[EAI Special Feature Commentary] Japan and the Korean Peninsula After Abe Shinzo's Re-election (1): Korean and Japanese Perspectives on Abe's Political Success

[Editor's Note]

On September 20, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan secured a third consecutive term in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election. Assuming no unforeseen events, Prime Minister Abe is expected to remain in office until September 2021. By November 2019, Prime Minister Abe will set the record for the longest-serving Prime Minister in Japanese history. In response, EAI has planned a special commentary series, "Japan and the Korean Peninsula After Abe Shinzo's Re-election," to analyze the factors behind Prime Minister Abe's prolonged tenure and to forecast the future of Japan and the Korean Peninsula. This commentary, the first in the series, features contributions from Professor Lee Jeong-hwan of Seoul National University and Professor Fukagawa Yukiko of Waseda University, analyzing Abe's political success from the perspectives of both South Korea and Japan. According to the two authors, Abe's re-election success appears to be the result of a combination of factors, including the division of the opposition parties, the favorable economic conditions in Japan, the Abe administration's diplomatic achievements, the behavior patterns of LDP Diet members, and the fear of punishment for strong leaders. However, the authors assess that it remains uncertain whether Prime Minister Abe can achieve a 'successful conclusion' by the end of his term in 2021, due to various domestic and international variables.

Factors Behind the Long-Term Rule of the Abe LDP

Lee Jeong-hwan, Professor, Seoul National University

Introduction

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo won a third term in the LDP presidential election held on September 20, 2018, defeating former Secretary-General Ishiba Shigeru. His three-year term, scheduled to end in September 2021, coincides with the end of the term of the House of Representatives elected in the 48th general election in October 2017, assuming the House is not dissolved and serves its full four-year term. Prime Minister Abe's victory in this presidential election reflects the current state of Japanese politics, symbolized by the "Abe 1-strong" dominance. However, the fact that he secured 553 out of 810 total votes, or 68.3%, does not in itself represent the essence of "Abe 1-strong." Rather, the LDP convention held on March 5, 2017, where the party rules were amended to allow Prime Minister Abe to seek a third term, is more symbolic of the "Abe 1-strong" phenomenon. At that time, the LDP finalized the amendment to the party rules regarding the presidential term, which had been proposed by the internal Party System Reform Implementation Headquarters in October 2016. The proposal extended the presidential term from the existing 'two consecutive terms, six years' to 'three consecutive terms, nine years.' The outcome of the September 2018 presidential election was thus foreshadowed by the party convention in March 2017.

Opportunities Provided by the Democratic Party Administration

Even without Abe becoming Prime Minister, the prediction that the LDP administration would continue for a long time after the December 2012 general election was widely accepted. Firstly, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration, which ruled for three years from 2009, served as a catalyst for the erosion of the political foundation of non-LDP political forces. Secondly, the DPJ's rule led to the marginalization of policy diversity within the LDP and a convergence towards conservative social reforms. Lastly, disappointment with the DPJ administration in the social sphere led to a reduction in political participation among the non-LDP support base that had been a key force in bringing the DPJ to power.

The three years of DPJ rule ended with the party's division and its devastating defeat in the 2012 general election. The DPJ administration, which had successfully gained power by establishing a policy opposition axis with the LDP centered on the inequality issues brought about by Koizumi Junichiro's neoliberal reforms, experienced a process of division over issues such as consumption tax hikes and participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The DPJ, lacking policy consensus on national identity and domestic and foreign policies beyond opposition to the LDP, was devoid of political leadership to unite its members.

After losing power in 2012, the DPJ not only failed to establish a policy opposition axis with the Abe LDP but also failed to secure its position as the main opposition party. Although it narrowly retained its status as the main opposition party by securing 57 seats in the 2012 election, just ahead of the Japan Innovation Party which won 54 seats, it received three million fewer votes than the Japan Innovation Party in the proportional representation vote. In the 2014 general election, it secured 73 seats, a stark contrast to the 326 seats won by the LDP-Komeito coalition government. Katsuya Okada, who took over as DPJ leader in January 2015 after Banri Kaieda, launched the Democratic Party (DP) in March 2016 in alliance with a faction of the Japan Innovation Party. The leadership of Renho, which emerged from the DP framework in the first leadership election held in September 2016, revealed internal conflicts regarding electoral cooperation among opposition parties. In 2017, Renho's leadership's attempt to adopt a nuclear-free policy as the party's platform caused discord with Rengo, a key support group of the DP. The DP's effort to differentiate itself from the LDP led by Abe through a nuclear-free policy was unsuccessful. Meanwhile, after a crushing defeat in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in July 2017, the newly formed Maehara Seiji leadership decided to dissolve the DP and merge into the Party of Hope led by Tokyo Governor Koike Yuriko, capitalizing on Koike's popularity during the dissolution of the House of Representatives in the fall of 2017 and the subsequent general election. Those who opposed this move established the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan centered around Yukio Edano, leading to the DP's division into the Party of Hope and the Constitutional Democratic Party in the October 2017 general election. Contrary to expectations of establishing a two-party conservative system, the political forces representing anti-LDP sentiment failed to demonstrate either the capacity to counter the LDP or a clear stance.

This division of the DPJ provided an opportunity for the convergence of various policy lines within the LDP. Even during Koizumi's premiership in the 2000s, there was a confrontation within the LDP between conservative-liberals and hard-line conservatives, centered on issues of national identity, visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and the abduction issue by North Korea. Abe, representing hard-line conservatives in the 2000s, served as LDP Secretary-General during the Koizumi administration, establishing a Basic Ideology Committee within the party to solidify the LDP's view of the nation and use it as a foundation for constitutional reform and the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education. He pursued a path of consolidating 'hard-line conservatives' focused on constitutional reform and the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education. Abe's 'hard-line conservative' path, unlike Koizumi's neoliberal reform path, had a hard-line conservative character based on traditional values. However, unlike Abe's hard-line conservative path, the conservative-liberal faction, which approached constitutional reform from a pro-constitution stance and sought to maintain a conciliatory policy toward Asia, acted as a constraint on Abe's hard-line conservatism dominating the LDP's policy lines. This influenced Abe, who became Prime Minister in the 2006 LDP presidential election with Yasukuni Shrine visits as a key issue, to adopt a conciliatory policy toward the public without visiting Yasukuni Shrine during his one-year tenure. Furthermore, they exerted influence to ensure that the 'Draft Constitution of Japan' (新憲法草案) finalized by the LDP in 2005 did not incorporate the traditional conservative elements advocated by Abe and others. In the late 2000s, Abe made the following statement about the distribution of power within the LDP: "About 20% are true conservatives like myself within the LDP, 12-13% are liberal figures like Kato Koichi, and the rest are opportunists." However, the LDP's crushing defeat in the 2009 general election brought about a change in the confrontation between conservative-liberals and hard-line conservatives within the party. Within the LDP, along with negative views on the neoliberal reforms led by Koizumi, the perception that the party should return to its founding principles and find its true conservative identity was widely shared. Tanigaki Sadakazu, who was elected president after the party became the opposition, departed from the liberal tendencies shown in the mid-2000s and pursued the goal of establishing the LDP's identity as a conservative party. Tanigaki also became an opportunist. During the period as an opposition party, the content of the LDP's pursuit of a conservative identity was filled with Abe's traditional values. The hard-line conservative faction, represented by Abe, succeeded in incorporating into the 'Draft Constitutional Revision of Japan' (日本国憲法改正草案), which was finalized as party policy in 2012, elements that could not be included in the 2005 'Draft Constitution of Japan' within the context of the LDP's pursuit of a conservative identity. This is significant given that the then-president who finally approved this draft was Tanigaki, who was considered a conservative-liberal figure as the successor to Kato Koichi's faction. While the LDP was in opposition during the DPJ administration, hard-line conservative tendencies became more widely accepted within the party.

Disappointment with the DPJ administration led to a significant factor in the maintenance of the LDP administration: voter disengagement from elections in Japanese society. Following 2012, a trend of non-participation in elections was observed among anti-LDP voters who had brought the DPJ administration to power. The proportional representation vote counts for the LDP have been a consistent indicator across the general elections of 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2017. The LDP obtained 18,810,217 votes (2009), 16,624,457 votes (2012), 17,658,916 votes (2014), and 18,555,711 votes (2017) in these four elections, respectively. The proportional representation vote counts reveal that the LDP's vote share has not increased in the elections since the LDP's victory in 2012. Paradoxically, the LDP received its highest number of proportional representation votes in the 2009 election, the only election it lost in the past four general elections. The DPJ, which received 29,844,799 votes in the 2009 proportional representation election, saw its vote count drop significantly to 9,628,653 in 2012 and 9,775,991 in 2014, altering the outcome of the House of Representatives proportional representation election. The total proportional representation vote count symbolizes that the overall support for the LDP in Japanese society has not significantly changed, regardless of whether the LDP experienced a landslide defeat or victory. In contrast, unlike the stable voting results for the LDP, many voters who had placed their hopes in the DP and participated in the 2009 election have been turning away from political participation since 2012. However, it is noteworthy that in the 2017 general election, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan garnered 11,084,890 votes, showing a relatively high proportional representation vote share, and when combined with the 9,677,524 votes obtained by the Party of Hope, the total votes for the two parties originating from the DPJ exceed those of the LDP. This indicates that the anti-LDP voter base, which had disengaged from elections after the DPJ administration, has the potential to re-engage in political participation through elections, depending on the political circumstances.

Abe Administration's Economic Policies

Amidst the lack of structural organization of anti-LDP forces in Japanese society into inter-party competition, the Abe administration has maintained a very high level of cabinet approval ratings in opinion polls for the past six years. With the exception of the passage of the security legislation in 2015 and the scandals involving Moritomo Gakuen and Kake Gakuen in 2017, approval ratings have consistently remained above 40%. There is no dispute that the long-term rule of the Abe administration is based on high cabinet approval ratings. While the LDP maintains high cabinet approval ratings, the anti-LDP political forces have not succeeded in organizing themselves, and within the LDP, there are no signs of challenges to "Abe 1-strong."

One of the reasons for the Abe administration's high approval ratings is the improvement in economic conditions, as represented by growth rates and employment rates. The Abe administration has promoted this as a result of Abenomics, and this was the case in the recent presidential election as well. However, there is room for debate regarding how much the quantitative easing, a core component of Abenomics, has contributed to economic improvement. While it is significant in that it encouraged increased investment from Japanese companies that had been hesitant to invest due to prolonged recession, the direct link between the promotion of Abenomics and the indicator of high employment rates is weak. This is because Japan's high employment rate is largely attributable to structural changes in society, such as population decline and aging. Of course, even if policies are not the direct cause of economic conditions, favorable economic conditions have a politically positive impact on the ruling party.

In this presidential election, Ishiba emphasized that the benefits of Abenomics were concentrated in large cities and large corporations and did not trickle down to regional areas and small and medium-sized enterprises. Kishida Fumio, the Chairman of the Policy Research Council, also raised this issue before withdrawing his candidacy for the presidential election. These arguments were an attempt to evoke the redistribution function that the LDP has consistently performed within the post-war political and economic system and to secure support from segments of society excluded from the trickle-down effect of Abenomics. However, unlike Koizumi's neoliberal reforms, Abe's economic policies did not lead to the politicization of social discontent. The Abe administration has set structural reform as the third arrow of Abenomics and formulates the Japan Revitalization Strategy annually. However, the Abe administration's structural reform path, unlike the Koizumi administration which weakened the redistribution function, is focused on enhancing sustainability in an era of population decline. The structural reform path to eliminate inefficiencies has not been concretized in policy, and fiscal measures as compensation for segments of society that could be excluded from the trickle-down effect of economic improvement have not been reduced. Agricultural reform, which was the most prominent in terms of eliminating inefficiencies under the Abe administration, was centered on reforming the governance of agricultural cooperatives, and fiscal measures for the agricultural sector were not reduced. The reason why the fiscal consolidation plan has been repeatedly postponed under the current administration is that Abe's policy stance does not involve reducing fiscal measures for inefficient social sectors.

In this regard, Prime Minister Abe's announcement of a blueprint during this presidential election—'to establish an employment system suitable for an era of lifelong careers within one year, and to proceed with reforms of the entire social security system, including healthcare and pensions, over the next two years'—is an important reference point for forecasting the political implications of future Abe administration economic policies. The shortage of labor in the Japanese labor market due to population decline is difficult to resolve through labor reforms such as promoting women's labor participation, which have been pursued thus far. Prime Minister Abe's remarks, which imply policies such as promoting the participation of the elderly (aged 65 and over) in the labor market and raising the age for social security benefit commencement in conjunction with this, could lead to increased individual burdens and reduced benefits from the perspective of beneficiaries (especially those aged 65-70). It remains to be seen whether the Abe administration can manage the anticipated social backlash without attracting political attention.

Behavior Patterns and Factional Dynamics of LDP Diet Members

In this presidential election, LDP Diet members overwhelmingly supported Abe. Prime Minister Abe received 329 out of 405 votes, or 81%. Nevertheless, Ishiba's receipt of about 20 more votes than expected from Diet members became news. The fact that over 80% of Diet members' support was less than anticipated demonstrates Abe's strong power within the current LDP. Six years ago, in the September 2012 LDP presidential election, although Ishiba led in votes from party members in the first round, Abe was elected president through the support of Diet members in both the first and second rounds. However, compared to that time, the support for Abe among LDP Diet members has significantly strengthened.

The tendency of Diet members to support a Prime Minister with high approval ratings is logically considered natural under the current electoral system and serves as the most crucial explanation for understanding Abe's long-term rule. However, this explanation based on the behavior patterns of Diet members is insufficient to understand the dynamics of Abe's support within the LDP, especially when considering the recent strengthening of factions within the LDP. The explanation based on the rational behavior patterns of Diet members supporting a Prime Minister/President with high popularity that benefits their own election is based on the assumption that the weakening of institutions such as support groups, factions, and policy research councils, which the LDP has long relied on under the 1955 system, and the strengthening of the Prime Minister/President's status were anticipated. However, as demonstrated in this presidential election, Prime Minister Abe's vote acquisition from Diet members within the party is based on securing support from various factions. In particular, the explanation of factional dynamics becomes more persuasive when included. The number of Diet members belonging to the Hosoda, Aso, and Nikai factions, which are active supporters of the Abe administration, amounts to 198 out of a total of 405 members, or 49%. Despite various rumors and scandals, Taro Aso's continued tenure as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance since the launch of the Abe administration, setting a record for the longest-serving Finance Minister in post-war history, attests to Aso's importance within the current Abe administration. Toshihiro Nikai, who has actively supported Abe since the early days of the Abe administration, has been a central figure in the Abe administration as Secretary-General since 2016. Although it is called "Abe 1-strong," the stability of the Abe administration is found in its factional dynamics, as it is based on a coalition of major factions. Of course, the explanation of Diet members' behavior patterns is applicable to the process by which other factions, excluding the Ishiba faction, ultimately supported Abe. In particular, the fact that the leadership and Upper House members of the Takeshita faction intended to support Ishiba at the factional level but it was thwarted by opposition from House of Representatives members clearly shows that the high cabinet approval ratings for the Abe administration are influencing the behavior patterns of Diet members.

Interestingly, the explanation based on the rational behavior patterns of Diet members is based on the assumption that the Prime Minister/President's popularity will benefit their elections; however, in reality, within the LDP Diet members' behavior patterns, there exists not only a logic of self-interest but also a psychological fear of punishment. The memory of Koizumi's punishment of dissenting members in the 2005 postal reform election remains strong within the LDP. The memory of the postal reform election makes LDP Diet members hesitant to challenge strong leadership. Although the policy preferences of LDP members have generally become more conservative during the opposition period, policy consensus is not the core factor in the current active support for Abe within the LDP. The re-strengthening of factions within the LDP may be a result of the fear of punishment from a strong Prime Minister/President. Of course, in policy processes, the Abe administration makes more active use of the internal pre-screening system compared to the Koizumi administration. Even with policies led by the Prime Minister's Office, unlike Koizumi who bypassed the party, the Abe administration shows respect for internal party processes. However, while the party is given an active role in policy processes, the basic agenda setting is carried out under the leadership of the Prime Minister's Office, and free expression of opinions within the party on these matters remains difficult.

Conclusion

It is uncertain whether Abe can maintain his term as Prime Minister/President for the full three years, but the policy agenda that the Abe administration intends to pursue in the future is likely to bring about changes in the various factors that allow the Abe LDP to continue for a long time. The process of pursuing constitutional revision, which Abe considers a long-cherished goal, may lead to changes in the powerless opposition and the disengaged Japanese society. Furthermore, the upcoming economic policy tasks—the exit strategy from quantitative easing, the consumption tax hike to 10% in the fall of 2019, and social security system reform—will be noteworthy for their political implications. Looking back at the history of the LDP, the party has consistently shown a pattern of ousting prime ministers with low approval ratings. The extent to which the Abe administration successfully manages these political aspects during the process of constitutional revision and economic policy implementation will determine the attitudes of LDP Diet members and factions toward Abe. ■

■ Author: Lee Jeong-hwan_ Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. His main research areas are Japanese politics and economy, and Japanese foreign policy.

The Abe Administration's 'Successful Conclusion' and the Korean Peninsula

Fukagawa Yukiko, Professor, Waseda University

On September 20, the day of the LDP presidential election, Japanese news was filled not with election coverage but with discussions about the inter-Korean summit. This was because Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's victory, having declared his final term, was almost certain. There were no extreme policy differences between him and his challenger, Ishiba, and Abe's only challenge was 'how to win.' In the previous presidential election, Ishiba had surpassed the Prime Minister in votes from local party members, although he was not a Diet member. However, this time, Prime Minister Abe won, securing 329 out of 402 votes from Diet members (excluding invalid votes) and 224 out of 405 votes from local party members. The Abe administration, despite facing a series of scandals surrounding Prime Minister Abe due to its prolonged tenure, was rescued by the division of the opposition parties. Furthermore, this time, Ishiba's challenge and the fact that Koizumi Shinjiro (the second son of former Prime Minister Koizumi), who enjoyed high public popularity, stated, "There must be a party that allows for dissent," and supported Ishiba at the last minute, ironically mitigated criticism of the arrogance that comes with a long-term administration, bringing him good fortune. Even if the Abe administration fails to complete its term, the LDP administration appears poised to continue.

Amidst severe divisions and political conflicts in major countries around the world, what has been the reason for the Abe administration's relative stability until recently? Simply put, it is because public satisfaction has been relatively high in two aspects: the economy, which has the market as its counterpart, and foreign policy, which has other countries as its counterpart. In surveys conducted by the Cabinet Office for a long time, the combined response to the question "Are you satisfied with your current life?" exceeded 75% as of July 2018, a significant increase from 60% in 2008. Among young people aged 18-29, this satisfaction was even higher at 82%, surpassing that of middle-aged and older individuals aged 40 and above.

In economic terms, since the launch of the second Abe administration, the government adopted a path to combat deflation by advocating "Abenomics," which consists of bold quantitative monetary easing, dynamic fiscal management, and private-sector-led growth strategies. As a result, the government pursued quantitative easing at an extreme level compared to Western countries, and above all, despite having the worst fiscal situation among developed nations, it began to be constantly scrutinized by the market regarding stock prices and long-term interest rates. Except for large corporations that have achieved record profits, the success that the public has truly felt from the rapid growth strategy has been limited to the roughly threefold to fourfold increase in foreign tourists over five years. However, while this demand has gradually spread not only to consumption but also to the rebound of land prices and the overseas businesses of small and medium-sized enterprises, the full-scale retirement of the baby boomer generation has led to job shortages and employment insecurity, thereby dispelling the sense of stagnation that had permeated society.

In terms of foreign policy, compared to the period between 2006 and 2012 when prime ministers changed almost every year, the administration has been stable. The Abe administration has pursued an active foreign policy, starting with the successful bid for the Tokyo Olympics, strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance, managing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) abandoned due to the change of administration in the United States, concluding the Japan-EU FTA, re-examining relations with Russia, with whom there was no peace treaty, and restoring frozen Japan-China relations. Although Japan is relatively less interested in foreign policy, the public's dissatisfaction with the decline or contraction of Japan's international standing due to domestic political turmoil, the Great East Japan Earthquake, and the nuclear accident has gradually improved. While they constitute only about 2% of the population, the relatively tolerant approach towards the rapidly increasing number of foreign workers has led to a slight increase in wages for non-regular workers, a long-standing issue. Moreover, the anti-globalization movement has not destabilized domestic politics as it has in the United States and Europe, thereby maintaining the freedom of foreign policy.

However, there is no guarantee that the Abe administration will achieve a 'successful conclusion' with the Tokyo Olympics as its final act. The escape from deflation is only at an ambiguous level, and the market has begun to react negatively to the pace of productivity improvement due to the delay in technological innovation and the subsequent recovery of growth potential. Although Japan's trade dependence is low on the surface, Japanese companies have established long, deep, and complex supply chains in Asia, including the United States and China. Unable to rely solely on domestic demand like the United States, the damage and uncertainty from the trade war between the world's two largest markets are also increasing. If the United States demands greater liberalization of agricultural and fishery products beyond the TPP and the negotiation of a U.S.-Japan FTA begins, will the protectionist policies for the agricultural and fishery sectors, which had just reached a compromise, be revived?

The foreign policy arena is also fraught with challenges. Despite being pressured by the market, constitutional revision is undoubtedly the central political value for the Abe administration. Although it has pledged to maintain its non-nuclear weapons policy, as Ishiba criticized, it is still difficult to say that sufficient public understanding and support have been obtained. Constitutional revision is heavily influenced by surrounding diplomacy. Unfortunately, the framework of diplomacy centered on the Japan-U.S. alliance is being shaken by the unpredictable Trump administration. While a balance has been maintained through expressions of participation in China's Belt and Road Initiative and efforts to promote economic cooperation with Russia over the Northern Territories, there are limits to the security relationship with China, which is strengthening its maritime expansion. Russia and North Korea are also unlikely to act boldly as long as U.S. economic sanctions continue.

Finally, how does South Korea and the Korean Peninsula appear to the Abe administration, which is seeking a 'successful conclusion'? Japan's allergy to nuclear weapons is intense, as it is the world's only country to have suffered nuclear attacks. Unlike South Korea, where politicians speak of developing nuclear weapons to counter North Korea, Japan harbors a greater distrust and hatred towards North Korea's nuclear development than the United States. The gap in sentiment with South Korea, which is rapidly moving towards reconciliation with North Korea, will not be easily bridged. While South Korea's perspective on inter-Korean cooperation tends to be continental-oriented, focusing on concepts like the Land Bridge initiative and energy cooperation, Japan tends to be ocean-oriented, focusing on the Indo-Pacific region, and their directions will differ here as well. However, speaking coolly and excluding emotional arguments, South Korea and Japan share many common interests. The prevalence of protectionism poses a significant common threat, and South Korea and Japan cannot create growth structures like the United States and China, which use their vast domestic markets as laboratories for technological innovation. It will be difficult to avoid increased burdens on social security due to rapid aging, and it will be difficult to address vested interests such as Japan's agricultural sector and South Korea's labor unions. Although there may be many frictions in political terms at the national level, at the micro-level of local governments, corporations, and individuals, there are many common interests in the socio-economic sphere. There are many areas for cooperation, such as competitive deregulation, sharing of specialized personnel in fields like IT, and promoting the maintenance and deepening of the WTO's functions. If practical cooperation accumulates and mutual positions are clarified, more opportunities can be found for Abe's diplomacy aimed at a 'successful conclusion.' ■

■ Author: Fukagawa Yukiko(深川由起子)_ Professor at the Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University. She holds a Master's degree in International Economics from Yale University and is pursuing a Ph.D. at Waseda University. Her main research areas are East Asian development, growth, and economic systems.

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