Democratic Resilience: The Korean Experience

[Editor's Note]

Korean democracy has not regressed. However, "signs of crisis" in democracy are being witnessed across the board. In this issue brief, Kang Won-taek, Professor at Seoul National University, focuses on how these "signs of crisis" present challenges for the advancement of Korean democracy. The author explains what is necessary to overcome these signs of crisis and strengthen democratic resilience, based on an analysis of Korea's democratization process. Emphasizing the role of vigilant citizens as a key factor in protecting and maintaining democratic values, he argues for greater emphasis on tolerance and coexistence in civic education.

I. Introduction

Thirty years ago, democratization was a global trend. Beginning in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s, democratization spread to many countries in Asia via Latin America in the 1980s. It was followed by democratization in Eastern European countries with the collapse of communist regimes, and became a worldwide phenomenon, symbolized by the democratization of South Africa under Nelson Mandela. Samuel Huntington called this the "Third Wave of Democratization," and Francis Fukuyama declared it the "End of History" as ideological competition concluded.

However, signs of democratic regression have recently appeared in various parts of the world. This is evident not only in new democracies such as Hungary, Turkey, Thailand, the Philippines, and Russia, but also in phenomena like the Trump phenomenon in the United States, the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom, and the rise of far-right and populist parties in various European countries. This demonstrates that democracy is not a completed state but is always subject to challenges, and its resilience is crucial.

II. Korea's Democratization Process

Since democratization in 1987, South Korea has achieved relatively stable and continuous democratic consolidation. For a long period before democratization, Korea was under an authoritarian regime. However, despite being a non-democratic system, it had not completely deviated from liberal democratic principles. Elections were held periodically, and the existence of opposition parties was permitted. Although the fairness of elections was questionable and the possibility of an opposition party gaining power was virtually nil, the elections were quite competitive. Even under the authoritarian regime, elections served as an outlet for public discontent with the government, acting as a serious political warning to the ruling power. The military, even if it seized power through a coup, sought legitimacy through elections and was fundamentally aware of its inherent legitimacy deficit. For these reasons, opposition leaders believed in the possibility of power transition through elections, provided that free and fair elections were guaranteed.

Korea's democratization occurred in this context. The establishment of procedural democracy was the core element of Korea's democratization. This is why the "constitutional amendment for direct presidential elections" was the most important agenda item for Korean democratization in 1987. Subsequently, the process of democratic consolidation focused on establishing the fairness of elections. The establishment of electoral democracy and the resulting possibility of power transition led to a centripetal form of competition among major political leaders, which helped reduce political instability in the early stages of democratization. Furthermore, in their pursuit of electoral victory, major political leaders competitively sought to recruit new figures, including a considerable number of hardliners dissatisfied with the "compromise-based" democratic transition. The entry of these individuals into institutional politics not only represented the recruitment of new elites but also helped prevent political polarization and fragmentation. The party structure based on regionalism and the electoral system centered on the simple plurality system, which emerged with democratization, also limited the number of effective parties to three or four, thus maintaining a stable moderate multi-party system. Power transitions through elections indeed occurred and have now become a common phenomenon. The delegation of power through elections has been established as the only game in town.

The prompt depoliticization of the military in the early stages of democratization also played a significant role in Korea's democratic consolidation. Kim Young-sam, the second president after democratization, upon taking office, leveraged the high expectations and support for the new president, along with his democratic legitimacy, to dismiss military generals with strong political affiliations from the authoritarian military era and replace them with new figures. Many military personnel who had been disadvantaged under the rule of the "new military" faction centered around Chun Doo-hwan welcomed this military reform and developed loyalty to the new system formed by democratization. Concurrently, during Korea's smooth democratic consolidation process, economic growth was steady, and economic inequality was not severe. Until the 1997 foreign exchange crisis, the majority of the population considered themselves middle class and had strong faith in social mobility.

Moreover, just as democratization in 1987 was achieved through citizen participation, citizens' roles were crucial during the democratic consolidation process. Even after democratization, when political institutions were ineffective or political responsiveness was significantly low, citizens exerted pressure on institutional politics through direct political participation. Large-scale candlelight vigils in 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2016 serve as examples. While these candlelight vigils involved numerous citizens and often had a sustained duration, they did not escalate into extreme forms like riots involving violence. Korea's democratic consolidation proceeded in a relatively stable and smooth manner, combining these factors.

III. Is Korean Democracy Regressing?

Recently, phenomena that can be described as "signs of crisis" in democracy have been observed in Korea as well. While it cannot be said that Korean democracy has "regressed" or transformed into an authoritarian system, concerning phenomena have emerged, at least from the perspective of the "quality of democracy."

First, problems related to procedural democracy, which can be considered the core of the "1987 system," have arisen. The National Intelligence Service's online comment manipulation incident occurred during the 2012 presidential election, and the Druking incident occurred during the 2017 presidential election. Both incidents are serious because they involved actions intended to influence public opinion related to elections. Furthermore, since the 2020 general election, disputes related to the fairness of elections have continued, with some segments of society claiming vote-counting fraud. The repeated occurrence of doubts or interference concerning the fairness of elections is highly concerning as it undermines the foundation of a healthy democracy.

The disputes over the integrity of the electoral process are even more serious as they are linked to doubts about the neutrality and independence of "arbitrating institutions" such as the National Election Commission, the Board of Audit and Inspection, and the prosecution. The repeated controversies over the independence and autonomy of the prosecution, and the fact that the judiciary, which should prioritize fairness and independence above all else, is often the subject of political debate, are also causes for concern.

Incidents and legislation that could infringe upon citizens' political freedoms have also occurred. Examples include the civilian surveillance conducted by the Anti-Corruption and Civil Defense Agency under the Prime Minister's Office during the Lee Myung-bak administration in 2008, and the passage of laws such as the Act on the Punishment of Civil Defamation Related to the Gwangju Democratization Movement and the Act on the Prohibition of Spreading Leaflets to North Korea during the Moon Jae-in administration, which could restrict freedom of expression. The controversial Media Arbitration Act can also be viewed in this context.

Socially, as partisan polarization intensifies, negative phenomena related to core liberal democratic values such as pluralism, tolerance, and consideration are emerging. The appointment of Cho Kuk as Minister of Justice in 2019 caused significant social conflict. As that incident clearly demonstrated, our society is currently divided into two ideologically and politically polarized groups. While political conflict or differences in political stances are natural in a democratic society, the problem is that conflicts are not being resolved but are increasingly overlapping with partisan polarization. Our society, divided by regionalism immediately after democratization, is now further fractured by ideological, generational, and class divides. Instead of being dispersed among various political parties, these diverse fissures are concentrated and monopolized by two major political factions, intensifying bipolar confrontation. In such a situation, radical and extreme arguments gain more traction within each camp than rational and moderate voices, thereby escalating social conflict. The bipolar conflict arising from differences in political views is even perceived by extreme supporters of each camp as a confrontation between "good and evil." If one's own argument is "good" and the other's is "evil," compromise and reconciliation become impossible. In this mindset, it is justified for good to overcome evil. This leads to a situation where one cannot respect the other's position or acknowledge differences.

This polarization phenomenon is particularly severe in online discussions and on social networking services (SNS), where discussions on public affairs are confined to like-minded individuals, reinforcing biased positions between camps. Instead of facilitating the hearing of diverse opinions and the drawing of social consensus, communication in the online space tends to confirm and reinforce one's own biased views through interaction with those who share similar thoughts.

The problem is that institutional politics, which should resolve such social conflicts and ideological polarization, is instead engaging in adversary politics that fuels polarization. Issues raised socially lead to partisan conflict through institutional politics such as the National Assembly or political parties, which in turn exacerbates ideological and partisan polarization in civil society, creating a vicious cycle.

Furthermore, despite over 30 years of consolidation since democratization, the concentration of power in the presidency and the central government persists. Moreover, the concentration of power around presidential confidants, often referred to as a "Cheong Wa Dae government," has become even more pronounced recently. This concentration of power in the presidency significantly undermines the autonomy of various departments and agencies, negatively impacting governance efficiency and policy implementation continuity. Additionally, despite local autonomy, local governments remain administratively and financially weak compared to the central government. South Korea remains a "Republic of Seoul." These phenomena all indicate "signs of crisis" in Korean democracy. Despite relatively stable democratic transition and consolidation, Korea, too, faces continuous challenges to its democracy.

However, viewing Korea's situation as a "collapse of democracy" or a "fundamental regression" does not seem appropriate. Korea's situation can be characterized as an issue of power execution and personnel rather than a corruption of essential democratic values. In this regard, the "signs of crisis" in Korean democracy are expected to possess self-restoring capabilities due to citizen participation and the functioning of institutions.

IV. Challenges for Strengthening Democratic Resilience

A notable characteristic of the development of Korean democracy since democratization is the absence of serious threats to the democratic system itself. Crisis situations that could burden the democratic system have occurred several times. The 1997 foreign exchange crisis, the impeachment attempt against President Roh Moo-hyun in 2004, and the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in 2017 brought about severe political and economic crises. However, these crises were all resolved through political institutions. The 1997 foreign exchange crisis led to the first peaceful transfer of power between ruling and opposition parties. The impeachment of President Roh Moo-hyun in 2004, while a severe political crisis, was resolved politically when the ruling Uri Party secured a majority in the 17th general election, which effectively served as a referendum on the impeachment, and was finally concluded by a Constitutional Court ruling. The state-sponsored corruption and abuse of power scandal surrounding President Park Geun-hye in 2016 was resolved through citizen demands expressed in candlelight vigils, the National Assembly's response, and the Constitutional Court's acceptance of these demands. Severe crises were all resolved through citizen participation and judgment, and the constitutional order.

In this regard, Korean democracy is expected to demonstrate considerable resilience in addressing the current "signs of crisis" and the "decline in the quality of democracy." Citizen interest and participation in political phenomena and democracy are paramount. The establishment of fair elections and political accountability through them, as well as the normalization of power transitions, are important institutional foundations for democratic resilience. Based on Korea's experience, the most crucial factor for democratic resilience is the establishment of procedural democracy, including fair and free elections and the possibility of power transition.

The current "signs of crisis" present challenges that must be addressed for the deepening of Korean democracy. First, we must consider the reform of party politics, which serves as a link between civil society and the state. Restoring the competitiveness of party politics, moving beyond the cartel structure of the two major parties based on regionalism, is of utmost importance. It must be possible for new and competitive political forces to emerge in the political competition market of elections, thereby leading to changes in the party politics ecosystem and fostering more open and pluralistic politics.

When dissatisfaction grows that existing parties represent vested interests or only specific interests or viewpoints, political institutions become unstable. Populism and extremist politics also gain strength in such situations. Therefore, diverse social interests must be able to be expressed through party politics, and new demands or claims must be reflected in institutional politics through new political forces. However, under the current electoral system based on simple plurality, it is difficult to secure such diverse representation. Under the electoral system primarily based on simple plurality combined with regionalism, the possibility of new parties emerging to challenge the vested interests of the two major parties is very low. Protected by such institutional arrangements, the two major parties seek to consolidate their supporters through bipolar confrontation, resulting in further escalation of social conflict. Therefore, reform towards an electoral system with higher proportionality is necessary. This requires a change in the system that genuinely implements the principle of proportionality, not a "clever" compromise like the "quasi-proportional representation system" implemented before the 21st general election. In this process, balanced representation should be reflected, ensuring that it is not biased towards any particular group based on criteria such as class, gender, status, education, occupation, or origin.

In addition, strengthening the institutional role of "judges" who monitor power is also important. The independence and neutrality of the judiciary, as well as administrative bodies like the National Election Commission and the Board of Audit and Inspection, are crucial. Controversies over the autonomy and independence of various institutions, including the judiciary, are related to the status of the President as "Head of State" and the concentration of power in the presidency. Therefore, in the long term, through constitutional amendment processes, the President should be restored to the position of head of the executive branch, and institutional improvements are needed to establish the independent status of each institutional body from power, such as the revival of the judicial recommendation committee at the Supreme Court. The dismantling of the presidential system, which is even called "imperial," is also necessary. To this end, the realization of local decentralization, which involves boldly transferring administrative and financial authority concentrated in central administrative agencies and Seoul to the regions, is also important. At the time of democratization, the core task of our society was limited to establishing procedural democracy. That goal has now been largely achieved. Over 30 years after democratization, efforts are needed for constitutional revision to build a new national governance system from a future-oriented perspective.

However, the most crucial factor in protecting and maintaining democratic values remains the role of vigilant citizens. The power to check power, monitor the functioning of political institutions, and, if necessary, restore democracy through active participation originates from the citizens. Civic education, which awakens and teaches citizens' consciousness to acquire and protect democratic values, also holds significant meaning in relation to democratic resilience. Another important aspect for expanding representation and inclusivity is the diversification of the composition of party elites. It is essential to ensure that they are not biased based on criteria such as class, gender, status, education, occupation, or origin.

In this regard, the importance of tolerance and coexistence needs to be emphasized in civic education. It needs to be taught that the natural state of society is not homogeneity and uniformity, but rather disagreement and diversity, and that consensus is "built" through compromise and concession among such diverse individuals. The pluralistic value of "agreeing to disagree," which is the foundation of a liberal democratic system, must be internalized socially. In fact, in the development process of liberal democracy in Korea, the emphasis has been on democracy rather than liberty. Democracy has always been a significant value in our politics since the April 19 Revolution in 1960. Even under oppressive authoritarian regimes, the desire for democratization never waned. In contrast, liberal values have not been extensively discussed in our society. Liberal values such as individual freedom, acceptance of differences, tolerance and consideration, and respect for diversity have been relatively neglected. It is difficult to achieve a harmonious and reconciled society through institutional politics alone. Citizens must become the agents who create such values themselves. The most important foundation for the restoration of democracy is the consciousness of citizens who strive to protect those values. ■

■ Author: Kang Won-taek_ Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He has served as President of the Korean Political Science Association and the Korean Association of Party Studies. His main research areas include Korean politics, legislatures, elections, and political parties. His major publications include "Decisive Moments in Korean Politics" (2019), "Writing Social Science" (2019), "Korean Politics" (2019), "Democracy Made by Citizens" (2018, co-authored), "Evaluation of 30 Years of Korean Democratization" (2017, co-authored), and "Presidential System, Parliamentary System, and Semi-Presidential System" (2016).

■ Management and Editing: Yoon Ha-eun_EAI Research Fellow

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | hyoon@eai.or.kr