[EAI Issue Briefing] The Crisis in Korea-Japan Relations as Seen Through Public Opinion Polls: The People Want Change

Editor's Note

The deterioration of relations between South Korea and Japan, triggered by the Japanese government's declaration of export restrictions on July 1, 2019, has continued in a stalemate, extending beyond trade disputes and boycotts of Japanese goods to security conflicts such as the termination of the GSOMIA agreement. The author, Son Yeol, President of the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Professor at Yonsei University, analyzes the current situation and proposes solutions based on five key characteristics derived from the results of the <Korea-Japan Public Mutual Perception Survey> conducted jointly with Japan's Genron NPO in September 2020, and the discussions from the subsequent <8th Korea-Japan Future Dialogue>. The author points out that public opinion in South Korea towards Japan has plummeted, with the 2030 generation leading this trend; that the decline in favorable views towards South Korea in Japan has reversed; that public support for both governments' policies and attitudes towards the other country is only around 30%; that public support for both governments' positions on the Supreme Court's forced labor ruling is changing; and that the negative ripple effects of historical conflicts are severe. Based on these points, the author urges both countries to address the current situation, warning of a potential crisis if left unattended, and to devise wise solutions that go beyond anti-Japan and anti-Korea sentiments.

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The diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan have entered an unprecedented state. The bilateral relationship, which dramatically escalated with former Prime Minister Abe's export restriction declaration on July 1, 2019, has resulted in a major diplomatic crisis, leading to economic conflicts such as the exclusion from the whitelist and boycotts of Japanese goods, and security conflicts like the termination of the GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement). The historical issue of the Korean Supreme Court's ruling on compensation for forced labor in October 2018, which served as the background for these events, remains unresolved and continues to strain bilateral relations. Negotiations between the two governments are stagnant, with constant friction on various issues. If the court orders the seizure and liquidation of Japanese corporate assets, it could trigger another tumultuous period between the two countries due to retaliatory measures from the Japanese government.

This paper aims to present interpretations and prescriptions by identifying the key characteristics of the current Korea-Japan relations, derived from the results of the Korea-Japan Public Mutual Perception Survey jointly conducted in September 2020 by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in South Korea and Genron NPO in Japan, and from the discussions at the subsequent <8th Korea-Japan Future Dialogue> jointly hosted by the two institutions. The first characteristic is the sharp decline in South Korean public opinion towards Japan. Favorable views towards Japan, which had been steadily rising for the past five years, dropped by 20 percentage points, while unfavorable views increased by 22 percentage points, with the 2030 generation leading this trend. Second, the declining trend of favorable views towards South Korea in Japan has reversed. Analysis is required to determine whether this is a temporary rebound or a shift in the upward trend. Third, public support for both governments' policies and attitudes towards the other country is only around 30%, which can be seen as a significant expression of dissatisfaction with the current situation and policies. Fourth, specifically, public support for the positions of both governments regarding the Supreme Court's forced labor ruling is changing, indicating that public voices are calling for new approaches. Finally, there is a high possibility of another crisis if the two governments fail to break the long-term stalemate and allow the situation to persist. Therefore, the South Korean government must sensitively read the changes in public opinion and make a political decision towards a forward-looking policy on the conscription issue, while simultaneously developing a comprehensive strategy to restore trust between the two countries.

1. Sharp Decline in South Korea's Favorable View of Japan, Exodus of the Younger Generation

· Sharp decline of 19.4 percentage points in South Korea's favorable view of Japan; sharp increase of 21.7 percentage points in unfavorable view.

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Rapid increase in negative sentiment among the 2030 generation, driving the surge in unfavorable views.

The most significant change revealed in this opinion poll is the sharp decline in favorable views towards Japan within South Korea. Negative perceptions of Japan among South Koreans surged from 49.9% in 2019 to 71.6%. Conversely, positive perceptions of Japan plummeted from 31.7% in 2019 to 12.3%. Considering that favorable views towards Japan in South Korea had been on an upward trend since 2015 (15.7% -> 21.3% -> 26.8% -> 28.3% -> 31.7%), this change is quite shocking. Negative perceptions of Japan showed a downward trend from 72.5% in 2015 to 49.9% in 2019, but in 2020, it soared to 71.6%, a level similar to 2015. In contrast, negative perceptions of South Korea in Japan decreased slightly compared to the previous year, and positive perceptions increased. From 2016 to 2019, favorable views of South Korea in Japan were on a continuous downward trend (29.1% -> 26.9% -> 22.9% -> 20%), but in 2020, favorable views rebounded to 25.9%, an increase of 5.9 percentage points.

[Figure 1] Impressions of the Other Country (2013-2020)

Given that the changes in preferences between the two countries have fluctuated within a 10% margin since the 2015 Korea-Japan agreement on comfort women, the current sharp change of around 20% is clearly an outlier. What changes have occurred?

[Figure 2] Trend of Preference Changes by Age Group in South Korea

[Figure 3] Trend of Preference Changes by Age Group in Japan

[Figure 4] Change in Favorable Views by Age Group in South Korea in 2020

As shown in Figures 2 and 3, the age groups that have driven favorable views towards the other country have been those in their 20s and 30s. Considering that the favorable views of young people in both countries were higher than in other age groups, the sharp decline in favorable views and the surge in unfavorable views among young people in the 2020 South Korean results represent a serious change. As shown in Figure 4, unfavorable views among those in their 30s increased by a remarkable 83.6% compared to the previous year, while favorable views decreased by 71.2%. Even among those in their 20s, who have the highest favorable views towards Japan, unfavorable views increased by 55.8% and favorable views decreased by 53.8%. Therefore, the sharp decline in favorable views towards Japan and the surge in unfavorable views in South Korea this year can be largely attributed to changes among the 2030 generation. What, then, are the factors behind the mass departure of the 2030 generation?

The primary factor is the Abe administration's declaration of export restrictions on three semiconductor components in July 2019. The semiconductor industry is a strategic industry, often called the lifeline of the South Korean economy, and thus, export restrictions directly targeting it can be seen as a measure that shakes the foundation of South Korea. The government's strong backlash at the time, defining it as "economic aggression," was for this very reason. The Abe administration argued that the sanctions were imposed due to issues with South Korea's strategic material management system, framing it as an export control measure from a national security perspective. However, it is safe to say that very few South Koreans accepted this explanation at face value. Even if there were issues with the management system, the majority of the public could not understand why such a measure, which undermines the foundation of the South Korean economy, was deemed necessary as a response to a matter that did not threaten Japan's national security. Ultimately, this measure was perceived, and later revealed during bilateral negotiations, as a retaliatory action by the Japanese government stemming from its strong dissatisfaction with the Korean Supreme Court's forced labor ruling in October 2018 and the South Korean government's response (or lack thereof).

A second point to note is the attitude and remarks of former Prime Minister Abe and key members of his administration towards South Korea during the process of the Supreme Court's forced labor ruling and the export control measures. While previous bilateral conflicts typically involved South Korea taking an offensive stance on historical issues and Japan responding defensively, the Abe administration notably counterattacked by criticizing South Korea's approach and attitude in handling historical issues. Former Prime Minister Abe repeatedly accused South Korea of being "a country that does not keep its promises," "a country where the rule of law does not apply," and "an untrustworthy country." These remarks were echoed by the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and even the then-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Taro Kono, vehemently attacked the South Korean Supreme Court ruling as a "flagrant violation" and a "challenge to the international order." While Japanese government leaders have criticized the South Korean government's policies and attitudes since the normalization of diplomatic relations, criticizing South Korea's national identity was unprecedented. Such harsh rhetoric provoked strong backlash from the South Korean government and media, inflaming public sentiment and resulting in a vicious cycle of emotional confrontation between the two countries.

What is noteworthy here is the reaction of the 2030 generation. They do not view Japan with anti-Japanese sentiment stemming from shame, animosity, or inferiority complexes related to Japan's colonial rule. They perceive South Korea as an advanced country on par with Japan, and they regard Japan as a country with attractive popular culture and cuisine, making it a good place for shopping and travel. This is why they have led the improvement of South Korea's perception of Japan. On the other hand, over the past year, the 2030 generation has strongly expressed their perception that the Abe administration's export restrictions and rhetoric were unfair and unjust through boycotts of Japanese goods and travel. This is distinct from the deep-seated anti-Japanese sentiment formed by the older generation based on history. This suggests that if Japan rectifies its unfair policies, this generation could quickly return to a trend of favorable views.

2. Japanese Public Opinion Hits Bottom and Rebounds Unexpectedly

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The Limits of Anti-Korea and Xenophobic Public Opinion

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Continued Recognition of Importance, Support for Improving Relations

Contrary to the sharp decline in South Korea's favorable view of Japan, Japan's favorable view of South Korea has rebounded. After steadily declining from 31.1% in 2013 to 20% last year, Japan's favorable view was expected to fall further amidst the intense diplomatic war and exchange of economic retaliations and mutual animosity over the past year. However, it unexpectedly succeeded in rebounding by 5.9 percentage points ([Figure 1]). While it remains to be seen whether this change will lead to a sustained upward trend, the rebound after approaching the bottom of the downward curve is noteworthy.

South Korean media and intellectual circles have expressed deep concern over the widespread anti-Korea and xenophobic sentiment in Japanese society. The reasons why Japanese people have negative impressions of South Korea ([Figure 5]) reveal that these concerns are not unfounded. Japanese public opinion expresses discomfort with the attitudes of South Koreans rather than opposition to specific South Korean policies or events. As the survey results show, the top reason, as in the previous year, is 'continuously criticizing Japan over historical issues' (55.7%). This indicates that the Japanese public is uncomfortable with the way South Korea handles historical issues, rather than with the historical perception itself. Following this, reasons such as 'due to the emotional words and actions of South Koreans' (23.1%) and 'due to the incomprehensible patriotic actions of South Koreans' (21.6%) are cited. This suggests that Japanese public opinion views South Korea as being driven by anti-Japanese sentiment in handling historical issues. This can be considered a kind of identity dispute.

[Figure 5] Reasons for Having a Negative Impression of the Other Country

On the other hand, a majority of Japanese citizens still recognize the importance of Korea-Japan relations and support efforts to improve them. A majority of Japanese citizens, 48%, recognize the importance of Korea-Japan relations ([Figure 6]), and 38.8% support improving relations, clearly outnumbering those who believe no effort is needed (7.3%) or are uninterested in the future of Korea-Japan relations (7.6%) ([Figure 7]).

While the lower limit of 20% for the Korea-Japan relationship in Japanese society has been confirmed, it cannot be prematurely concluded that it will lead to future rebounds. Whether public opinion will remain around 20% or create a new trend line depends on the political and diplomatic capabilities of the governments of both countries.

[Figure 6] Importance of Korea-Japan Relations (2013-2020)

[Figure 7] Efforts to Restore Korea-Japan Relations

3. Low Public Support for Own Government's Policies Towards the Other Country

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Favorable view of former Prime Minister Abe in South Korea and President Moon Jae-in in Japan is around 1%.

- [South Korea] Impression of former Prime Minister Abe: Favorable 1.1%, Unfavorable 90%

- [Japan] Impression of President Moon Jae-in: Favorable 1.5%, Unfavorable 49.7%

President Moon Jae-in: Favorable 1.5%, Unfavorable 49.7%

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Support for South Korea's policy towards Japan is 30.8%, and support for Japan's policy towards South Korea is 29.6%.

Even lower than the low favorability ratings of the other country's citizens are the favorability ratings of the leaders of the opposing country. The favorable view of former Prime Minister Abe among South Koreans and President Moon Jae-in among Japanese is around 1%, and the unfavorable view of former Prime Minister Abe among South Koreans has reached a record high of 90%. Considering that the overall impression of the other country is 12% in South Korea (32% in 2019) and 26% in Japan, there appears to be a certain degree of decoupling between the country and its leader or government.

When the other country expresses strong unfavorable views towards one's own leader, diplomacy (especially public diplomacy) faces significant challenges. In fact, positive evaluations of the Moon Jae-in administration's policy towards Japan among Japanese citizens are 2.8%, and negative evaluations are 57.3%. For South Koreans, positive evaluations of the Abe administration's policy towards South Korea are 5.4%, and negative evaluations are 78.4%.

[Figure 8] Evaluation of the Moon Jae-in Administration's Policy Towards Japan

[Figure 9] Evaluation of the Abe Administration's Policy Towards South Korea

Furthermore, citizens of both countries express limited support for their own government's diplomatic policies towards the other country. In Japan, positive evaluations of the Abe administration's policy towards South Korea are 29.6%, while in South Korea, positive evaluations of the Moon Jae-in administration's policy towards Japan are only 30.8%. These figures are more than 10 percentage points lower than the overall approval ratings for the government, which are in the 40-50% range.

As mentioned earlier, despite the decline in mutual favorability, the perception of the importance of Korea-Japan relations among the citizens of both countries remains unchanged. In South Korea, it has remained above 80% for the past eight years, and in Japan, it has hovered around 50% ([Figure 6]). Despite the importance of Korea-Japan relations, the discomfort with the worst relationship since normalization, coupled with anxiety over conflicts escalating from historical issues to economic and security retaliation, and public fatigue with the two-year stalemate in resolving the Supreme Court ruling, appears to have led to critical evaluations of the other country's policies. Conversely, the government authorities of both countries need to recognize this as a time to adjust policies reflecting these changes in public opinion.

4. Forced Labor Compensation Issue: The Public Wants New Solutions

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In South Korea, the response favoring 'compensation by Japanese companies according to the court ruling or forced execution' sharply decreased from 58.1% in 2019 to 36%.

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In Japan, the response stating 'Japanese companies do not need to comply with forced execution that contradicts the Korea-Japan Agreement' was 29.3%.

The most pressing issue and urgent task facing both countries is the dispute surrounding the compensation ruling by the Korean Supreme Court for forced labor. An interesting result from this opinion poll is the change in public opinion regarding solutions. The key point is the significant decline in public support for the South Korean government's principled stance. The solution that 'Japanese companies should provide compensation according to the Korean Supreme Court ruling, and if they refuse, forced execution should be carried out' dropped by 22 percentage points from 58.1% last year to 36% this year. Including the current proposal by the South Korean government, which suggests establishing a foundation funded by companies and citizens from both countries to compensate victims (6.2%), approximately 42% of the public can be interpreted as supporting the current government's approach. On the other hand, opinions such as the South Korean government and private sector taking over financial support (18.2%) or seeking arbitration or a ruling from the International Court of Justice (13.2%) have gained support compared to 2019. Surprisingly, the Japanese government's position, 'the Supreme Court ruling contradicts the Korea-Japan Agreement, so Japanese companies do not need to compensate,' received 14% support. In essence, public opinion in South Korea is emerging that the government needs to find new solutions.

[Figure 10] Solutions for the Confrontation Between the Two Countries Regarding the Supreme Court Ruling

The situation in Japan is also interesting. Only 29.3% of the Japanese public supports the Japanese government's assertion that 'the Supreme Court ruling contradicts the 1965 Korea-Japan Claims Agreement, so Japanese companies do not need to comply with the South Korean government's execution.' Those who responded 'I don't know' accounted for 34.6%, more than one-third of all respondents, and the opinion that 'resolution will be difficult' was the third most common at 15.9%. This indicates that a majority find it difficult to express an opinion because they believe no solution is possible or they are not well-informed about the issue and its details. Japanese public opinion also shows limited support for the principled stance taken by its government, likely because they believe this approach will not resolve the issue.

In summary, public opinion in Japan suggests that South Korea is in the wrong in the bilateral conflict, criticizing South Korea for violating the state-to-state agreement of the Korea-Japan Agreement, and there is a perception that resolution is unlikely, especially with the Moon Jae-in administration. Conversely, public opinion in South Korea is forming that the government should take the initiative in finding forward-looking solutions.

5. Severe Negative Ripple Effects of Historical Conflicts: A Crisis May Arise If the Situation is Left Unattended

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Preferir una pronta resolución de las disputas comerciales en lugar de una respuesta contundente.

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Apoyar contramedidas contundentes en caso de que se produzca una situación de liquidación.

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Posibilidad de cooperación "win-win" tras las restricciones a la exportación.

La confrontación y el conflicto políticos y diplomáticos en torno a la resolución de las sentencias sobre trabajadores forzados están teniendo efectos negativos (spillover) en las relaciones económicas y de seguridad. La violación del llamado principio de separación entre política y economía, que se manifestó de forma extrema en las medidas de represalia del gobierno de Abe de restricciones a la exportación y la consideración por parte del gobierno coreano de dar por terminado el GSOMIA, ha dejado un precedente sin precedentes en las relaciones entre Corea y Japón desde el establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas. El problema no se detiene aquí, sino que ha ampliado la percepción negativa del público sobre la cooperación económica y de seguridad entre ambos países.

En cuanto a las relaciones económicas entre Corea y Japón, la respuesta de que es posible una "relación de beneficio mutuo" con Japón disminuyó del 41,6% al 34,3% en el lado coreano, y la respuesta de que es "difícil una relación de beneficio mutuo" aumentó del 37,4% al 45,4%. En Japón, las opiniones positivas cayeron drásticamente del 43,6% al 25,1%, y las opiniones negativas aumentaron bruscamente del 19,7% al 37,7%. La confianza en la "interdependencia económica" entre ambos países ha disminuido.

[Figura 11] Opinión sobre las relaciones económicas entre Corea y Japón.

En términos de seguridad militar, la confianza entre ambos países también ha disminuido notablemente en el último año. La percepción de amenaza militar hacia Japón por parte de los coreanos aumentó del 38,3% al 44,1% ([Figura 12]). En el caso de Japón, se observó un ligero aumento (12,3% -> 13,4%). En una pregunta más específica sobre la posibilidad de conflicto militar entre ambos países en torno a Dokdo, las respuestas de "creo que ocurrirá en los próximos años" (13,7%) y "creo que ocurrirá en un futuro lejano" (36,1%) aumentaron en Corea. La respuesta de "creo que no ocurrirá" disminuyó del 54,8% al 39,5%. En Japón, la respuesta de "creo que ocurrirá en un futuro lejano" (19%) sobre la posibilidad de un conflicto militar entre ambos países aumentó, y la respuesta de que no ocurrirá disminuyó del 57% en 2019 al 40,9%.

[Figura 12] Países/regiones que perciben como amenaza militar.

[Figura 13] Posibilidad de conflicto militar entre Corea y Japón en torno a Dokdo.

Por otro lado, la opinión de que Corea debería fortalecer la cooperación en seguridad entre Corea, Estados Unidos y Japón disminuyó del 66,2% en 2019 al 53,6% en 2020. La respuesta "ninguna de las dos" aumentó del 25% al 35,4%. En Japón, la respuesta "ninguna de las dos" superó la mayoría, pasando del 45,8% al 50,6%. Al igual que las controversias en torno al GSOMIA en 2019, las preocupaciones sobre conflictos militares aumentaron tanto como las disputas comerciales, y se manifestó una postura cautelosa hacia la cooperación en seguridad entre Corea y Japón, y entre Corea, Estados Unidos y Japón.

[Figura 14] Necesidad de fortalecer la alianza de seguridad entre Corea, Estados Unidos y Japón.

Como se ha señalado, el aumento de la percepción de amenazas económicas y militares entre Corea y Japón puede considerarse una secuela de los conflictos diplomáticos derivados de cuestiones históricas. Por lo tanto, la resolución de los problemas actuales es aún más importante para la protección de los intereses estratégicos mutuos. El problema es que, si se procede a la liquidación de activos japoneses en el proceso de ejecución de la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo sobre trabajadores forzados, se prevén medidas de represalia por parte del gobierno japonés y se confirma el apoyo de la opinión pública a estas medidas. Mientras que el 54,2% de los ciudadanos japoneses apoya las contramedidas, solo el 5,4% se opone a ellas.

Por el contrario, en Corea, la opinión de que se debe llegar a un acuerdo y resolver rápidamente la disputa comercial (30,6%) y la preocupación de que "el estado de conflicto es preocupante en medio de la crisis del COVID-19" (17,7%) tienen prioridad sobre la postura contundente de "responder con firmeza a Japón incluso si se sufren pérdidas" (17,9%). El problema surge si Japón toma medidas de represalia contra Corea. En cuanto a la opinión pública, la postura de que "se deben hacer esfuerzos diplomáticos para cancelar las contramedidas, ya que las contramedidas provocan un círculo vicioso de represalias" (33,9%) es menos predominante que la de que "el gobierno coreano también debe tomar medidas de respuesta" (54%). Además, si se toman contramedidas, se apoya la postura contundente de "responder enérgicamente utilizando todos los medios" (46%) o "utilizar medidas de seguridad como la terminación del GSOMIA" (9,4%). Por lo tanto, si la cuestión se deja sin resolver, existe una alta probabilidad de que surjan posturas contundentes y se entre en una fase de confrontación y crisis.

En lugar de conclusiones

Los ciudadanos de ambos países están fatigados por el deterioro de las relaciones entre Corea y Japón y la prolongación de la confrontación entre los gobiernos. La parálisis diplomática se ha prolongado durante más de un año y cuatro meses, y se percibe que se acerca otra ola de crisis. La opinión pública exige que se busquen soluciones al problema de los trabajadores forzados, considerando tantas opciones como sea posible y extendiendo el plazo para la liquidación de los activos de las empresas japonesas.

Sin embargo, el quid de la cuestión es que la desconfianza entre los gobiernos y la confrontación emocional han llegado a un nivel peligroso. Los trabajadores forzados son un síntoma del conflicto entre Corea y Japón, no la causa. Ambos gobiernos están atrapados en un torbellino de desconfianza al repetir un juego de ignorancia mutua y represalias. Desde la disputa sobre la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de Corea, la controversia sobre la iluminación del radar del avión de patrulla japonés sobre el Mar del Este, las represalias y respuestas a las restricciones de exportación, hasta la declaración de terminación del GSOMIA, este año, a pesar de que ambos países están prácticamente aislados debido al COVID-19, están inmersos en una guerra diplomática no presencial, atacándose mutuamente en cada asunto.

En este estado, incluso si se encuentra una solución ingeniosa relacionada con los trabajadores forzados, el barco puede hundirse en las olas de las relaciones conflictivas entre ambos países, como un dueto de anti-japonismo y anti-coreanismo. Es una esperanza ilusoria pensar que las relaciones entre Corea y Japón se normalizarán si se resuelve el problema de los trabajadores forzados. Se deben realizar esfuerzos desde una perspectiva más integral y compleja para la recuperación de las relaciones.

Aquí, el papel de los ciudadanos de ambos países es de suma importancia. Los líderes políticos de ambos países no pueden liberarse de los elementos exclusivos y regresivos del nacionalismo moderno. Los líderes han empeorado la situación al responder emocionalmente con anti-japonismo y anti-coreanismo, lo que ha llevado a la ventilación de la opinión pública negativa y a la formación de un círculo vicioso de confrontación de sentimientos nacionales. En este sentido, los ciudadanos de ambos países deben preservar y expandir los diversos intercambios que eluden al estado. Sobre todo, la promoción de un diálogo y entendimiento saludables entre la generación joven de 20 y 30 años, que será responsable del futuro de las relaciones entre Corea y Japón, es fundamental. La sociedad civil de ambos países es el actor central que impulsa una relación de coexistencia y prosperidad basada en un pensamiento posmoderno, posnacional y posnacionalista (nacionalismo excluyente). Deben allanar el camino para que la generación joven emerja plenamente en el escenario de la historia a través de su papel de liderazgo.

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■ Son Yeol_Director del EAI y profesor en la Escuela de Graduados de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad Yonsei. Doctorado en Ciencias Políticas por la Universidad de Chicago. Ha sido Decano de la Escuela de Graduados de Estudios Internacionales y Jefe del Departamento de Estudios Internacionales Underwood de la Universidad Yonsei, así como Director del Instituto de Investigación para el Desarrollo Sostenible y Director del Instituto de Investigación de Estudios Internacionales. Ha sido Profesor Invitado Especial en la Universidad de Tokio y Profesor Visitante en la Universidad de Carolina del Norte (Chapel Hill) y la Universidad de California (Berkeley). Ha sido Presidente de la Asociación Coreana de Política Internacional (2019) y Presidente de la Asociación de Estudios Japoneses Modernos (2012). Ha sido becario senior de Fulbright, MacArthur, Japan Foundation y del Instituto de Estudios Avanzados de la Universidad de Waseda, y ha servido como asesor del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, el Instituto de Estudios Diplomáticos, el Instituto de Investigación Histórica de Asia Oriental y la Fundación Coreana para el Intercambio Internacional, y como miembro experto del Comité de la Era de Asia Oriental. Su área de especialización incluye la diplomacia japonesa, la economía política internacional, la política internacional de Asia Oriental y la diplomacia pública. Sus obras recientes incluyen Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2019, con T. J. Pempel), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia (2016, con Jan Melissen), "South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking," The Pacific Review (2019), 32, 6, y 『한국의 중견국외교』 (Diplomacia de potencia intermedia de Corea) (2017, coeditado).

■ Responsable y editor: Lee Eun-ji, Investigadora del EAI.

Contacto: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) / ejlee@eai.or.kr

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