[Global NK Commentary] Kim Jong Un's Dual Strategy: The "First South, Then North" Tactic

[Editor's Note]

In September, North Korea conducted four missile test launches within the month, reporting success in hitting targets set for new cruise missiles and rail-mobile missiles. Amidst the continuous advancement of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, the military threats and arms race among neighboring major powers are intensifying. North Korea demands that the South abandon its sense of crisis and victimhood regarding North Korean provocations, asserting that the future resolution of inter-Korean relations hinges on the South Korean authorities' attitude, including the withdrawal of their hostile policy. The author notes that while the restoration of inter-Korean communication lines after 55 days could mark a turning point, the path to inter-Korean relations recovery will not be smooth due to the differing attitudes of both Koreas.

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In January, Chairman Kim Jong Un hinted at the augmentation of cutting-edge, novel weaponry. When he ordered the fulfillment of the defense industry development strategic goals presented at the 8th Party Congress in January, stating the need to continuously strengthen national defense capabilities, the foremost right of a sovereign state, by miniaturizing nuclear weapons, tacticalizing them, producing super-large nuclear warheads, developing and introducing hypersonic glide vehicle warheads, and developing solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the terms themselves were unfamiliar, and it was assessed as merely a threat from the Songun (military-first) political system. However, things began to unravel in September. On September 13, North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that on the 11th and 12th, new cruise missiles flew for approximately 7,580 seconds (about 126 minutes) along pre-designed elliptical and figure-eight flight trajectories, successfully hitting targets installed at a boundary line approximately 1,500 km away. If North Korea's announcement is true, this would be the longest-range flight achieved by any cruise missile developed to date. Furthermore, the entire territory of Japan falls within the strike range of these cruise missiles.

Then, on the 16th, KCNA reported: "The railway mobile missile regiment was assigned the mission to strike a target area 800 km away in the central mountainous region on the morning of the 15th and participated in the training." It further stated, "The railway mobile missile regiment completed rapid deployment and maneuvering according to the operating regulations and action sequences of the railway mobile missile system and accurately struck a target set in the waters 800 km off the East Sea of Korea according to the fire mission." The diversification of missile launch platforms has now extended to trains. Previously, North Korea launched ballistic missiles from tracked and wheeled mobile launchers; however, two KN-23 (North Korean version of Iskander) missiles fired from Yangdok, South Pyongan Province, the previous day were launched from a train. This is analyzed as imitating a launch method used by the former Soviet Union. Ballistic missiles can be launched not only from trains but also from vertical launchers mounted on ships. North Korean media reported the establishment of a railway mobile missile regiment this year and hinted at the possibility of expanding it into a brigade-level unit in the future. North Korea's railway mobile missile system appears to have adopted a system developed and operated by the former Soviet Union. North Korea's system is similar to the way the former Soviet Union operated its railway-based ICBMs, signifying an intent to expand its capability for simultaneous missile attacks. The ability to carry and transport multiple heavy ballistic missiles and operate them from tunnels for concealment increases the burden on our military, which must now prepare for train-based launches in addition to missile bases and mobile missile launchers (TELs).

Additionally, on the 28th, a peculiar missile was showcased. KCNA reported on the 29th that the National Defense Science Academy test-fired the Hwasong-8 missile in Doyang-ri, Yongnim County, Jagang Province, on the morning of the 28th. KCNA introduced this missile as a hypersonic missile. Hypersonic refers to missiles that fly at speeds exceeding Mach 5 (approximately 6,125 km/h). The publicly released photos show a black ballistic missile with a warhead resembling a squid in flight.

North Korea's four missile test launches in September suggest a 'hard-soft dual strategy.' Chairman Kim Jong Un, who had been focusing on domestic affairs and delegating external messages to officials like Kim Yo Jong, the Vice Department Director of the Workers' Party, revealed his vision for inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea relations in a policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly. Rodong Sinmun reported on the last day of September that Kim delivered a policy speech titled 'On the Immediate Fighting Tasks for a New Development of Socialist Construction' on the second day of the 5th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly the previous day. In his policy speech, Kim Jong Un first revealed his plan to resolve inter-Korean relations and postpone dialogue with the United States. Regarding inter-Korean relations, he demanded that the South abandon its sense of crisis and victimhood regarding North Korean provocations and asserted that the future prospects for inter-Korean relations depend on the attitude of the South Korean authorities. However, he also stated his intention to restore the severed inter-Korean communication lines starting in early October as part of efforts to realize the nation's expectations and aspirations for inter-Korean relations recovery and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

There are two key points to watch regarding the future Korean Peninsula situation. First is the hope of the Blue House for a video inter-Korean summit, leading to an inter-Korean summit coinciding with the Beijing Winter Olympics. This is followed by a plan to make the Korean Peninsula Peace Process, which he boasts of as his greatest achievement, irreversible. The ruling party and even the opposition party in the next administration are expected to maintain the April 27th Agreement, the Pyongyang Joint Declaration, and the September 19th Inter-Korean Military Agreement. Second is the potential rift in the ROK-U.S. alliance and closer ties between South Korea and China. Upon returning from the UN General Assembly, President Moon Jae-in stated aboard the plane, "The end-of-war declaration and the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea have no relation whatsoever with the ROK-U.S. alliance." He explained that there is no need to worry about some claims that North Korea will demand the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea after an end-of-war declaration is signed among South Korea, North Korea, and the U.S., or among South Korea, North Korea, China, and the U.S. However, in a statement on August 10th, Kim Yo Jong effectively demanded the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea, stating, "As long as the U.S. forces are stationed in South Korea, the root cause of the periodic worsening of the situation on the Korean Peninsula will never be eliminated." President Moon's decision to bring up the concept of an end-of-war declaration, which had been effectively 'disposed of,' is largely seen as a message directed at North Korea. It is interpreted as a plan to mobilize the international community under the pretext of the 30th anniversary of simultaneous UN membership for both Koreas. The ultimate destination is a summit. An end-of-war declaration inductively weakens the rationale for the presence of U.S. Forces Korea and the ROK-U.S. alliance, which are in place to counter North Korean threats.

Although inter-Korean communication lines have been restored after 55 days, there is a 'difference of opinion' regarding the future direction of inter-Korean relations. While the South responded by proposing the swift resumption of inter-Korean dialogue to discuss establishing lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, the North still emphasizes that the South must first resolve 'critical tasks' such as the withdrawal of its hostile policy. Although the re-activated inter-Korean channel, which had been cut off for some time, may lead to the path of relations recovery at Kim Jong Un's will, the road ahead will not be smooth, as both Koreas are focused on different objectives.

It is not easy for the South to accept the North's demands. Minister of Foreign Affairs Chung Eui-yong stated at a parliamentary audit on the 1st that the demands made by Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong for the withdrawal of the anti-North Korea hostile policy were unilateral claims that South Korea and the United States could not accept. Although autumn is deepening, it is unlikely that inter-Korean relations will rapidly improve in the immediate future. North Korea, which had been quiet for some time, has reopened communication channels with the South as a move to shift the current situation. North Korea is pursuing an improvement in inter-Korean relations as a way to seek a turnaround from its deteriorating economy and livelihoods due to prolonged sanctions and COVID-19, and to explore possibilities for dialogue with the United States. This is North Korea's 'high tide' strategy. However, North Korea will retreat to a 'low tide' strategy whenever its demands are not met.

■ Author: Nam Sung-wook_Professor of Korean Studies, Graduate School of Public Administration, Korea University, and former President of the Institute for National Security Strategy. He holds a Ph.D. in Applied Economics from the University of Missouri-Columbia and is currently a commentator on North Korean affairs for Korean Broadcasting System (KBS). He is an East Asian expert with theoretical and practical experience in institutions such as academia and government, including serving as President of the Institute for National Security Strategy (2008-2012) and Secretary-General of the National Unification Advisory Council (2012-2013). He also served as Director of the North Korea Research Center at the Asiatic Research Center, Korea University (2014-2019), and as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Unification (2017-2019).

■ Management and Editing: Min Ji-yoon Head of External Cooperation, EAI

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) | jymin@eai.or.kr