[EAI Issue Briefing] From G7 to D10: The Complexity of Regime Competition within the Multilateral Order Amidst US-China Rivalry

[Editor's Note]

In June, an 'Expanded G7 Summit' including South Korea, India, Australia, and South Africa was held in Cornwall, UK. The joint communiqué subsequently released expressed the participating democracies' commitment to more strongly defend democratic values within the traditional rules-based multilateral system, and further articulated the logic of countering challenges to the liberal international order. This has drawn a backlash from China. Lee Sook-jong, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University and Senior Fellow at EAI, explains the position of democracy amidst US-China regime competition and the role of democratic states. The author emphasizes that regime competition between democracy and autocracy could potentially lead to the bloc-ification of multilateralism, posing an unrealistic choice for many democracies that require both the US and China. She argues that democratic values should be approached as universal values that transcend regime competition. Furthermore, she adds that democratic nations in Europe and Asia must continuously protect democracy and strengthen independent regional cooperation among emerging democracies for the advocacy of democratic values.

An expanded G7 Summit, including South Korea, India, Australia, and South Africa, was held in Cornwall, UK, from June 11 to 13. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson had announced his intention to convene an 'D10' summit by inviting three additional democracies—South Korea, India, and Australia—since last year. This expanded G7 Summit is the first iteration supporting the 'Summit for Democracy' concept that US President Biden had spoken of during his election campaign. The idea that democratic values and norms serve as the foundation for collective action in addressing global challenges and that they help stabilize the existing multilateral international order has begun to be strongly shared again between the Biden administration and European democracies. Underlying this is the logic that the retreat of democracy observed worldwide and the simultaneous challenges to the liberal international order must be countered. The Western perspective that democracy is not just a national political system but also an issue of international order is provoking China's backlash. The differing perceptions of multilateralism between the US and China, the strategic competition between them, and the confused discussions about the place of democracy within this context necessitate a clarification of their relationship. Only then can Asian democracies explore ways to cooperate with the US and other Western democracies on issues such as freedom, human rights, and anti-corruption, while simultaneously avoiding tensions with China.

1. Expanded G7 Summit and the Discussion of a Washington-led Democratic Alliance

The joint communiqué of the expanded G7 Summit outlines a shared global agenda for action, dedicating significant portions to ending COVID-19 and economic recovery, as well as addressing future growth, protecting the planet, strengthening partnerships, and issues of values.[1]The principled declaration of using the power of 'our values'—such as democracy, freedom, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights—to respond to the challenges of a changing world is woven throughout the subsequent agenda. It is particularly noteworthy that these values are incorporated into the technology sector. For instance, regarding the digital ecosystem, it states that 'we must protect an open, interoperable, and secure internet that supports human freedom, innovation, and trust.' It emphasizes coordinating international norms and standards to ensure that new technologies reflect democratic values, open competitive markets, and safeguards for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Specifically, it calls for opposing government internet shutdowns and network access restrictions, and for discussing how to regulate algorithmic decision-making that promotes bias. The plan mentions that democratic partners will discuss international challenges in support of open societies at the 'Future Tech Forum' in September, sponsored by the OECD. These discussions align with Europe's ongoing efforts to establish norms and rules for new technologies, while strengthening regulations in areas related to security and openness.[2]

The joint communiqué describes the international order championed by the G7 as an 'open and resilient international order' and states that the agenda agreed upon will be pursued within existing 'multilateral rules-based systems' such as the G20 and the UN, in cooperation with other countries. Here, we can observe a movement to 'separately' build an alliance that more strongly advocates for democratic values within the framework of international law and traditional multilateral rules-based systems like the UN. Discussions on a democratic alliance rapidly gained momentum at the beginning of this year, preceding the inauguration of the Biden administration. Jones and Twardowski (2021) emphasize that for democracies to maintain their influence in the international system, new forms of cooperation beyond the West are necessary. They refer to the strategy of advancing coordination and cooperation among democratic nations within the framework of the multilateral order as 'democratic multilateralism,' arguing that efforts to weaken or alter the nature of the existing order by Russia and China must be thwarted.[3]

The view that China's expanding influence at the level of international organizations and global governance poses a challenge to the international order has been explained in other writings. For example, Hart and Johnson (2019) outline China's efforts to reshape the international order into six categories: shaping multilateral actions to align with China's interests, disrupting international legal regimes, transforming international norms, capturing international organizations, creating new international organizations, and building China-centric international cooperation platforms.[4]Nadege (2020) argues that China's relatively weak international standing, despite its economic power over the past decade, is due to its vulnerability in terms of 'discourse power'—the ability to articulate and have its voice heard. China has been striving to secure this 'discourse power' to shape ideas and intellectual frameworks that underpin the international order.[5]Specifically, China has been systematically engaging in state-led activities to disseminate Chinese narratives or manipulate public opinion by leveraging the open communication structures of the external world.[6]For these reasons, discussions on forming various combinations of 'democratic coalitions' among democratic nations to counter China, which poses a threat to the existing international order, in areas such as trade, technology, supply chains, human rights, and corruption, were published in two articles in Foreign Affairs in January.[7]It is noteworthy that issues in technical and functional areas, such as trade, technology, and supply chains, which were previously considered ideologically neutral, are now being linked with values like freedom and human rights, leading to the emergence of the logic that these issues must ultimately be addressed within an ideological framework in Washington and parts of Europe.

It is crucial to determine whether the US and European democracies view China's expanding influence as a geopolitical competition or an ideological one. The Trump administration adopted the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' concept, initially proposed by Japan, viewing China as a geopolitical competitor and refining its Indo-Pacific strategy to curb its influence. Consequently, security concepts were integrated not only into military competition but also into trade, particularly in technology, leading to the spread of logic for political decoupling, irrespective of its feasibility, rather than market logic. At that time, democracy had not yet taken center stage in US foreign policy. However, with the inauguration of the Biden administration, competition with Russia and China began to be framed within the context of an ideological regime competition: democracy versus autocracy.

Nearly six months into his term, Brands (2021) summarizes this perspective, the 'Biden Doctrine,' as follows: The democratic world faces three challenges: first, attempts by Russia or China to alter the international system based on liberal principles for their own regimes (e.g., Russia's cyber interference and spread of fake news, China's coercive diplomacy using market dominance); second, authoritarian regimes appearing to cope better than democratic regimes during crises like COVID-19; and third, the democratic regression occurring within advanced democracies, including the United States.[8]This perspective emphasizes that the challenges to democracy are interconnected both domestically and internationally, highlighting the importance of protecting the democratic international order to safeguard democracy at home, rather than simply dividing the world into exemplary democracies versus rogue non-democracies. To counter each of these challenges, the US strategy involves strengthening the cohesion and resilience of the democratic community against autocratic rivals, demonstrating that democratic regimes can better address transnational problems, and domestically, investing in infrastructure for the working and middle classes. This perspective emphasizes that the challenges to democracy are interconnected both domestically and internationally, highlighting the importance of protecting the democratic international order to safeguard democracy at home, rather than simply dividing the world into exemplary democracies versus rogue non-democracies. In his March 31st speech in Pittsburgh, President Biden stated that the competition between the US and China is fundamentally about whether democracy can deliver better benefits to its people than autocracy.[9]In the same vein, there is the belief that democratic alliances can and should demonstrate superior capabilities in addressing transnational issues. Accordingly, the Biden administration views partnerships among other democracies as key to establishing a democratic order and is engaging in cooperation with specific countries on very concrete issues.[10]

The inclusion of ideological regime competition within strategic competition for geopolitical influence may aid in the restoration of global democracy, which has been in decline for the past 15 years, but it clearly presents a dilemma for Asian democracies being asked to partner. Democratic values and norms are inherently important for individual freedom, human rights, and the rule of law within individual states, and simultaneously, these values and norms are essential for respecting the sovereignty of individual states and for mutual cooperation within the multilateral order. Nevertheless, the regime competition between democracy and autocracy raises concerns regarding its realism, justification, and effectiveness. First, unlike the Cold War era when the world was divided into capitalist and communist blocs, major authoritarian states, particularly China, the world's second-largest economy, are closely integrated with Asian economies, making it difficult for cooperation among democracies to lead to China's exclusion. In other words, its realism is questionable. Second, if the US advocacy for democratic systems is perceived as a tool for geopolitical competition, governments and civil societies seeking to protect and support democracy will doubt its sincerity. That is, the democratic alliance theory can only be sustainable as a value-based coalition, beyond calculations of national interest, if its justification is sufficiently robust. Third, the regime competition theory can fragment international cooperation between the US and China to address transnational challenges. Pepinsky and Weiss (2021) also point out that the Biden administration's view of China as an ideological competitor overestimates the appeal of the Chinese regime and is an impractical approach that could deter countries in Asia and elsewhere from cooperating with the US and stimulate alliances among autocratic states.[11]Cooperation with China is crucial for addressing transnational challenges and crises such as climate change and financial crises, given its significant influence. In this regard, the European Union, in its 'EU Strategic Outlook on China 2019,' has devised a balanced China strategy by multidimensionally defining China as a 'partner for cooperation and negotiation' on global issues like climate change and the WTO, an 'economic competitor' concerning technological leadership and market access, and a 'systemic rival' pursuing alternative governance models in future state system-related matters. However, it is challenging to engage with China as a partner for cooperation and negotiation while simultaneously addressing China's infringement of European norms. For example, when Europe imposed sanctions on Chinese officials over human rights abuses in Xinjiang, China retaliated by sanctioning European human rights activists, causing controversy. In May, the European Parliament overwhelmingly approved a statement freezing the ratification of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment by a vote of 599 in favor, 30 against, and 58 abstentions.[12]In other words, issues arise where human rights advocacy and economic cooperation are difficult to separate. Nevertheless, if these two China engagement strategies were integrated from the outset, the realization of either would become impossible, necessitating a case-by-case, ex-post facto, and selective response.

2. China's Response to the Discussion of a Chinese-style Multilateral Order and Regime Competition

The Trump administration, under the banner of 'America First,' engaged in trade and technological disputes with China. In 2020, as the US became the country most affected by COVID-19, President Trump blamed China, referring to it as the 'China virus,' and submitted a request to the UN and Congress to withdraw from the World Health Organization, accusing it of being favorable to China. Upon taking office, President Biden, on January 20th, included a halt to the withdrawal process from the WHO, along with rejoining the Paris Agreement on climate change, among his first 17 executive orders. While Europe has enthusiastically welcomed 'America is Back,' China views the Biden administration's return to the international stage, actively incorporating regime competition into its foreign policy, with considerable apprehension.

China has promoted itself as a supporter of development for developing countries, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative, and as a proponent of UN-centered multilateralism, under its system of Chinese socialism. The 'Chinese Dream,' which began to spread after Xi Jinping assumed the positions of General Secretary in November 2012 and President the following year, aims to establish a horizontal relationship with the US, gain international status as a superpower, and strengthen the identity of Chinese socialism domestically. The logic that the expansion of China's global influence as a socialist state is harmonious with the international multilateral order has been propagated through the concept of a 'community of shared future for mankind.' Regarding the US concern that the expansion of China's global influence and its socialist identity are progressing simultaneously, China has condemned the US as unilateralist and a bully that disregards sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs, prioritizing its own interests and ideology. China's narrative of being a responsible multilateral actor has been strengthened, especially in contrast to the Trump administration. In his online speech at the World Economic Forum in January, titled 'Let Multilateralism Light Up Humanity's Future,' Xi Jinping once again emphasized the need to respect the historical, cultural, and social uniqueness of each country, abandon ideological prejudice, and move forward on the path of peaceful coexistence, mutual benefit, and win-win cooperation.[13]Yang Jiechi (2021) also criticizes interference in internal affairs under the guise of human rights or democracy, or scapegoating certain countries for ideological division, as contrary to multilateralism. He emphasizes that responding to transnational issues faced by humanity, such as pandemics, economic crises, and climate change, requires reciprocity and cooperation, and that China is a champion of UN-centered international multilateralism.[14]At the ceremony commemorating the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China on July 1st, Xi Jinping emphasized that only Chinese socialism can develop China and called for strengthening the Party's leadership. He stated that China does not possess aggressive or hegemonic genes, and while continuing to advocate for the construction of a community of shared future for mankind, it will uphold humanity's shared values such as 'peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom' together with peace-loving countries and peoples.[15]

Ultimately, while the West views multilateralism as international cooperation based on the foundation of individual freedom, human rights, and the rule of law being upheld domestically, China's concept of multilateralism involves pursuing reciprocal cooperation while each country maintains its own political system. Although China speaks of democracy and freedom as shared values, these remain at the community or national level rather than at the individual level. In recent years, the human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong have indeed revealed a significant discrepancy between the rhetoric of political leaders and reality. UN human rights monitors and non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have reported on crimes against humanity, including violations of the right to health, detention and torture, and cultural persecution of these ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Tibet, as well as the infringement of fundamental rights such as freedom of religion, expression, and association.[16]The human rights abuses against Uyghurs are particularly severe, leading the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada to announce sanctions against five Chinese officials in March over this issue.[17]

The international law and UN system, which China claims to respect, have protected human rights as universal values. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, outlines 30 rights and freedoms that all individuals possess and cannot be deprived of. This declaration has served as a cornerstone for the proliferation of international human rights law since the 1970s, protecting the human rights of all people in all regions of the world. While the UN and the international community emphasize national sovereignty, they have engaged in humanitarian intervention in cases of severe human rights violations. Conversely, China has denied the universality of democratic values related to individual human rights and the concept of humanitarian intervention. Yan Xuetong points out that if the US defines democracy and freedom in terms of electoral politics or individual expression, China defines them as social stability and economic development, and argues that the US must accept this difference. He states that the Biden administration's attempts to form anti-China coalitions on human rights issues that could curb China's technological advantage or incite separatism in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang constitute exclusive multilateralism, and China considers this the greatest obstacle to political stability and national rejuvenation, making it an inevitable source of future US-China tensions.[18]Wang Jisi observes that traditionally, the US respected the internal order of the Chinese Communist Party's rule, and China respected the US-led international order, but recent US attempts to weaken the CCP and China's challenge to US leadership and Western values in international organizations have led to a vicious cycle of conflict. The CCP perceives the US effort to isolate and divide China as a new consensus in Washington, leading it to strengthen its power and control and increase vigilance against US interference.[19]Respecting the liberal and socialist identities of both the US and China, while advocating for democratic values and norms, would be best achieved by not limiting democracy to electoral democracy, reaching an agreement on respecting individual freedom and well-being—which China also recognizes as shared human values—and moving towards healthy regime competition for good governance.

3. The Role of Democracies in Moderating Regime Competition within the Multilateral Order

As US-China competition escalates from military, technological, and trade arenas into regime competition, it is appropriate for Asian democracies to pursue cautious engagement.[20]Democratic values and norms must be established as universal principles that operate beyond regime ideologies to prevent the multilateral order from becoming bloc-oriented. Three approaches to cautious engagement appear possible. First is the response to human rights issues. Asian governments and civil societies that value democratic principles find it difficult to accept China's human rights abuses under the pretext of non-interference in internal affairs. However, civil society, free from economic and political constraints, can more easily act from a perspective that upholds universal values like human rights than governments can. Governments of Asian democracies, within their limitations, could also voice collective concerns within the framework of the UN human rights system. Second, cooperation in functional areas such as technology, trade, and health need not be mutually exclusive, whether with the US or China; it is desirable to establish fair and reasonable principles and standards for partnerships. In this regard, it is necessary to benchmark Europe's approach to responding to US-China competition by establishing fair rules and guidelines. Third, it is necessary to engage dualistically to prevent regime competition between democracy and autocracy from fragmenting into US-led and China-led spheres of influence within the UN and existing functional global governance systems. Only then will it be possible to effectively address global challenges such as pandemics, climate change, and technological transformation, and many democracies, which maintain close relationships with both the US and China, will be able to preserve their diplomatic autonomy. European and Asian democracies must act as impartial arbiters to safeguard the multilateral order in the face of US-China regime competition. To properly fulfill this role as arbiters in the international community, they must not only continue to cherish and protect their own democracies but also strengthen independent regional cooperation among emerging democracies for the advocacy of democratic values. ■

[1]White House, “Carbisbay G7 Summit Communique,“https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/13/carbis-bay-g7-summit-communique/

[2]Lee Sook-jong, “Europe’s Pragmatic Response to the Entry of Chinese Telecommunications Company Huawei,” East Asia Institute, February 2020.https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=13931&board=kor_issuebriefing&keyword_option=board_content&keyword=%EC%9D%B4%EC%88%99%EC%A2%85&more=

[3] Bruce Jones and Adam Twardowski, “Bolstering democracies in a changing international order: The case for democratic multilateralism,” Brookings Institutions, January 25, 2021.

https://www.brookings.edu/research/bolstering-democracies-in-a-changing-international-order-the-case-for-democratic-multilateralism/

[4] Melanie Hart and Blaine Johnson, “Mapping China’s Global Governance Ambitions,” Center for American Progress, February 2019,

[5] Nadege Rolland, “China’s Vision for a New World Order,” The National Bureau of Asia Research Special Report 83, January 2020,

https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr83_chinasvision_jan2020.pdf

[6] Digital Forensic Lab, “Chinese Discourse Power: China’s Use of Information Manipulation in Regional and Global Competition,” Atlantic Council, December 2020.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/China-Discouse-Power-FINAL.pdf

[7] Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “How American Can Shore Up Asian Order: A Strategy Restoring Balance and Legitimacy,” Foreign Affairs January 12, 2021, How America Can Shore Up Asian Order | Foreign Affairs; Frances Z. Brown, Thomas Carothers, and Alex Pascal, “America Needs a Democracy Summit More than Ever,” Foreign Affairs, January 15, 2021.

[8] Hal Brands, “The Emerging Biden Doctrine: Democracy, Autocracy and the Defining Clash of Our Time,” June 29, 2021.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-06-29/emerging-biden-doctrine?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=The%20Emerging%20Biden%20Doctrine&utm_content=20210629&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017

[9] “Remarks by the President Biden on the American Jobs Plan,” Carpenters Pittsburgh Training Center,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/03/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-american-jobs-plan/

[10] For example, cooperation with South Korea on semiconductors and 5G/6G technology, with the EU on the linkage between technology and trade policy, with Japan on the issue of global internet openness, and with NATO on cyberattacks and information distortion.

[11] Thomas Pepinsky and Jessica Chen Weiss, “The Clash of Sys-tems?: Washington Should Avoid Ideological Competition With Beijing,” Foreign Affairs, June 11, 2021.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-06-11/clash-sys-tems

[12] European Commission, EU Strategic Outlook on China 2019; China Briefing, “European Parliament Votes to Freeze the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment.” May 27, 2021.

https://www.china-briefing.com/news/european-parliament-votes-to-freeze-the-eu-china-comprehensive-agreement-on-investment/

[13] XinhuaNet, “Special Address by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the World Economic Forum Virtual Event of the Davos Agenda,” January 15, 2021.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-01/25/c_139696610.htm

[14] Yang Jiechi, “Firmly Uphold and Practice Multilateralism and Build a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind,” February 21, 2021,

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1855530.shtml

[15] “Full text of Xi Jinping's speech on the CCP's 100th anniversary,“

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Full-text-of-Xi-Jinping-s-speech-on-the-CCP-s-100th-anniversary.

[16] Amnesty International, “China 2020,”

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56487162;Human Rights Watch,

“China: Crimes Against Humanity in Xinjiang,“ April 19, 2021.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/19/china-crimes-against-humanity-xinjiang

[17] BBC, “Uighurs: Western countries sanction China over rights abuses,” March 22, 2021.

https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/china/report-china/

[18] Yan Xuetong, “Becoming Strong: The New Chinese Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs July/August 2021.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-06-22/becoming-strong

[19] Wang Jisi, “The Plot Against China?: How Beijing Sees the New Washington Consensus,” Foreign Affairs July/August, 2021.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-06-22/plot-against-china

[20] Sook Jong Lee, “Beyond the US-China Rivalry: Developing a Shared Democratic Vision for the Indo-Pacific,” ADRN Issue Briefing, January 25, 2021,

http://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=20341&board=kor_issuebriefing','kor_workingpaper','kor_special','kor_multimedia&keyword_option=board_content&keyword=Sook Jong Lee&more=

• Author: Sook Jong Lee_Senior Fellow and Director, East Asia Institute (EAI); Professor, Sungkyunkwan University. She received her Ph.D. in Sociology from Harvard University and has served as a Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute, Visiting Scholar at the Brookings Institution, Lecturer at Johns Hopkins University, President of the Association for Modern Japanese Studies, Policy Advisory Committee Member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Director of EAI. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed.), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (co-ed.), The Second Era of Globalization: Korean-Style Globalization and New Designs (co-ed.), and Conditions for Presidential Success in 2017 (co-ed.).

• Managed and Edited by: Jinkyung Baek Director of Research, EAI
  
  Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I j.baek@eai.or.kr