[EAI Commentary] Local Elections and Party Realignment

[Editor's Note]

The local elections held on June 13 concluded with a landslide victory for the ruling Democratic Party. However, post-election discussions have focused more on the implications for the future political landscape than on the election results themselves. Political science refers to the process of structural change and persistence in the relationship between voters and parties as 'realignment.' Professor Park Won-ho of Seoul National University analyzes that the current party system in South Korea shows a strong possibility of undergoing realignment based on these elections. Professor Park cites the simultaneous collapse of the relative balance between parties at the voter, government, and organizational levels, the systematic defection of voters who supported conservative parties, and the emergence of new issues beyond existing ones as evidence for this analysis.

The 7th local elections, held on June 13, resulted in the election of 4,016 officials, including 17 mayors and provincial governors, 17 superintendents of education, and 226 heads of local governments. Additionally, 12 members of the National Assembly were elected through concurrent by-elections. However, any discussion surrounding these elections inevitably focused not on the results of the 'local' elections themselves, but on the broader picture they painted and the implications for the future of our politics. This is because we are navigating an era of unprecedented political upheaval, and these elections were perceived as a powerful message from the voters to the political establishment, extending beyond the mere formation of local governments at various levels.

We can perhaps label the message sent by the voters as a realignment of party politics. Beyond the 4,000-plus individual elected officials, what collective message are voters sending, and what does this imply for our party politics? Are these changes merely reflecting the temporary dynamics of power during a period of impeachment and inter-Korean reconciliation, or do they herald the arrival of a new party system that will persist over a considerable long term?

As with all social science research, particularly studies on elections and parties, we are more accustomed to describing and analyzing static states and possess a limited theoretical and empirical toolkit for understanding large-scale structural changes. In this sense, answers to these questions can only be provisional. Nevertheless, this article aims to discuss the possibilities and implications that the recent local elections hold for the long-term realignment of South Korean party politics.

Theoretical Discussion of Party Realignment

The literature on American voting behavior and electoral history refers to the structural change and persistence in the relationship between voters and parties as "realignment." Their arguments can be summarized as follows.

First, realignment exists on multiple levels. For instance, according to Professor Key (1955), a party simultaneously exists as an organization (party-in-the-organization), as a force behind the government or legislature (party-in-the-government/legislature), and, more importantly, in the minds of the electorate (party-in-the-electorate). When we speak of the realignment of parties and party systems, it means that all of these are being reconstructed in the short term. This signifies not just a change in the collective of politicians or their relative dynamics, but also a shift in the party identification or partisanship held in the minds of voters. For example, the term "two-party system" does not merely refer to the relative balance of two parties in the legislature but also to the division of voter support. In a strict sense, realignment signifies the collapse of this balance across all dimensions.

Second, the attachment between parties and voters persists stably over a considerable period. This is because voters internalize the values of a particular party through the process of political socialization, support policies and candidates, and strengthen these connections through political practice. This connection does not necessarily need to be based on rational policy support. For example, minority groups in the United States supported the Republican Party, Lincoln's party, and conservative voters in the American South supported the Democratic Party for a considerable time, even after the historical origins had faded and largely irrespective of policy positions. The seminal work on American electoral studies, "The American Voter," was in fact a study of this persistent loyalty to a party; according to this book, what best explains American elections is not policy or candidates, but voters' party identification (Campbell et al. 1960).

Third, this relationship between parties and voters sometimes experiences catastrophic breaks under specific historical circumstances, and interestingly, these cycles occur approximately every 30 years. Due to space limitations, it is impossible to detail all relevant elections, but the "New Deal coalition" formed around President Roosevelt in the 1932 U.S. election, which encompassed urban workers, minority groups, intellectuals, and Southern whites—all distinct from previous Democratic supporters—and initiated a long period of Democratic governance, is a quintessential example of realignment. Subsequently, the Civil Rights Movement in 1964, which saw the full transfer of Black support to the Democratic Party, and the 1994 elections, where religious conflicts came to the fore and the Republican Party gained a majority in Congress, are generally understood as "critical elections" that initiated realignment. Interestingly, these critical elections occur in cycles of approximately 30 years (Burnham 1970).

Fourth, this realignment does not occur in a vacuum but is driven by key issues. Newly emerging issues complement or replace previous ones, and new political cleavages replace existing ones. For instance, the 1964 U.S. election proceeded with racial conflict issues encroaching upon the issue of national welfare, which formed the basis of the previous New Deal coalition (Carmines and Stimson 1989).

To summarize the above:

1) The Trinity Thesis: Has the long-standing balance of power between parties shifted across all dimensions—party organization, party in government, and voter partisanship?

2) The Partisanship Thesis: Has the psychological attachment voters have internalized with parties changed, particularly among specific voter groups? Is this change structural and persistent?

3) The Cyclical Thesis: a) Metaphysical cyclical theory: Do these structural changes repeat in cycles of approximately 30 years? b) Empirical generational theory: If the 30-year period represents the replacement of a generation, what generational changes are occurring?

4) The Issue Thesis: Have new issues emerged that are causing these changes? Are the new issues powerful enough to replace previous ones? And are these issues persistent?

Are We Undergoing a Period of Realignment?

The above points are highly interesting in themselves, but they are also crucial for evaluating the current trajectory of South Korean politics and providing a starting point for long-term predictions. This is because we can move beyond merely describing the recent elections and identify critical junctures in the discussion. Evaluating the recent local elections based on the aforementioned theses yields the following:

(1) The Trinity Thesis: Collapse of the Balance Between Voters, Government, and Parties as Organizations

It is no exaggeration to say that virtually all media critiques of this election have converged on this question. All critiques implicitly asked whether the high public support for the president and the ruling party—that is, the 'party in the electorate'—would translate into the composition of local governments, and more importantly, whether the dynamics of parties within the National Assembly, which differ significantly from this public support distribution, would change. More specifically, it manifested as a question of whether the public support distribution revealed by these local elections would persist until the National Assembly elections two years later. The emphasis on the results of the local government head elections was likely due to the fact that these electoral districts most closely resemble those for the National Assembly elections to be held in two years, rather than an interest in the results themselves. Of course, for the same reason, the results of the 12 by-elections were also of paramount interest.

The answer to this question is straightforward. What these local elections have shown is that the distribution of voter party support is significantly different from that of the National Assembly elections held two years prior, and this difference was confirmed in terms of vote share. The bipolar confrontation that had persisted for a considerable period, or the multi-party distribution revealed in the 2016 general elections and the 2017 presidential election, has now manifested in these local elections as a near one-party dominant system, or a "1.5 party system" composed of one dominant majority party and weak minority parties.

What needs particular emphasis here is that even if the distribution of voter progressivism and conservatism shifted from approximately 4:6 to 6:4 in a short period, this election demonstrated that it signifies a very rapid and fundamental change in the process of producing 'parties in government.' Despite the medium-sized electoral districts (local councils) and limited proportional representation (local and regional councils), the small-district electoral system currently in place has resulted in a more drastic concentration of votes than the change in voter distribution. The ruling party won 151 out of 226 local government heads, two-thirds of the total, and swept all but one district in Seoul and two in Gyeonggi Province. In the Gyeonggi Provincial Assembly, the ruling party secured 128 out of 129 seats. It appears relatively clear that if the general elections were held tomorrow, the ruling party would achieve an overwhelming majority.

Party organizations also appear to be rapidly experiencing centripetal forces towards the ruling party and centrifugal forces away from the opposition parties before and after the election. The ruling party has grown in qualitative and quantitative terms, to the extent that it had to hold primaries in the Yeongnam region, where it previously struggled to find candidates. Conversely, the opposition parties appear to need a period of reorganization, undergoing divisions, competition among multiple parties, and internal accountability debates. It remains uncertain whether the less than two years until the general elections are sufficient, but the relative balance of party organizations appears to be a firmly dominant one-party system at present.

In summary, the balance of power among parties across the three dimensions of voters, government, and organizations, as revealed by these local elections, has clearly been broken. In particular, local governments have been formed with the ruling party overwhelmingly represented, far exceeding the distribution of voters, which is likely to further exacerbate the imbalance in party organizations. In this sense, it is highly probable that opposition parties will actively pursue revisions to the political relations laws to move beyond the small-district electoral system, while the ruling party may have an incentive to adopt a lukewarm stance on proportional representation, which it previously advocated.

(2) The Partisanship Thesis: Have South Korean Voters Changed?

While more detailed research at the voter level is needed, provisional answers to questions such as whether voters' party identification has persisted and whether it has fundamentally changed due to specific events are as follows.

First, although South Korean parties have formed a highly 'fluid' party system through constant name changes and mergers and splits, it has been assessed that voters have not had significant difficulty identifying 'their party' until now. It is understood that voters have historically voted based on their party attachment, independent of short-term issues, policies, or candidate characteristics (Park Won-ho et al. 2014). Whether this foundation was regionalism, economic policy, attitudes toward authoritarianism, or generational factors, it is true that this voter attachment to parties has persisted for a considerable period, and we can refer to this system as the '87 System.

Second, nevertheless, there are signs of specific voter groups, particularly supporters of conservative parties, abandoning 'their party' in a relatively short period and shifting to minor conservative parties or the ruling party. Hypothetically, the coalition that South Korean conservative parties have formed since the merger of three parties—namely, developmental state conservatism and market-oriented conservatism—may have become untenable during the Park Geun-hye administration (Kang Won-taek 2017). Empirical findings indicate that relatively young voters in the Seoul metropolitan area with high levels of education and income no longer support the Liberty Korea Party in the last presidential election and do not even consider it as a second choice.

Third, the persistence of the current party system change will be determined by whether this 'defection' from conservative parties is short-term or long-term. However, what is certain is that this defection was already detected in 2016 (Park Won-ho 2016), materialized through the candlelight protests and impeachment, manifested in the 2017 presidential election, and has been reconfirmed in the recent local elections.

It appears that more time will be needed to collect and analyze all the data for these discussions. Furthermore, researchers will need to observe several more elections to clearly understand whether these changes are short-term or will persist. Nevertheless, what is certain is that this defection from conservative parties has accelerated and continued for a considerable period since 2016.

(3) The Cyclical Thesis: Another Name for Generational Theory?

In fact, there is no serious discussion in American electoral literature about why realignment occurs in 30-year cycles. It is merely speculated that perhaps it takes about 30 years for one generation to completely disappear and be replaced by a new one. In the context of South Korea, where the history of democracy and universal suffrage is relatively short, discussing a 30-year cycle is undoubtedly premature. Nevertheless, what is interesting is that the present moment marks 30 years since the "87 System" began, and it may be related to generational changes in the South Korean demographic composition over that period.

For example, the 50-somethings in 2018—better known as the '386 generation'—who constitute about 20% of the population, are politically closer to the current ruling party compared to their counterparts 10, 20, or 30 years ago. They have not politically aged (age effect), and they represent an overwhelming proportion of the total electorate. Those in their 40s and 50s now account for nearly 40% of the total electorate, while the elderly population aged 60 and above accounts for only 25%. These demographic changes are very gradual but, like the passage of time, irreversible. As mentioned earlier, it is worth recalling that even if voters' partisan shifts are not significant, their impact on election results can be substantial.

An interesting discussion related to this is the 10-year cycle theory of power alternation between conservative and progressive parties. The hypothesis suggests that when power shifts from one political faction to another, that faction holds power for about 10 years—perhaps two presidential terms—and then power returns to the opposing faction due to policy failures during that period. In this context, analyses frequently juxtapose the recent local elections with the 4th local elections in 2006, when the Grand National Party achieved a landslide victory.

To state the conclusion upfront, neither the 10-year cycle theory nor the 30-year cycle theory is subject to empirical verification. In particular, the hypothesis that conservatives and progressives alternate power every 10 years is not a discussion at the voter level but a metaphysical argument predicated on the inevitable corruption of private power accompanying South Korea's "imperial presidency" and is therefore not a serious consideration. Regarding the "30-year cycle theory," the focus should be on the generational discussion it implies, rather than the 30-year period itself.

Equally noteworthy as the '386 generation theory' mentioned above are recent studies on the 'conservatism' of those in their 20s and 30s. What is certain is that these groups have not supported the Saenuri Party and the Liberty Korea Party in recent elections, and if this trend continues, the support base for South Korean conservative parties will continue to shrink.

(4) The Issue Thesis: What Are the New Issues?

Have there been issues that have divided voters in entirely new ways, enabling the current Democratic Party to form a coalition of voters far exceeding a majority? Hypothetical answers to this question would likely be, first, the "clearing of deep-rooted evils" ( 적폐청산) and, second, inter-Korean reconciliation. While it is difficult to assert definitively without sufficient academic data collection and analysis, both theoretically appear to possess considerable potential and promise.

If South Korean political cleavages have been centered around region and generation for the past 30 years, then issues causing these cleavages have certainly existed. Representative examples include the issue of democratization (or authoritarianism), and economic growth (or welfare distribution) and security (or unification) have also been major issues dividing South Korean voters into progressive and conservative camps. What is interesting is that, as indicated by political science literature on issue evolution, the issues newly emerging in 2018 are not entirely new but rather reconstruct existing issues in different ways, thereby gradually altering the composition of issue coalitions.

First, 'clearing of deep-rooted evils' is, precisely speaking, another name for the liquidation of authoritarianism from the developmental state era, and it is a contemporary variation of the traditional issue of democratization versus authoritarianism. However, unlike in the past, the issue of democratization versus authoritarianism has found a clear object of opposition through the candlelight protests and impeachment process. If the Park Geun-hye administration's policy choices, such as the state-authored history textbooks and the unilateral closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, already demonstrated the characteristics of a typical authoritarian state, leading to the defection of market-friendly conservative voters in the 2016 general elections, then the state-sponsored corruption revealed during the impeachment process prompted these individuals to take to the streets with candles. In short, the 'clearing of deep-rooted evils' as an agenda in 2018 could have formed a much larger coalition than in elections held in the 2000s or even as far back as 1987.

Second, security has traditionally been a favorable issue for South Korean conservative parties. It was also an issue that encompassed young voters in their 20s and 30s, who are known to hold more 'conservative' positions on North Korea than even those in their 40s and 50s. The reconciliation process between North and South Korea and the United States, which rapidly unfolded from the beginning of the year, may have helped the ruling party reconstruct the security issue in its favor, and in a sense, this was an unexpected stroke of luck for the ruling party.

However, what I want to emphasize most here is the unique way the president and the ruling party have handled the security issue. No one has prominently featured terms like 'unification' or 'nation,' but rather the key related keywords have been 'reconciliation' and 'coexistence.' The traditional security issue has expanded to a new dimension beyond defense and unification. Although this needs to be verified with more detailed data, it is worth recalling that a core aspect of the attitude of South Koreans in their 20s and 30s toward North Korea involves a certain indifference and active economic pragmatism. In this regard, the government and ruling party have found a minimum agenda that these groups can accept. In the process, South Korea's traditional 'security conservatives' have been forced into a defensive position.

As discussed above, discussions on new issues are bound to be speculative, and it remains unknown how significant they actually were or whether they will remain long-term issues that define South Korean elections. However, it is certain that these two issues possess the strongest explanatory power.

In Lieu of a Conclusion: What Time Is It Now?

Just as Minerva's owl can only fly at dusk, it is difficult for South Korean social science to definitively state whether the country's parties are currently undergoing a period of comprehensive realignment. If this is the case, we are navigating a path where everything around us is rapidly and simultaneously in flux, and discerning what lies at the end of this path will be even more challenging. The point at which the balance between parties breaks down is also a time when a comprehensive revision of the rules, such as the electoral system, is considered. Furthermore, the complex and delicate international geopolitical situation can only act as a factor increasing fluidity on another level.

Nevertheless, the current situation in 2018 also imposes upon us the responsibility to roughly gauge where we stand and where we are heading. This is particularly true because the party system that defined South Korean politics since the democratization of 1987, or the "87 System," has been called upon to adapt and change in some form through the candlelight protests and impeachment process that began in late 2016, and these local elections represent the most recent response from South Korean politics and society.

One way to understand this is to revisit questions such as whether this is a period of party system realignment or whether the recent elections we have just passed were 'critical elections.' According to the discussion in this article, there appears to be a strong possibility that this is the case. The relative balance of parties is collapsing simultaneously at the voter, government, and organizational levels, and in particular, the systematic defection of voters who supported conservative parties, unfavorable generational prospects, and the emergence of new issues beyond existing ones all point to the possibility of realignment.

The normative discussion about whether the future to which the current changes lead will be desirable remains another complex challenge. For instance, questions persist about whether a one-party dominant party politics is possible and desirable in South Korea, how to interpret local elections from which the 'local' has evaporated, and whether more urgent and important issues have been obscured in the process. However, in any case, the starting point for all answers will be the question of where we stand and what point in time this is in modern Korean history. ■

References

Burnham, Walter Dean. 1970. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: Norton.

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1980. The American Voter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1989. Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics. Reprint edition. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Key, V. O. Jr. 1955. “A Theory of Critical Elections.” The Journal of Politics 17 (1): 3–18.

Kang, Won-taek. 2017. “The Conservative Politics in the 2017 Presidential Election.” *Journal of Korean Political Parties* 16 (2): 5-33.

Park, Won-ho. 2016. “Central Perspective: The 20th General Election and the Reorganization of the 1987 System.” *JoongAng Ilbo*, May 27.

Park, Won-ho & Shin, Hwa-yong. 2014. “The Emotional Basis of Party Preference.” *Korean Political Science Review* 48 (5): 119–42.

Author

Park, Won-ho_ Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) and has served as Vice President of the Korean Political Parties Association, Research Director of the Korean Political Science Association, and Research Director of the Korean Survey Research Association. His main research areas include voting behavior, comparative parties, Korean politics, and quantitative analysis. His major books and edited volumes include *Looking Back at Changes in Korean Society* (co-authored), *The Reality and Reform Tasks of Korean Local Autonomy* (co-authored), and *American Politics Through Issues* (co-authored).

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