarianism and conservative elites, effectively signifying an intention to rewrite modern Korean history. It was a complex undertaking that sought to connect the spirit and values of the independence movement during the Japanese colonial period with the legitimacy deficits of the authoritarian regimes during the Cold War and the construction of a divided nation after liberation. It was an error that overlooked the multi-layered and complex nature of Korean history, simplifying Korean society into dichotomies such as 'authoritarian vs. non-authoritarian forces,' 'pro-Japanese collaborators vs. independence activists,' 'conservatives vs. progressives,' 'those responsible for division vs. those not,' and 'nationalists vs. anti-nationalists,' and interpreting them ideologically. By defining the candlelight protests as a revolution, it left room for conservative governments, including the Park Geun-hye administration prior to the 'candlelight revolution' of the 1980s, military authoritarian regimes before the 1980s democratization, and ruling elites to be targeted for historical and corruption reckoning. The broad reform policies prioritizing past and historical reckoning hold historical significance in two aspects. First, they broke the 'pacted transition' that sustained democracy after the 1980s democratization, as the conservative forces of authoritarianism, who were parties to that pact, became targets of reckoning. Second, they triggered a comprehensive division of society and politics into progressive vs. conservative and reformist vs. regressive camps, which had not been experienced since the 1980s democratization. This created the task of not only newly establishing the foundation for democracy but also reintegrating a deeply polarized Korean society within a range of cooperation.

Following the candlelight revolution, Korean society was inevitably destined for deep division. The practice of taking sides (polarization) came to dominate political conflict and competition. The categorization and division into 'reformers' and 'targets of reform,' and 'us' and 'them' also continued. While the reformers asserted their legitimacy as moral evaluators and judges, a satirical term, 'naeronambul' (I do it, but you can't), emerged in society to express the difficulty of maintaining the moral integrity and authority of these judges. Those categorized as targets of judgment inevitably experienced profound confusion and fragmentation.

This political and social polarization was underpinned by the Moon Jae-in administration's activist and populist view of democracy. The Moon administration sought to reinterpret democracy after the candlelight protests. While encouraging direct democracy as a counterpoint to representative democracy, it fostered a sentiment of animosity towards institutional politics, party politics, and elected politicians/legislators, centered on the dichotomy of 'democratic citizens versus vested interests' from an activist perspective. President Moon, in his inaugural address commemorating the June 10th Uprising, expressed his hope that 'democracy would extend to workplaces and homes, and that each individual would be trained in democracy in their daily lives' to ensure a stable life. He referred to those who could realize and lead this as 'awakened citizens,' 'informed citizens,' or 'democratic citizens.' These are individuals referred to as the 'people acting outside the system.' Political scientist Jan-Werner Müller, who has studied the political theory and history of the Weimar Republic, concisely describes this concept of citizenship as 'moralized anti-pluralists.' Alternatively, from another perspective, it can be seen as advocating for individuals to become 'total citizens,' as described by the prominent German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf. This is the flip side of the phenomenon corresponding to the 'total state.' The idea that an individual must realize the principles and values of democracy in all spheres of private and public life inevitably leads to 'over-politicization,' where the entire society is politicized through political participation. This shrinks the autonomous sphere of civil society, does not allow for pluralism, and ultimately leads to the demise of the space for individual freedom.

III. Expansion of State Power and the Diminution of the Individual

The specific view of democracy espoused by the Moon Jae-in administration and the pursuit of reform tasks based on it have highlighted the issue of state power expansion alongside polarization. The expansion of state power manifests in the principles that underpin and drive government policies and their outcomes. While these are also principles of democracy, their realization inevitably clashes with the issue of liberalism. The problem of liberalism is related to the inherent weakness of liberalism in Korean society. Unlike Western societies such as the United States or the United Kingdom, Korean society has not had sufficient political experience or historical time to internalize liberalism, which underpins the protection of individual rights. If liberalism had not been understood negatively by both conservative and progressive camps during the Cold War era prior to democratization, it might have existed only in name and remained outside the scope of attention. The conservative camp equated 'Cold War liberalism' with Western liberal ideology prior to the Cold War, while the progressive camp interpreted liberalism negatively as an ideology underlying the Cold War and division. Misunderstandings about liberalism continued even after democratization, resulting in Korean democracy merely embodying a democracy that lacked a liberal foundation or was weak in liberalism. Consequently, the ideological basis enabling the efficacy and dominance of a liberal constitution remained weak. In Western societies, when rulers or governments do not adhere to the rule of law, it is referred to as arbitrary power (tyranny) or despotism, which disregards the rule of law. These terms are also critical descriptions of power frequently used in Western political history and contemporary politics. However, in Korea, while terms like dictatorship or military authoritarianism are widely used, there is no established term for a form of government centered on the presence or absence of the rule of law.

The Korean Constitution (referring to the Constituent Assembly Constitution, upon which all constitutions are based) is legally perfect. This is because it ideally synthesized the US and German constitutions, considered the best at the time. It reflects the principles of separation of powers, checks, and balances to establish a presidential system. Simultaneously, following the spirit of the Weimar Republic's constitution, it defines the role of political parties and addresses socio-economic issues. However, the Cold War, the divided nation, and the war did not allow for the political and socio-economic space for liberal philosophy and norms, which emphasize the protection of individual rights, to take root. Despite modern democracy being effectively an abbreviation of liberal democracy, and laws and institutions ideally adhering to its principles, Korea's political history prior to democratization showed a significant divergence from this. In this context, it is difficult to describe the democratization of the 1980s as an effort to restore liberalism, which had not been enjoyed internally, and establish democracy based upon it. Korea's democratization was not a movement to 'restore the liberalism not enjoyed internally.' Rather, it was about realizing the goal and ideal of 'embodying the voice of the people.' Democratization was also an ideal for realizing national aspirations. This understanding of democracy, which supported and paralleled democratization through activism, fostered an affinity with a 'maximalist view of democracy' that believes democracy can solve everything. It is natural for this understanding of democracy to evolve into an 'activist view of democracy.' This is also the environment that leads to the definition of the candlelight protests as a 'candlelight revolution.' These conditions can be understood as leading to the activist and populist view of democracy of the Moon Jae-in administration mentioned earlier.

In this regard, it is noteworthy that under weak liberal conditions, Korean democracy has continuously maintained and realized the condition of state (power) expansion. This also means that democratically elected governments can be constantly exposed to authoritarian threats. Since its founding, the Korean state power, while maintaining the conditions of the Cold War and a divided nation, has enjoyed considerable autonomy from society and the economy. Furthermore, in pursuit of a developmental state that deeply involved state power in the market to achieve economic growth, it created a social structure where pluralistic power based on autonomous associations found it difficult to establish itself. Consequently, liberalism as a legal norm rarely had the opportunity to strengthen itself. The practice of a 'regal presidential system,' where power is concentrated in the president, has continued since the First Republic, and was further strengthened during the Moon Jae-in administration. The expansion of presidential power as the head of state, and the weakness of the legislative and judicial branches as spaces for party activities, have weakened the separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances. It appears to be a structural condition that makes it difficult for the exercise and structure of state power itself to operate according to the principles of liberal democracy. Amidst this, no matter how democratically elected a president may be, when they become the subject and helmsman of reform, the exercise and operation of presidential power deeply impact the daily lives of individuals. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, where state power has further expanded, the reduction of citizens' autonomous spheres and private living spaces has become unavoidable.

IV. A Message to the Next President: Foster the Spirit of Liberalism, Reduce Power in the Blue House and Government

The next president is highly likely to face the significant obstacle of democratic backsliding. Under conditions of extreme political and social polarization, the expansion of state power, and a crisis of liberalism that protects citizens' rights, what should the president do?

Several proposals can be considered regarding the tasks the next president must undertake. First, the president must respect the spirit of liberalism and the rule of law. In "How Democracies Die" (2018), Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, whose work is widely read in Korea, emphasize 'restraint' and 'tolerance' as the most crucial unwritten norms for the exercise of power, essential for the healthy maintenance of democracy. Among various factors, the authors particularly highlight two points. First, they stress that the president, as the head of the executive branch—the most powerful government department—should 'exercise self-restraint' in wielding power over the other two branches, the judiciary and the legislature. Second, they advocate for 'mutual tolerance' among adversarial or competing political parties. This offers significant implications for the current situation in Korea under the Democratic Party administration. When the ruling party, holding an overwhelming majority of nearly two-thirds of the seats, pushes legislation through sheer force of numbers, the normal functioning of democracy is thrown into chaos or paralyzed. This paralysis of democracy is easily observed in the 20th National Assembly and the 21st National Assembly under the overwhelming numerical dominance of the Democratic Party. During the Moon Jae-in administration, the ruling party's government, the state power shifted to the Blue House, rendering the term 'Blue House government' almost redundant, and undermining the responsibility and role of the cabinet. Consequently, polarization was created or exacerbated in almost all policy areas. To prevent this, the next president critically needs a mindset of restraint regarding the expansion of power. The power available to the president for state management is immense, encompassing personnel appointments, budget allocation and formulation, and oversight of powerful institutions such as the prosecution service, the National Tax Service, the Board of Audit and Inspection, and the National Intelligence Service. Therefore, it is necessary to exercise restraint in the temptation to achieve policy and political outcomes through the power vested in and exercised by the president. The president must exercise restraint in wielding power over the judiciary and legislature and respect their autonomy to ensure the functioning of the basic democratic principles of separation of powers and checks and balances. Above all, for the maturation of Korean democracy, rather than presenting grand projects over a five-year term to impress the public, it is necessary to make efforts to voluntarily reduce Blue House power by transferring it to the cabinet. The abolition of the Senior Secretary for Civil Affairs office would be a litmus test for such efforts.

Equally important is the tolerance of opposing parties and critical forces that compete with the president. Politicians and the media in the opposition parties emphasize 'cooperation' and call for collaboration between progressive and conservative parties, and between the ruling and opposition parties. However, under the current conditions where polarization can be described as a defining characteristic of Korean democracy, the term 'cooperation' is merely empty rhetoric. Therefore, exploring the conditions for cooperation and contemplating and practicing the attitudes and norms for genuine effort must precede any meaningful discussion of cooperation; otherwise, the term 'cooperation' will remain nothing more than pleasant-sounding words. The president must respect and tolerate the roles and reasons for existence of opposing parties and political rivals. For these to be possible, political parties must be autonomous; specifically, the ruling party, which enjoys strong presidential power, must be independent and free from presidential influence. If the president influences party nominations and the party acts as an agent of the president, it becomes difficult for the party to fulfill its functions.

The division into democracy vs. anti-democracy, progressive vs. conservative, and reformist vs. regressive can no longer serve as nourishment for the development of Korean democracy. The most critical task we face is likely nothing more than to 'democratically' legislate and implement laws that 'represent' the demands of society and the economy. To understand this simple fact and strive for it, efforts must be made to realize a 'limited state' and to more firmly establish the roots of liberalism that can support it. Is this not the most important task for the newly elected government? ■

■ Author: Choi Jang-jipGraduated from the Department of Political Science and International Relations and the Graduate School of Korea University, and received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. He served as Director of the Asiatic Research Center at Korea University and Chairman of the Presidential Advisory Council on Policy Planning, and is currently an Emeritus Professor at Korea University. His works include "The Labor Movement and the State in Korea," "Democracy After Democratization," "Democratization of Democracy," "From the People to Citizens," "The Human Wounds of Democracy Without Labor," and "The Space of Politics."

■ Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun EAI Research Fellow

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr