[Global NK Commentary] Proper Valuation and Rational Proposals: The End-of-War Declaration and North Korea's Nuclear Tests

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[Editor's Note]

Following his proposal for a joint end-of-war declaration in his UN address, President Moon Jae-in is making all-out efforts by holding consultations with related countries such as the United States and China. In this commentary, Professor Bong Young-shik assesses the current situation, where there is no active support from related countries for the end-of-war declaration, and suggests the government's course of action. The author judges that the end-of-war declaration is unlikely to succeed due to its symbolic nature and lack of legal enforceability. Therefore, he emphasizes that the South Korean government must present practical and rational alternatives that can persuade related countries based on a proper valuation to increase its feasibility.

1. South Korea's Proposal for an End-of-War Declaration and North Korea's Missile Response

2. Increasing the Value of the End-of-War Proposal

3. The Political Landscape Ahead: North Korea's 'Guns vs. Butter' Dilemma

1. South Korea's Proposal for an End-of-War Declaration and North Korea's Missile Response

In his address to the 76th UN General Assembly on September 21, 2021, President Moon Jae-in proposed a trilateral or quadrilateral official end-of-war declaration. This was the third time President Moon had called for an end-of-war declaration in his UN address over the past four years, and it appears to be his final attempt as his term ends in May 2022.

Following President Moon Jae-in's proposal for a joint end-of-war declaration, the South Korean government is making all-out efforts by holding consultations with the United States and China. However, no related country has yet shown active support for this proposal. North Korea has expressed conditional willingness to respond to the proposal through two statements. Ri Thae-song, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea, stated in a statement that if the end-of-war declaration does not lead to the "withdrawal of hostile policy towards us," it is "premature." Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea, also stated in a statement on September 24 that the "end-of-war declaration is not bad," but that South Korea and the United States must first "put aside the past where they provoked us, applied double standards, unreasonably insisted, and nitpicked at every turn, and must be considerate and non-hostile in their future words and actions."

North Korea has not yet specified the preconditions for accepting the end-of-war proposal. Instead, North Korea has conducted various missile test launches for two months since President Moon Jae-in's UN address. On September 13, 2021, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the North Korean National Defense Science Academy had successfully test-fired newly developed long-range cruise missiles on September 11 and 12. The North Korean military also conducted a test of a ballistic missile (KN-30), emphasizing that it was designed for rail mobile missile regiment training as an effective counter-strike means capable of inflicting severe damage on threatening forces simultaneously. On October 19, North Korea launched a ballistic missile from the submarine '8.24 Hero Ship,' which is estimated to have flown approximately 590 km at an altitude of 60 km.

Meanwhile, the Chinese government has not offered a clear opinion on the end-of-war declaration proposal, maintaining a rather principled stance. For the first time, unlike in the past, President Moon Jae-in mentioned China as a party related to the end-of-war declaration in his keynote speech at the UN General Assembly in September, but the silence from the Xi Jinping government is disappointing the South Korean government.

The Biden administration is also maintaining a cautious stance. Sung Kim, the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea, held two rounds of discussions with his South Korean counterpart, Noh Kyu-duk, the Director General for Policy Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on issues related to the Korean Peninsula, including South Korea's end-of-war declaration, and stated that he "looks forward to continuing the discussion." The Biden administration also emphasized that it will continue to advocate for the human rights of the North Korean people and urge the immediate resolution of the abduction issue. Special Representative Kim pointed out that North Korea's recent missile test launches violate UN Security Council resolutions and pose a threat to neighboring countries and the international community. On October 26, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that the U.S. and South Korea may have different perspectives on the timing and conditions for discussing an end-of-war declaration.

2. Increasing the Value of the End-of-War Proposal

Considering these reactions from the parties involved in the end-of-war declaration, there are concerns that pursuing the declaration might be in vain. In response, some have expressed skeptical views about the proposal. However, there are ways to increase the likelihood of acceptance by the related parties. Everything in this world has its price. If each related party can be offered a proposal that meets its appropriate value and interests, negotiations and agreements on the end-of-war declaration may become possible.

President Moon Jae-in must make more substantial proposals to each related party. Ironically, the end-of-war declaration has no legal binding force. While the Moon Jae-in administration has tried to persuade related parties by emphasizing this aspect, it is precisely this point that has ironically backfired and served to attract the interest of related parties. The South Korean government has argued that the end-of-war declaration has low risks and only symbolic meaning, implying that related parties have nothing to lose.

However, the fact that the end-of-war declaration is symbolic and lacks legal enforceability does not necessarily increase its acceptability. On the contrary, it may cause related parties to lose interest. If accepting the proposal does not yield significant expected outcomes, why should they bother considering it? President Moon stated in his UN address, "When the parties to the Korean War gather and achieve an 'end-of-war declaration,' complete peace can begin along with irreversible progress in denuclearization." This shows that the Moon Jae-in administration recognizes the joint end-of-war declaration as an important starting point for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of a sustainable peace regime. However, South Korea has not clearly and persuasively demonstrated how this 'gateway theory of the end-of-war declaration' will function. The Chinese government asks how that gateway will lead to an official end of the war. The United States asks if that gateway leads to the complete, irreversible, and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. From North Korea's perspective, when the proposal for an end-of-war declaration was made during the inter-Korean summit between President Roh Moo-hyun and Chairman Kim Jong-il in 2007, there was some interest as it could have provided an opportunity for significant symbolic meetings with the U.S. President. However, after two official summit meetings and one informal meeting with the Donald Trump administration, the leadership has also lost interest in this proposal.

Considering all these factors, the Moon Jae-in administration, with its term nearing its end, should deviate from its existing approach and instead adopt an 'exit strategy.' Related parties will seriously consider the end-of-war proposal when it can bring them substantial and concrete benefits.

3. The Political Landscape Ahead: North Korea's 'Guns vs. Butter' Dilemma

So, what cards does the South Korean government hold to persuade the related parties? Recent North Korean missile tests offer useful clues. North Korea is increasingly grappling with the 'guns vs. butter' dilemma (the dynamics of defense spending versus welfare spending) in economics. If North Korea keenly feels the need to escape the burden and pressure of the inter-Korean arms race, it will be more proactive in accepting the joint declaration proposal to reduce this burden.

At the 8th Party Congress held in January, Chairman Kim Jong-un admitted economic failure, stating that the "five-year national economic development plan fell far short in all sectors." At the same time, the Party Congress announced a five-year plan for defense science development and weapons system development.

The Kim Jong-un regime emphasized that "missiles are strategic weapons of great significance in achieving key objectives" and that they have been developed according to a scientific and reliable weapons system development process over the past two years. After the second test launch of two ballistic missiles on September 14, Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea, stated in a statement, "We are not conducting 'provocations' targeting anyone or choosing any specific timing as South Korea speculates, but are carrying out normal and self-defensive activities to fulfill the key tasks of the first year of the five-year plan for defense science development and weapons system development." She added, "It is no different from South Korea's 'mid-term defense plan.'"

It remains questionable whether the Kim Jong-un regime can bear the dual pressure of reviving the economy and developing new advanced weapons. North Korea feels particularly burdened by the need to keep pace with South Korea's military capabilities in missile technology. On September 15, the South Korean military successfully test-fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). With this, South Korea became the seventh country, along with the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, India, and Russia, to possess underwater launch capabilities. On October 21, South Korea took another step towards its dream of space development by launching its first domestically produced rocket, Nuri. The launch of Nuri is estimated to have cost approximately $11.6 billion, and the government has announced its goal of achieving a lunar landing with its own launch vehicle by 2030.

North Korea may accept the proposal for a joint inter-Korean end-of-war declaration as a means to alleviate the burden of the inter-Korean arms race by linking it to South Korea's military capabilities. China and the United States would also welcome the easing of military tensions and arms control on the Korean Peninsula. Given the current situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula, the end-of-war proposal has a low probability of success. To increase the feasibility of the proposal, the South Korean government must be able to offer proposals that provide substantial benefits based on proper valuation, rather than symbolic gestures.

■ Bong Young-sikResearcher at the Institute for National Unification Studies, Yonsei University, and Visiting Professor at the Graduate School of Hallym University. He holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Pennsylvania and previously served as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at American University's School of International Service and Williams College.

■ Managed and Edited by: Min Ji-yoon EAI 대외협력실장

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