EAI Commentary: The Path Beyond the Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Towards Building a New Northeast Asian Order: South Korea's Strategy and Role

[Editor's Note]

"South Korea Must Consider the Strategic Environment Beyond the Korean Peninsula Peace Regime, Beyond North Korea's Nuclear Issue"

With the inter-Korean and US-North Korea summits having brought about significant changes in the geopolitical landscape of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, the momentum for change is expected to accelerate with discussions of a potential second US-North Korea summit within the year, as well as North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia summits. In response, EAI aims to provide readers with a more systematic understanding of these developments through a series of "Reading North Korea Correctly" reports, compiling previously published relevant analyses. This commentary is the tenth report in this series, authored by EAI Director of the Center for International Relations, Jeon Jae-sung (Professor at Seoul National University). In this commentary, the author discusses South Korea's strategy and role in guiding the ongoing North Korean nuclear negotiations towards establishing a Korean Peninsula peace regime and a new Northeast Asian order. The author emphasizes that South Korea's role is crucial in dispelling the deep-seated mistrust between the US and North Korea, the biggest obstacle in this process, and fostering mutual understanding. To achieve this successfully, South Korea must, first, adhere to the principles of complete denuclearization and the establishment of a Korean Peninsula peace regime, and second, create an environment that considers the medium- and long-term strategic interests of both South Korea and its neighboring countries.

Expectations are growing that the North Korean nuclear negotiations will advance following US Secretary of State Pompeo's fourth visit to Pyongyang on October 7. With a series of summits anticipated within the year, including a second US-North Korea summit, North Korea-Russia and North Korea-China summits, and potentially Kim Jong Un's visit to Seoul, President Moon Jae-in has expressed prospects for establishing a new Northeast Asian order beyond resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. If the security structure of Northeast Asia, composed of major powers, can undergo even a slight transformation in the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, it would be a truly significant change.

Hopes are also rising that the differences in opinion between the US and North Korea regarding the current stage of nuclear negotiations will narrow. However, as the nuclear negotiations progress, numerous unforeseen difficulties and challenges are emerging. The most prominent among these are the fundamental mistrust between the US and North Korea, the controversy over the equivalence of phased reciprocal actions, and internal political factors within both the US and North Korea.

American skepticism stems from the observation that Kim Jong Un has not explicitly and directly addressed North Korea's denuclearization, and that progress in presenting denuclearization as a goal and taking meaningful denuclearization measures has been insufficient. From a suspicious viewpoint, facilities like the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site and launchpad, which North Korea has dismantled, are already obsolete for North Korea's nuclear and missile development, and North Korea is still pursuing plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment, and the advancement of its nuclear capabilities through simulations.

Meanwhile, North Korea views US actions as untrustworthy, arguing that since the Singapore US-North Korea summit, the US has not taken reciprocal actions beyond suspending joint US-ROK military exercises, and that the suspension of exercises is a reversible measure that can be resumed at any time. North Korea also criticizes the US for evading the declaration of an end to the Korean War, which it dismisses as merely a "political declaration," and expresses disappointment that the US intends to maintain economic sanctions prior to irreversible denuclearization.

At the current stage, both the US and North Korea are engaged in a contest over the dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, US and international verification, North Korea's submission of a list of nuclear facilities and weapons, and the easing of sanctions against North Korea. The conflict between the US and North Korea revolves around the equivalence of their respective actions, driven by a lack of trust. The US's initial proposal of compensating North Korea after unilateral and short-term denuclearization measures has been effectively abandoned, and with the adoption of North Korea's phased and simultaneous approach, the core of the controversy has become the equivalence of "words for words, actions for actions" and the (in)reversibility of the actions taken by both sides.

The internal political burden associated with taking a "first move" that appears to disadvantage the other party also plays a significant role. President Trump's strategy for North Korea negotiations has long been a target of criticism from mainstream strategists in the US who are aware of the history of failed US-North Korea negotiations. The controversy over unprepared and inequivalent concessions to North Korea creates a domestic political burden for President Trump. On the North Korean side, it is also true that the denuclearization negotiations, personally led by Chairman Kim Jong Un, are bringing about significant changes in North Korea's internal political and social landscape.

It has been reported that Chairman Kim Jong Un conveyed to the South Korean special envoys who visited in September that he needs an environment where his decisions are perceived as correct, as the negotiations must result in benefits and achievements for North Korea. Even if a strong trust is being built between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un, both sides are in a similar situation, facing a double-edged game where they must each contend with domestic political attacks.

President Moon Jae-in has played a significant role in resolving these difficulties. Despite the proliferation of rhetoric about South Korea's role in US-North Korea negotiations, such as the "driver's seat" theory, South Korea's role as a facilitator of US-North Korea cooperation can ultimately be defined as follows: First, to interpret and understand the positions and strategies of both North Korea and the US empathetically and convey them accurately to the other party; second, based on this understanding, to propose creative alternatives acceptable to both sides; and third, to share a portion of the burden to alleviate the domestic political pressure resulting from unilateral actions or concessions by either side at each stage of the negotiations.

Although it has been over 25 years since the US and North Korea began bilateral high-level talks, starting with the Kim Yong-sun-Cainter meeting in early 1992, a vast distance, as wide as the Pacific Ocean, still exists in mutual understanding. South Korea, with its history as a single ethnic nation and blood alliance, possesses an interpretive horizon that allows it to understand the positions of both the US and North Korea, and has the capacity to "translate" and convey their views. President Moon Jae-in is in a position to broaden the horizon of understanding by conveying North Korea's future strategies and aspirations, and the US's role and burdens as a hegemonic power to each other. The South Korean government has proposed alternatives at various levels to facilitate progress in the negotiations. When actions do not advance, it seeks progress in negotiations through dialogue; when conflicting alternatives are difficult to agree upon, it breaks down the alternatives into smaller components to expand the scope for compromise; and it attempts to drive US-North Korea negotiations by advancing inter-Korean relations. Many of the proposals put forth by South Korea are rejected by both the US and North Korea, provoke backlash within South Korea, and many unrefined proposals become subjects of criticism. However, it appears that some degree of failure and trial-and-error is unavoidable in the process of coordinating various proposals.

President Moon Jae-in preemptively addresses potential criticisms to enable President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un to deal more flexibly with domestic politics and opposing views. He indirectly persuades the North Korean public about a denuclearized future for North Korea and argues to US strategists that President Trump's negotiations are reversible and carry no significant losses even if they fail. While this process may lead to considerable misunderstandings, it is ultimately part of an effort to resolve internal dissatisfaction in the US-North Korea negotiations and facilitate progress.

The role of facilitating cooperation and mediation requires highly sophisticated and strategic efforts. In particular, if the efforts fail in the following two aspects, the progress made so far could be severely undermined. First, consistency in the principles for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. President Moon Jae-in has presented and adhered to essential principles for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, including complete denuclearization by North Korea, maintenance of sanctions prior to denuclearization, establishment of a permanent peace regime, and normalization of US-North Korea relations. In an interview with the BBC on October 12, 2018, President Moon Jae-in affirmed that North Korea's denuclearization "includes everything from refraining from further nuclear and missile tests to dismantling nuclear production facilities and missile facilities, and eliminating existing nuclear weapons and nuclear materials." He also stated, "Chairman Kim Jong Un has said he will abandon nuclear weapons for economic development, and there is no reason for North Korea to possess nuclear weapons while enduring difficulties from sanctions."

The problem is that North Korea and the US still have incentives to deviate from principles during the mediation process. If North Korea's path to survival and development is secured through the easing of economic sanctions, it will be difficult for North Korea to abandon its incentive to possess nuclear weapons as a minimum deterrent. By maximizing the potential for economic cooperation through strengthened relations with China and Russia and by jointly criticizing the US's passive stance, North Korea may mistakenly believe that the international sanctions regime is collapsing and that nuclear possession is still a possibility.

While the US will seek complete denuclearization and verification from North Korea through maximum pressure, it may subsequently adopt a lukewarm and passive stance towards establishing a strategic relationship with North Korea. Lacking a concrete and long-term strategy for the strategic benefits of a denuclearized North Korea, the US may limit its focus on the North Korean nuclear issue to the security of the US homeland and nuclear non-proliferation. South Korea must steadfastly uphold and consistently pursue the goal of complete denuclearization and the establishment of a Korean Peninsula peace regime.

North Korea criticizes South Korea for being subservient to the US and constrained by economic sanctions against North Korea while pursuing inter-Korean relations. Discussions are also ongoing within South Korea about pursuing partial easing of economic sanctions and lifting South Korea's independent sanctions against North Korea within the scope of not violating international sanctions. Inter-Korean economic exchange is a policy essential for North Korea's future survival and development. However, to avoid strengthening North Korea's incentives to deviate from its strategy of complete denuclearization, economic sanctions based on principles must be maintained.

Some in the US express suspicion that South Korea intends to deviate from international sanctions against North Korea if it strengthens inter-Korean relations, thereby emphasizing US-ROK conflict. However, it is necessary to persuade them that efforts to develop concrete and comprehensive plans for inter-Korean engagement, demonstrating sincerity in engagement, and coordinating the timing of implementation based on North Korea's denuclearization measures are proceeding in parallel, from the perspective of the necessity of engagement policy towards North Korea.

Second, South Korea must create a foundation for the completion of North Korea's denuclearization by considering the medium- and long-term strategic interests of the surrounding countries, while also realizing its own medium- and long-term strategic interests. Numerous discussions are emerging regarding the timeline for the completion of North Korea's denuclearization, but the core issue is whether North Korea will be able to completely dismantle the nuclear weapons it has already developed as a minimum deterrent, and whether the trust-building and peace regime between the US and North Korea that would enable this can be established.

A peace regime is a negotiation for negative peace, preventing war and conflict, but it is also a process of positive peace that seeks a path to development through North Korea's future status and self-help strategies. Even after denuclearization is complete, various competitions will unfold surrounding North Korea's future. North Korea will pursue development while aiming for regime preservation and the maintenance of its leadership system, and will seek to initiate a new level of competition with South Korea while maximally excluding the possibility of absorption by South Korea.

China and Russia, in cooperation, aim to check the US on a global and Northeast Asian scale. Particularly as the Trump administration's trade offensive against China intensifies, China feels an urgent need to prepare for long-term US aggression. Having already experienced the side effects of strengthening the US-ROK alliance due to the North Korean nuclear issue, China will seek to realize its interests on the Korean Peninsula during the peace regime negotiations. By preparing for strengthened strategic cooperative relations with North Korea after denuclearization, China has recently revived rhetoric about the North Korea-China blood alliance and socialist solidarity.

In contrast, the US Trump administration has failed to present a systematic East Asia strategy beyond its trade offensive against China, and it remains uncertain whether it can draw up a grand vision for sharing strategic interests between the US and North Korea under the emerging Indo-Pacific strategy. It is also uncertain how actively the US, which lacks a medium- and long-term strategy for North Korea beyond its nuclear strategy, will pursue trust-building with North Korea in the peace regime negotiations.

South Korea must also play a role in facilitating cooperation for the establishment of strategic relations between the US and North Korea, anticipating North Korea's diplomatic and South Korea-focused strategies after the establishment of a peace regime. This equation includes the task of resetting the relationships among major powers in Northeast Asia, including US-China relations. South Korea must create an international environment conducive to a peaceful unification centered on South Korea, while preventing the Korean Peninsula from becoming a theater for US-China strategic competition. The new Northeast Asian order pursued by President Moon Jae-in must encompass a vision for the dynamics of great power competition and cooperation surrounding the Korean Peninsula beyond the North Korean nuclear negotiation process. ■

■ Author: Jeon Jae-sung_ Director of EAI Center for International Relations, Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University, USA, and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, international relations history, ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "War Threats and Peace Between North and South Korea" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

■ Managed and Edited by: Choi Soo-ee, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 105) | schoi@eai.or.kr

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