[New Year Special Commentary Series - EAI Prospects and Strategies for Korean Diplomacy in 2021] II. The Xi Jinping Administration's Seven Diplomatic Initiatives and the Challenges and Strategies for Korean Diplomacy

Editor's Note

This is the second report in the New Year Special Commentary series, "Prospects and Strategies for Korean Diplomacy in 2021." Lee Dong-ryul, Director of the EAI China Center (Professor of Chinese Language and Literature at Dongduk Women's University), presents the Xi Jinping administration's seven diplomatic initiatives aimed at pursuing both regime stability and economic recovery in 2021, along with the challenges and strategies for Korean diplomacy amidst deepening US-China conflict. The author explains that China is pursuing an indirect diplomacy towards the United States while simultaneously seeking to strengthen its role and standing in the international community and improve its image through multilateral economic cooperation, moving beyond internal regime stability. The author emphasizes the need for South Korea and China to leverage the opportunity for relationship recovery through cooperation on COVID-19 containment, thereby developing consultative mechanisms in preparation for the strengthening of the South Korea-US alliance following the inauguration of the Biden administration.

1. The Xi Jinping Administration's Seven Diplomatic Initiatives: The Trio of Regime Stability, Economic Recovery, and Power Expansion

2021 marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party, a symbolically significant year as it represents the first centenary goal of the Xi Jinping administration's 'Two Centenaries' objectives. It also serves as the first year of the 14th Five-Year Plan. Crucially, it is one year prior to the 20th Party Congress, where, by convention, a new generation of political leadership should emerge. More than any other year, the long-standing tenet of Chinese diplomacy, 'diplomacy is an extension of domestic policy,' is being re-emphasized. The foundation of the stability and continuity of China's party-state system lies in the stability of its power structure and the legitimacy of its achievements. China faces an uncertain economic recovery due to the COVID-19 crisis, and its succession dynamics are also more opaque than at any point since the Deng Xiaoping era. Concurrently, the United States continues its high-intensity pressure on the Chinese system, and international sentiment and containment efforts against China are strong. In essence, the Xi Jinping administration faces the dual challenge of achieving regime stability and economic recovery in 2021. These two objectives are two sides of the same coin, and neither can be neglected. Given the nature of the Chinese system, tangible achievements that can be showcased domestically and internationally on the 100th anniversary of the Party's founding on July 1st are necessary. This explains why President Xi Jinping emphasized 'the journey of a hundred years, the original aspiration' in his New Year address and stressed 'striving towards a new path of building a socialist modernized country at the intersection of two centenary historical moments.'

The seven major diplomatic tasks presented by Foreign Minister Wang Yi also reflect the challenges and considerations facing the Xi Jinping administration.[1] Firstly, three of the seven major diplomatic tasks for 2021 focus on creating an international environment conducive to regime stability and economic development. This involves navigating the COVID-19 pandemic and emphasizing the creation of a favorable external environment for the implementation of the 14th Five-Year Plan. To this end, supporting global economic recovery and expanding opening-up are prioritized, with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) being the primary method. In preparation for the post-COVID era, there is a stated commitment to focus on the development of health, digital, and green Silk Roads. In essence, the goal is to strengthen the party-state system by securing legitimacy through economic recovery.

Secondly, China aims to simultaneously strengthen its role and standing in the international community beyond 'diplomacy for regime stability.' While characterizing the current international situation as a 'period of unprecedented change in a century (百年变局),' China asserts the need to forge a 'new phase (新局)' and seize the 'initiative (先机).' This approach evokes the strategy of 'offense is the best defense.' The core diplomatic initiatives are broadly categorized into four: building a new type of international relations, strengthening international cooperation through the Shanghai Spirit [2], taking a leading role in reforming the global governance system, and promoting the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind. Although these are existing diplomatic discourses, when compared to the six initiatives proposed in 2020, such as deepening partnerships, safeguarding multilateralism, expanding international cooperation, and modernizing China's diplomatic system, they represent a diplomatic vision and design that extends beyond mere strategy. Despite adverse conditions including the COVID-19 crisis, relentless US pressure, deteriorating international public opinion, and the decline of the free trade order, China demonstrates a clear intention to actively participate in and shape the post-COVID international order, moving beyond regime defense.[2]

The four major diplomatic initiatives proposed by China do not outwardly center on diplomacy with the US. The concept of building a new type of international relations emphasizes relations with Russia and Europe. It even asserts that Sino-Russian relations will be a pillar of global peace, security, and strategic stability. Cooperation with European countries is highlighted in areas such as multilateralism, free trade, climate change, digital, and green initiatives. Regional cooperation specifically mentions cooperation among South Korea, China, and Japan, and the development of the Mekong River economic development belt. This strategy involves circumventing confrontation with the United States while expanding China's diplomatic periphery, focusing on Russia, Europe, and ASEAN. Ultimately, China seeks to pursue a multi-faceted diplomacy centered on multilateral economic cooperation, deliberately avoiding placing the US at the core of its diplomatic efforts. However, it is not easy for China to rally friendly nations capable of countering the US solely through economic means. Since China already uses economic tools as leverage for pressure, their function and credibility as incentives are weakened.

Thirdly, China is also seeking to improve its international image and standing through diplomacy. Emphasis is placed on diplomacy aimed at promoting international understanding of the Communist Party of China and 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' through active exchanges with various countries. This signifies a proactive approach to foster understanding, moving beyond merely defending China's 'different' system and values. Notably, the emphasis on protecting core interests—sovereignty, security, and development interests—which was one of the six diplomatic tasks in 2020, has been replaced by 'promoting understanding and trust.'

Since Xi Jinping came to power, the protection of core interests has become a point of friction with neighboring countries and a symbol of assertive diplomacy. The Trump administration, through its relentless pressure on China's core interests such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, sought to build an anti-China international coalition. In reality, it is unnatural for China, on the verge of becoming a superpower, to still define sovereignty and territorial integrity as core interests and a bottom line. China is compelled to adopt a firm stance on its self-defined core interests, which, in turn, has paradoxically led to the very international anti-China coalition it fears most. It appears that the complex domestic and international situation makes it difficult to resolve the dilemma of core interests, emphasized over the past decade, in the short term as China hopes. If the Biden administration continues its offensive, China may lack adequate countermeasures, but it cannot simply evade the issue. Tensions remain high regarding Taiwan, and China's pressure on Australia and Canada continues, making the intended image improvement difficult.

In summary, at a critical juncture in international relations in 2021, China appears to be seeking space and time to focus on strengthening its internal regime stability and capabilities by circumventing or delaying confrontation and conflict with the United States. Specifically, China aims to exercise restraint in direct confrontation with the US, while expanding its circle of allies globally and capitalizing on the post-COVID global economic recovery. Notably, China intends to expand its base of legitimacy through achievements by concentrating its diplomatic efforts on Russia, Europe, and ASEAN to broaden its support base, and by revitalizing international cooperation in emerging economic areas such as digital, green, and health sectors.

2. China's Strategy Towards theUS: A Complex Strategy of Circumvention, Evasion, Cooperation, and Competition

China is actively conveying messages of reconciliation to the Biden administration, expressing expectations for improved relations. In his congratulatory message to President-elect Biden, President Xi Jinping proposed that 'both sides avoid conflict and confrontation, manage differences with a spirit of mutual respect and win-win cooperation, focus on cooperation, and promote the healthy and stable development of China-US relations and world peace and development.' China has also expressed specific willingness to cooperate on areas where there is common ground with the Biden administration's four major priorities, excluding racial issues: namely, COVID-19 containment, economic recovery, and climate change.

Nevertheless, China appears to have developed a more fundamental distrust of the United States through its experiences with the COVID-19 pandemic and the Trump administration's offensives. China anticipates that pressure on its system and ideology will likely continue under the Biden administration. China perceives a full-scale power competition with the US as inevitable in the long term and believes that strengthening its internal system and capabilities is paramount to prepare for this. Therefore, China hopes to circumvent or delay power competition with the US as much as possible, considering the current domestic and international circumstances.

While China hopes for improved relations with the US, it identifies ideology, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, issues related to sovereignty, economic and trade matters, the South China Sea, and people-to-people exchanges as inevitable points of conflict. These are predominantly bilateral issues where the US is actively exerting pressure. China has few effective countermeasures against US pressure other than mobilizing nationalism to consolidate and stabilize the regime, which is a tactic that does not become a necessary and sufficient condition for maintaining the Communist Party's rule. Therefore, China wishes to manage these issues in a way that prevents escalation of conflict with the US, adhering to the principle of 'seeking common ground while reserving differences.'

Conversely, China is preparing for competition while also seeking cooperation with the US on multilateral platforms in the post-COVID era. As mentioned earlier, China is voicing its stance on reforming the global governance system and actively seeking alliances with countries like Russia and ASEAN, in preparation for the US's return to multilateral forums. From China's perspective, international cooperation and multilateralism are crucial spaces for development, making it impossible to avoid competition with the US. Therefore, China is preparing for competition with the Biden administration not so much in terms of values and ideology, but rather in key areas for China's development such as the Belt and Road Initiative, advanced technologies and industries like 5G, and international multilateral economic cooperation.

3. Challenges and Strategies for Korean Diplomacy

Amidst the global spread of COVID-19, South Korea and China have an unusual opportunity to restore relations through cooperation on pandemic control. The spokesperson for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs exceptionally highlighted that South Korea and China have achieved 'four firsts' in cooperation on COVID-19 containment, emphasizing their leadership in establishing a cooperation framework, controlling the virus, opening 'fast-track lanes (simplified entry procedures),' and strengthening cooperation for production recovery. However, despite intergovernmental cooperation, mutual perceptions between the publics of the two countries remain unrepaired or have worsened. According to a Pew Research Center survey in October 2020, the unfavorable view of China among South Koreans was 75%, higher than in the United States (73%), where sentiment towards China is at an all-time low. [3] A public opinion poll also indicated that South Korea's influence on China is only 4.6%, lower than that of North Korea (5.2%). [4] Furthermore, projections suggest that after the inauguration of the Biden administration, South Korea may face increasingly complex and difficult choices amidst US-China competition. Korean diplomacy requires more sophisticated and meticulous strategies than ever before.^[3][4]

First, it is necessary to realistically assess the current state of bilateral relations between South Korea and China. The new momentum for cooperation in South Korea-China relations provided by the COVID-19 pandemic will not, in itself, drive the relationship, which stands at a crossroads, to a new stage of development. It is time to make efforts to systematize and structure the hard-won cooperative momentum between the two countries. With the likely strengthening of the South Korea-US alliance following the inauguration of the Biden administration, strategic communication is needed to prevent and manage conflicts between South Korea and China. This presents an opportunity to institutionalize dialogue for building a pandemic safety network between South Korea and China, and to develop this into a consultative body that comprehensively analyzes and responds to various human security issues, thereby revitalizing the stagnant strategic dialogue between the two countries.

Second, nationalism is heightened in both South Korea and China, and politics and ideology are overemphasized. Notably, this year marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party in China, and South Korea is entering a full-fledged election and political season. Therefore, more than ever, both governments and media must remain vigilant and cautious against the temptation to instrumentalize diplomacy for domestic political purposes, while exercising restraint and prudence in their diplomatic rhetoric and actions.

Third, the issues that South Korea needs to cooperate on and discuss with China on a bilateral level primarily involve unification and North Korea's nuclear program, which could lead to dependence on China, or draw US-China competition into the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, beyond these issues, both countries need to gradually develop and expand new areas of cooperation in fields such as public health, green initiatives, and climate change, which may be less subject to intense US-China competition in the post-COVID era.

Fourth, South Korea's role is limited in the short term amidst intensifying power competition between the US and China. Nevertheless, caution is needed to avoid inadvertently drawing US-China competition into the Korean Peninsula and creating a dilemma of choice. In the process of pursuing national policy objectives within their term, administrations have relied on the power of major countries, inadvertently becoming entangled in the conflict and competition between the two great powers. Especially in the current situation, where domestic political confrontation between conservatives and progressives is intense, and simultaneously, US-China conflict is escalating, the likelihood of US-China competition for influence on the Korean Peninsula being inadvertently triggered increases. Therefore, as US-China confrontation intensifies, it is crucial to be mindful of preventing US-China conflict issues from being exploited in domestic political disputes.

Fifth, while the US-China relationship fundamentally possesses the characteristics of power competition, it also retains elements of fluidity and uncertainty. South Korea's fundamental premise is to maintain cooperative and friendly relations with both the US and China, and this basic stance and policy direction must be consistently communicated to both countries. South Korea must fulfill its responsibilities and obligations as an ally of the United States, while simultaneously conveying to both countries that it has no intention of containing or antagonizing China through a consistent policy approach. Based on this approach, South Korea needs to adopt a complex and flexible strategy that expands areas of cooperation with both countries and manages conflict factors based on national interests in each domain of competition and conflict—economic, security, and values.

Sixth, the possibility of escalating and prolonged US-China conflict and competition appears evident. Therefore, South Korea's strategic response must move beyond addressing short-term issues and prepare for structural strategic responses in the long term. To minimize the impact of the fluidity in US-China relations, South Korea must create its own strategic value in the long run. Efforts are needed to secure South Korea's status as a country with strong international networks, and in this context, it is necessary to break away from the existing diplomatic landscape heavily tilted towards major powers like the US and China. By keenly observing the new trends in international affairs exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the 'America First' policy, South Korea needs to proactively diversify and broaden its diplomatic landscape, gradually expand its international networks, and thereby build a new, independent standing. The New Southern Policy and New Northern Policy must also be envisioned with long-term strategies to gain actual momentum and be implemented, rather than remaining mere rhetoric, and human resources and systems need to be strengthened accordingly. ■

[1] Wang Yi Discusses China's Seven Major Diplomatic Tasks for 2021 (December 11, 2020), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1839412.shtml

[2] The Shanghai Spirit refers to mutual trust (互信), mutual benefit (互利), equality (平等), consultation (协商), respect for diverse civilizations (尊重多样文明), and the pursuit of common development (谋求共同发展). It serves as the foundation and core value for the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Through the Shanghai Spirit, China aims to emphasize the need to strengthen political trust through equal consultation among different civilizations, pursue economic reciprocity, and promote common development.

[3] Laura Silver, Kat Devlin and Christine Huang, “Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries,” Pew Research Center (October 5, 2020) https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/

[4] This is from a public opinion poll conducted by China's Global Times in December 2020. Chinese respondents perceive the United States (47.5%), Russia (33.8%), the EU (27.7%), ASEAN (14.8%), and Japan (9.5%) as the countries with the greatest influence on China, in that order. “Chinese rational on China-US ties: GT poll,” (2020/12/26). https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1211038.shtml

■ Author: Lee Dong-ryul Director of the EAI China Studies Center and Professor at Dongduk Women's University. He earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from Peking University's School of International Studies, served as the President of the Association for Contemporary Chinese Studies, and is currently a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Policy Advisory Committee. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and ethnic minority issues. His recent works include "China's Strategy and Role in the Korean Peninsula's Denuclearization and Peace Process," "Evolution and Current Implications of China's Foreign Policy Discourse Since the 1990s," "A Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemma of Xi Jinping's 'Maritime Power' Initiative," "Deciphering China’s Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea," and "China's Territorial Disputes" (co-authored).

■ Responsible Editor: Seo Jung-hye, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) / jhsuh@eai.or.kr

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