[EAI Issue Brief] Crisis in Korea-Japan Relations as Seen Through Public Opinion Polls: The People Want Change

Editor's Note

The deterioration of relations between South Korea and Japan, triggered by the Japanese government's imposition of export controls on July 1, 2019, has persisted in a stalemate, extending beyond trade disputes and boycotts of Japanese goods to security conflicts such as the termination of the GSOMIA agreement. The author, Son Yeol, President of the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Professor at Yonsei University, analyzes the current situation and proposes solutions based on five key characteristics derived from the results of the <Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey> jointly conducted with Japan's Genron NPO in September 2020 and the discussions from the subsequent <8th Korea-Japan Future Dialogue>. The author highlights that public opinion in Korea towards Japan has plummeted, with the 2030 generation leading this trend; that favorable views towards South Korea in Japan have rebounded; that public support for both governments' policies and attitudes towards the other country hovers around 30%; that public support for both governments' stances on the Supreme Court's forced labor ruling is shifting; and that the negative ripple effects of historical disputes are severe. Based on these points, the author urges both countries to address the crisis before it escalates and to devise wise solutions that go beyond anti-Japan and anti-Korea sentiments.

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The diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan have entered an unprecedented state. The bilateral relationship, which erupted with former Prime Minister Abe's announcement of export restrictions on July 1, 2019, escalated into economic conflicts such as the exclusion from the whitelist and boycotts of Japanese goods, and security conflicts like the termination of GSOMIA, marking a major diplomatic crisis. The historical issue of the Korean Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor compensation in October 2018, which served as the backdrop, continues to constrain the bilateral relationship as an unresolved issue. Negotiations between the two governments are stalled, with constant friction on every issue. If the court orders the seizure and liquidation of assets of Japanese companies, the two countries will be thrown into another maelstrom due to retaliatory measures by the Japanese government.

This paper aims to identify and interpret the key characteristics of the current Korea-Japan relations and offer prescriptions, based on the results of the Korea-Japan Mutual Perception Survey jointly conducted in September 2020 by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in Korea and Genron NPO in Japan, and the discussions from the subsequent <8th Korea-Japan Future Dialogue> jointly hosted by the two institutions. The first characteristic is the sharp decline in South Korean public opinion towards Japan. Favorable views towards Japan, which had been steadily rising for the past five years, dropped by 20 percentage points, while unfavorable views increased by 22 percentage points, with the 2030 generation leading this trend. Second, the downward trend in favorable views towards South Korea in Japan has reversed. Analysis is required to determine whether this is a temporary rebound or a shift in the upward trend. Third, public support in both countries for their respective governments' policies and attitudes towards the other nation hovers around 30%, which can be interpreted as a significant expression of dissatisfaction with the current situation and policies. Fourth, specifically, public support for both governments' positions on the Supreme Court's forced labor ruling is changing, indicating that public voices are emerging for new approaches. Finally, if the two governments fail to break the prolonged stalemate and allow the situation to fester, another crisis is highly likely to occur. Therefore, the South Korean government must sensitively read the changes in public opinion and make a political decision towards a forward-looking policy on the conscription issue, while simultaneously developing a comprehensive strategy to restore trust between the two countries.

1. Plummeting Favorability Towards Japan in Korea, Exodus of the Youth Generation

· Sharp decline of 19.4%p in favorable views towards Japan in Korea, sharp increase of 21.7%p in unfavorable views

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Surge in negative sentiment among the 2030 generation, driving the sharp increase in unfavorable views

The most significant change revealed in this opinion poll is the sharp decline in favorable views towards Japan within South Korea. Negative perceptions of Japan among Koreans surged from 49.9% in 2019 to 71.6%. Conversely, positive perceptions of Japan plummeted from 31.7% in 2019 to 12.3%. Considering that favorable views towards Japan in Korea had been on an upward trend since 2015 (15.7% -> 21.3% -> 26.8% -> 28.3% -> 31.7%), this change is quite shocking. Negative perceptions of Japan, which had shown a downward trend from 72.5% in 2015 to 49.9% in 2019, soared to 71.6% in 2020, a level similar to 2015. In contrast, negative perceptions of South Korea in Japan slightly decreased compared to the previous year, and positive perceptions increased. From 2016 to 2019, favorable views of South Korea in Japan were on a continuous downward trend (29.1% -> 26.9% -> 22.9% -> 20%), but in 2020, favorability rebounded with a 5.9 percentage point increase to 25.9%.

[Figure 1] Perceptions of the Other Country (2013-2020)

Given that the shifts in preferences between the peoples of South Korea and Japan have fluctuated within a 10% margin since the 2015 agreement on comfort women, the current sharp change of around 20% is clearly an outlier. What changes have occurred?

[Figure 2] Trend of Preference Changes by Age Group in Korea

[Figure 3] Trend of Preference Changes by Age Group in Japan

[Figure 4] Change in Favorability by Age Group in Korea in 2020

As shown in Figures 2 and 3, the age groups that have driven favorability towards the other country have been those in their 20s and 30s. Considering that the favorability among young people in both countries was higher than in other age groups, the sharp decline in favorability among young people and the surge in unfavorable views in the 2020 Korean results represent a serious change. As shown in Figure 4, unfavorable views among those in their 30s increased by a staggering 83.6% compared to the previous year, while favorable views decreased by 71.2%. Even among those in their 20s, who have the highest favorability towards Japan, unfavorable views increased by 55.8% and favorable views decreased by 53.8%. Therefore, the sharp decline in favorable views towards Japan and the surge in unfavorable views in Korea this year can be largely attributed to changes among the 2030 generation. What, then, are the factors behind the mass defection of the 2030 generation?

The primary factor is the Abe administration's announcement in July 2019 of export restrictions on three semiconductor components. As the semiconductor industry is a strategic industry considered the lifeline of the Korean economy, export restrictions targeting it can be seen as a measure that shakes the foundation of South Korea. The strong backlash from the government at the time, which characterized it as "economic aggression," was for this reason. The Abe administration argued that the sanctions were imposed due to issues with South Korea's strategic goods management system, i.e., on national security grounds. However, it is safe to say that very few Korean citizens accepted this argument at face value. Even if there were issues with the management system, the majority of the public did not understand why such a measure, which shakes the foundation of the Korean economy, was deemed necessary as a response to a matter that supposedly threatened Japan's national security. Ultimately, this measure was perceived, and later revealed during bilateral negotiations, as an expression of the Japanese government's strong dissatisfaction with the Korean Supreme Court's ruling on forced labor in October 2018 and the Korean government's response (or lack thereof) to it, manifested as retaliatory action.

A second point to note is the attitude and remarks of former Prime Minister Abe and key members of his administration towards South Korea during the process of the Supreme Court's forced labor ruling and the export control measures. While past bilateral conflicts typically involved South Korea taking an offensive stance on historical issues and Japan responding defensively, the Abe administration notably counterattacked by criticizing South Korea's approach and attitude in handling historical issues. Former Prime Minister Abe repeatedly accused South Korea of being 'a country that does not keep its promises,' 'a country where the rule of law does not apply,' and 'an untrustworthy country.' These remarks were echoed by the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and even the then-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Taro Kono, vehemently attacked the Korean Supreme Court's ruling as an 'outrage and a challenge to the international order.' While Japanese government leaders have criticized the South Korean government's policies and attitudes since the normalization of diplomatic relations, criticizing South Korea's national identity was unprecedented. Such harsh rhetoric provoked strong reactions from the South Korean government and media, inflamed public sentiment, and consequently led to a vicious cycle of emotional confrontation between the two countries.

What is noteworthy here is the reaction of the 2030 generation. They do not approach Japan with anti-Japanese sentiment stemming from shame, animosity, or inferiority complex regarding Japan's colonial rule. They perceive Korea as a developed country on par with Japan, viewing Japan as a country with attractive popular culture and cuisine, good for shopping and travel. This is why they have led the improvement of South Korea's perception of Japan. On the other hand, over the past year, the 2030 generation has strongly expressed their perception that the Abe administration's export controls and rhetoric were unfair and unjust through boycotts of Japanese goods and travel. This is distinct from the deep-rooted anti-Japanese sentiment formed by historical experiences of older generations. This implies that if Japan rectifies its unfair policies, they could quickly return to a trend of favorable views.

2. Japanese Public Opinion Hits Bottom and Rebounds Unexpectedly

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The Limits of Anti-Korea and Xenophobic Sentiment

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Importance Still Recognized, Support for Improving Relations

In contrast to the sharp decline in favorable views towards Japan in South Korea, favorable views towards South Korea in Japan have rebounded. Japanese favorability towards South Korea, which had steadily declined from 31.1% in 2013 to 20% last year, was expected to fall further amidst the intense diplomatic war and exchange of economic retaliations over the past year, creating an atmosphere of mutual animosity. However, it unexpectedly managed a rebound of 5.9% ([Figure 1]). While it remains a task for future analysis to determine whether this change will lead to a sustained upward trend, the rebound after approaching the bottom of the downward curve is noteworthy.

The South Korean media and intellectual circles have expressed deep concern over the widespread anti-Korea and xenophobic sentiment in Japanese society. The reasons why the Japanese public holds negative impressions of South Korea ([Figure 5]) reveal that these concerns are materializing. Japanese public opinion expresses discomfort with the attitude of Koreans rather than opposition to specific South Korean policies or events. As the survey results show, the top reason, as in the previous year, is 'continuously criticizing Japan over historical issues' (55.7%). This indicates that the Japanese public is uncomfortable with the way South Korea handles historical issues, rather than with the historical perception itself. Following this are reasons such as 'due to emotional words and actions of Koreans' (23.1%) and 'due to incomprehensible patriotic actions of Koreans' (21.6%). This suggests that Japanese public opinion views South Korea as being driven by anti-Japanese sentiment in its handling of historical issues, which can be seen as a matter of identity.

[Figure 5] Reasons for Having a Negative Impression of the Other Country

Conversely, a majority of the Japanese public still recognizes the importance of Korea-Japan relations and supports efforts to improve them. 48% of the Japanese public recognizes the importance of Korea-Japan relations ([Figure 6]), and 38.8% support improving relations, clearly outnumbering those who believe no effort is needed (7.3%) or are uninterested in the future of Korea-Japan relations (7.6%) ([Figure 7]).

While the 20% floor supporting Korea-Japan relations in Japanese society has been confirmed, it cannot be preemptively assumed that it will lead to a future rebound. Whether public opinion will remain around 20% or establish a new trend line depends on the political and diplomatic capabilities of the governments of both countries.

[Figure 6] Importance of Korea-Japan Relations (2013-2020)

[Figure 7] Efforts to Restore Korea-Japan Relations

3. Low Support for Own Government's Policies Towards the Other Country

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Favorability towards former Prime Minister Abe in Korea and towards President Moon Jae-in in Japan at around 1%

- [Korea] Impression of former Prime Minister Abe: Favorability 1.1%, Unfavorability 90%

- [Japan] Impression of President Moon Jae-in: Favorability 1.5%, Unfavorability 49.7%

President Moon Jae-in

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Support for the South Korean government's policy towards Japan at 30.8%, support for the Japanese government's policy towards South Korea at 29.6%

Even lower than the low favorability ratings between the publics of South Korea and Japan is the favorability towards the leaders of the respective countries. The favorability of Koreans towards former Prime Minister Abe and the favorability of Japanese towards President Moon Jae-in are both around 1%, with unfavorable views towards former Prime Minister Abe reaching a record high of 90% among Koreans. Considering the overall perceptions of the other country are 12% in Korea (32% in 2019) and 26% in Japan, a certain degree of decoupling can be observed between the country, its leader, and its government.

When the other country expresses strong unfavorable views towards one's own leader, diplomacy (especially public diplomacy) with that country faces significant challenges. In fact, positive evaluations of the Moon Jae-in administration's policy towards Japan among the Japanese public are 2.8%, and negative evaluations are 57.3%. Similarly, positive evaluations of the Abe administration's policy towards South Korea among Koreans are 5.4%, and negative evaluations are 78.4%.

[Figure 8] Evaluation of the Moon Jae-in Administration's Policy Towards Japan

[Figure 9] Evaluation of the Abe Administration's Policy Towards South Korea

Furthermore, the publics of both countries express limited support for their own government's diplomatic policies towards the other. In Japan, positive evaluations of the Abe administration's policy towards South Korea stand at 29.6%, while in South Korea, positive evaluations of the Moon Jae-in administration's policy towards Japan are only 30.8%. These figures are more than 10 percentage points lower than the approval ratings for the government, which are in the 40-50% range.

As mentioned earlier, despite the decline in mutual favorability, the perception of the importance of Korea-Japan relations remains unchanged among the publics of both countries. For the past eight years, this has been maintained at over 80% in Korea and around 50% in Japan (Figure 6). Despite the importance of Korea-Japan relations, the discomfort with the worst relations since normalization, particularly the anxiety stemming from the escalation of conflicts originating from historical issues into economic and security retaliation, coupled with public fatigue from the two-year stalemate in resolving the Supreme Court ruling, appears to have led to critical evaluations of the other country's policies. Conversely, it is necessary for the governments of both countries to recognize this as a time to adjust policies reflecting these changes in public opinion.

4. Resolution of Forced Labor Compensation Issue: The Public Desires New Solutions

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In Korea, responses favoring 'compensation by Japanese companies according to the court ruling or compulsory execution' dropped sharply from 58.1% in 2019 to 36%

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In Japan, 29.3% responded that 'Japanese companies do not need to comply with compulsory execution that contradicts the Korea-Japan Agreement.'

The most pressing issue and urgent task facing both countries is the dispute surrounding the compensation ruling by the Korean Supreme Court for forced labor. An interesting finding from this opinion poll is the shift in public opinion regarding solutions. The core point is the significant decline in public support for the South Korean government's principled stance. The solution that 'Japanese companies should provide compensation according to the Korean Supreme Court's ruling, and if they do not comply, compulsory execution should be carried out' dropped by 22 percentage points from 58.1% last year to 36% this year. Including the current approach being pursued by the South Korean government—establishing a foundation funded by companies and citizens from both countries to compensate victims (6.2%)—approximately 42% of the public can be interpreted as supporting the current government's direction. On the other hand, opinions such as the South Korean government and private sector taking financial responsibility (18.2%) or the need for arbitration or a ruling by the International Court of Justice (13.2%) have gained support compared to 2019. Surprisingly, the Japanese government's position that 'the Supreme Court ruling contradicts the Korea-Japan Agreement, therefore Japanese companies are not obligated to compensate' also garnered 14% support. In essence, public opinion in South Korea is shifting towards the need for the government to find new solutions.

[Figure 10] Proposed Solutions for the Stalemate Over the Supreme Court Ruling

The situation in Japan is also interesting. Only 29.3% of the Japanese public supports the Japanese government's assertion that 'the Korean Supreme Court ruling contradicts the 1965 Korea-Japan Claims Agreement, and therefore Japanese companies are not required to comply with the South Korean government's execution.' Those who responded 'I don't know' accounted for 34.6%, more than one-third of all respondents, and the opinion that 'resolution will be difficult' was third at 15.9%. This indicates that a majority find it difficult to express an opinion because they believe no solution is possible or they are unfamiliar with the issues and details. Japanese public opinion also shows limited support for the principled stance taken by its government, likely because they believe this approach will not resolve the issue.

In summary, on the Japanese side, public opinion is forming that South Korea is in the wrong in the bilateral conflict, that South Korea is violating the state-to-state agreement of the Korea-Japan Agreement, and there is a perception that resolution is unlikely, particularly with the Moon Jae-in administration. On the South Korean side, public opinion is forming that the government should proactively seek solutions.

5. Severe Negative Ripple Effects of Historical Disputes: Neglecting the Situation Could Lead to Crisis

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Preference for swift resolution over strong response to trade disputes

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Support for strong retaliatory measures if asset liquidation occurs

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Possibility of win-win cooperation following export restrictions

The political and diplomatic confrontation and conflict surrounding the handling of the forced mobilization rulings are having negative spillover effects on economic and security relations. The erosion of the so-called principle of separating politics from economics, starkly revealed by the Abe administration's export restrictions and the South Korean government's consideration of terminating GSOMIA as retaliatory measures, has set an unprecedented worst precedent in Korea-Japan relations since normalization. The problem does not end here, but has expanded the public's negative perception of bilateral economic and security cooperation.

Regarding Korea-Japan economic relations, the response that Korea is in a 'win-win relationship with Japan' decreased from 41.6% to 34.3%, while the response that a 'win-win relationship is difficult' increased from 37.4% to 45.4%. In Japan, positive opinions plummeted from 43.6% to 25.1%, and negative opinions surged from 19.7% to 37.7%. Confidence in 'economic interdependence' between the two countries has declined.

[Figure 11] Opinion on Korea-Japan Economic Relations

In terms of military security, the decline in trust between the two countries has been significant over the past year. The perception of military threat from Japan among Koreans increased from 38.3% to 44.1% ([Figure 12]). In Japan's case, a slight increase was observed (12.3% -> 13.4%). Regarding the more specific question of the possibility of conflict around Dokdo, which could lead to military conflict between the two countries, the response rates for 'I think it will happen within a few years' (13.7%) and 'I think it will happen in the distant future' (36.1%) increased in Korea. The response that 'I don't think it will happen' decreased from 54.8% to 39.5%. In Japan as well, the response that the possibility of military conflict between the two countries 'will happen in the distant future' (19%) increased, and the response that it will not happen decreased from 57% in 2019 to 40.9%.

[Figure 12] Countries/Regions Perceived as Military Threats

[Figure 13] Possibility of Korea-Japan Military Conflict around Dokdo

Meanwhile, the opinion that Korea should strengthen security cooperation with the US and Japan decreased from 66.2% in 2019 to 53.6% in 2020. 'Neither' increased from 25% to 35.4%. In Japan as well, 'Neither' exceeded half, increasing from 45.8% to 50.6%. As seen in the controversy surrounding GSOMIA in 2019, concerns about military conflict have increased as much as concerns about trade disputes, and a cautious stance on security cooperation between Korea and Japan, and between Korea, the US, and Japan, has emerged.

[Figure 14] Necessity of Strengthening Korea-US-Japan Security Alliance

As such, the increase in perceptions of economic and military threats between Korea and Japan can be attributed to the repercussions of diplomatic conflicts stemming from historical issues. Therefore, resolving current issues is even more important for the protection of mutual strategic interests. The problem is that if the liquidation of Japanese assets proceeds in the process of enforcing the Supreme Court's ruling on forced mobilization, retaliatory measures by the Japanese government are anticipated, and public support for these measures is confirmed. While 54.2% of Japanese citizens support retaliatory measures, only 5.4% oppose them.

In contrast, in Korea, opinions favoring negotiation, such as 'We should compromise and resolve the trade dispute quickly' (30.6%) and 'The conflict is concerning during the COVID-19 crisis' (17.7%), outweigh hardline opinions such as 'We should take a strong stance against Japan even if we suffer damage' (17.9%). The issue arises if Japan implements retaliatory measures. In Korea, the public opinion that 'retaliation will cause a vicious cycle of retaliation, so diplomatic efforts should be made to cancel the countermeasures' (33.9%) is less dominant than the stance that 'the Korean government should also devise countermeasures' (54%). Furthermore, if countermeasures are taken, public opinion supports hardline arguments such as 'we should respond strongly using all means' (46%) or 'we should mobilize security measures like terminating GSOMIA' (9.4%). Thus, if the issue is left unaddressed, hardline arguments are likely to gain traction, leading to a confrontation and crisis.

Instead of a Conclusion

The citizens of both countries are weary of the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations and the prolonged stalemate in government-level confrontation. The diplomatic deadlock has persisted for over a year and four months, and there is a sense that another wave of crisis is approaching. Public opinion calls for finding a solution to the forced mobilization issue while extending the deadline for the liquidation of Japanese corporate assets, considering various options.

However, the core of the problem is that distrust and emotional confrontation between the governments have reached a dangerous level. Forced mobilization is a symptom, not the cause, of the Korea-Japan conflict. The two governments are trapped in a vortex of distrust by repeatedly engaging in mutual disregard and retaliatory games. From disputes over the Korean Supreme Court ruling, the controversy over the radar irradiation incident involving a Japanese patrol aircraft over the East Sea, retaliatory export restrictions and responses, to the declaration of GSOMIA termination, this year, despite the de facto quarantine between the two countries due to COVID-19, they are engaged in a non-contact diplomatic war, constantly attacking each other.

In this state, even if a clever solution is found for the forced mobilization issue, the relationship may founder amidst the waves of conflict characterized by the duet of anti-Japan sentiment and anti-Korea sentiment. The idea that Korea-Japan relations will normalize if the conscription issue is resolved is wishful thinking. Efforts must be made from a more comprehensive and multifaceted perspective to restore relations.

Here, the role of citizens in both countries is extremely important. The political leadership in both countries cannot escape from the exclusive and regressive elements of modern nationalism. The leadership exacerbates the situation by responding emotionally with anti-Japan and anti-Korea sentiments, which in turn ventilates negative public opinion, forming a vicious cycle of public sentiment clashes. In this regard, citizens of both countries must protect and expand various exchanges that bypass the state. Above all, fostering healthy dialogue and understanding among the younger generation, who will be responsible for the future of Korea-Japan relations, is crucial. Civil societies in both countries are central actors leading the relationship towards coexistence and prosperity, based on post-modern, post-state-centric, and post-nationalist (exclusive nationalism) thinking. They must pave the way for the younger generation to fully emerge on the stage of history through their proactive roles.

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■ Son Yeol_Director of EAI, Professor at Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies. Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. He has served as Director of Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies, Dean of Underwood International College, Director of the Institute for Sustainable Development, and Director of the Institute for International Studies. He has also been a Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo, and a Visiting Scholar at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) and the University of California (Berkeley). He served as President of the Korean Political Science Association (2019) and President of the Korean Association for Contemporary Japanese Studies (2012). He has been a Senior Fellow at Fulbright, MacArthur, Japan Foundation, and Waseda University Institute for Advanced Study, and has served as an advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the Korea Foundation, as well as a specialist committee member of the Northeast Asian Cooperation Committee. His research areas include Japanese foreign policy, international political economy, East Asian international politics, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2019, with T. J. Pempel), Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia (2016, with Jan Melissen), “South Korea under US-China Rivalry: the Dynamics of the Economic-Security Nexus in the Trade Policymaking,” The Pacific Review (2019), 32, 6, and 『한국의 중견국외교』 (Korean Middle Power Diplomacy) (2017, co-edited).

■Managed and Edited by: Lee Eun-ji, EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) / ejlee@eai.or.kr

[EAI Issue Briefing] is a series planned to provide a forum for discourse where experts from various fields can present in-depth analyses and policy recommendations on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not affiliated with EAI and solely represent the views of the individual author.