[Global NK Commentary] Appropriate Valuation and Rational Proposals: The End-of-War Declaration and North Korea's Nuclear Tests

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[Editor's Note]

Following his proposal for a joint end-of-war declaration at the UN General Assembly, President Moon Jae-in is making all-out efforts through a series of consultations with relevant countries, including the United States and China. In this commentary, Professor Bong Young-shik assesses the current situation where there is no active support from relevant countries for the end-of-war declaration and proposes a course of action for the government. The author judges that the end-of-war declaration is unlikely to succeed due to its symbolic nature and lack of legal enforceability. Therefore, he emphasizes that the South Korean government must present substantial and rational alternatives, based on an appropriate valuation, to persuade the relevant countries to increase its feasibility.

1. South Korea's Proposal for an End-of-War Declaration and North Korea's Missile Response

2. Increasing the Value of the End-of-War Proposal

3. The Political Landscape Ahead: North Korea's 'Guns vs. Butter' Dilemma

1. South Korea's Proposal for an End-of-War Declaration and North Korea's Missile Response

In his address to the 76th UN General Assembly on September 21, 2021, President Moon Jae-in proposed a trilateral or quadrilateral formal end-of-war declaration. This marks the third time President Moon has called for an end-of-war declaration in his UN speeches over the past four years, and it appears to be his final attempt before his term ends in May 2022.

Following President Moon Jae-in's proposal for a joint end-of-war declaration, the South Korean government is making comprehensive efforts through a series of consultations with the United States and China. However, no relevant country has yet actively supported this proposal. North Korea has expressed conditional willingness to respond to the proposal through two statements. In a statement, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Ri Thae-song stated that if the end-of-war declaration does not lead to the "withdrawal of hostile policy towards us," it is "premature." Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea, also stated in a September 24 statement that the "end-of-war declaration is not bad," but added that South Korea and the United States must first "distance themselves from the past behavior of provoking us (North Korea), applying double standards, stubbornly insisting, and finding fault in every matter, and must be considerate and non-hostile in all future words and actions."

North Korea has not yet specified the preconditions for accepting the end-of-war proposal. Instead, North Korea has proceeded with various missile test launches over the two months since President Moon Jae-in's UN speech. On September 13, 2021, North Korea's Korean Central News Agency reported that the National Defense Science Academy of North Korea had successfully conducted test launches of newly developed long-range cruise missiles on September 11 and 12. The North Korean military also conducted a ballistic missile (KN-30) test, emphasizing that it was designed for railway-mobile missile regiment training as an effective counter-strike capability that can simultaneously inflict severe damage on threatening forces. On October 19, North Korea launched a ballistic missile from the submarine '8.24 Hero Ship,' which is estimated to have flown approximately 590 km at an altitude of 60 km.

Meanwhile, the Chinese government has not offered a clear opinion on the end-of-war declaration proposal, maintaining a rather principled stance. Although President Moon Jae-in mentioned China as a party to the end-of-war declaration for the first time in his keynote address at the UN General Assembly in September, the silence from the Xi Jinping government is disappointing to the South Korean government.

The Biden administration has also maintained a cautious stance. Sung Kim, the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea, held two consecutive meetings with his South Korean counterpart, Noh Kyu-duk, the Director-General for Policy Planning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to discuss issues related to the end-of-war declaration and the Korean Peninsula, stating that he "looks forward to continuing the discussion." The Biden administration also emphasized that it will continue to advocate for the human rights of the North Korean people and urge the immediate resolution of the abduction issue. Special Representative Kim pointed out that North Korea's recent missile test launches violate UN Security Council resolutions against North Korea and pose a threat to neighboring countries and the international community. On October 26, Jake Sullivan, White House National Security Advisor, stated that the U.S. and South Korea may have differing perspectives on the timing and conditions for discussing an end-of-war declaration.

2. Increasing the Value of the End-of-War Proposal

Given these reactions from the countries involved in the end-of-war declaration, there are concerns that pursuing the declaration might be in vain. In response, some have expressed skeptical views about the proposal. However, there are ways to increase the likelihood of acceptance by the relevant countries. Everything in this world has its price. If each relevant country can be offered a proposal that meets its appropriate value and interests, negotiations and agreements on the end-of-war declaration may become possible.

President Moon Jae-in must make more substantial proposals to each relevant country. Ironically, the end-of-war declaration lacks legal binding force. While the Moon Jae-in administration has emphasized this aspect to persuade relevant countries, this very point may have backfired and failed to capture the interest of the relevant countries. The South Korean government has argued that the end-of-war declaration carries low risk and only symbolic meaning, implying that the relevant countries have nothing to lose.

However, the fact that the end-of-war declaration is symbolic and lacks legal enforceability does not increase its acceptability. On the contrary, it may cause relevant countries to lose interest. If accepting the proposal does not yield significant expected outcomes, why should they bother considering it? President Moon stated in his UN address, "When the parties to the Korean War come together and achieve an 'end-of-war declaration,' complete peace can begin along with irreversible progress in denuclearization." This shows that the Moon Jae-in administration recognizes the joint end-of-war declaration as an important starting point for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of a sustainable peace regime. However, South Korea has not clearly and persuasively demonstrated how this 'gateway theory of the end-of-war declaration' will function. The Chinese government asks how this gateway will lead to an official end of war. The United States asks if this gateway leads to the door of complete, irreversible, and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. From North Korea's perspective, when the proposal for an end-of-war declaration was made during the 2007 inter-Korean summit between President Roh Moo-hyun and Chairman Kim Jong-il, there was some interest as it could have provided an opportunity for symbolic and significant meetings with the U.S. president. However, after two official summits and one informal meeting with the Donald Trump administration, the leadership has also lost interest in this proposal.

Considering all these factors, the Moon Jae-in administration, with its term nearing its end, should abandon its existing approach and instead adopt an 'exit strategy.' Relevant countries will seriously consider the end-of-war proposal only when it can bring them substantial and tangible benefits.

3. The Political Landscape Ahead: North Korea's 'Guns vs. Butter' Dilemma

What, then, are the cards that the South Korean government holds to persuade the relevant countries? Recent North Korean missile tests offer a useful clue. North Korea is increasingly grappling with the economic dilemma of 'guns vs. butter' (the dynamics of allocating budgets between defense and welfare). If North Korea feels the urgent need to escape the burden and pressure of an inter-Korean arms race, it will be more proactive in accepting the proposal for a joint declaration to reduce this burden.

In his report to the 8th Party Congress in January, Chairman Kim Jong-un admitted economic failure, stating that the "five-year national economic development plan fell far short in all sectors." At the same time, the Party Congress announced a five-year plan for defense science development and weapons system development.

The Kim Jong-un regime emphasized that "missiles are strategic weapons of great significance in achieving key objectives" and that they have been pursued according to a scientific and reliable weapons system development process over the past two years. Following the second test launch of two ballistic missiles on September 14, Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea, stated in a press release, "We are not conducting 'provocations' targeting anyone or choosing any particular time, as South Korea speculates, but are carrying out normal and self-defensive activities to fulfill the key tasks for the first year of the five-year plan for defense science development and weapons system development." She added, "This is no different from South Korea's 'mid-term defense plan.'

It remains questionable whether the Kim Jong-un regime can bear the dual pressure of revitalizing the economy and developing new advanced weapons. North Korea feels particularly pressured not to fall behind South Korea in missile technology. On September 15, the South Korean military successfully test-fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). With this, South Korea became the seventh country, alongside the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, India, and Russia, to possess underwater launch capabilities. On October 21, South Korea took a step closer to its dream of space development by launching its first domestically produced rocket, Nuri. The launch of Nuri is estimated to have cost approximately $11.6 billion, and the government has announced its goal of achieving a lunar landing with its own launch vehicle by 2030.

North Korea may accept the proposal for a joint inter-Korean end-of-war declaration with the aim of alleviating the burden of the inter-Korean arms race through military linkage with South Korea. China and the United States would also welcome the easing of military tensions and arms control on the Korean Peninsula. Given the current situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula, the end-of-war proposal has a low probability of success. To increase the feasibility of the proposal, the South Korean government must be able to make proposals that offer substantial benefits based on appropriate valuation, rather than symbolic gestures.

■ Bong Young-sikResearch Fellow at the Institute for National Unification, Yonsei University, and Visiting Professor at Hallym University Graduate School of International Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Pennsylvania and previously served as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at American University's School of International Service and Williams College.

■ Managed and Edited by: Min Ji-yoon Director of External Cooperation, EAI

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