“2020 Myanmar General Election Was Fair”: Myanmar Public Opinion Confirmed by Pre-Coup Survey

[Editor's Note]

On February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military staged a coup, claiming the 2020 general election was fraudulent, and detained government leaders including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. Amidst a spreading civil disobedience movement, Associate Professor Bae Jin-seok of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Gyeongsang National University and Jeong Han-ul, Senior Researcher at the Public Opinion Division of Korea Research, pose the critical question: “How do Myanmar citizens evaluate the 2020 general election and their country’s democratization?” The authors draw attention to the post-election survey conducted in Mandalay Region and Kachin State by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in collaboration with local partner organizations, aiming to infer the public opinion of Myanmar citizens just before the coup. Although it was a regional survey rather than a nationwide one, the demographic and political characteristics of the two regions were assessed to be valuable data as they fairly reflected the opinions of the ruling party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), its opposition, and minority groups.

The survey results indicated that Myanmar's public opinion contradicted the military's claims of election fraud. The vast majority of citizens recognized the legitimacy of the 2020 general election and perceived that Myanmar's democratization had progressed under the NLD administration. The military's declaration of a state of emergency was neither procedurally legitimate nor reflective of Myanmar's public opinion. In light of the current situation, where a military coup occurred despite the NLD's landslide victory in the general election, the two authors question the sustainability of Myanmar's gradual democratization model. They point out that as long as the pro-democracy forces share power with the military, they remain vulnerable to the threat of a military coup at any time. However, given that the options available to the Myanmar military following the coup are limited to elections that function as referendums, it remains to be seen whether Myanmar's democratization will be entirely undone by this coup.

Finally, the authors highlight that in response to the question of whether the international community should have opportunities to exert effective pressure on Myanmar due to human rights violations, 70% of respondents in Kachin State agreed. They urge the international community, including South Korean civil society and the government, to appropriately utilize the assessment that Myanmar citizens' desire for democracy and the election results are legitimate, so that the "Spring of Myanmar" does not fade away.

Introduction: 2020 Myanmar General Election's First Public Opinion

On February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) declared a state of emergency, detaining the President and key figures of the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD). The military initially imposed martial law in Mandalay and Yangon on February 8, subsequently extending it to other regions. As protests against the state of emergency escalated, gatherings of more than five people were prohibited.^[1] The military's stated justification for imposing the state of emergency was "election fraud." They claimed that the voter lists for the November 2020 general election were manipulated, and this issue obstructed Myanmar's democratization. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), a pro-military party, also alleged election fraud shortly after the general election. Subsequently, on January 26, the military claimed to have identified 8.6 million discrepancies in the voter lists, lending credence to the USDP's claims. However, these remain mere allegations, and no evidence to support widespread election fraud has yet been presented.

The Myanmar Election Commission and domestic and international election monitoring groups have repeatedly denied the allegations of election fraud made by the military and the USDP.^[2] Multiple domestic election monitoring organizations in Myanmar confirmed that the election was conducted lawfully.^[3] International election monitoring groups hold the same view. While acknowledging some procedural flaws, they concluded that these were not significant enough to affect the election outcome and that there was no large-scale, systematic election manipulation.^[4] This election was also held under the 2008 constitutional framework. Similar to the 2015 election, the constitution fundamentally barred Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming president by restricting presidential eligibility for those with spouses or children holding foreign citizenship. Furthermore, the military was pre-allocated 25% of seats in both the upper and lower houses, control over one of the two vice-presidential positions, and the ministries of Home Affairs, Defense, and Border Affairs. Despite these provisions, the election concluded with an overwhelming NLD victory, making claims of systematic election manipulation appear untenable.^[5] The NLD secured 61.6% (138 out of 224 seats) of the seats in the Amyothar Hluttaw (Upper House) and 58.6% (258 out of 440 seats) in the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives). Excluding seats allocated to the military and areas where elections could not be held due to the state of emergency, the NLD won in 85.7% (138 out of 161 constituencies) of the upper house races and 81.9% (258 out of 315 constituencies) of the lower house races. Despite predictions of low voter turnout due to the COVID-19 pandemic, election authorities estimated that the turnout for this election would exceed the 69% recorded in 2015, reaching over 70%.^[6]

Regarding the military's claims of election fraud and the subsequent coup, what stance do Myanmar citizens actually hold on these issues? While reports on protests against the military's state of emergency are readily available, the public opinion within Myanmar regarding the alleged "election fraud"—the justification for the coup—remains largely unknown. The results of the post-election surveys conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in Mandalay Region and Kachin State shortly after the 2020 general election, prior to the coup, provide empirical evidence for understanding how Myanmar citizens perceived the 2020 election results.^[7] EAI, in collaboration with local partner organizations in Myanmar, conducted face-to-face interviews using structured questionnaires with adult men and women aged 18 and above in these two regions, selected through stratified random sampling. The survey in Mandalay Region took place from December 12 to 27, and in Kachin State from December 7 to 22. The number of collected samples was 400 in Mandalay Region and 758 in Kachin State. While these regional surveys have limitations in representing the opinions of all Myanmar citizens, they offer valuable data for inferring the overall public sentiment, considering the demographic and political characteristics of the two regions.

Mandalay Region, located in the central part of Myanmar, is a key region in terms of population and economic scale. As of 2014, it ranked third in population with 6.16 million people and is home to Mandalay City, the second-largest city after Yangon. The ruling NLD holds significant political influence in the region. In the 2020 general election, the NLD won 35 out of 36 seats in the House of Representatives, with only one seat going to the USDP. In the upper house elections, the NLD won all 12 seats. In terms of population composition, Mandalay Region is predominantly populated by the Bamar ethnic group, the majority ethnic group in Myanmar, and Buddhists. Therefore, it provides an environment conducive to inferring the opinions of the NLD's support base and the mainstream groups such as the Bamar and Buddhists. In contrast, Kachin State, located in the northernmost part of Myanmar bordering China, is a state with a population of approximately 1.69 million (ranking around 10th) where the NLD's influence is relatively weaker. In the recent general election, the NLD secured 13 out of 18 seats in the House of Representatives. The USDP won four seats, and the Kachin State People’s Party (KSPP) won the remaining seat. In the upper house elections, the NLD won 10 out of 12 seats, with the USDP and the New Democracy Party each winning one seat. Kachin State has the strongest opposition influence after Shan State. Due to over a decade of civil war and issues concerning internally displaced persons, the NLD government has handled Kachin State with political sensitivity. Kachin State also has a more diverse ethnic and religious composition compared to other regions.^[8] In this regard, Kachin State provides an environment conducive to inferring the opinions of groups opposing the NLD government, as well as minority groups such as ethnic minorities and Christians.

The survey results revealed that while NLD candidates ranked first in terms of support in both regions for the upper house, lower house, and local council elections, there were distinct differences in the breadth of support. In Mandalay Region, NLD candidate support rates were around 77-78%, whereas in Kachin State, they were around 46-49%, indicating the survey's utility in examining the opinions of the anti-NLD segment.^[9]

[Figure 1] Respondent Support Rate for NLD Candidates (%) Approval rating (%)

"Equal opportunity was provided to

Our primary concern is the perception of Myanmar citizens regarding the fairness of the general election. It is necessary to ascertain whether Myanmar citizens, like the military, harbor doubts about the election's integrity. Let us first examine the perceptions of the election in both Mandalay Region and Kachin State, where common questions were posed. Since the election, the military has alleged irregularities in voter lists, claiming discrepancies of approximately 8.6 to 10 million voters, and asserted that the NLD's landslide victory was a result of these issues. However, our survey results show that in both Mandalay Region, where pro-NLD sentiment is strong, and Kachin State, where anti-NLD sentiment is relatively stronger, 89.3% and 80.4% of respondents, respectively, agreed with the statement "Equal opportunity was provided to all voters." Furthermore, regarding the statement "This election was a democratic election based on a multi-party system," 87.0% of respondents in Mandalay (82.5% "Somewhat agree," 4.5% "Strongly agree") expressed agreement. In Kachin State, the "Agree" rate was also high at 79.5% ("Somewhat agree" 72.8%, "Strongly agree" 6.8%). Dissenting opinions were in the minority.

[Figure 2] Perception of 2020 General Election (Agreement Rate %) Regarding Perception (Agreement Rate %)^[10]

Let's examine the specifics by region. In the Mandalay Region survey, a more comprehensive assessment of election fairness was conducted. Regarding the statement "This election was free and fair," 86.7% responded in agreement. Similarly, the statement "The results of this election were valid and correct" received approximately 88% agreement. The proportion of respondents who disagreed with these statements was only around 1-2%.

[Figure 3] Election Assessment in Mandalay Region (%) Regional Election Evaluation (%)

The survey conducted in Kachin State asked about the evaluation of the election results and process. The results showed that the majority of respondents were "very satisfied" (72.7%) or "satisfied" (10.2%) with the election process. A total of 77.3% of respondents expressed general trust in the election results, with only 9.1% expressing distrust. The overwhelming majority (97.4%) reported not experiencing any pressure at the polling stations.

[Figure 4] Election Assessment in Kachin State (%) State Election Evaluation (%)

In Kachin State, ethnic parties like KSPP and the pro-military USDP show relative strength compared to other states, securing second and third place in the general election. Among respondents, NLD voters (311 individuals) showed over 90% positive responses regarding both the election results and process. Although not reaching the high positive response rate of NLD voters, a majority of KSPP voters (180 individuals) and USDP voters (63 individuals) also expressed satisfaction with the election process and acceptance of the results. Among KSPP voters, 88.3% were satisfied with the election process, and 62.6% trusted the election results. Among USDP voters, 63.5% were satisfied with the election process, and 68.3% trusted the election results. This indicates that even among voters who cast ballots for opposition parties in Kachin State, where anti-NLD sentiment is relatively strong, a majority trusted the election process and accepted the results. Considering that such public opinion was already formed before the coup, the military's claims of widespread election fraud appear unconvincing.

[Figure 5] Kachin State State By party affiliation Election Evaluation (%)

The survey results above confirm that the pretext for the state of emergency declared by the Myanmar military junta is contrary to Myanmar's public opinion. The vast majority of Myanmar citizens recognized the legitimacy of the 2020 general election. Furthermore, the perception that a state of emergency needed to be declared due to a crisis situation, as claimed by the military junta, was not found at all in the survey results. The military junta's declaration of a state of emergency not only lacks procedural legitimacy but also fails to reflect Myanmar's public opinion in substance.

NLD's overwhelming victory and the shadow behind it: “Is Myanmar heading in the right direction?”

Despite the NLD's landslide victory in the 2020 general election, Myanmar's democracy faced a significant challenge due to the military coup. The survey results also highlight the tasks that the NLD government and pro-democracy forces must address to end the state of emergency and normalize democracy. Given that this survey was conducted at a time when there were no signs of a coup, the response to the question, “Is Myanmar heading in the right direction?” is particularly significant. In Mandalay, a region with strong NLD support, a majority (85%) responded that Myanmar was heading in the right direction, with only 2% indicating it was heading in the wrong direction. However, in Kachin State, only 44.3% agreed that Myanmar was heading in the right direction, and a significant 41.9% responded with “I don't know.” While only 12.1% responded that it was heading in the wrong direction, it is noteworthy that nearly half of the respondents in Kachin State, which has a large proportion of ethnic minorities and non-Buddhists, did not readily agree on the country's future, unlike in Mandalay. This suggests that the tasks facing the second democratic government before the coup were considerable.

[Figure 6] Expectations (Agreement %) for the New Government in Kachin State

Is the Myanmar-style gradual democratization model sustainable?

Further details on expectations for the new government from the Kachin State survey revealed that a majority held positive perceptions regarding economic and state administration, with agreement rates of 63.0% for “quality public services” and 57.2% for “job provision.” However, the proportion agreeing with the statement “The public will have the right to freely participate in demonstrations” dropped to half, with the remaining respondents either withholding their answers or disagreeing. This appears to reflect criticism that the first NLD government was passive in engaging in democratic dialogue, persuasion, and coordination with ethnic minorities and opposition groups. Notably, the agreement rate of only 39.3% for the statement “The NLD government will successfully amend the 2008 constitution,” which retains provisions restricting liberal democratic order, also hints at the shadows looming over the new government prior to the coup.

Furthermore, even in the Mandalay region survey, which showed optimistic responses about Myanmar's future, only 28% of respondents believed that the military's political intervention would decrease under the newly elected government. While 65% of respondents predicted that democratic values would be strengthened and 52% predicted that freedom of expression would expand, the proportion of respondents who expected the military's influence to weaken was relatively small.

What are the implications of these survey results? For the past decade, Myanmar's pro-democracy and military factions have shared power. Consequently, Myanmar's democratization model has been perceived as gradual or partial democratization. However, many citizens are concerned that this model has limited the scope of democratization and political reform. This implies that citizens do not perceive the power-sharing situation with the military as progress in democratization.

The NLD has made significant contributions to Myanmar's democratization. However, the NLD's approach to democratization also has clear limitations. The strategy of pursuing a transition to a democratic system while sharing power with the military can no longer be viewed with unmitigated optimism. Existing research on democratic transitions and historical experiences offer the following lessons regarding the military's political withdrawal: First, efforts must be actively made to divide the military and foster factions within the military that can align with the pro-democracy forces. Second, key military positions should be rotated, and officers resisting democratization should be removed in a timely manner.^[11]It is questionable whether the pro-democracy forces in Myanmar have taken such measures over the past decade of power-sharing with the military. Samuel Huntington expressed concern that nascent democracies might spoil the military.^[12]Nascent democracies have sometimes used the military to achieve short-term political objectives, thereby providing the military with economic and political resources. These measures are far removed from weakening the military's power and removing it from the political sphere. The simple truth that a democratic government, if it fails to control the military properly, will ultimately empower the military to plot a coup has once again been proven by the current coup.^[13]Myanmar's democracy leaders are likely aware that they have fallen into a trap themselves, as attempts to reclaim military power could themselves trigger a coup. This is why the NLD government responded ineffectually when the military threatened a coup in late January. In the current situation where a military coup has become a reality, the sustainability of Myanmar's gradual democratization model, termed "pacted transition," can only be questioned from a long-term perspective.

The military also has limited options

The Myanmar military junta cannot be optimistic about the current situation either. Although it has declared a state of emergency and promised elections in one year, the likelihood of a military-backed party winning the next election as intended by the junta is very low. Elections held after a coup generally take on the character of a referendum on the approval of the coup. As confirmed by the current survey results, Myanmar citizens attribute legitimacy to the results of the 2020 general election. If elections are held normally, the defeat of the military or its supported party can be easily predicted. The military is well aware of this, making the possibility of holding free and fair elections low. If this happens, Myanmar's democratization is likely to fall deeper into a quagmire.

It is difficult to postpone the elections promised for one year later. To maintain the power acquired through the coup, a process of justification is necessary. Maintaining the legitimacy of power without elections is nearly impossible. According to recent studies, the median duration of military regimes that seized power through a coup but subsequently held elections is approximately 88 months (7.3 years), whereas the duration of military regimes that seized power through a coup and did not hold elections is only 24 months.^[14] While it is difficult to predict the future choices of the military, the options available to the Myanmar military after the coup are limited.

An interesting finding emerged from the Kachin State survey: 70% of respondents agreed with the statement, “The international community should have opportunities to effectively pressure Myanmar when human rights violations occur.” Only 9.1% argued that the international community should not be allowed to pressure Myanmar. This survey result can also be applied to the current coup situation. Similar to the human rights issue, it can be inferred that there is a majority public opinion within Myanmar that supports international intervention in the event of a military coup. The UN, the US Biden administration, and leaders from other Western societies are condemning the Myanmar military's coup attempt. It is now time for leaders in the Asian region to also voice their support for Myanmar's democracy. It is a time when more active support and solidarity are needed from the South Korean government and civil society, which started from a similar position to Myanmar just 30 years ago and are now widely regarded as exemplary cases in both economic growth and democratic consolidation.

[1] Al Jazeera and News Agencies. 2021. “Myanmar military ruler defends coup as protests intensify.”https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/8/myanmar-military-leader-gives-first-address-to-nation-since-coup

[2] Pyae Sone Win. January 29, 2021. “Myanmar election commission rejects military’s fraud claims.” apnews.com.

[3] Domestic Election Observer Organization. 2021. “Joint Statement by Domestic Election Observer Organization.” https://www.pacemyanmar.org/mmobservers-statement-eng/

[4] The Carter Center. 2020. “Election Observation Mission: Myanmar, General Election, November 8, 2020.” https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/myanmar-preliminary-statement-112020.pdf

[5] The Myanmar Times. November 16. 2020 “A Deeper Look into the Myanmar Elections.” https://www.mmtimes.com/news/deeper-look-myanmar-elections.html

[6] The Myanmar Times. November 30. 2020. “Suu Kyi’s Charm and Cult Proven in 2020 Polls.” https://www.mmtimes.com/news/suu-kyis-charm-and-cult-proven-2020-polls.html

[7]EAI conducted a public opinion survey after the 2020 general election in Myanmar to investigate the voting behavior and political consciousness of Myanmar citizens in collaboration with local partner organizations. The original plan to survey the entire country of Myanmar was scaled down to surveys in the Mandalay region and Kachin State due to the spread of COVID-19.

[8]As of 2014, Buddhists accounted for 64.0%, Christians 33.8%, Muslims 1.6%, and Hindus 1.6%, a characteristic feature being the high proportion of Christians in addition to Buddhists. This is in contrast to the Mandalay region, which is composed of 95.7% Buddhists, 3.0% Muslims, 1.1% Christians, and 0.2% Hindus (wikipedia.org).

[9]All elections in Myanmar adopt the first-past-the-post system, and the President and two Vice Presidents are elected by the Presidential Electoral College, which represents the upper and lower houses and the military.

[10]While the wording of the two statements was identical, the scales differed. The survey in the Mandalay region used a 5-point scale (1. Strongly agree, 2. Slightly agree, 3. Neutral, 4. Slightly disagree, 5. Strongly disagree), and the survey in Kachin State used a 4-point scale (1. Strongly agree, 2. Agree, 3. Disagree, 4. Strongly disagree). The figures indicated in the graph are the sum of 1 and 2, and the remaining responses were mostly neutral or unknown/no response, with few disagreeing responses.

[11]Biddle, Stephen and Robert Zirkle. 1996. “Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World.” Journal of Strategic Studies 19(2): 171-212; Sudduth, Jun Koga. 2017. “Coup Risk, Coup-Proofing and Leader Survival.” Journal of Peace Research. 54(1): 3-15

[12]Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press

[13]Feaver, Peter. 1999. “Civil-Military Relations.” Annual Review of Political Science. 2(1): 211-241

[14]Grewal, Sharan and Yasser Kureshi. 2019. “How to Sell a Coup: Election as Coup Legitimation.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 63(4): 1001-1031

■ Author: Bae Jin-seok_ Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Gyeongsang National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Texas at Austin. His main research areas include elections, political parties, and public opinion in the context of democratization and new democracies. As a Senior Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute (EAI), he was involved in the establishment of the Asia Democracy Network (ADN) and the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) in 2013.

■ Author: Jeong Han-ul_ Senior Researcher, Public Opinion Division, Hankook Research. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from Korea University. He served as Deputy Director of the EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center, Deputy Director of the Center for Foreign Affairs and National Security, and Secretary-General. His main research areas include elections and generational politics, national identity and security perceptions, and survey research in the CSR field. His major publications include "20s Men," "Koreans' Policy Preferences for Universal Basic Income," "Koreans' 'New Security' Perceptions: Changes and Continuities," and "An Empirical Study on the 'Gapjil' Culture in Korean Society."

■ Editor: Jeon Ju-hyun, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 204) jhjun@eai.or.kr