[New Year Special Commentary Series - EAI's Outlook and Strategy for Korean Diplomacy in 2021] III. The Launch of the Biden Administration and South Korea's Strategy Toward Japan: What to Do and What Not to Do

Editor's Note

In this third commentary of the New Year Special Commentary series, "EAI's Outlook and Strategy for Korean Diplomacy in 2021," EAI President and Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies Professor Yeo-han Son predicts the impact and involvement of the new U.S. administration under President-elect Biden, who has positioned himself as a mediator for improving South Korea-Japan relations since his vice-presidential days, on bilateral relations. Son argues that the Biden administration, aiming to restore U.S. global leadership by building international solidarity based on democratic values, will emphasize the necessity of cooperation between South Korea and Japan as a means to contain China. He asserts that South Korea must seek coexistence and establish a new order amidst this U.S.-China power competition. Unlike Japan's one-track diplomacy, which links export regulations with solutions to the forced labor issue, Son calls for a two-track approach that separates historical issues from security and economic cooperation agendas.

If the biggest diplomatic failure of the Park Geun-hye administration was the deterioration of South Korea-Japan relations, which became volatile due to the comfort women issue, then the Moon Jae-in administration is also likely to be remembered for its failure in managing relations with Japan during its five-year term. The South Korea-Japan agreement on comfort women has become hollow, and since the Supreme Court ruling on forced labor, the two countries have fallen into a cycle of retaliatory measures, reaching the worst state since the normalization of diplomatic ties. The confrontation continues over the issue of resolving the liquidation of assets in South Korea of Japanese companies ordered by the Supreme Court ruling, and the South Korean government has filed a complaint with the WTO against the Japanese government, which refuses to lift export restrictions without progress on this matter. Despite the South Korean government's efforts to break the deadlock throughout last year, Japan has remained unresponsive, and the public is expressing fatigue. The situation has become more strained with the new year due to court rulings ordering Japanese government compensation to former comfort women. Will there be a change in 2021? Will the launch of the new U.S. administration under Biden, a major external variable for South Korean diplomacy this year, bring a shock of change to South Korea-Japan relations? What should the Moon Jae-in administration do in its remaining year?

In 2013, Biden

On December 6, 2013, Vice President Joe Biden visited Seoul with his National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and delivered a strong message. Emphasizing the U.S. pivot to Asia, he stated, "Betting against the U.S. is not a good strategy, and the U.S. is betting on Korea," sparking controversy. He also strongly urged President Park Geun-hye to improve relations with Japan. The six-day diplomatic itinerary, which included Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul, was strategically designed. In Tokyo on December 3, Biden emphasized to Prime Minister Abe that improving and cooperating on South Korea-Japan relations would not only benefit Japan but also the United States. In Beijing, after strongly protesting China's expansion of its air defense identification zone and its suppression of the press against American journalists, he then visited Seoul to emphasize trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, and the improvement of South Korea-Japan relations, targeting China. This conveyed a message about South Korea's position within the U.S.-China strategic competition and the status of South Korea-Japan relations.

Biden also actively intervened in the unique historical issues between South Korea and Japan. He persuaded President Park Geun-hye to improve relations, suggesting that Prime Minister Abe would take a forward-looking stance on historical issues. He even directly called Abe on December 26 to dissuade him from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, which Abe subsequently did. However, Biden's core intention was strategic cooperation to counter China's challenges. Despite South Korea's strong objections to the Prime Minister's Yasukuni Shrine visit, he planned a trilateral summit with South Korea and Japan and urged South Korea's participation. In March 2014, at the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, the U.S. acted as a mediator between South Korea and Japan to facilitate a trilateral meeting. Subsequently, the U.S. became deeply involved in the comfort women negotiations, playing a crucial role in facilitating the South Korea-Japan agreement on comfort women in December 2015.

In 2021, Biden

Now, with the launch of the Biden administration, it is necessary to pay attention to what goals the U.S. will pursue and how it will intervene in South Korea-Japan relations. The Trump administration expressed concern over the major clash between South Korea and Japan in the summer of 2019, but it did not attempt any intervention or mediation regarding the historical issues that caused it. On the other hand, it took a firm stance against attempts that could undermine the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, such as the South Korean government's declaration to terminate GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement), ultimately leading the South Korean government to reverse its declaration.

The Biden administration is pursuing the strengthening of alliances and international solidarity based on democratic values to restore America's global leadership. Unlike the Trump administration's transactional and bilateral approach, it aims to counter China's challenges through a collective approach and multilateralism. As a way to compensate for the relative decline in U.S. physical capabilities, it plans to pursue military deterrence, normative offensives through human rights and democracy, and pressure on discriminatory trade barriers in the Chinese market through joint actions with allies and partners. The demand for a pivotal role from Japan and South Korea has become even greater than in 2013.

The Biden administration's new strategy, while providing Japan with greater stability and predictability compared to the unpredictable Trump diplomacy, also presents significant challenges. It is relatively easy to anticipate that Japan will face the following three strategic challenges in 2021. First, the U.S. will pressure Japan to increase its practical military capabilities through defense spending increases and contribute to regional stability (i.e., deterrence against China). Second, it will request Japan's proactive participation in international solidarity for democracy. Although Japan has outwardly espoused value diplomacy, its stance of respecting national sovereignty over fundamental human rights, as seen in its response to human rights abuses in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, could put it in a difficult position going forward. Finally, Japan will be strongly urged to improve relations with South Korea as part of consolidating the front against China.

Suga's Prime Minister's Concerns

Is the Yoshihide Suga administration prepared? As revealed in his New Year's press conference on January 1, Prime Minister Suga remains at the level of merely following Abe's diplomacy. While centering on the U.S.-Japan alliance and cooperating with Australia, India, Europe, and ASEAN to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific, he aims to build stable relations with China, Russia, and neighboring countries. Like former Prime Minister Abe, he emphasizes the abduction issue but does not even mention South Korea. This stance was also evident in his press conference upon taking office last September, where his complete omission of South Korea raised concerns about "Korea passing."

Furthermore, Prime Minister Suga faces domestic circumstances that make it difficult to respond consistently and strategically in terms of foreign policy. With the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, Japan's economy is in its worst state since the post-war period, with GDP projected to contract by 6.4% in 2020. As the number of infections continues to break daily records in the new year, the government has resorted to declaring a second state of emergency. Public opinion has turned cold, with the cabinet's approval rating plummeting from 74% in September to 42% in December, according to a Nikkei poll. The Suga cabinet is compelled to focus entirely on COVID-19 countermeasures and economic revitalization measures, leaving little room for a forward-looking approach to foreign policy.

In contrast, the Moon Jae-in administration is relatively proactive in improving relations, largely due to pressure from the U.S. On November 13 last year, during a joint seminar hosted by EAI and the Brookings Institution, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marc Knapper exerted pressure for improved relations, stating that South Korea and Japan must accompany the U.S. in defending freedom and democracy in the region. Domestically, political burdens are also increasing. If the situation is left unattended as the deadline for the liquidation of Japanese corporate assets approaches, and if the cycle of retaliation between the two countries recurs, the Moon Jae-in administration will leave a significant negative legacy for the next government.

Another reason is the desire to leverage Japan for the Moon administration's primary diplomatic objective: improving inter-Korean relations. Last November, National Intelligence Service Director Park Jie-won and Chairman of the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians' Union Kim Jin-pyo, who met with Prime Minister Suga respectively, mentioned the diplomatic utilization of the 2021 Tokyo Olympics. Just as North Korea's First Vice Department Director Kim Yo-jong was invited to the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics, if Japan invites Chairman Kim Jong-un to the Tokyo Olympics, it could present a golden opportunity to break the deadlock in inter-Korean relations, North Korea-Japan relations, and South Korea-Japan relations.

Moon Jae-in Administration's Tasks and Strategy

The Moon Jae-in administration has only one year left to improve relations with Japan. Considering that nationalistic conflicts between the political leaders of the two countries have spread to the general public over the past decade, fostering emotional confrontations of anti-Japan sentiment and anti-Korean sentiment, it is realistically difficult for the Moon Jae-in administration and the Suga administration to find mutually acceptable solutions to the forced labor and comfort women issues that align with public expectations. The Suga administration's position is not significantly different from that of the Abe administration; it maintains the stance that since South Korea caused the forced labor issue, it is responsible for resolving it. Regarding the Seoul District Court's ruling on comfort women compensation on January 8, Japan maintains that South Korea, which violated international law (the principle of "sovereign immunity") and the 2015 intergovernmental agreement, must resolve the issue. This is far from the Moon Jae-in administration's position of seeking a solution through cooperation between the two countries based on respecting judicial decisions and the victim-centered principle. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Moon Jae-in administration will adopt a forward-looking approach in an election year.

Therefore, the realistic strategy is to adhere to the principle of a two-track approach, separating historical issues from security and economic cooperation agendas and decoupling them. This principle was originally proposed by the U.S. In 2014, when the Park Geun-hye administration insisted on a one-track diplomacy, making Japan's sincere actions on the comfort women issue a condition for improving South Korea-Japan relations (i.e., holding a summit), the U.S. strongly recommended a two-track approach. The current situation is the opposite: the Abe and Suga administrations are adhering to a one-track approach that links export restrictions with solutions to the forced labor issue. The Moon Jae-in administration should actively accept the Biden administration's call for improved relations while clearly presenting a policy agenda and roadmap for resolving issues through a two-track approach. The reason why the Moon Jae-in administration's outwardly stated two-track diplomacy has not been sufficiently persuasive is that it has not actively engaged in cooperation with Japan in areas such as security and economy. This is because South Korean diplomacy has leaned towards "North Korea First"ism, failing to find incentives and momentum for policy cooperation with Japan unless it contributes to improving inter-Korean relations. Japan may be a spoiler for improving inter-Korean relations, but it is also a crucial partner for cooperation in other areas. 2021 should mark the beginning of the full operation of the cooperation track.

On the historical track, the government should abandon attempts to resolve the complex forced labor and comfort women issues all at once. To overcome the current stalemate where Japan clings to the 1965 Claims Settlement Agreement and South Korea adheres to the Supreme Court ruling, the political leaders of both countries must be liberated from exclusive nationalistic sentiments. However, resolution within the year is impossible with the current leadership. The government should focus on managing the situation rather than resolving the pending issues, preventing further deterioration, and seeking the momentum for improved relations from the cooperation track. In the case of forced labor, political will must be mobilized to defer the liquidation of Japanese corporate assets as much as possible and find ways to block/minimize actual losses for Japanese companies, thereby preventing another spiral of retaliation between the two countries. In the case of the comfort women ruling, to avoid repeating the precedent of forced labor that pushed bilateral relations into crisis, efforts must be made to maintain a dialogue and achieve decoupling with the cooperation track, possibly by reusing the 2015 agreement.

On the cooperation track, the government should pursue diplomatic efforts to utilize the Tokyo Olympics as an opportunity to improve inter-Korean relations, while being wary of getting entangled in a one-track approach that links it with historical issues. If a package deal linking the forced labor or comfort women issues is attempted hastily for the sake of advancing inter-Korean relations, it is highly likely to provoke domestic backlash, similar to the lessons learned from the 2015 comfort women agreement, and will place a significant burden on the next administration.

A more important task is to strategically respond to the intensified pressure for trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan following the advent of the Biden administration. The Biden administration views South Korea and Japan as essential partners within a collective approach. It will pursue cooperation in various fields such as security, trade, development, and values/norms. However, if the U.S. directly targets China, neither South Korea nor Japan can afford to take sides in the U.S.-China power competition – that is, either China's attempt to overturn the existing order or the U.S.'s attempt to curb China's growth. Here, the strategic interests of both countries align. They should attempt rudimentary cooperation to jointly seek and design a new order that allows for legitimate competition, coexistence, and symbiosis, including North Korea.

Second, moving beyond the narrow debate for the lifting of export control measures, the government should seek ways to cooperate with Japan to reverse the trend of deglobalization or anti-globalization, where nationalism and populism are rampant as a backlash against neoliberal globalization. If discussions on cooperative tasks between South Korea and Japan to restore the liberal, rules-based international order, which is the foundation of prosperity and stability for both countries, are seriously initiated, the export control issue will naturally move towards resolution.

Third, the global spread of the coronavirus has brought about significant shocks to the international order. A more effective and robust international cooperation system is needed to control the virus, which exerts powerful influence across borders. South Korea and Japan should cooperate on infectious disease control for the successful hosting of the Tokyo Olympics in the first half of the year, and subsequently, with a long-term perspective, seek mutual cooperation to contribute to the reglobalization and the establishment of global governance in the post-COVID-19 era.

Finally, South Korea's policy toward Japan in 2021 must adhere to the principle of decoupling from domestic politics. This year is an election year, creating fertile ground for political choices that stimulate anti-Japanese nationalism. Particularly as the deadline for the liquidation of Japanese corporate assets approaches, and as it overlaps with the election period, there is a possibility that hardline anti-Japanese sentiments will prevail. Therefore, we hope for the courage and leadership of the government and political leaders to prevent the worst-case scenario. ■

■ Author: Yeo-han Son_ Director of EAI, Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University. Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. Recent publications include "South Korea's Choices After the Crisis" (2020), "Japan and Asia's Contested Order" (2019, with T. J. Pempel), and "Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia" (2016, with Jan Melissen).

■ Managed and Edited by: Jeonghye Seo, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) / jhsuh@eai.or.kr

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