[Global NK Commentary] Characteristics of North Korean Disaster Governance in the Kim Jong Un Era and Implications for North Korea Policy

[Editor's Note]

Entering its tenth year in power, the Kim Jong Un regime appears to be justifying its rule by emphasizing crisis management capabilities through 'disaster' governance. By actively promoting the global health security agenda of overcoming disasters, North Korea has been able to legitimize Kim Jong Un's leadership internally and project an image of a normal state externally. The author explains that North Korea's focus on disaster risk reduction governance can be attributed to three factors: internal political dynamics for consolidating the regime, practical aspects of breaking through sanctions, and the desire for external recognition as a 'normal state' concerned with the safety of its people. Disaster risk reduction governance is emphasized as a crucial political rhetoric for navigating national emergencies, creating opportunities for communication with the international community, and suggesting avenues for inter-Korean relations improvement.

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Introduction

The Kim Jong Un regime will enter its tenth year in power next year. Facing a triple crisis of comprehensive sanctions, chronic natural disasters, and the global spread of COVID-19 last year, what future does the Kim Jong Un regime envision? In response to this triple crisis, the Kim Jong Un regime is observed to be actively utilizing 'disaster' governance. The Kim Jong Un regime appears to be justifying its rule by emphasizing crisis management capabilities through 'disaster' governance. Having returned empty-handed from the "nuclear negotiations" with the United States in 2018-2019, Kim Jong Un is now showing signs of seeking to win public support and expand communication with the international community through battles against disasters. North Korea's assertion of being a "COVID-19-free zone" is, like other authoritarian states such as China and Venezuela, becoming a tool of governance to demonstrate the 'normality' or even 'superiority' of the North Korean system. In fact, although the breakdown of North Korea-US talks challenged Kim Jong Un's leadership by hardliners within the military advocating for a tough stance against the US, the transition to a 'state emergency quarantine system' due to COVID-19 last year paradoxically provided Kim Jong Un with an opportunity to strengthen his regime. That is, by actively promoting the global health security agenda of overcoming disasters, North Korea has been able to legitimize Kim Jong Un's leadership internally and project an image of a 'normal state' externally. In particular, it is noteworthy that North Korea in the Kim Jong Un era is actively incorporating international development discourse, such as the UN's 'Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)', into its policies and seeking ways to improve institutional frameworks and utilize multilateral organizations for disaster risk reduction.

Motivations for North Korea's Focus on Disaster Risk Reduction Governance

There are three main reasons why North Korea is focusing on disaster risk reduction governance. First, internal political factors. In North Korea under the Kim Jong Un regime, 'disasters' are being utilized as a key policy resource for establishing new governance aimed at ending the era of the previous generation's emergency state and transitioning to a modern normal state. While the 'need for security' was prioritized in an emergency system, the 'need for safety' takes precedence in a normal system. North Korea is experiencing a vicious cycle of disasters, including chronic floods and droughts, malnutrition, and outbreaks of infectious diseases. To prevent public discontent and consolidate the Kim Jong Un regime, enhancing crisis management capabilities through disaster recovery and prevention measures is essential.

Second, the practical aspect of breaking through sanctions. In reality, disaster governance is a useful channel through which North Korea can legally receive external assistance. Under comprehensive sanctions by the US, Europe, and the UN, the only external resources North Korea can mobilize are humanitarian aid for food, health/medical care, and maternal support, as well as participation in projects linked to UN SDGs. Especially with the global spread of COVID-19, which has led North Korea to self-impose border closures and even halt cross-border smuggling for epidemic prevention, international support for disaster recovery and prevention is more crucial than ever. In other words, the realm of disaster risk reduction—encompassing prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery—in the Kim Jong Un era is the only sector where North Korea's participation in the international community is encouraged within a multilateral cooperation space, and it also offers potential for improving inter-Korean relations.

Third, the desire for external recognition. In the Kim Jong Un era, North Korea is actively projecting an image of a 'normal state' externally by demonstrating concern for the safety of its people from disasters. Last year, in his speech at the military parade celebrating the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea (October 10, 2020), Chairman Kim Jong Un devoted a significant portion to thanking the North Korean people and military for enduring the triple hardships of "harsh and prolonged sanctions," "severe natural damage," and "emergency quarantine due to COVID-19." In particular, Kim Jong Un's tears and self-reflection during the speech were perceived as a refreshing contrast to the trend of deepening authoritarianism observed during the global health and security crisis. Furthermore, at the 8th Party Congress in early 2021 (January 5-12), Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his commitment to "concentrating all efforts on economic construction" internally, advocating for "people-first" and "our-country-first" principles, appearing to focus further on establishing legitimacy and stability as a normal state.

Distinguishing Features of North Korea's Disaster Risk Reduction Governance in the Kim Jong Un Era

As such, disasters provide Kim Jong Un with opportunities to consolidate his regime despite domestic and international challenges, and the Kim Jong Un regime appears to be fully leveraging this for its governance. The first sign of this can be found in the changes in disaster preparedness and recovery policies within North Korea. Since Kim Jong Un came to power, North Korean media have increasingly reported on international news related to climate change and natural disasters, and have dedicated more space to efforts in climate change adaptation and mitigation, such as renewable energy and environmental protection. This shift in awareness has led to the following policy changes.

Immediately upon Chairman Kim Jong Un's assumption of office, North Korea reorganized its 'typhoon early warning system' (2012) and established a 'Disaster Management Bureau' under the State Planning Commission (2013) to implement national-level emergency measures in areas where damage was anticipated. Under the command of the 'State Emergency Disaster Control Committee' (newly established in 2014), a disaster response governance structure was established. In accordance with Decree No. 76 of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, North Korea enacted the 'Law on Disaster Prevention and Relief and Recovery' (revised in 2017), which integrated previously fragmented disaster risk management legislation. Based on this law, the State Emergency Disaster Control Committee (SCDEM), a permanent national disaster risk management body, was created on November 30, 2014. The SCDEM, responsible for the entire process of disaster prevention and recovery, established strategies for consolidating the scientific and technological foundation for disaster risk management, disaster preparedness, initial recovery, and disaster management, and prioritized the development of disaster risk assessment and disaster recovery technologies tailored to North Korea's circumstances. Furthermore, the disaster response system was bifurcated into sectoral (e.g., food security by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries, and Land and Environment Protection) and regional (response systems under city/county people's committees) levels to enhance disaster response efficiency. Additionally, in the national disaster governance structure, regional Red Cross organizations cooperate with local governments in disaster response, prevention, and preparedness. This indicates that North Korea in the Kim Jong Un era is aiming for long-term reconstruction and prevention through institutional reforms, rather than merely short-term response or relief, which aligns with the disaster risk reduction governance pursued by the international community today.

Another clear sign that Kim Jong Un is actively utilizing disaster risk reduction governance as a tool for rule is his proactive pursuit of multilateral solutions for disaster risk reduction. The response of the Kim Jong Un regime to the flood-affected areas in North Hamgyong Province from August 29-31, 2016, serves as a representative example of North Korea's changed disaster governance and perception. At that time, Typhoon Lionrock caused 138 deaths, over 400 missing persons, and approximately 600,000 displaced individuals in six regions: Hoeryong, Yeonse, Onsong, Kyongwon, Musan, and Kyonghung. In response, the Kim Jong Un regime concentrated national, social, and popular capabilities on the new battle of 'disaster recovery,' under banners such as the 'Northern Disaster Recovery Front' and 'Northern Front,' immediately prior to the 7th Party Congress in 2016. During this process, the Kim Jong Un regime actively requested assistance from the international community while unusually accepting international norms for disaster risk management. Unlike in the past, the Kim Jong Un regime did not conceal the damage or the fact of receiving international aid; instead, it actively reported on flood assistance from UN agencies and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. Furthermore, the UN North Korea Disaster Relief Program, initiated by an urgent appeal from the UN Resident Coordinator in North Korea, was implemented within the broader framework of the 'Second UN Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation' (UNSF 2017-2021).

In 2010, North Korea, under the Kim Jong Un succession system, established the 'First UN Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation' (UNSF 2011-2015) with the UN Country Team (UNCT) and set 'Social Development,' 'Partnership for Knowledge and Development Management,' 'Nutritional Improvement,' and 'Climate Change and Environment' as priority areas. At that time, the UN expanded its assistance to North Korea, which had suffered severe floods and droughts in 2011-2012, but achieved limited results due to the uncooperative attitude of the North Korean authorities towards UN agencies' activities in North Korea for aid distribution and monitoring. However, after Kim Jong Un came to power, North Korea expanded cooperation with international organizations such as the UN, despite sanctions imposed due to successive nuclear tests. Following the enactment and revision of the 'Law on Disaster Prevention and Relief and Recovery' in 2014, strengthened disaster risk reduction governance led to the formulation of the 'National Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy (2019-2030)' and the 'National Environmental Protection Strategy (2019-2030),' and the implementation of the 'Afforestation Plan (2015-2024) to fulfill carbon emission reduction targets in response to climate change.' These initiatives indicated the Kim Jong Un regime's willingness to pursue disaster risk reduction policies in line with international norms. In the fall of 2015, North Korea prepared a new draft UNSF for the implementation of the UN's SDGs, and at the 7th Party Congress in May 2016, it incorporated the SDG implementation plan into the five-year national economic development strategy. Based on the second UNSF (2017-2021), completed in 2016 after gathering opinions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' National Coordination Committee (NCC) and relevant ministries, a framework for global partnership and coordination between the North Korean authorities and the UNCT was established, strengthening various activities for North Korea's SDG implementation and the UN's humanitarian assistance system. Within this framework of global partnership, during the floods of 2016, the Kim Jong Un regime was able to carry out disaster recovery projects in six areas—nutrition and food security, health, maternal and child health, water sanitation and education, and housing reconstruction—under the four strategic objectives of the second UNSF ('Food and Nutritional Security,' 'Social Development Services,' 'Resilience and Sustainability,' and 'Data and Development Management').

The enhanced multilateral cooperation in disaster risk reduction governance has also yielded significant results in actual relief efforts at the regional level. According to a 2020 report by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), which emphasized the need for disaster response governance at the community level as early as a 2010 report, 'community engagement and accountability' were implemented in disaster response and recovery processes during the relief efforts for Typhoon Lingling in 2019, despite border closures due to COVID-19 and international sanctions. Furthermore, during a monitoring visit to Yonggang County on September 23, 2019, linked to relief support for Typhoon Lingling, the IFRC assessed that the early warning drills conducted in 2015 were effective in enabling local residents to prepare for the disaster, receive warning messages, and take appropriate actions during Typhoon Lingling. Thus, the interaction with the international community for disaster relief support and efforts to improve national disaster governance have led to notable progress in North Korea's disaster risk reduction in the Kim Jong Un era. This change is reflected in the social atmosphere of prioritizing disaster prevention measures in national land management projects during the spring and fall of 2020 and 2021. While fulfilling its obligations as a UN member state in the area of disaster governance, North Korea has also asserted its right to technical and financial support from the international community, submitting project proposals for 'readiness support' for climate change adaptation and mitigation to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) in 2019. Based on these proactive steps in disaster risk reduction, it can be anticipated that North Korea will participate in the international community not only in disaster risk reduction but also in various other areas in a manner consistent with universal standards.

The positive attitude shown by North Korea during the flood recovery efforts in 2016 also brought about a change in North Korea's political narrative. The disaster recovery experience of the 'Northern Front' in 2016 has been continuously invoked as a prime example of Kim Jong Un's 'people-first' ideology. For instance, an editorial in the Rodong Sinmun on October 8, about 60 days after the flood, justified the Kim Jong Un regime by highlighting disaster risk management as an expression of Kim Jong Un's 'love for the people.' This emphasis on the 'people' is consistent with the emergence of 'our-country-first' as a key component under the slogan 'people-first' in 2019. While Kim Il Sung's era emphasized 'military-first politics' and support for the military, the Kim Jong Un era's 'people-first politics' clearly distinguishes itself by emphasizing the unity of the military and the people through disaster recovery projects, thereby promoting the military's role in serving the people. Furthermore, driven by the regime's intention to legitimize national disaster risk reduction efforts through 'people-first' politics, various awareness-raising initiatives have emerged. Additionally, the direct involvement of the Party and administration in guiding and managing rapid initial response strategies and actions on-site has become even more visible during the natural disaster emergency exacerbated by the global spread of COVID-19 in 2020.

During the 2020 flood crisis, the Kim Jong Un regime demonstrated unconventional efforts by holding consecutive Party and government meetings, including a Party Political Bureau meeting, at the disaster-stricken sites and by establishing regional response systems. The dispatch of the People's Army and shock troops mobilized for the '200-day battle' immediately after the Party Congress to disaster areas during the recovery from Typhoon Lionrock in 2016, emphasizing the socialist principle centered on the masses, and the dispatch of 12,000 'capital city Party members' through a letter from the supreme leader for the recovery and reconstruction of flood-stricken areas in 2020, setting the '80-day battle' as the main direction for disaster recovery, leading to the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, all attest to the significant position disaster governance holds in North Korea's national identity under the Kim Jong Un regime. These domestic political changes demonstrate that 'people-first politics' plays a crucial role in legitimizing Kim Jong Un's succession. This can be seen as a result of the shift from the Kim Jong Il regime's pursuit of military-first politics for the completion of nuclear armament to the Kim Jong Un regime's declaration of a new line of 'concentrating all efforts on economic construction' in April 2018, based on the premise of having completed the 'state nuclear force' by the end of 2017.

Conclusion

So far, we have examined the shift in perception and policy changes in North Korea's disaster risk reduction governance during the Kim Jong Un era. Entering its tenth year in power next year, the Kim Jong Un regime faces challenges different from those of its predecessors. This challenge is North Korea itself. Historically, North Korea has conducted economic activities by depleting its natural environment. For instance, trees were cut down for firewood, and mountains and land were excavated to mine key mineral resources. As a result, the weakened ground could not withstand heavy rainfall, causing landslides and large-scale casualties. The damage in isolated flood-stricken areas increased as roads were washed away, making recovery difficult. As flood recovery was delayed, infectious diseases spread due to contaminated water supply and sewage systems, and casualties further increased due to shortages of medicine and food. This cycle of disasters has continued annually in North Korea and is therefore not entirely new.

However, as introduced above, since the Kim Jong Un era, North Korea's response system and political rhetoric related to disaster risk reduction have changed. This is because North Korea is actively introducing and incorporating the UN's concept of 'Sustainable Development' into its policies, going beyond simply emphasizing the importance of 'water' and 'air.' This has significant implications for future North Korea policy formulation. At a time when disasters are being elevated to national security issues, we need to pay attention to the fact that disaster governance in North Korea under the Kim Jong Un regime has emerged as a key topic of political rhetoric for overcoming national emergencies such as floods, infectious diseases, and sanctions. In particular, the occurrence of disasters, comparable to wartime situations, has provided a strong justification for effectively mobilizing domestic and international resources despite sanctions, in the process of pursuing the Kim Jong Un regime's governance goal of 'normalization.' In this process, North Korea in the Kim Jong Un era is showing new aspects, such as presenting 'people-first politics' as a key governance principle, replacing the previous generation's 'military-first politics,' emphasizing light industry for civilian use over heavy industry focused on military supplies, and expediting housing and water/sewage improvement projects.

Under the universally shared goal of disaster risk reduction, North Korea appears to be creating points of communication with the international community. From this, we can explore ways to guide the Kim Jong Un regime away from isolation and seclusion. For North Korea, this could be a shortcut to being recognized as a member of the international community by fulfilling its obligations and asserting its rights under the universal norms of SDGs. Given that 'disasters' have recently emerged as a significant topic in North Korean political rhetoric, the international community needs to seriously consider what implications this will have for the Kim Jong Un regime and the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula. 

■ Cho Eun-jeong_Senior Researcher, Korea Institute for National Security Strategy. Her research focuses on nuclear non-proliferation and the establishment of a peace regime through regional integration. Her major publications include "UK and French Military Engagement in the Indo-Pacific: Current Status and Implications (2021)," "Japan's Decision to Release Water from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant (April 13): Key Issues and South Korea's Response Strategy (2021)," "Nation branding for survival in North Korea: The Arirang Festival and nuclear weapons tests (2017)," "North Korea and International Politics (2018)," "The 21st Century Transformation of the Concept of International Security (2017)," "Does Nuclear Cooperation Fuel Nuclear Proliferation?: The International Nuclear Control Aspect of the US-ROK Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation (2016)," "The 'Structural Gap' of the Nuclear-Missile System and North Korea's Nuclear-Missile Alliance Network (2014)," and "EURATOM: Bridging 'Rapprochement' and 'Radiance' of France in the Post-war (2013)," among others.

■ Kim Tae-kyung_Associate Research Fellow, Korea Future Institute. He holds a Ph.D. in the formation of North Korean socialist realism in the 1950s from Seoul National University and worked as a research professor at the Center for North-South Korean Mind Integration at the University of North Korean Studies. His recent papers include "North Korea's 'Peaceful Coexistence Minds' in the 1950s: Acceptance of the Soviet 'Peaceful Coexistence' Line and North Korea's Discourse on Arms Reduction," "North Korea's Acceptance of the German Confederation Model for Unification in the 1950s and the Imagination of Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula," and "The Making of the 'Reader-People' in the 1950–1960s North Korean Socialist Literature."

■ Responsible for and Edited by: Min Ji-yoonDirector of External Affairs, EAI

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) | jymin@eai.or.kr