[EAI Issue Brief] South Korea and the Asian Cooperation Framework, the Quad (Quad) Strategy

[Editor's Note]

The United States has recently adopted an active stance in forming multilateral cooperation bodies and regional forums within Asia, deciding to base its strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region on the Quad. The Quad began as an "informal" consultative body to jointly respond to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, an urgent crisis. Today, this Quad is rapidly becoming formalized. Evan A. Feigenbaum, Deputy Director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argues that the Quad, which prioritizes form over function, risks falling into the same trap as past failures and must shift its focus to a mode of joint action to address the most pressing issues currently facing regional countries. In this issue brief, the author analyzes the history, challenges, and improvements of the Quad, as well as areas where South Korea can participate in a Quad Plus framework.

The Biden administration's decision to base its strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region on the Quad has reignited interest in the future of Asia's cooperation framework. The formation of multilateral, minilateral, and ad hoc consultative bodies is not a new phenomenon. Building multilateral cooperation forums has been a significant challenge in Asia, sometimes appearing as a competition. For the past two decades, the United States has ignored efforts by Asian countries to form multilateral cooperation bodies or regional forums of various sizes, combinations, and types, but has recently adopted a more active stance.

However, such regional cooperation in Asia has not been effective and has lacked clear objectives. That is, these consultative bodies have not fully utilized the efforts to cooperate with countries possessing the greatest capacity for joint problem-solving. Instead, Asian consultative bodies prioritize form over function and content of cooperation. Consequently, bilateral, trilateral, or quadrilateral cooperation structures have been emphasized, with the assumption that filling the number of participating countries and formalizing the consultative body would provide effective solutions to address the most pressing issues in the region.

But this is not the case. In almost all crisis situations over the past 30 years, including the East Timor crisis, the avian influenza pandemic, the Myanmar cyclone, the Indian Ocean tsunami, and the COVID-19 pandemic, formal consultative bodies have failed to play a problem-solving role. Instead, ad hoc regional coalitions formed by the United States have become the driving force for joint action.

The current Quad is at risk of falling into the same trap as past failures. This is ironic, as the Quad was not formed in this manner. Seventeen years ago, the "informal" Quad began as a means of joint response to the urgent crisis of the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. The Quad provided rapid and effective relief to the injured and displaced, but it disbanded with successful outcomes without a secretariat, summits, or official statements.

However, the ad hoc consultative body, the Quad, is rapidly becoming formalized today, evolving into a Quad with an official name. The Quad hosts meetings and discusses various joint initiatives. However, consultative bodies are always formed with a purpose. Its purpose can be seen not as quadrilateral cooperation for joint response to specific agendas and tasks, but as an alliance of four countries to counter the rise of China.

The true test of the Quad's capabilities lies in whether the cooperating countries will make the Quad the core of a flexible regional cooperation body. This is a matter of whether the Quad can become a cooperative group that can jointly respond to practical regional issues, and this can be verified by observing whether it can expand areas of cooperation with partner countries that will help solve future problems. This means that the Quad needs to be re-recognized as an ad hoc alliance that can change its partner countries for cooperation as needed, depending on the capabilities and will of the countries in the region.

There is a similar case to the Quad in the Asia-Pacific region recently: the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The CPTPP began as an informal consultative body of four countries from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) - Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. This ad hoc consultative body composed of the aforementioned four countries accurately sensed that while other countries were interested in trade liberalization, they were not ready to take action. Therefore, it became a driving force for joint regional action by promoting positive regional agendas and encouraging the participation of other countries. The CPTPP was thus launched.

In reality, there are no problems that can be solved by the power of the four Quad countries alone. To address issues in various areas such as climate change, drug control, and maritime capacity, cooperation and participation from more countries are necessary. The obstacles to the expansion of the Quad are largely twofold. First, there is a lack of cohesion on non-security issues. Cross-utilization management for data access and transfer is an example. Various models have been proposed in this regard, but no common model has been agreed upon by all countries. The Osaka Initiative was introduced at the G20 Summit in 2019, but India and Indonesia refused to join. Second, there are already regional cooperation bodies related to economic cooperation. RCEP and CPTPP, which already involve many countries, are expected to become benchmarks for regional trade and investment. However, it should be noted that India and the United States, major economic powers in the region, are not included in RCEP and CPTPP.

The challenges for the expansion of the Quad are: 1) building cohesion. 2) selecting participating countries that accurately reflect capabilities and willingness, and 3) establishing regional benchmarks. Establishing regional benchmarks means setting common infrastructure standards for finance, environmental regulations, and environmental impact assessments. Since the Quad strategy benefits from a larger number of participating countries, standards that can be agreed upon by various countries must be established. South Korea can also play a significant role in establishing regional standards and benchmarks.

For South Korea, "joining" the Quad or pursuing official membership in a Quad Plus consultative body is not the main issue. Instead, the key strategic question is whether Quad member states will extend a hand of cooperation to South Korea on specific issues and functional areas, and how South Korea can leverage its strengths to assist ad hoc consultative bodies in resolving major regional issues and enhancing the Quad's capabilities. It is projected that South Korea's capabilities can be demonstrated through the following areas:

(1) Supply chain resilience

(2) Cross-utilization management for data access and transfer

(3) Response to disinformation

(4) Sharing best practices in public health and healthcare

(5) Expansion of green technology and diversification of the use of green bonds and green credit products

In conclusion, to solve problems efficiently and sustainably, the Quad's focus must shift from a novel form of dialogue to a mode of joint action to address the most pressing issues currently facing regional countries. This is a task of providing opportunities for South Korea to promote joint regional action, rather than simply "joining" other existing intergovernmental consultative bodies. If other Asian countries perceive the Quad solely as a forum for discussing threats from China's rise, its usefulness will not be recognized, nor will it be considered a model for consultation for their own choices and actions. ■

• Evan A. FeigenbaumDeputy Director, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Former James R. Schlesinger Distinguished Professor (2019-2020) and current Senior Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University and has worked in government, think tanks, the private sector, and across three regions of Asia. His work from 2001 to 2009 includes serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs (2007-2009), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asian Affairs (2006-2007), Director for East Asian and Pacific Policy Planning (2001-2006), and adviser to Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick on China. His books include "The United States in the New Asia" and "China's Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age."

• Managed and Edited by Yoon Ha-eun, EAI Research Fellow

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