[EAI Issue Brief] From G7 to D10: The Complexity of Regime Competition within the Multilateral Order Amidst US-China Rivalry

[Editor's Note]

In June, an expanded G7 summit, including South Korea, India, Australia, and South Africa, was held in Cornwall, UK. The joint communiqué subsequently released expressed a commitment to more strongly defend democratic values within the traditional rules-based multilateral system of participating democracies, and further argued for the need to prevent challenges to the liberal international order. This has drawn protests from China. Lee Sook-jong, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University and Senior Fellow at EAI, explains the position of democracy amidst US-China regime competition and the role of democratic states. The author emphasizes that regime competition, framed as democracy versus autocracy, can inadvertently lead to the bloc-ization of multilateralism and pose unrealistic choices for many democracies that rely on both the US and China. She argues that democratic values should be approached as universal values that transcend regime competition. Furthermore, she adds that democratic nations in Europe and Asia must continuously protect democracy and strengthen independent regional cooperation among emerging democracies for the defense of democratic values.

An expanded G7 summit, including South Korea, India, Australia, and South Africa, was held in Cornwall, UK, from June 11 to 13. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson had announced his intention to hold an 'expanded G7' or 'D10' summit by inviting three additional democracies—South Korea, India, and Australia—since last year. This expanded G7 summit is the first iteration supporting the 'Summit for Democracy' initiative that US President Biden had spoken about during his election campaign. The idea that democratic values and norms serve as the foundation for collective action in addressing global challenges and help stabilize the existing multilateral international order has begun to be strongly shared again between the Biden administration and European democratic nations. Behind this lies the logic that the decline of democracy observed worldwide and the simultaneous challenges to the liberal international order must be prevented. The Western perspective that democracy is not just a domestic political system but also an issue of international order is provoking China's backlash. The differing perceptions of the US and China regarding multilateralism, the US-China strategic competition, and the confused discourse surrounding democracy within this context necessitate a clarification of their relationship. This will enable Asian democracies to explore ways to cooperate with the US and Western democracies on issues such as freedom, human rights, and anti-corruption while simultaneously avoiding heightened tensions with China.

1. Expanded G7 Summit and the Discussion of a Washington-led Democratic Alliance

The joint communiqué of the expanded G7 summit outlines a shared global agenda for action, dedicating significant space to ending COVID-19 and economic recovery, alongside securing future growth, protecting the planet, strengthening partnerships, and addressing issues of values.[1]The principled declaration of using the power of 'our values' such as democracy, freedom, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights to respond to the challenges of a changing world is woven throughout the subsequent agenda. It is particularly noteworthy that these values are incorporated into the technology sector. For instance, regarding the digital ecosystem, it states that 'we must protect an open, interoperable, and secure internet that supports human freedom, innovation, and trust.' It emphasizes coordinating to create international norms and standards that reflect democratic values, open competitive markets, and safeguards for human rights and fundamental freedoms in new technologies. Specifically, it calls for opposing government internet shutdowns or network access restrictions and discussing how to regulate algorithmic decision-making that promotes bias. The plan mentions that democratic partners will discuss international challenges in support of open societies at the 'Future Tech Forum' in September, sponsored by the OECD. These discussions align with Europe's ongoing efforts to establish norms and rules for new technologies, strengthening regulations in areas related to security while maintaining openness.[2]

The joint communiqué describes the international order championed by the G7 as an 'open and resilient international order' and states that the agenda agreed upon at this meeting will be pursued in cooperation with other countries within existing 'multilateral rules-based systems' such as the G20 and the UN. Here, we can observe a movement to 'separately' establish an alliance that more strongly defends democratic values within the framework of international law and traditional multilateral rules-based systems like the UN. Discussions on a democratic alliance have rapidly gained momentum since the beginning of this year, preceding the inauguration of the Biden administration. Jones and Twardowski (2021) emphasize that for democratic nations to maintain their influence in the international system, new forms of cooperation beyond the West are necessary. They refer to the strategy of advancing coordination and cooperation among democratic nations within the framework of the multilateral order as 'democratic multilateralism,' arguing that it is necessary to thwart efforts by Russia and China to weaken or alter the nature of the existing order.[3]

The view that China's growing influence in international organizations and global governance poses a challenge to the international order has been further elaborated in other works. For example, Hart and Johnson (2019) outline China's efforts to reshape the international order into six categories: shaping multilateral actions to align with China's interests, disrupting international legal regimes, transforming international norms, capturing international organizations, creating new international organizations, and building China-centric international cooperation platforms.[4]Nadege (2020) argues that China's international standing has not commensurately increased with its economic power over the past decade due to a weak capacity for 'discourse power' (话语权) to articulate and be heard. She contends that China has been striving to secure 'discourse power,' which involves shaping ideas and intellectual frameworks underpinning the international order.[5]Specifically, it notes that the state is systematically engaged in activities to disseminate Chinese narratives or manipulate public opinion by leveraging the open communication structures of the external world.[6]For these reasons, discussions on forming various 'democratic coalitions' among democratic nations to counter China's threat to the existing international order in areas such as trade, technology, supply chains, human rights, and corruption were published in two articles in Foreign Affairs magazine this past January.[7]It is noteworthy that in Washington and parts of Europe, a logic is emerging that issues in technical and functional areas, such as trade, technology, and supply chains, which were previously considered ideologically neutral, are now being linked to value domains like freedom and human rights, ultimately requiring a response within an ideological framework.

It is crucial to determine whether the US and European democratic nations view China's expanding influence as a geopolitical competition or an ideological one. The Trump administration adopted the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' concept, initially proposed by Japan, viewing China as a geopolitical competitor and refining its Indo-Pacific strategy to counter its growing influence. Consequently, the concept of security became intertwined not only with military competition but also with trade, especially in technology, leading to the spread of a logic of political decoupling, regardless of its feasibility, rather than market logic. At that time, democracy had not yet taken center stage in US foreign policy. However, with the inauguration of the Biden administration, the competition with Russia and China began to be framed anew within the context of an ideological regime competition: democracy versus autocracy.

Nearly six months into his presidency, Brands (2021) summarizes this perspective of the 'Biden Doctrine' as follows: The three challenges facing the democratic world are: first, attempts by Russia or China to alter the international system based on liberal principles for their own regimes (e.g., Russian cyber interference and disinformation campaigns, coercive diplomacy leveraging China's market dominance); second, authoritarian regimes appearing to cope better than democratic systems during crises like COVID-19; and third, the regression of democracy within advanced democratic countries, including the United States.[8]This perspective emphasizes that the challenges to democracy are interconnected both domestically and internationally, highlighting the importance of protecting the democratic international order to safeguard one's own democracy, rather than adopting a dichotomy of exemplary democracies versus rogue non-democracies. In response to each of these challenges, the US strategy involves strengthening the cohesion and resilience of the democratic community to counter authoritarian rivals, demonstrating that democratic systems can better address transnational challenges, and domestically, investing in infrastructure for the disaffected working and middle classes. This viewpoint emphasizes the interconnectedness of democratic issues within domestic and international relations, underscoring the importance of protecting the democratic international order even for the sake of safeguarding domestic democracy, rather than adhering to a simple dichotomy of exemplary democracies versus rogue non-democracies. In his March 31st speech in Pittsburgh, President Biden stated that the competition between the US and China fundamentally boils down to whether democracy can deliver better benefits to its people than autocracy.[9]In the same vein, democratic alliances are believed to have, and should demonstrate, a better capacity to address transnational challenges. Accordingly, the Biden administration views partnerships among other democratic nations as key to establishing a democratic order and is engaging in cooperation with specific countries on very concrete, issue-by-issue bases.[10]

The inclusion of ideological regime competition in strategic competition for geopolitical influence may help restore global democracy, which has been in decline for the past 15 years, but it clearly presents a dilemma for Asian democracies being asked to partner. Democratic values and norms are inherently important for individual freedom, human rights, and the rule of law within individual states, and simultaneously, these values and norms are essential for respecting the sovereignty and mutual cooperation of individual states within the multilateral order. Nevertheless, the regime competition of democracy versus autocracy raises concerns regarding its realism, justification, and effectiveness. First, unlike the Cold War era when the world was divided into capitalist and communist blocs, the economies of major authoritarian states, particularly China, the world's second-largest economy, are closely interconnected with Asian economies, making it difficult for cooperation among democratic nations to exclude China. In other words, it is assessed as lacking realism. Second, if the US advocacy of democratic systems is perceived as a tool for geopolitical competition, governments and civil societies aiming to protect and support democracy will question its sincerity. That is, the logic of democratic alliances can only be sustainable as a value-based coalition, beyond calculations of national interest, if its justification is sufficiently strong. Third, the logic of regime competition can fragment international cooperation between the US and China to address transnational challenges. Pepinsky and Weiss (2021) also point out that the Biden administration's view of China as an ideological competitor overestimates the appeal of the Chinese regime and is an impractical approach that could deter Asian and other regional countries from cooperating with the US and stimulate alliances among authoritarian states.[11]Cooperation with China is crucial for addressing transnational challenges and crises such as climate change and financial crises, given its significant influence. In this regard, the European Union, in its 'EU Strategic Outlook on China 2019,' strategically defines China in a multifaceted way: as a 'partner for cooperation and negotiation' on global issues like climate change and the WTO; as an 'economic competitor' concerning technological leadership and market access; and as a 'systemic rival' pursuing alternative governance models in relation to future state systems. However, it is challenging to engage with China as a partner for cooperation and negotiation while simultaneously addressing China's infringement of European norms. For instance, when the EU sanctioned Chinese officials over human rights abuses in Xinjiang, China retaliated by sanctioning European human rights activists, causing controversy. In May, the European Parliament overwhelmingly approved a motion to freeze the ratification of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment by a vote of 599 in favor, 30 against, and 58 abstentions.[12]In other words, issues arise where upholding human rights and economic cooperation are difficult to separate. Nevertheless, if these two engagement strategies toward China were integrated from the outset, the realization of either would become impossible, necessitating a response based on post-hoc, selective choices depending on the issue.

2. China's Response to the Discussion of a Chinese-Style Multilateral Order and Regime Competition

The Trump administration, under the banner of 'America First,' engaged in trade and technological disputes with China. In 2020, as the US became the hardest-hit country by COVID-19, President Trump blamed China, referring to it as the 'China virus,' and submitted a notice to the UN and Congress to withdraw from the World Health Organization, accusing it of being favorable to China. Upon taking office, President Biden immediately included a halt to the withdrawal process from the WHO, along with rejoining the Paris Agreement on climate change, among his 17 initial executive orders on January 20th. While Europe has enthusiastically welcomed 'America is Back,' China is responding with considerable apprehension to the Biden administration's return to the international stage, which actively incorporates regime competition into its foreign policy.

China has promoted itself as a supporter of development for developing countries, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative, and as a defender of UN-centered multilateralism, under the banner of Chinese-style socialism. The 'Chinese Dream,' which began to spread after Xi Jinping assumed the position of General Secretary in November 2012 and President in the following year, aims to establish a horizontal relationship with the US, achieve international status as a superpower, and domestically, strengthen the identity of Chinese-style socialism. The logic that the expansion of the global influence of socialist China is harmonious with the international multilateral order has been propagated through the concept of a 'community of shared future for mankind.' Regarding the US concern that the expansion of China's influence in global governance is concurrent with the strengthening of its socialist identity, China has condemned the US as unilateralist and a bully that violates sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs, prioritizing its own interests and ideology. China's rhetoric as a responsible multilateral actor has been particularly amplified to contrast with the Trump administration. In his online speech at the World Economic Forum this past January, titled 'Let Multilateralism Light Up Humanity's Path Forward,' Xi Jinping once again emphasized the need to respect the historical, cultural, and social uniqueness of each country, abandon ideological prejudice, and move forward on the path of peaceful coexistence, mutual benefit, and win-win cooperation.[13]Yang Jiechi (2021) also criticizes interference in internal affairs under the guise of human rights or democracy, or scapegoating certain countries for ideological division, as contrary to multilateralism. He emphasizes that responding to transnational challenges faced by all humanity, such as pandemics, economic crises, and climate change, requires reciprocity and cooperation, and that China is a champion of UN-centered international multilateralism.[14]At the ceremony commemorating the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China on July 1st, Xi Jinping stressed that only Chinese-style socialism can develop China and called for strengthening the leadership of the Party. He stated that China does not possess aggressive or hegemonic genes and will continue to advocate for the construction of a community of shared future for mankind, promoting shared human values such as 'peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom' alongside peace-loving countries and peoples.[15]

Ultimately, if the multilateralism advocated by the Western world is based on international cooperation underpinned by the protection of individual freedom, human rights, and the rule of law domestically, then the multilateralism advocated by China is based on pursuing mutually beneficial cooperation while respecting each country's independent political system. Although China speaks of democracy and freedom as shared values, they remain at the community or national level rather than at the individual level. In recent years, the human rights abuses seen in issues concerning ethnic minorities and Hong Kong have indeed revealed a significant gap between the rhetoric of political leaders and reality. UN human rights monitoring bodies and non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have reported on violations of basic rights such as freedom of religion, expression, and association in the Uyghur regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, as well as crimes against humanity, including violations of the right to health, detention and torture, and cultural persecution of these ethnic minorities.[16]The human rights abuses against Uyghurs are particularly severe, leading the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada to announce sanctions against five Chinese officials in March over this issue.[17]

The international law and UN system, which China claims to respect, have protected human rights as universal values. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, outlines 30 rights and freedoms that all individuals possess and cannot be deprived of. This declaration has served as a cornerstone for numerous international human rights laws established since the 1970s, protecting the human rights of all people in all regions of the world. While the UN and the international community emphasize national sovereignty, they have engaged in 'humanitarian intervention' in cases of severe human rights violations. Meanwhile, China has denied the universality of democratic values related to individual human rights and the concept of humanitarian intervention. Yan Xuetong points out that if the US defines democracy and freedom in terms of electoral politics or individual expression, China defines them in terms of social stability and economic development, and argues that the US must accept this difference. He contends that the Biden administration's attempts to form an anti-China coalition on issues such as human rights that could hinder China's technological superiority or encourage separatism in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang constitute exclusive multilateralism, and that China will inevitably view this as the greatest obstacle to its political stability and national rejuvenation, thus becoming a source of future US-China tensions.[18]Wang Jisi observes that traditionally, the US respected the internal order of the Chinese Communist Party's rule, and China respected the US-led international order; however, as the US recently attempts to weaken the CCP and China challenges US leadership and Western values in international organizations, they are falling into a vicious cycle of conflict. The CCP perceives the US efforts to isolate and divide China as a new consensus in Washington, leading it to strengthen its power and control and increase vigilance against US interference.[19]While respecting the liberal and socialist identities of both the US and China, advocating for democratic values and norms requires moving towards healthy regime competition for good governance, with an agreement to respect individual freedom and well-being as shared human values—values that China also recognizes—without limiting democracy solely to electoral democracy.

3. The Role of Democratic Nations in Moderating Regime Competition within the Multilateral Order

As US-China competition escalates from military, technological, and trade domains into regime competition, it is appropriate for Asian democracies to pursue cautious engagement.[20]Democratic values and norms must be established as universal principles that transcend regime ideologies to prevent the multilateral order from becoming bloc-oriented. Three approaches seem possible for cautious engagement. First is the response to human rights issues. Asian governments and civil societies that value democratic principles find it difficult to accept China's human rights abuses under the guise of non-interference in internal affairs. However, civil society, free from economic and political ties, can more easily act from a perspective that upholds universal values like human rights than governments can. Governments of Asian democracies, within their limitations, can also voice collective opinions within the framework of the UN human rights system. Second, cooperation in functional areas such as technology, trade, and health does not need to be mutually exclusive, whether it is cooperation with the US or China; it is desirable to establish partnerships based on fair and reasonable principles and standards. In this regard, it is necessary to benchmark Europe's approach of developing fair rules and guidelines to respond to US-China competition. Third, engagement must be dual to prevent regime competition, framed as democracy versus autocracy, from fragmenting into US-led and China-led blocs within the UN and existing functional global governance systems. This will enable effective responses to global challenges such as pandemics, climate change, and technological transformation, and will allow many democratic countries, which maintain close relationships with both the US and China, to preserve their diplomatic autonomy. In the face of US-China regime competition, democratic nations in Europe and Asia must act as impartial arbiters to uphold the multilateral order. To properly fulfill this role as arbiters in the international community, they must continue to cherish and protect their own democracies, as well as strengthen independent regional cooperation among emerging democracies for the defense of democratic values. ■

[1] White House, “Carbisbay G7 Summit Communique,“

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/13/carbis-bay-g7-summit-communique/

[2]Lee Sook-jong, "Europe's Pragmatic Response to the Entry of Chinese Telecommunications Company Huawei," East Asia Institute, February 2020.

https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=13931&board=kor_issuebriefing&keyword_option=board_content&keyword=%EC%9D%B4%EC%88%99%EC%A2%85&more=

[3] Брюс Джонс и Адам Твардовски, «Укрепление демократий в меняющемся международном порядке: Аргументы в пользу демократического мультилатерализма», Brookings Institutions, 25 января 2021 г.

https://www.brookings.edu/research/bolstering-democracies-in-a-changing-international-order-the-case-for-democratic-multilateralism/

[4] Мелани Харт и Блейн Джонсон, «Картографирование амбиций Китая в области глобального управления», Center for American Progress, февраль 2019 г.,

[5] Надже Роллан, «Видение Китая нового мирового порядка», The National Bureau of Asia Research Special Report 83, январь 2020 г.,

https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr83_chinasvision_jan2020.pdf

[6] Digital Forensic Lab, «Дискурсивная сила Китая: Использование Китаем информационных манипуляций в региональной и глобальной конкуренции», Atlantic Council, декабрь 2020 г.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/China-Discouse-Power-FINAL.pdf

[7] Курт М. Кэмпбелл и Раш Доши, «Как Америка может укрепить азиатский порядок: Стратегия восстановления баланса и легитимности», Foreign Affairs, 12 января 2021 г., How America Can Shore Up Asian Order | Foreign Affairs; Фрэнсис З. Браун, Томас Каротерс и Алекс Паскаль, «Америке нужен саммит по вопросам демократии больше, чем когда-либо», Foreign Affairs, 15 января 2021 г.

[8] Хэл Брэндс, «Формирующаяся доктрина Байдена: Демократия, автократия и определяющее столкновение нашего времени», 29 июня 2021 г.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-06-29/emerging-biden-doctrine?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=The%20Emerging%20Biden%20Doctrine&utm_content=20210629&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017

[9] «Выступление президента Байдена по плану американских рабочих мест», Учебный центр плотников Питтсбурга,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/03/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-american-jobs-plan/

[10] Например, сотрудничество с Южной Кореей в области полупроводников и технологий 5G/6G, с ЕС — в области связи технологий и торговой политики, с Японией — в вопросе глобальной открытости Интернета, с НАТО — в области кибератак и дезинформации.

[11] Томас Пепински и Джессика Чен Вайс, «Столкновение систем?: Вашингтону следует избегать идеологической конкуренции с Пекином», Foreign Affairs, 11 июня 2021 г.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-06-11/clash-sys-tems

[12] Европейская комиссия, EU Strategic Outlook on China 2019; China Briefing, «Европейский парламент голосует за замораживание Всеобъемлющего соглашения ЕС-Китай об инвестициях». 27 мая 2021 г.

https://www.china-briefing.com/news/european-parliament-votes-to-freeze-the-eu-china-comprehensive-agreement-on-investment/

[13] XinhuaNet, «Специальное обращение председателя КНР Си Цзиньпина на виртуальном мероприятии Всемирного экономического форума «Давосская повестка дня», 15 января 2021 г.

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-01/25/c_139696610.htm

[14] Ян Цзечи, «Твердо отстаивать и практиковать мультилатерализм и строить сообщество единой судьбы для человечества», 21 февраля 2021 г.,

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1855530.shtml

[15] «Полный текст речи Си Цзиньпина на 100-летии КПК»,

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Full-text-of-Xi-Jinping-s-speech-on-the-CCP-s-100th-anniversary.

[16] Amnesty International, «Китай 2020»,

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56487162; Human Rights Watch, «Китай: Преступления против человечности в Синьцзяне», 19 апреля 2021 г.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/19/china-crimes-against-humanity-xinjiang

[17] BBC, «Уйгуры: Западные страны вводят санкции против Китая за нарушения прав человека», 22 марта 2021 г.

https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/china/report-china/

[18] Янь Сюэтун, «Становление сильным: Новая внешняя политика Китая», Foreign Affairs, июль/август 2021 г.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-06-22/becoming-strong

[19] Ван Цзисы, «Заговор против Китая?: Как Пекин видит новый Вашингтонский консенсус», Foreign Affairs, июль/август 2021 г.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-06-22/plot-against-china

[20] Ли Сок Чжон, «За пределами соперничества США и Китая: Разработка общего демократического видения для Индо-Тихоокеанского региона», ADRN Issue Briefing, 25 января 2021 г.,

http://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=20341&board=kor_issuebriefing','kor_workingpaper','kor_special','kor_multimedia&keyword_option=board_content&keyword=Sook Jong Lee&more=

• Автор: Ли Сук Чжон — старший научный сотрудник и директор EAI, профессор Университета Сонгюнгван. Получила степень доктора социологии в Гарвардском университете (Harvard University), работала научным сотрудником в Институте Седжона, приглашенным научным сотрудником в Институте Брукингса, приглашенным преподавателем Университета Джонса Хопкинса, президентом Ассоциации современных японских исследований, членом консультативного комитета Министерства иностранных дел, директором EAI. Среди ее недавних публикаций: Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea‟s Role in the 21st Century (ред.), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (соред.), «Второй акт глобализации: Корейская глобализация и новая концепция» (соред.), «Условия успеха президента в 2017 году» (соред.).

• Ответственные и редакторы: Пэк Чжин Гён — руководитель отдела исследований EAI
  
             Контакт: 02 2277 1683 (доб. 209) I j.baek@eai.or.kr