Mutual Favorability Between South Korea and Japan Driven by Popular Culture Consumption: Can It Be a Breakthrough in Strained Bilateral Relations?

[Editor's Note]

Popular culture, including dramas and K-pop, significantly influences perceptions of the other country and, by extension, bilateral political and diplomatic relations. This is also confirmed by the results of the '9th Survey on Mutual Perceptions Between South Korea and Japan,' jointly conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI, President Son Yeol) and Genron NPO. In this issue brief, EAI President Son Yeol and EAI Research Fellow Lee Hayeon emphasize that in a situation where economic and security cooperation between the two countries remains lukewarm, cultural public diplomacy that promotes cultural consumption is the primary means to enhance mutual favorability. The authors propose concrete measures to promote cultural exchange, such as diversifying channels for popular culture, resuming people-to-people exchanges, and fully opening up to Japanese culture.

1. Introduction

What role does popular culture play in South Korea-Japan relations? Does the popularity of 'Hallyu'—such as BTS, Crash Landing on You, and Parasite—in Japan, and the popularity of 'J-culture'—such as Japanese manga, anime, novels, and J-pop like Demon Slayer in South Korea—positively influence mutual perceptions between the people of the two countries? Who are the primary consumers of popular culture? How is popular culture consumption affected when bilateral relations deteriorate? Can cultural appeal provide an opportunity to overcome political conflicts?

The results of the '9th Survey on Mutual Perceptions Between South Korea and Japan,' jointly conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Genron NPO, indicate that cultural consumption, including popular culture like Hallyu and J-culture, as well as shopping and food culture, influences perceptions of the other country and, consequently, South Korea-Japan relations. The primary consumers of popular culture are the 20s and 30s generations, or Generation MZ, and EAI research has confirmed that their perceptions of the other country differ from those of older generations.[1]The survey results suggest that the younger generations of both countries, who actively consume the other's popular culture and hold positive perceptions, are the key drivers for pioneering a new future for South Korea-Japan relations.

2. Japanese Consumption of Popular Culture and Perceptions of South Korea

In the mutual perception surveys conducted over the past nine years, favorable views of South Korea among Japanese respondents have ranged between 20.5% and 31.1%, while unfavorable views have ranged between 37.3% and 54.4% (Figure 1). What led the 25.4% of Japanese citizens who held a favorable view of South Korea in 2021 to feel that way? The overwhelming reason cited for favorable impressions of South Korea is cultural consumption, encompassing attractive popular culture, food culture, and shopping. A significant 53.9% of respondents stated they were interested in Korean popular culture, and 49.2% cited 'attractive Korean food culture and shopping' as reasons (Figures 2-1).

Figure 1: Trends in Perceptions of the Other Country, 2013-2021

Source: East Asia Institute (EAI)-Genron NPO, South Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (2013-2021)

Figure 2-1: Reasons for Favorable Impressions of the Other Country (2020-2021)

Source: East Asia Institute (EAI)-Genron NPO, South Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (2020-2021)

Figure 2-2: What are the reasons for your favorable impression of South Korea?

Source: East Asia Institute (EAI)-Genron NPO, South Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (2021)

Interestingly, Japanese respondents who consume popular culture generally report having a favorable impression of the other country. While 34.5% of Japanese respondents enjoy Korean popular culture (Figure 3), an overwhelmingly high 81.2% of them responded that consuming popular culture led to a favorable impression of South Korea (Figure 4).

Figure 3: Consumption of the Other Country's Popular Culture

Source: East Asia Institute (EAI)-Genron NPO, South Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (2021)

Figure 4: Impressions of the Other Country Due to Popular Culture Consumption

Source: East Asia Institute (EAI)-Genron NPO, South Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (2021)

Furthermore, a high proportion of Japanese respondents, 64.6%, indicated that 'consumption of Korean popular culture is not affected by the deterioration of South Korea-Japan relations' (Figure 5). This phenomenon can be seen as a success of the customer stickiness strategy employed by the Korean cultural content industry. The Korean entertainment industry has effectively understood the needs of the Japanese market, offering something unique that was absent in Japanese popular culture, leading to immense popularity and a loyal fanbase in music, dramas, films, and recently, even in manga and novels, areas where Japan traditionally held a strong position. In other words, Japanese consumers of Korean popular culture largely form a virtuous cycle where they consume their preferred culture, irrespective of the views held by political or social leaders, and consequently develop a favorable impression of South Korea. The fact that 34.5% of Japanese respondents, or more than one in three, consume Korean culture indicates that Korean popular culture has become somewhat mainstream in Japan.

Figure 5: Impact of South Korea-Japan Relations on Popular Culture Consumption

Source: East Asia Institute (EAI)-Genron NPO, South Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (2021)

Analyzing the survey results by age reveals that these trends are more pronounced among younger demographics. Among those under 49, the proportion of people with a favorable impression of South Korea is high, nearing 40%, while the unfavorable impressions held by those aged 60 and above significantly lower the overall average (Figure 6). This indicates a perception gap regarding South Korea between older and younger generations. Furthermore, younger generations, specifically those under 29 and in their 30s, reported consuming Korean popular culture at rates of 46.9% and 45.6%, respectively (Figure 3). This is a remarkably high proportion, nearly one in two. Moreover, the percentage of these individuals who developed a favorable impression of South Korea due to consuming Korean popular culture is between 60% and 80%, significantly higher than the overall average (Figure 2-2). While respondents across all age groups in Japan reported developing favorable impressions of South Korea through consuming its popular culture (Figure 4) and enjoying it regardless of the political situation (Figure 5), the high loyalty to Korean popular culture among those under 30 is particularly noteworthy.

Figure 6: Perceptions of South Korea by Age Group

Source: East Asia Institute (EAI)-Genron NPO, South Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (2021)

3. South Korean Consumption of Japanese Popular Culture and Perceptions of Japan

What about the situation in South Korea? The survey results over the past nine years show that the younger generation, particularly those under 29, has led the increase in favorability towards Japan. However, the trade and security conflict between the two countries in 2019 revealed that the favorability of South Korean youth towards Japan can fluctuate more significantly than that of older generations (Figure 7). Nevertheless, respondents under 29, including Generation Z, showed the highest favorability (19.4% among those in their 20s in the 2020 survey) and the lowest unfavorability (52.8% among those in their 20s in the 2020 survey) even in the 2020 survey, which was conducted amidst deteriorating public opinion towards Japan. This is notable when compared to the favorability and unfavorability levels of those in their 30s, which fluctuated to a level quite similar to older generations.

Figure 7: Changes in Favorability Towards Japan by Age Group (2019-2021)

Source: East Asia Institute (EAI)-Genron NPO, South Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (2021)

The consumption of popular culture by older and younger generations in South Korea also offers interesting insights. While 34.5% of Japanese respondents, and a relatively even distribution across all age groups, reported consuming Korean popular culture, only 18.0% of South Koreans reported consuming Japanese popular culture, including novels, manga/anime, and films. In contrast, older generations in South Korea hardly consume Japanese popular culture, and even among the younger demographic of those in their 30s, this proportion is around 21.8%, similar to the overall average for South Korea. However, among those under 29, the proportion consuming Japanese popular culture is a very high 41.5% (Figure 3).

Similar to Japanese respondents, 67.0% of South Korean respondents who consume Japanese popular culture stated that enjoying the other country's popular culture generally leads to a favorable impression of that country. This proportion shows no significant difference between older and younger generations. The fact that popular culture consumption generally leads to favorable impressions is also confirmed in South Korea, regardless of age group (Figure 4).

However, while a high proportion of Japanese respondents (64.6%) answered that popular culture consumption is not affected by bilateral political situations, only 32.4% of South Koreans responded that it is not affected by bilateral relations (Figure 5). Despite this, among the younger generation in South Korea, the proportion of those who answered that they hesitate to consume Japanese popular culture when relations deteriorate was relatively low. For those under 29 and in their 30s, the proportion stating that their consumption of Japanese popular culture is not affected by deteriorating relations was the highest, and the proportion stating they hesitate to consume Japanese popular culture due to deteriorating relations was the lowest. Therefore, it is confirmed that in South Korea as well, the consumption of the other country's popular culture serves as a support for maintaining a favorable impression.

4. Popular Culture Consumption Among Generation MZ

What distinguishes South Korea's Generation MZ from older generations is their direct experience of Japanese culture through visits to Japan. A very high proportion of South Koreans under 29 (66.5%) and in their 30s (59.6%) expressed an intention to visit Japan in the future. Generation MZ in South Korea has actually visited Japan at higher rates than older generations and has visited multiple times. Despite global travel restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic over the past two years (2020-2021), the increase in the percentage of South Koreans who have visited Japan to 41.4% (up 4 percentage points from 37.4% in 2020) is attributed to the increased proportion of Generation MZ newly included in the survey pool. Among respondents in 2021, 44.3% of those aged 18-29 and 46.8% of those in their 30s reported having visited Japan, the highest among all age groups. Furthermore, among those who have visited Japan, 89.8% of those under 29 and 69.9% of those in their 30s reported having visited Japan within the last five years (Figure 8). Their repeat visit rate to Japan was also the highest among all age groups. Among those under 29, 34.6% of those who had visited Japan reported visiting Japan 2-4 times or 5+ times in the past five years (Figure 9). Those in their 30s also had the second-highest rate at 24.7%. The high rate of visits and repeat visits to Japan by Generation MZ means that these young people have more opportunities to experience Japan firsthand and form their own impressions. Survey results show that while older respondents (40s and above) most frequently cited 'Japan being an advanced country with a high standard of living' as a reason for their favorable impression of Japan, those under 30 consistently cited 'the kindness and diligence of the Japanese people.' This contrasts with the economic perspective of older generations, showing a cultural perspective from Generation MZ. While older generations hold views of Japan reflecting the power disparity between South Korea and Japan during the modernization period, Generation MZ is forming new views of Japan based on the narrowing gap in per capita income and defense spending and the rise of South Korean culture as of 2021.

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Source: East Asia Institute (EAI)-Genron NPO, South Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (2021)

The survey results also reveal a clear difference between Generation MZ and older generations in how they acquire information about Japan and form their impressions and favorability. As shown in Figure 10, 66.8% to 95.3% of respondents aged 40 and above primarily obtain information about Japan or South Korea-Japan relations through traditional media such as television news. In contrast, this proportion was 38.6% for those in their 30s and 30.0% for those under 29. Instead, Generation MZ overwhelmingly accesses information related to Japan through computers and mobile devices. It can be inferred that the information obtained through these different channels by younger and older generations is considerably different.

Figure 10: Channels for Obtaining Information About Japan

Source: East Asia Institute (EAI)-Genron NPO, South Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (2021)

The assessment of traditional media reporting by Generation MZ in South Korea is also noteworthy. When asked, 'Do you believe South Korean newspapers, magazines, and broadcasts report objectively and fairly on South Korea-Japan relations?', 43.2% of those under 29 and 46.2% of those in their 30s answered 'no.' When asked why they believed the reporting was not objective or fair, 69.7% of those under 29 and 68.1% of those in their 30s responded that it was 'because media outlets are influenced by political situations or stances.' While these responses are quite close to the average figures for all age groups (45.4% for the first question and 62.3% for the second), older generations predominantly use these media outlets despite holding such views, whereas younger generations obtain information about Japan through other channels. Online and mobile platforms, by their nature, offer a much wider range of information and opinions than traditional media. Furthermore, online and mobile environments allow individuals to proactively search for information and directly compare various sources. This difference in information channels appears to influence perceptions and favorability.

We have confirmed that South Korea's younger generation obtains information about Japan through different channels than older generations, experiences Japan firsthand through travel, and forms their views of Japan through consuming popular culture. However, the fact that South Korean youth like Japanese popular culture and hold relatively favorable views of Japan does not mean they adopt a more moderate stance on historical issues between the two countries, recent trade disputes, or inflammatory remarks from Japanese politicians. Survey results from 2019-2021 indicate that younger generations are more sensitive to historical issues and Japan's export restrictions than older generations. As research by Oh Seung-hee and others shows, South Korean youth view issues such as the comfort women and forced labor during the Japanese colonial period not merely as disputes between South Korea and Japan but as issues of human rights or justice, leading to strong backlash.[2]

5. Policy Implications

This public opinion poll confirmed the cultural influence of both countries, including popular culture, as a factor in improving mutual perceptions between South Korea and Japan. This leads to the conclusion that the dissemination of South Korean popular culture is effective in terms of public diplomacy towards Japan. It is difficult to change Japanese public opinion by strengthening policy-oriented public diplomacy on historical issues or the Dokdo/Takeshima issue. In this survey, 44.9% of Japanese respondents cited 'continuous criticism of Japan due to historical issues, etc.' and 30.7% cited 'the Dokdo/Takeshima issue' as reasons for their unfavorable impression of South Korea. Furthermore, cooperation in bilateral economic and security matters remains lukewarm. In a situation where a distancing stance towards South Korea persists, the primary means to enhance the favorability of Japanese citizens towards South Korea must be cultural public diplomacy that promotes cultural consumption, such as popular culture, food, and shopping.

However, there may be structural limitations. In contrast to South Korea, where there is no gender difference in the consumption of the other country's popular culture (17.4% for men, 18.6% for women), in Japan, the primary consumers of Korean culture are predominantly women. While 41.3% of Japanese women responded that they consume Korean culture, only 27.3% of Japanese men do, a trend observed across all age groups. Therefore, unless women's preferences are well-represented in the political system in Japanese society, the political effectiveness of cultural public diplomacy is likely to be limited.

Second, for more active cultural exchange to occur across various segments of society in both South Korea and Japan, the channels for popular culture provided to the public need to be diversified. However, Japan's IT usage rate can be considered low compared to other developed countries. For example, Korean dramas like Squid Game and Crash Landing on You are mostly watched overseas through applications like Netflix. While Netflix subscribers in Japan increased significantly during the COVID-19 pandemic, the number stood at approximately 5 million as of 2020, which is more than in South Korea (3.8 million subscribers), but relatively lower in terms of population ratio (Mainichi, 2020 data).[3]Japan exhibits limitations in its channels.

Despite these challenges, there are numerous policy measures to promote cultural exchange between South Korea and Japan. First, people-to-people exchanges, which have been hindered by COVID-19, should be resumed to support cultural experiences and consumption. To this end, the governments of both countries need to promptly initiate dialogue for visa exemptions and quarantine cooperation. Second, the South Korean government needs to fully open up to Japanese culture. In Japan, there are many who criticize Hallyu as 'unfair' cultural exchange, citing the fact that South Korea still maintains regulations on Japanese popular culture.[4]Such criticisms gain traction in the current strained atmosphere. The South Korean government should further promote cultural exchange between the two countries by lifting remaining restrictions on Japanese culture, such as the ban on broadcasting Japanese dramas on terrestrial television and playing Japanese songs on the radio. ■

[1]See the four articles included in "Analysis of South Korea-Japan Relations by Generation: How the Youth (MZ Generation) Perceive South Korea-Japan Relations" [EAI Working Paper Series (2020.08.11.)]:

         Oh Seung-hee. 2020. "'Me'-Centric External Views, 'Consuming' Japan, 'Fairness' Over Anti-Japan." *Working Paper*. East Asia Institute. August 11.http://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=19898&board=kor_workingpaper&keyword_option=&keyword=&more=;

          Cho, Eunil. 2020. “Korea-Japan Relations as Seen by the MZ Generation.” *Working Paper*. East Asia Institute. August 11.

            http://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/etc/search_view.asp?intSeq=19899&board=kor_workingpaper;

          Yoon, Seokjeong. 2020. “The MZ Generation and the Issue of Japanese Military ‘Comfort Women’.” *Working Paper*. East Asia Institute. August 11.

            http://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/etc/search_view.asp?intSeq=19900&board=kor_workingpaper;

          Seok, Juhee. 2020. “Hallyu and ‘Hate’: The Paradox of the MZ Generation.” *Working Paper*. East Asia Institute. August 11.

            http://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/etc/search_view.asp?intSeq=19901&board=kor_workingpaper.

[2]Ibid.

[3] Sasamoto, Hiroki. 2021 “Netflix raises streaming prices in Japan as more subscribers staying at home.”The Mainichi. February 5. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20210205/p2a/00m/0bu/036000c.

[4] Kang, Tae-woong. 2015. “Korea-Japan Cultural Exchange Should Continue: Beyond ‘Anti-Korea’ Sentiment.” *EAI Commentary*. East Asia Institute. March 24. http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/kor_report/2015032514313993.pdf.

■ Author: Son, Yeol_Director of EAI, Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. His research areas include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. Recent publications include Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2019, with T. J. Pempel), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia (2016, with Jan Melissen), “South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking,” The Pacific Review (2019), 32, 6, *Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy* (2017, co-edited), *South Korea's Choices After the Crisis: Global Financial Crisis, Order Transformation, and Korea's Economic Diplomacy* (2020, co-edited), and (2020, co-edited).

■ Author: Lee, Hayeon_Research Fellow at EAI. Majored in Political Science and Environmental Engineering at Yale University and obtained an MBA from the University of Chicago.

■ Responsible Editor: Yang, Suyeong_Research Fellow at EAI

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