East Asia Institute (EAI) Issue Brief: South Korean Pride Beyond 'Gukppong' Controversies and 'Hell Joseon' Discourse: Light and Shadow

Editor's Note

The discourse surrounding 'Gukppong' controversies and 'Hell Joseon' within South Korean society reflects the perceptions of Koreans living in contemporary South Korea. The author, Jeong Han-ul, a senior researcher at the Public Opinion Division of Korea Research, analyzes the significant increase in a sense of belonging and national pride as a South Korean compared to the past, based on the National Identity Survey conducted in 2020 by the East Asia Institute and the Sungkyunkwan University's Center for East Asian Cooperation and Coexistence. The author posits that this surge in national pride is attributable to the successful response to the COVID-19 pandemic, exemplified by 'K-Quarantine,' and a re-evaluation of South Korea's healthcare/welfare systems and civic consciousness. However, the author cautions against the 'Gukppong' phenomenon, distinguishing it from genuine national pride, and emphasizes the necessity of addressing the persistent underlying issues within South Korean society, urging a restoration of pride and trust in the community rather than succumbing to the pessimism of 'Hell Joseon'.

1. The Success of 'K-Quarantine' and the 'Gukppong' Controversy

One of the most striking findings from the 2020 National Identity Survey, conducted every five years since 2005 by the East Asia Institute and the Sungkyunkwan University's Center for East Asian Cooperation and Coexistence, is the dramatic rise in Koreans' sense of identification and national pride. An analysis of the sense of belonging (degree of closeness) to various community units shows that the proportion of respondents feeling close to 'South Korean citizens' has steadily increased from 77% in the first survey in 2005 to 90% in the 2020 survey. This contrasts with the sense of belonging to the 'Korean people,' which saw a slight increase but then declined to around 64%.[1]Furthermore, there is a strengthening of positive emotional attachment, moving away from a tendency that previously coexisted between national pride and shame. The response to 'I would want to be a South Korean citizen even if I were reborn' increased from 70% in 2005 to 80% in 2020, while agreement with the statement 'There are aspects of South Korea that are shameful' significantly decreased from 48% in 2005 to 31% in 2020.

The rise in South Koreans' national identification and pride has been influenced by the globally recognized success in COVID-19 containment. According to the bi-weekly regular survey 'Public Opinion within Public Opinion' by Korea Research, public evaluation of the government's COVID-19 response remained high, between 70% and 80%, after the sharp decline in confirmed cases in the second week of March. Although it dropped to the 50% range as the number of confirmed cases increased after August 15, 2020, it rose again to 75% in the first week of October, coinciding with the return to Level 1 social distancing (Figure 2). Reports from The Wall Street Journal, CNN, and others on the reduction in infections, contact tracing apps, and diagnostic kits, and the subsequent domestic dissemination of this news, led to the characterization of South Korea's COVID-19 containment efforts as 'K-Quarantine.'[2]In the 'Public Opinion within Public Opinion' survey conducted in August 2019, prior to the pandemic, only 68% agreed with the statement 'I am proud to be a South Korean citizen.' This figure surged to 80% in the April 2020 survey. Similarly, agreement with the statement 'I am satisfied living in South Korean society' jumped from 58% to 76% (Figure 3). Alongside the heightened national pride in South Korean society, which has become noticeably stronger since the pre-pandemic era, concerns about excessive 'Gukppong' have also intensified. Discussions have particularly focused on the 'Gukppong' phenomenon among the younger demographic (20s and 30s).[3]

Certainly, factors such as the global success of K-pop and K-dramas, including BTS topping the Billboard charts and Bong Joon-ho's film 'Parasite' winning an Academy Award earlier this year, have contributed to the rise in 'Gukppong' controversies and national pride. Furthermore, the leadership of government ministries (especially quarantine authorities) in spearheading 'K-Quarantine' during the pandemic, along with the strengths of South Korea's welfare and healthcare systems, appear to have played a role. A survey by KBS, Sisain, Seoul National University, and Korea Research on changes in trust towards major institutions and groups after COVID-19 found that a remarkable 53% responded that their trust in 'South Korea' had increased. Trust in the Blue House and the government also increased by 27% and 21%, respectively. Considering that trust in religious institutions (-46%), the media (-45%), and the National Assembly (-33%) largely decreased, it is difficult to deny the impact of 'K-Quarantine' on the recent rise in national pride.[4]

2. Factors Behind the Rise in National Pride: A Rediscovery of 'K-Healthcare/Welfare' + 'K-Citizenship'

Existing discussions suggest that the government's 'K-Quarantine' success, amplified by media and YouTube content exaggerating South Korea's superiority while downplaying international failures, is stimulating 'Gukppong' sentiments among Koreans, particularly the youth. This raises concerns about an overestimation of South Korea and a disparagement of other cultures.

However, the survey results indicate that the surge in national pride during the COVID-19 response was driven not by comparisons with other countries or a sense of superiority, but rather by an evaluation of quarantine performance, a re-appreciation of the strengths of South Korea's healthcare/welfare systems that were previously underestimated, and recognition of citizens who diligently followed quarantine guidelines. Figure 4 shows that compared to the third survey in 2015, the area with the most significant increase in pride was 'Social Security Level,' which rose by 35 percentage points (from 46% to 81%). 'Maturity of Democracy' also increased by 22 percentage points (from 52% to 74%). For the 'Healthcare/Public Health System,' included for the first time in the 2020 survey, a remarkable 96% expressed pride.

While the 'Culture and Arts' sector, represented by the Korean Wave (K-pop, K-dramas), clearly contributed to the rise in pride, with 89% expressing pride in the 2020 survey (second only to the healthcare system), the increase was only 12 percentage points (from 78% to 89%) compared to five years prior. This increase is less significant than the 22 percentage point rise observed between 2010 and 2015. South Korea's 'Economic Achievements' showed no change from previous surveys. 'Military Power' increased by 12 percentage points (from 45% to 57%), and pride in South Korea's 'International Standing' rose by only 12 percentage points (from 49% to 61%).

The significant increase in pride in areas such as the healthcare system, maturity of democracy, and social security level—areas that have historically been subjects of self-deprecating evaluation in South Korean society—cannot be explained without considering the COVID-19 response. The Korea Research survey in March, mentioned earlier, asked about the evaluation of efforts by various social actors to overcome COVID-19. Responses exceeded 90% for 'Public Healthcare System' (96%), 'Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency' (94%), and 'Private Healthcare Sector' (93%), along with 'Citizens' themselves. Additionally, the government's role received favorable evaluations, with 'Ministry of Health and Welfare' (86%) and the 'Blue House' (69%) also receiving positive responses.

[Figure 5] Evaluation of Efforts by Social Actors to Overcome COVID-19: Percentage Responding 'Making Efforts' (%)

Interestingly, the sensitive reaction to 'national pride' appears to be more prevalent among middle-aged and older generations than the younger generation. A comparative study of 'Generation Z' and 'Generation X' (born in the 1970s) published in January 2020 by Hankook Ilbo and Korea Research found that the national pride levels of younger generations do not reach those of older generations. When asked 'I feel proud of the spread of Korean Wave culture, including BTS,' 71% of Generation X agreed, whereas only 53% of Generation Z agreed.[5]According to the Korea Research survey results introduced earlier, the proportion of agreement with the statement 'I am proud to be a South Korean citizen' increased the most among those in their 30s by 16 percentage points (from 66% to 82%) and among those aged 60 and above by 16 percentage points (from 63% to 79%) compared to August 2019. Meanwhile, the increase was 13 percentage points for those in their 50s (from 69% to 82%), 9 percentage points for those in their 40s (from 75% to 84%), and only 7 percentage points for those in their 20s (from 67% to 74%). Caution is needed when generalizing the characteristics of the entire younger generation based on the behavior of a segment observed in media and social media.

3. Coexistence of 'Hell Joseon' Perceptions Despite Rising National Pride

Conversely, we must remain vigilant against the detrimental effects of the counter-tendency, the 'Hell Joseon discourse.' A primary obstacle to South Korea's social maturation and advancement has been identified as weak social capital. Establishing fair rule of law, expanding social networks, and strengthening the social safety net have been highlighted as key tasks for building social capital (Lee Jae-yeol, 2019).[7]Notably, recent survey results suggest that psychological attachment to the community can significantly influence the formation of social trust among individuals. This implies that cynicism or frustration towards the national community is a major factor eroding social capital. Indeed, a May survey by KBS, Sisain, Seoul National University, and Korea Research confirmed a clear correlation between national pride and social trust. Individuals with strong national pride were more likely to trust South Korean society (76%), while this proportion was significantly lower among those with weak national pride (42%). Furthermore, pride in the community can foster solidarity and a sense of responsibility towards the less fortunate members of society. The same survey found that groups with high national pride were more willing to bear tax burdens to help the poor and less likely to refuse tax contributions (Figures 8, 9). This clearly demonstrates that positive emotions lead to positive actions. Concerns about excessive national pride are valid, as it can hinder objective self-assessment and lead to exclusionary superiority complexes towards out-groups. However, it is also important not to overlook the positive functions of national pride. Pride serves as a connecting element for members of the national community and acts as a psychological adhesive that maintains integration by sharing the norms and interests of that community. Moreover, enhanced pride in the community can strengthen individuals' trust in and sense of social responsibility towards it (Jeong Han-ul & Jeong Won-chil, 2007; Jeong Han-ul & Lee Gon-soo, 2011).[6]

4. Persistent Distrust in South Korea's Laws and Institutions and Lack of Community Spirit

While pride in the COVID-19 response stems from the perceived leadership of the government and the institutional strengths of the nation, negative perceptions of South Korea's laws and existing institutions have not fundamentally changed.

As shown in [Figure 10], favorable perceptions of government trust, social trust, and welfare systems surged during the COVID-19 response, stimulating positive sentiment. However, distrust in the rule of law, the fundamental principle governing society, remained entrenched, and hope for upward social mobility remained bleak. Trust in the fair enforcement of laws in South Korea has consistently remained in the 20% range, and optimism about opportunities for upward mobility is a dream held by only one or two out of ten people. These are the basic principles by which society operates and the foundation of hope. As these societal fundamentals remain unchanged, recent government/social trust, which was a source of COVID-related pride, shows signs of rapid decline due to environmental changes.

While trust in the welfare system remains, its upward trend has stalled (Figure 10). Despite heated political debates on universal versus selective welfare, the safety net beyond pandemic response remains extremely fragile. In the context of contactless living, there is insufficient support to buffer or recover from the risks of caregiving or economic hardship. Only about 30% of citizens can contact institutions for assistance when needing help with household chores during self-quarantine or borrowing money due to financial difficulties. Furthermore, less than half report having someone to turn to for private assistance. A recently released survey indicates that the flexible work arrangements implemented to cope with such situations paradoxically impose a double burden of work and caregiving on those with care responsibilities, with parents being more likely to evaluate flexible work arrangements negatively.[8]

The pride of citizens themselves, the main drivers of pride in South Korean democracy, rests on a fragile foundation. Amidst social distancing and mask shortages, citizens demonstrated remarkable self-restraint of their freedoms and rights for the goal of pandemic containment. However, this civic action has not yet progressed to the stage of proactive participation and solidarity to address the emerging problems. Less than 20% of individuals have provided material or non-material support to acquaintances experiencing difficulties with caregiving or livelihood, and participation in donations and volunteer work is only 15% (Figure 11). This indicates that the social safety net is insufficient to address the issues faced by vulnerable populations who fall through the cracks, beyond the reach of government support or social assistance. While expanding the government's welfare system is necessary, the results suggest a need for a more advanced form of citizenship characterized by solidarity and responsibility.[9]

There is no need to be stingy about the capabilities and resilience demonstrated by South Korean society during the COVID-19 response. The reason South Korean society was exhilarated by the success of this short-term goal was not due to the intense interest from foreign media and countries, but because, for the first time since industrialization and democratization, it experienced the power of a positive paradigm, moving beyond the negative paradigms (such as 'Hell Joseon,' a society of disparity, the 'N-po generation,' and a society of triple distrust: distrust, dissatisfaction, and anxiety). Ultimately, to take a step forward as a society capable of resolving the remaining challenges, it is essential to start by building pride and trust in the community we live in, rather than succumbing to the pessimism of 'Hell Joseon.' ■

[1] For a discussion on the weakening of ethnic identity alongside the strengthening of national identity using the same survey data, refer to Kang Won-taek, "South Koreans' National and Ethnic Identity: Changes Over 15 Years" (2020).

[2]"The World is Paying Attention to K-Quarantine... Government to Hold Online Foreign Press Briefing" Yonhap News (2020.05.07.)

[3]'Gukppong' is a portmanteau of 'Gukga' (nation) and 'Philopon' (methamphetamine), referring to a state of excessive intoxication with national pride. Hankook Ilbo, "Quarantine Gukppong by National Diplomatic Academy Director... Excessive Expectations Should Not Lead to Arrogance" (2020.05.28.); Weekly Chosun, "COVID-19 is Raising Young Gukppong Nationalists" (2020.06.18.); Kyunghyang Shinmun, "The Gukppong of K-Quarantine" (2020.06.29.); Hankook Ilbo, "Reasons Why the 2030 Generation is Drunk on Gukppong While Still Dreaming of Escaping Joseon" (2020.09.16).

[4] Cheon Kwan-yul, "The 'World of Koreans' Revealed by COVID-19 - Unexpected Response Edition," Sisain, Issue No. 663 (2020.06.02.)

[5] Hankook Ilbo, "Lived Like Strangers, Why Bother?... The Concept of Unification is Fading for Generation Z" (2020.01.03.)

[6] Jeong Han-ul & Jeong Won-chil, "Growth of Democratic Citizenship and Ethnic Identity," in Kang Won-taek, ed., *South Koreans' National Identity and South Korean Politics* (EAI, 2007); Jeong Han-ul & Lee Gon-soo, "Possibilities of Democratic Identity: A Comparison of 2005 and 2010 Data," in *Who Are We Koreans?* (EAI, 2011).

[7] Lee Jae-yeol, *Would You Live in Korea If You Were Reborn?: Finding the Lost Dignity of Society from the Miracle on the Han River to Hell Joseon* (21st Century Books, 2019).

[8] For details, see Choi Seon-ah, "Flexible Work Arrangements Accelerated by COVID-19: Reality and Future," Korea Research <Public Opinion within Public Opinion>, Issue No. 101-01 (2020.10.28).

[9] Kim Hye-jin, "Overcoming COVID-19 and Social Trust - Mutual Trust Has Deepened, But Half Are Left to Their Own Devices," Korea Research <Public Opinion within Public Opinion>, Issue No. 72 (2020.04.08).

■Jeong Han-ul_ Senior Researcher, Public Opinion Division, Korea Research. Holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from Korea University. Previously served as Deputy Director of the EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center, Deputy Director of the Center for Diplomacy and Security, and Secretary-General. His main research areas include elections and generational politics, national identity and security perceptions, and CSR-related survey research. His major works include *20s Men*, *South Koreans' Policy Preferences on Universal Basic Income*, *South Koreans' 'New Security' Perceptions: Changes and Continuities*, and *An Empirical Study on the Experience of 'Gapjil' Culture in South Korean Society*.

■ Managed and Edited by: Lee Eun-ji, EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) / ejlee@eai.or.kr

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