Heightened US-China Conflict Demands Improvement in Korea-Japan Relations: Reading Korea-Japan Relations Through the 9th Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey

[Editor's Note]

It has been three years since Korea-Japan relations became strained following the Supreme Court's ruling on forced wartime labor in October 2018, and the fatigue among the people of both nations is growing daily. Bilateral cooperation for reorganizing the post-COVID-19 order has also shown no progress. Amidst this situation, the East Asia Institute (EAI, Director Yeo-han Son) conducted the '9th Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey' targeting citizens of both Korea and Japan, in collaboration with the Genron NPO, a non-profit think tank in Japan. Based on the main findings of this survey, this Issue Brief re-examines the Korean public opinion favoring improved Korea-Japan relations and cooperation, as well as the differences in views between the two countries regarding security and economic cooperation. The author argues that Korea-Japan relations need to be re-examined in light of the intensifying US-China strategic competition, China's coercive challenges, and global risks following the COVID-19 pandemic. It urges Japan to accurately understand the Korean public opinion that desires future-oriented cooperation and abandon its one-track approach, and calls for the next Korean government to rebuild Korea-Japan relations in response to public sentiment.

The most striking aspect of the 9th Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey results, announced on September 28, 2021, by the East Asia Institute and Genron NPO, is the Korean public opinion demanding improved relations and cooperation between Korea and Japan. For three years, Korea-Japan relations have remained strained since the Supreme Court's ruling on forced wartime labor in October 2018, and the fatigue among the people of both nations is growing daily. As intergovernmental relations have fallen into a state of paralysis, both countries have incurred significant economic and strategic costs. Bilateral trade and investment have decreased, cooperation with North Korea in security matters has weakened, and diplomatic energy is being consumed through distancing and mutual criticism on the international stage. Bilateral cooperation for post-COVID-19 order reorganization, including epidemic prevention and vaccine issues, is unthinkable. Amidst this, Japan has experienced political changes with Prime Minister Abe, who was at the center of negative sentiment towards Korea over the past year, being replaced by Prime Minister Suga, and then by Prime Minister Kishida on September 29. With the presidential election in Korea scheduled for next March, both countries are facing fluid political situations. Now, the people of both nations are criticizing the governments' sluggish efforts to improve relations and are sending signals of mutual cooperation.

The results of this opinion poll show an improvement in the perception of the other country and an increase in the preference for restoring relations. The degree of preference was stronger on the Korean side than on the Japanese side. The overall improvement in mutual perception can be interpreted not as a result of the dynamics of bilateral relations, such as progress in negotiations on bilateral issues, but rather as a consequence of changes in the foreign perception of the people of both countries.The concerns of the people of both countries regarding the intensifying US-China competition and China's challenges, more specifically, the increased perception of threat from China, are bringing about a change in the perception of Korea-Japan relations.In Korea, public opinion revealed a desire to strengthen cooperative relations with Japan through various channels, including security cooperation between Korea, the US, and Japan. In contrast, Japan's public opinion supported the existing foreign policy direction of responding through major diplomatic initiatives that Japan has actively pursued (but which Korea has not joined), such as the QUAD, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Japan still shows a lukewarm attitude towards cooperation, maintaining distance from Korea.

This opinion poll presents two challenges for Korea. First is the gap between the government and the public. How to narrow the decoupling between public opinion favoring improved Korea-Japan relations and cooperation (specifically, Korea-US-Japan security cooperation, QUAD participation, and solutions for forced labor issues) and the government's stance. Second is the gap between Korean and Japanese public opinion. How to narrow the gap with the lukewarm Japanese public opinion regarding improved relations and cooperation, and the loosely coupled stance of the Japanese government. These are the challenges that the next Korean government must address.

1. Trend of Improving Korea-Japan Relations and "Future-Oriented Cooperation"

If the Japanese public opinion, in response to the Korean Supreme Court's ruling on forced wartime labor in October 2018, clearly expressed its backlash in the June 2019 survey (49.9% unfavorable impression of Korea) as the Japanese government's offensive intensified, Korean public opinion dramatically expressed its backlash in the August 2020 survey regarding the Abe administration's export control declaration in July 2019, trade disputes, and security conflicts surrounding the termination of GSOMIA (71.6% unfavorable impression of Japan). This trend interestingly reveals the difference in how the two countries view the current Korea-Japan conflict. Japanese public opinion expressed dissatisfaction and anger over the Korean government's handling of the Supreme Court ruling, while Korean public opinion expressed dissatisfaction and anger, deeming the Japanese government's retaliatory measures unjust. Public opinion in both countries has moved in tandem with their respective governments' positions.

<Figure 1> Trend of Impressions of the Other Country, 2013-2021

Meanwhile, the dissatisfaction and anger expressed by the people of both countries, with a time lag, subsided within a year. Japan showed a rebound in favorability (5.9%) and a decrease in unfavorability (3.6%) in the 2020 survey, and Korea recorded a rebound in favorability (8.2%) and a decrease in unfavorability (8.4%) in the 2021 survey. The positive impression of Japan rose from a record low of 12.3% in 2020 to 20.5%, and the negative impression decreased from 71.6% in 2020 to 63.2%.

Conversely, Japan's negative perception of Korea slightly increased compared to the previous year, and its positive perception decreased. From 2016 to 2019, Japan's favorability towards Korea was on a continuous downward trend (29.1%→26.9%→22.9%→20%), but it rebounded to 5.9% in 2020 and has maintained this level this year, with unfavorable impressions also showing a slight downward trend. If Korea maintains this year's results in next year's survey, it will confirm the underlying base and downward rigidity of the relationship's deterioration for both countries.

<Figure 2> Stance Each Country Should Take in Relations with the Other

The increase in favorability towards Japan naturally leads to a request for improved Korea-Japan relations. As shown in <Figure 2>, Korea strongly expressed the opinion in 2019 that the deteriorating relations due to bilateral trade disputes and the GSOMIA controversy needed to be improved. 45.8% of the public expressed the opinion that confrontation should be overcome in a "future-oriented" manner, and the view that political confrontation should at least be avoided was held by 28.8%, indicating that an overwhelming majority of 74.6% of the public recognized the need to move beyond the current confrontational phase. Japan also supports this, with over half (54.8%) agreeing.

The hope to overcome confrontation in a "future-oriented" manner is also evident in public opinion that relativizes historical issues, the main cause of the deterioration of relations between the two countries. In <Figure 3>, the view that "As we build a future-oriented cooperative relationship (security, economy, health, climate change, etc.) between the two countries, historical issues will also be gradually resolved" increased by about 14 percentage points from the previous year (24.5%) to 38.1%. This contrasts with the sharp decline from 43.6% to 21.7% for the view that "Historical issues will not be resolved regardless of cooperation between the two countries," indicating that the Korean public places significant emphasis on "future-oriented cooperation." As part of this, only 32.6% of public opinion supports the government's existing solution for the confrontation situation arising from the Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor, with opinions favoring the exploration of various alternatives being dominant (<Figure 4>).

<Figure 3> Korea-Japan Relations and Historical Issues

<Figure 4> Solutions for the Confrontational Situation Arising from the Supreme Court Ruling

2. Anxiety about the Future Leads to Korea-Japan Cooperation

What future do the citizens who point to "future-oriented cooperation" envision? Do they simply mean "let's move towards the future without dwelling on the past, such as historical issues," or do they mean "let's explore Korea-Japan relations by concretely envisioning the coming future"? Clues to the answer can be found in the changes in public perception of security and economic issues.

Korean citizens tend to reduce the weight of China economically while increasing the relative importance of the United States and Japan. For "economically important countries," the US (74%→86.7%) and Japan (41.7%→52.4%) increased by 12.7 percentage points and 9.7 percentage points respectively compared to the previous year, while China's share remained at 80% from 78.7%, staying on its previous trend (<Figure 5>). This trend is surprising given China's continued growth and widening gap with the US, especially after experiencing the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Meanwhile, as "militarily threatening countries," China recorded 61.8%, a sharp increase of 17.5 percentage points from the previous year, following North Korea (85.7%), whereas Japan recorded 38.6%, a decrease of 5.5 percentage points from the previous year (<Figure 6>). Specifically, the impression of China has rapidly increased over the past two years with "unfavorable impressions" at 51.5% (2019)→59.4% (2020)→73.8% (2021), while "favorable impressions" halved from 22.2% (2019)→16.3% (2020)→10.7% (2021) (<Figure 7>).

<Figure 5> Countries or Regions Important for Korea's Economic Relations

<Figure 6> Countries/Regions Perceived as Military Threats

<Figure 7> Korean Impression of China

These results suggest that the future of Korean citizens is linked to China-related issues. When the biggest variable for the future safety and prosperity of Korea or the Korean Peninsula is the US-China competition, the perception of threat from China and the sharp increase in unfavorable views towards China become major drivers of Korea's foreign relations perception. In this context, it is interesting to note that the rise in favorable perceptions of the US and Japan contrasts with the sharp increase in the perception of threat and antipathy towards China. The worsening perception of China indicates a trend in Korean citizens' foreign perception tilting towards "US-Japan vs. China."

The tendency for Korean public opinion to perceive Korea-Japan cooperation within the framework of Korea-US-Japan cooperation in the context of US-China competition or as a means to counter China is reflected in <Figure 8>, which asks "Reasons why Korea-Japan relations are important." In Korea, following "Because they are important trading partners" (79.7%) and "Because they are neighboring countries" (62.4%), the item "Because pursuing Korea-Japan cooperation is mutually beneficial amidst US-China conflict" increased by 11.2 percentage points compared to the previous year, "Because we share security interests as allies of the US" increased by 9.6 percentage points, and "Because we share common values such as democracy" increased by 8.1 percentage points.

<Figure 8> Reasons Why Korea-Japan Relations are Important

Looking at the trend of public opinion on specific issues, as shown in <Figure 9>, the opinion that trilateral security cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan should be strengthened in Korea increased from 53.6% in 2020 to 64.2% in 2021, while "neither" decreased from 35.4% to 27.5%. This change contrasts with the previous year's survey results, which showed a decrease in the opinion that trilateral security cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan should be strengthened. It shows a V-shaped pattern, returning to the peak of positive perception of Japan by Koreans in the 2013 survey. Furthermore, 40% of respondents expressed the opinion that China's rise should be checked (<Figure 10>). <Figure 11> shows the survey on participation in the QUAD, with 51.1% of the public in favor and 18.1% opposed. Considering that the QUAD is a new cooperation platform led by the US and Japan to counter China, positive public opinion towards the QUAD can also be attributed to the sentiment of countering China. Additionally, regarding the response to human rights abuses in China, <Figure 12> shows that 61% responded that they should participate in strong responses led by the US and others. This is interpreted as the sentiment of countering China, rather than a deep interest in international human rights protection.

<Figure 9> Stance on Strengthening Trilateral Security Cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan

In summary, anxiety about the future due to the US-China conflict and China's challenges is being expressed as the need for multilateral responses, including trilateral security cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan, QUAD cooperation, and international solidarity on human rights issues. All of these are cases where Korea-Japan cooperation is requested. The demand for economic cooperation between Korea and Japan also slightly increased (34.3% (2020)→43.2% (2021)).

<Figure 10> Reasons for Believing Trilateral Security Cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan Should Be Strengthened

<Figure 11> Participation in the QUAD

<Figure 12> Necessity of Participating in Strong Responses to Human Rights Abuses in China

3. Differences in Korea-Japan Perceptions Revealed by Public Opinion: What to Do?

Japanese public opinion also reflects the US-China conflict and China's threat. The perception of military threat from China increased by 7.1 percentage points from the previous year to 70.5%, nearing North Korea (76.5%) (<Figure 6>). Support for the restoration of Korea-Japan relations is also evident (<Figure 13>). While Korea showed an increase of 9.9 percentage points compared to the previous year, Japan also showed an increase of 7.9 percentage points. However, only 46.7% of Japanese people supported the restoration of Korea-Japan relations, compared to 71.1% of Korean citizens. There are not high expectations for future-oriented cooperation with Korea, and there is a tendency to converge with Korea's past principled stance ("It is difficult to have future-oriented cooperation without resolving historical issues"), emphasizing the prerequisite of resolving historical issues (<Figure 3>). Therefore, Japan is also lukewarm towards the argument for strengthening trilateral security cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan. The "neither" stance slightly increased from 50.6% in 2020 to 52% in 2021, and the argument for "strengthening trilateral security cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan" slightly decreased from 38.9% in 2020 to 36% in 2021 (<Figure 9>). Japan shows a negative reaction to Korea's participation in the QUAD (only 11.4% in favor), and its assessment of Korea's economic status is low at 21.8%, ranking sixth overall (Korea is one of Japan's top three trading partners). The necessity of economic cooperation between Korea and Japan also slightly decreased from 47.1% to 44% (<Figure 14>).

<Figure 13> Efforts to Restore Korea-Japan Relations

<Figure 14> Importance of Korea-Japan Economic Cooperation for One's Own Country's Future

Japan's relatively lukewarm and sometimes indifferent attitude towards improving Korea-Japan relations can be divided into two reasons. First is the external factor of Korea-Japan relations. If Korea seeks to address the threat from China through various international mechanisms, including cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan, and hopes for the restoration of cooperation between Korea and Japan within that framework, Japan aims to counter China through the regional strategic mechanisms it has pursued, such as the QUAD, FOIP, and CPTPP. Since Korea is not participating in these, Japan has less incentive to make special efforts to restore bilateral cooperation. In that regard, second, the Japanese public is focused on the dynamics inherent in bilateral relations, such as resolving pending issues between Korea and Japan (e.g., forced labor and comfort women issues). This means that as long as the resolution of pending issues remains deadlocked, they will not show an active willingness to improve relations. In other words, this aligns with the Japanese government's one-track approach of not engaging in improving relations unless the Korean government presents a satisfactory solution to historical issues.

Korea-Japan relations have entered a new phase amidst the severe international environment of US-China conflict and China's challenges. Meanwhile, the US, since the launch of the Biden administration, has emphasized security cooperation among Korea, the US, and Japan to respond to China's challenges, and has strongly urged both Korea and Japan to improve relations under the premise that historical issues should not undermine core US security interests. The side that has accurately recognized this situation and called for new thinking is precisely the Korean public. They present a fundamentally different future in the discourse on Korea-Japan relations, moving away from the familiar "future's past." They re-examine Korea-Japan relations in light of the intensifying US-China strategic competition, China's assertive and coercive challenges, and global risks following the COVID-19 pandemic. Japan's new government and public must accurately understand Korean public opinion and abandon the one-track approach. The next Korean government must also respond to public sentiment and fully pursue the reconstruction of Korea-Japan relations to enable both countries to adapt to accelerating changes by accumulating unprecedented experiences.

■ Author:Yeo-han SonDirector, EAI; Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Chicago. He has served as Director of the Graduate School of International Studies and Dean of Underwood International College at Yonsei University, Director of the Institute for Sustainable Development, and Director of the Institute for International Studies. He was also a Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo, and a Visiting Scholar at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) and the University of California (Berkeley). He served as President of the Korean Political Science Association (2019) and President of the Association for Japanese Studies (2012). He was a Senior Fellow at Fulbright, MacArthur, Japan Foundation, and Waseda University’s Institute for Advanced Study. He has served as an advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the Korea Foundation, and as a specialist member of the Committee for Northeast Asian Cooperation. He is currently a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Self-Evaluation Committee. His areas of expertise include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. Recent publications include Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2019, with T. J. Pempel), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia (2016, with Jan Melissen), “South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking,” The Pacific Review (2019), 32, 6, and "Middle Power Diplomacy of Korea" (2017, co-edited).

■ Managed and Edited by: Ha-eun YoonResearch Fellow, EAI

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | hyoon@eai.or.kr