[Global NK Commentary] Restoration of Communication Lines and Combined Exercises: Reading North Korea's Tactics

[Editor's Note]

In this commentary, Professor Park Won-gon argues that it is unreasonable to interpret the restoration of communication lines in July as a shift in North Korea's policy towards South Korea from confrontation to improvement. He contends that North Korea's restoration of communication lines was aimed at building justification for proceeding with ROK-US combined exercises and its nuclear development, ultimately representing an 'offensive.' He emphasizes that combined exercises must proceed as planned to maintain leverage in negotiations with North Korea, especially since Pyongyang has shown no intention of returning to denuclearization talks. The subsequent action by North Korea, which severed the inter-Korean communication lines that had been restored after more than a year, in response to the ROK-US combined exercises, persuasively supports the author's view.

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North Korea's engagement with South Korea, which began with the restoration of communication lines on July 27, is in fact confirmed to be an 'offensive.' On July 27, both Koreas simultaneously announced the restoration of communication lines and expressed their will to improve inter-Korean relations. Notably, it was confirmed to be Chairman Kim Jong-un's decision, as it was known that the two Koreas had exchanged personal letters discussing the restoration of relations since April.

However, doubts about North Korea's intentions were raised from the time of the announcement on the 27th. This was because North Korea's handling of the ROK-US combined exercises scheduled for August was not included in the announcement on the 27th. Ultimately, four days later, on August 1, North Korea sent a message through a statement by Vice Department Director Kim Yo-jong, demanding the suspension of the combined exercises. Subsequently, when the ROK and US announced the implementation of the combined exercises, albeit in a reduced form, harsh criticisms were raised through statements by Kim Yo-jong on the 10th and Kim Yong-chol, head of the United Front Department, on the 11th, calling it a "treacherous act" and stating that they had "thrown away the opportunity to improve inter-Korean relations with their own hands." This paper aims to analyze the intentions behind North Korea's proposal to restore communication lines and its subsequent raising of the issue of combined exercises.

North Korea's Policy Towards South Korea

Upon the announcement of the restoration of inter-Korean communication lines on July 27, some interpreted it as a shift in North Korea's policy towards South Korea from confrontation to improvement. The prevailing analysis suggested that North Korea's change in policy was driven by its need for South Korea's assistance to overcome triple hardships, including COVID-19, international sanctions, and natural disasters. The economic difficulties faced by North Korea were publicly acknowledged by Kim Jong-un himself in June at the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, 3rd Plenary Session, stating that "the people's food situation is becoming strained." Another analysis suggested that by resuming inter-Korean dialogue, North Korea aimed to secure food and epidemic prevention aid from the South Korean government while simultaneously sending a message to the Biden administration to ease sanctions.

However, evidence of North Korea changing its policy towards South Korea is scarce. While it is clear that the supreme leader's decisions take precedence in North Korea, a state with a single leadership system, it strives to secure at least a minimum level of procedural legitimacy. Regarding its policy towards South Korea, since Kim Yo-jong's statement in June last year defining inter-Korean relations as "confrontational," the hardline policy towards the South was maintained at the 8th Party Congress in January. At the Party Congress, Kim Jong-un diagnosed the current inter-Korean relations as "it is no exaggeration to say that the current state of inter-Korean relations has regressed to the period before the announcement of the Panmunjom Declaration, and the dream of unification has become even more distant." Furthermore, he clearly demanded "the cessation of the introduction of advanced military equipment and joint military exercises with the United States" as conditions for improving inter-Korean relations, stating that relations would be determined "entirely by the attitude of the South Korean authorities." Since then, despite North Korea maintaining extreme border closures due to concerns about the spread of COVID-19, it has unusually held large-scale rallies and meetings every month, but there has been no 'line struggle' to change its policy towards South Korea. Therefore, interpreting the announcement on July 27 as a change in North Korea's policy towards South Korea is unreasonable.

The argument that North Korea is attempting to overcome its economic difficulties through South Korea is also not very convincing. Since the 8th Party Congress, North Korea has consistently emphasized two main themes in various meetings and conferences: 'self-reliance' and 'ideological struggle' to overcome anti-socialist and non-socialist elements. At the 8th Party Congress, Kim Jong-un redefined the self-reliance strategy as "an offensive strategy that turns the enemy's vile sanctions into a golden opportunity to enhance self-strength and strengthen internal driving forces, a political line that must be maintained permanently in socialist construction." In addition, emphasizing ideological struggle, he instructed to "strengthen learning and strictly establish revolutionary discipline." This stance by North Korea reaffirms the "revolutionary line of frontal breakthrough to overcome all difficulties hindering our progress" (hereinafter referred to as the 'Frontal Breakthrough Line') adopted at the 5th Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea held in December 2019. At that time, Kim Jong-un declared "frontal breakthrough through self-reliance" and proclaimed, "Let us break through all obstacles hindering our progress with a frontal breakthrough. This is the slogan that the entire people must uphold."

Furthermore, since enacting the "Law on the Rejection of Anti-Socialist Ideology and Culture" (Rejection Law) in December last year, Kim Jong-un instructed at the 8th Party Congress to "establish a revolutionary, our-style lifestyle and thoroughly overcome non-socialist elements." This has been repeated in almost all subsequent meetings. For example, at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee held in June, it was emphasized to "more aggressively and substantially carry out the struggle against anti-socialist and non-socialist elements." The Rejection Law stipulates a maximum penalty of death for distributing videos, photos, or books from countries like South Korea, the US, or Japan, and a maximum of 15 years imprisonment for utilizing them. It also prohibits using South Korean speech patterns or singing styles. Kim Jong-un referred to foreign hairstyles, clothing, and speech patterns as "poison" at the Congress of the Socialist Patriotic Youth League.

In addition, Kim Jong-un stated last year that he would "not accept external aid," and at the 8th Party Congress in January, he devalued South Korea's proposals for "epidemic prevention cooperation, humanitarian cooperation, and individual tourism" as "non-essential issues." Under these circumstances, it is difficult for North Korea to pursue economic cooperation with South Korea in earnest.

COVID-19 also hinders North Korea from resuming full-scale economic activities with South Korea, let alone the outside world. Since declaring a 'state of national emergency epidemic prevention' on January 24 last year, North Korea has maintained strict border closures as of the end of August 2021. Even the newly appointed Chinese Ambassador to North Korea and the replaced North Korean Ambassador to China have been unable to travel to Pyongyang. In June, at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party, Kim Jong-un himself urged "economic guiding bodies to meticulously organize economic work in the unfavorable environment of emergency epidemic prevention" in preparation for a prolonged struggle to ensure the people's livelihood due to the prolonged emergency epidemic prevention situation. It is assessed that North Korea is attempting to endure as long as possible through self-reliance while maintaining external controls. According to South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), North Korea has taken measures for limited exchanges in some regions. At the expanded Political Bureau meeting held at the end of June, North Korea pointed out "the grave incident that created a great crisis for the safety of the state and the people, and the severe consequences arising therefrom." The NIS analyzed the grave incident as "a combination of insufficient preparation for the operation of newly installed disinfection facilities for COVID-19 at the Uiju Airport near Sinuiju, delays in the supply of wartime reserve materials, and poor management." While there is a possibility that North Korea may pursue some limited exchanges, normal economic activities will only be possible after COVID-19 is effectively overcome, thus limiting cooperation with South Korea.

Further evidence supporting the analysis above is that North Korea did not inform its citizens about the restoration of communication lines and the will to improve inter-Korean relations on July 27. Subsequently, statements containing harsh criticism of the combined exercises were published in North Korean internal media on the 10th and 11th. This can be interpreted as the news on the 27th not being disseminated to the North Korean populace because there was no change in the hardline policy towards South Korea.

North Korea's Intentions

If North Korea did not change its policy towards South Korea, its actions can be analyzed with the following intentions. First, to undermine the ROK-US combined exercises. According to the NIS, North Korea first proposed the restoration of communication lines. The issue is that the timing, July 27, was a period when it was extremely difficult to adjust the ROK-US combined exercises. ROK-US combined exercises are typically prepared months in advance. By the end of July, US personnel participating in the exercises had already begun entering the country, and in early August, a 'seminar' overseen by the Commander of the US Forces Korea and the Chairman of the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff was held to finalize the exercise objectives and scenarios. The Crisis Management Staff Training (CMST), a preparatory exercise, was scheduled to begin on the 10th. The United States conducts combined exercises with its allies throughout the year, and given its conscription system, it prepares for combined exercises for at least three months, six months, or even a year. If adjustments are made with less than two weeks remaining before the exercise, it is difficult to conduct a meaningful training. Ultimately, the ROK-US combined exercises were further scaled down after Kim Yo-jong's demand on October 1.

Second, to build justification in the North Korean style. North Korea likely knew that the ROK and US would not cancel the combined exercises. Therefore, by first making a good-faith proposal to restore communication lines, and then claiming that the ROK and US proceeded with the combined exercises, which symbolize their hostile policy towards North Korea, North Korea created a justification for its subsequent actions. The statements released by Kim Yo-jong and Kim Yong-chol on the 10th and 11th exhibit a similar logical structure. Kim Yo-jong stated that due to the "treacherous act of the South Korean authorities," they will "further accelerate the strengthening of national defense capabilities and powerful preemptive strike capabilities." Kim Yong-chol also threatened, saying that although they gave the South "an opportunity to choose," they "chose the path of confrontation," and that they will be made to "feel every moment how they are approaching an immense security crisis." These are statements that accumulate justification for provocations.

North Korea's justification-building is also aimed at China. China also fundamentally does not want tensions on the Korean Peninsula to escalate due to North Korean provocations. Particularly, North Korea's continued missile launch tests provide justification for the US to build a missile (defense) network, which includes containing China, something China also dislikes. However, as US-China relations have intensified, China has shown closer ties with North Korea. Regarding combined exercises, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi criticized them as "lacking constructiveness in the current situation" at the ASEAN Regional Forum on August 6 and also called for "easing sanctions on North Korea." China is calling for a dual-track approach, which includes the suspension of combined exercises and North Korean missile/nuclear tests, and a peace process on the Korean Peninsula that includes the easing of sanctions on North Korea. North Korea, using the same logic, claims that its provocations are justified as self-defense because it made a good-faith effort to improve relations with South Korea, but the combined exercises, which even China opposes, were pushed through.

Third, to maximize discord between South Korea and the United States. The United States places great importance on combined exercises. General Paul LaCamera, Commander of the US Forces Korea, who took office on July 2, expressed reluctance to postpone the exercises, stating that "regular training is essential for building a combined defense posture." This is also linked to the ongoing issue of the Iran nuclear deal. Despite his campaign promises, President Biden is not restoring the nuclear deal, pressuring Iran with new demands. In this situation, pursuing a conciliatory policy only towards North Korea would lead to domestic political difficulties. Crucially, there is no guarantee that North Korea would return to nuclear negotiations even if the combined exercises were canceled. Washington experts unanimously point out that "the pattern of North Korea engaging in dialogue by setting specific conditions must be broken." The demand from China to suspend the exercises, amid intensifying US-China conflict, is also a burden. On the other hand, the South Korean government pursued adjustments to the exercises even after Kim Yo-jong's statement on the 1st, despite the fact that the exercises had effectively begun.

Finally, to legitimize North Korea's nuclear development. Although the term 'nuclear' is not explicitly used, Kim Yo-jong's statement on the 10th emphasizes the importance and legitimacy of possessing nuclear weapons through phrases such as "legitimacy of enhancing national defense capabilities," "strength to deter external threats," and "absolute deterrent power," which North Korea uses when referring to nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the demand for the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea is interpreted as a refusal to engage in denuclearization negotiations. Kim Yo-jong stated that "as long as US forces are stationed in South Korea, the root cause of periodically worsening tensions on the Korean Peninsula will never be eliminated." Even if denuclearization negotiations resume in the future, North Korea may present the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea as a key condition. In this case, since there is no possibility of ROK-US agreement, North Korea may instead demand recognition of its nuclear possession and a transition to nuclear disarmament negotiations.

In conclusion, North Korea's engagement with South Korea, which began with the restoration of communication lines, is confirmed to be an 'offensive.' There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that North Korea has changed its policy towards South Korea. Through its offensive, North Korea has succeeded in undermining combined exercises, creating ROK-US discord, fostering internal division in South Korea, and building justification. The most serious issue that emerged in this process is the spectacle of the United States, not South Korea, making efforts to prevent the combined exercises from being canceled, as North Korea and China jointly demanded their suspension.

The ROK-US combined exercises must be carried out as planned. Scaling them down at the last minute due to North Korean pressure, as in this case, makes them difficult to be meaningful. Furthermore, in a situation where North Korea has shown no intention of returning to denuclearization talks, adjusting the combined exercises is an act of self-diminishing negotiation leverage with North Korea. Above all, the ROK-US combined exercises are intended to maintain readiness against North Korea. The more ROK and the US strengthen their readiness and reduce the utility of North Korea's nuclear weapons, the greater the possibility of North Korea's denuclearization.

■ Park Won-gonProfessor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University. He holds a Ph.D. in Diplomacy from Seoul National University. He researched the ROK-US alliance and North Korea at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses for 18 years. He served as a professor of International Studies at Handong Global University. He is currently a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His main research areas include the ROK-US alliance, North Korean diplomacy and military affairs, and Northeast Asian international relations.

■ Editor: Min Ji-yoon EAI Director of External Relations

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) | jymin@eai.or.kr