[New Year's Special Commentary Series - EAI Korean Diplomacy 2021 Outlook and Strategy] ① The Inauguration of the Biden Administration and South Korea's Strategy Toward the U.S.

Editor's Note

As the first report in the New Year's Special Commentary Series, “EAI Korean Diplomacy 2021 Outlook and Strategy,” Dr. Jeon Jae-sung, Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies and Professor at Seoul National University's Department of Political Science and International Relations, analyzes the inauguration of the Biden administration and South Korea's subsequent strategy toward the U.S. In this commentary, the author discusses the new face of American politics revealed through the U.S. presidential election, the diplomatic challenges facing the Biden administration, its policy toward China aimed at competitive coexistence, and various issues including the complete denuclearization of North Korea. Finally, the author emphasizes the need to strengthen close and multi-layered cooperation mechanisms between South Korea and the U.S. as allies.

1. The Biden Administration's Foreign Policy Strategy

Two months have passed since the U.S. presidential election, and the initial excitement has subsided, giving way to fervent speculation about the policies of the Biden administration, set to take office in two weeks. While the domestic political situation in the U.S. is in unprecedented turmoil, there is a concurrent expectation of a more orderly world order emerging after the Trump era, alongside efforts by numerous countries to leverage the Biden administration for their own benefit. As President-elect Biden appoints key members of his administration and begins policy discussions, the directions of the policies the Biden administration will pursue are gradually becoming apparent.

The future of the Biden administration remains unclear amidst the fog of Trumpism. It is true that all U.S. administrations have faced crises different from their initial plans and struggled to fulfill their campaign pledges. President Bush faced the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Obama's pivot to Asia was left unfinished due to Russia's annexation of Crimea and upheavals in the Middle East, and President Trump lost his bid for re-election due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The early 2020s will also likely see unforeseen crises making the Biden administration's trajectory unpredictable, but the challenge from the Republican Party and its supporters who adhere to Trumpism will be a constant.

President Trump became the first candidate in history to lose the presidency despite receiving the second-highest number of votes ever. He secured over 90% of the Republican vote and received more votes than in 2016, not only from white voters but also from non-white voters. Trump's support base has expanded, and even after his election defeat, his supporters have not withdrawn their backing for him personally or for Trumpism. From the election until his departure from the White House, President Trump appeared to be fully engaged in campaigning for the 2024 election, laying the groundwork for the failure of the Biden administration and striving to leave a clear imprint of Trumpism. While the Democratic Party holds a slight majority in the House of Representatives, the outcome of the Senate elections in Georgia, which are yet to be decided, is expected to result in a near-even split in the Senate, making it difficult to predict a Democratic-led Congress.

While American politics is described as polarized, it has become evident that there are numerous factions within both the Democratic and Republican parties. It has also been confirmed that not all Democratic supporters actively endorse President Biden. President Biden finds himself in a situation where he must contend with the more progressive left wing of the Democratic Party, as well as moderate and right-wing factions of the traditional Republican Party, despite being a centrist within the Democratic Party. Rather than polarized politics, it can be described as multi-polar politics within the confrontation between the two major parties. The confrontation between the two parties has moved beyond political polarization to emotional polarization. As the COVID-19 pandemic subsides, economic and racial issues are likely to become more prominent, and President Biden may be increasingly tied down by domestic politics. The Republican Party also faces the challenge of developing a coherent foreign policy beyond the transactional order created by a geopolitically unaware President Trump, who focused heavily on domestic affairs.

The Biden administration's foreign policy strategy can be summarized by its commitment to restoring global leadership, strengthening multilateralism, rebuilding a U.S.-led rules-based order, pursuing coexistence amidst competition with China, constructing a global supply chain conducive to American resilience, selective decoupling from China, reinforcing alliances, and prioritizing global agendas such as global health, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and climate change. However, the core of this strategy is the consolidation of domestic support underpinning America's global leadership, in other words, securing a middle class that supports proactive U.S. foreign policy. The report "Making US Foreign Policy Work Better for the Middle Class" by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in which Jake Sullivan, appointed as National Security Advisor, participated, emphasizes that without overcoming neoliberal globalization, widening inequality within the U.S., the decline of manufacturing, job losses, and the crisis of the middle class, the domestic foundation of American hegemony will inevitably be shaken. It argues that U.S. foreign policy and policies for restoring the middle class are inseparable, and that the paradigm of U.S. foreign policy itself must change from that of the pre-Biden era. In-depth interviews reveal that the American middle class fully understands that proactive U.S. foreign policy, the support of allies, and free trade are crucial to U.S. interests, and that trade disputes are merely proxy battles for American economic development. The problem lies in the fact that America's normative foreign policy objectives, within the context of neoliberal globalization and hegemonic U.S. foreign interventionism, result in outcomes that undermine the interests of the middle class. President-elect Biden's appointment of Susan Rice, former National Security Advisor, as Chair of the Domestic Policy Council is also a reflection of this trend. The core of future U.S. foreign policy will likely be policies aimed at domestic economic recovery and, furthermore, the restoration of the middle class. This is connected to the questions of how to transform the trend of anti-globalization into a trend of re-globalization, how to transform the free trade order into a fair trade order that benefits the middle class, and how to pursue foreign policies that ensure American technological innovation and promote middle-class employment amidst the trend of automation driven by technological advancements.

The Biden administration seeks to pursue sustainable and long-term policies favorable to the U.S. through global multilateralism and the establishment of norms. Its return to the Paris Agreement and the announcement of plans to form a global summit for democracy are part of this effort. However, the actual success of the U.S.'s new global governance initiatives, particularly those based on a coalition of democracies, remains to be seen. The confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism, further intensified by the COVID-19 pandemic, was easily framed as a new Cold War under the Trump administration, but the competitive landscape is not so simple. The COVID-19 pandemic, economic crises stemming from globalization, political polarization, populism, far-right nationalism, and deepening economic inequality are already universal problems, and the exacerbation of environmental issues will inevitably lead to an expansion of state influence. While democratic societies may be superior in responsiveness and accountability to civil society, they can lag in efficiency, leading many democratic nations to exhibit democratic backsliding or a resurgence of authoritarianism.

In reality, President Biden may face numerous challenges in determining which countries to invite to the summit for democracy and on what agenda to establish global governance. In Europe, for instance, it remains to be seen whether countries within the EU or NATO that have become authoritarian, such as Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, will be invited. Conversely, will countries crucial to U.S. interests but not fully democratic, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, be excluded? Is India, criticized for its increasing authoritarianism, unproblematic? There are many obstacles to forming an inclusive democratic coalition. It is uncertain whether a new, functional governance structure can be established without weakening existing alliance structures or cooperation frameworks.

The Biden administration's policy of strengthening alliances is welcomed by South Korea and other existing U.S. allies. This is because President Trump's disparagement of alliances led allies to doubt the long-term security commitment from the U.S., forcing them to consider hedging strategies. Furthermore, countries with close economic and energy cooperation with China and Russia have abandoned the assumption that their interests automatically align with those of the U.S. This is not solely due to President Trump's policies; in the context of U.S.-China strategic competition, U.S. allies have established multi-layered economic cooperation with China, and it is difficult to divide the world into two camps as in the Cold War era simply because the U.S. and China are competing. The recent investment agreement between the EU and China reflects this complex situation. The world order has already bifurcated into multiple domains, and the divergent interests of nations in each domain make it difficult to assess all relationships through a uniform competitive order.

2. The Biden Administration's China Strategy

The Biden administration's China policy can be characterized by the goal of "competitive coexistence." This acknowledges that as strategic interests increasingly diverge with China, competition is unavoidable. However, competition does not necessarily entail confrontation or catastrophe; competitive coexistence is possible if competition is conducted based on rules. Moreover, the Biden administration emphasizes cooperation with China in areas such as global health, the environment, and non-proliferation. The relationship is diverse, encompassing security, economy, socio-cultural aspects, and digital domains, making it difficult to generalize U.S.-China relations with a single principle. The U.S. is pursuing a policy of leveraging its overwhelming military superiority to encourage China's rule-abiding behavior in other areas. However, the norms proposed by the U.S. are not always correct, and the U.S.'s norm-setting capacity and adherence to norms have been significantly weakened through the Trump administration, suggesting that competition between the U.S. and China over international norms will intensify.

In the reality of U.S.-China confrontation, while trade disputes will remain significant, security concerns surrounding Taiwan and the technological competition that began with 5G will become even more intense. Among the critical conflict zones in the Asia-Pacific region, the Taiwan Strait is an area where China could secure military superiority. If China were to gain control of Taiwan, it would represent a significant advance in its "first island chain" strategy and provide a military advantage in projecting power into the Pacific, akin to acquiring an "unsinkable aircraft carrier." The Biden administration will likely strengthen its security support for Taiwan, leading to increased tensions in cross-Strait relations. 5G also represents a competition for the future global internet infrastructure and a starting point for the U.S. to gain an advantage in the future digital order. Competition between the U.S. and China will be fierce in various domains, including semiconductors, digital policy, and information security.

3. The Biden Administration and North Korea's Nuclear Issue

From South Korea's perspective, the most pressing concern is the North Korean nuclear issue. The Biden administration's North Korea nuclear policy can be summarized by several principles thus far: confirming the objective of complete denuclearization, prioritizing the interests and opinions of allies, pursuing a bottom-up approach to North Korea negotiations, and emphasizing human rights issues. With North Korea possessing the capability to strike the U.S. mainland with its nuclear and missile programs, strategic patience is unlikely to be an option. However, it is also unlikely to be considered more important than resolving domestic issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic, economic recovery, and racial issues. Until the Biden administration's Asia foreign policy team is fully in place, North Korea's strategy toward the U.S. could become a critical juncture.

Unlike the Trump administration, where systematic policy-making by foreign policy and national security officials is becoming more important, the approaches of key officials such as Secretary of State-designate Antony Blinken will be crucial. Blinken's approach appears to be to seek a compromise, prioritizing the freezing of North Korea's nuclear capabilities and partial sanctions relief in light of the serious nuclear threat, followed by sustained negotiations based on complete declaration and verification to achieve complete denuclearization. This process will likely require establishing a new relationship between North Korea and the U.S. Given that North Korea has already achieved the outcome of establishing a new North Korea-U.S. relationship with President Trump, it is uncertain whether it will show any movement toward denuclearization first. Kim Yo-jong's statement in July last year set the condition for resuming North Korea-U.S. denuclearization talks as the withdrawal of the U.S.'s hostile policy toward North Korea. Whether the Biden administration will accept the outcomes of the Singapore North Korea-U.S. summit will be of primary importance. If North Korea demands signs of trust-building from the Biden administration in light of the spirit of the Singapore joint statement, which prioritized establishing a new North Korea-U.S. relationship before denuclearization, the Biden administration may face a difficult position.

4. South Korea's Strategy Toward the U.S.

As the Biden administration pursues a foreign policy that appears to be "anything but Trump," it raises significant questions about whether it is desirable or necessary for South Korea's strategy toward the U.S. to undergo a 180-degree change. South Korea should not be solely focused on understanding the content of the Biden administration's foreign policy. Instead, it must consider which of the Biden administration's policies are likely to succeed and which are not, and what policy alternatives South Korea, as an ally, can propose to the Biden administration.

First, it is crucial to accurately understand how the U.S. perceives current South Korean policies, beyond just the Biden administration. Books by American figures such as Bolton and Woodward portray South Korea not as a middle power actively consulting with and influencing the U.S. on regional or global issues, but rather as a nation focused on inter-Korean relations and the Korean Peninsula. Reports from U.S. think tanks also indicate that South Korea's importance in the U.S.'s China strategy has diminished compared to the past. While there may be a lack of understanding of the difficulties inherent in South Korea's intermediate position, the skepticism regarding South Korea's regional and global strategies may stem from this misunderstanding, but also from South Korea's insufficient development of clear global and regional strategies. Prior to formulating a strategy toward the U.S., South Korea must establish a clear vision for how it perceives international affairs and what regional and global strategies it intends to pursue.

Second, the Biden administration's China strategy is still evolving, with diverse viewpoints coexisting. In the post-Trump era's confrontational policy toward China, a spectrum of approaches is competing, ranging from rule-based competition and coexistence to efforts to structurally engage China and make it a responsible stakeholder. For South Korea, it is important to first promote U.S.-China cooperation in areas where possible and guide the U.S. and China toward fair competition in areas of rivalry that respect the positions of third countries. The Biden administration, as well as the Trump administration, has emphasized U.S.-China cooperation in non-proliferation, with the North Korean nuclear issue being a core matter. Since the North Korean nuclear issue extends beyond the Korean Peninsula and can serve as a basis for U.S.-China cooperation, South Korea should consider a comprehensive approach.

Third, while the denuclearization and peace policies for the Korean Peninsula pursued by the Moon Jae-in administration, with just over a year left in its term, are essential, their policy priorities may differ from those in U.S.-ROK relations. The newly inaugurated Biden administration will require some time to address the North Korean nuclear issue, and South Korea may feel a sense of urgency given the remaining term of its current government. If the ultimate common goal of both South Korea and the U.S. is the denuclearization of North Korea, then an agreement between the two countries laying the foundation for denuclearization will be crucial.

Fourth, denuclearization negotiations are likely to be conducted in a bottom-up manner, with an emphasis on working-level discussions. Despite the close relationship established between the leaders of North Korea and the U.S. during the Trump administration, U.S. security assurances for North Korea did not yield results. Instead, the importance of calm and detailed working-level negotiations has been confirmed. South Korea also has much to prepare should denuclearization negotiations progress, including methods for North Korea's declaration and verification of its nuclear program, international cooperation with North Korea following the lifting of economic sanctions, specific implementation methods for snapback provisions, and creative alternatives for ensuring North Korea's regime security. Efforts at the working level within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, and Ministry of Unification should be strengthened and respected, and policymakers at the highest level must make an effort to listen to the alternatives proposed at the working level. For working-level negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. to proceed smoothly, close cooperation at the working level between South Korea and the U.S., as well as Track 2 dialogues, are important. Therefore, close and multi-layered cooperation mechanisms between the two countries must be further strengthened. ■

■ Author: Jeon Jae-sung_ Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies and Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, international relations history, the ROK-U.S. alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "Threats of War and Peace Between the Two Koreas" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Managed and Edited by: Seo Jeong-hye, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) / jhsuh@eai.or.kr

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