[EAI Commentary] New Challenges Following the Panmunjom Declaration*

[Editor's Note]

On April 27, the leaders of South and North Korea held a historic meeting and announced the Panmunjom Declaration, which includes provisions on inter-Korean economic cooperation and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, for the full realization of this declaration, the 'North Korean nuclear issue' must be overcome. Professor Jeon Jae-sung of Seoul National University analyzes that this can only be resolved through phased cooperation with the United States, China, other Northeast Asian countries, and the international community. Furthermore, Professor Jeon emphasizes that to facilitate such cooperation, the South Korean government must take the lead in ensuring that the balance of power among major nations is at least maintained in the North Korean nuclear negotiations, and ideally, that the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue becomes a positive-sum game beneficial to all.

The inter-Korean summit held on April 27, 2018, and the Panmunjom Declaration have exceptionally raised expectations for the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula. Firstly, the South Korean government's persistent and sincere efforts to achieve North Korea's denuclearization and establish lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula paved the way for the summit. It conveyed its lack of intention to pursue absorption unification, sent signals of pursuing peace, prosperity, and unification through a strategic relationship with the Kim Jong-un regime, and pursued a North Korean nuclear strategy aligned with neighboring countries like the U.S. and China, as well as the international community. Despite considerable domestic and international skepticism, the summit and the anticipated North Korea-U.S. summit have created a turning point for the North Korean nuclear issue, deepening the nation's aspirations for the future.

Secondly, the North Korean nuclear issue concerns North Korea's survival and its position in Northeast Asia, making the establishment of North Korea-U.S. relations a core task since the early 1990s. With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a unipolar world order dominated by the U.S., North Korea, in a state of armistice, inevitably had to focus on establishing a new relationship with the U.S., its adversary. Leading up to and following the recent inter-Korean summit, South Korea made significant efforts to redefine North Korea-U.S. relations, and both North Korea and the U.S. responded positively.

Thirdly, the fact that the Panmunjom Declaration effectively addressed the North Korean nuclear issue as a primary agenda item and linked it to the issue of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula indicates that the overall structure of the North Korean nuclear and North Korean issues was shared between the two Koreas. This will serve as a foundation for South Korea to discuss related issues with North Korea within this overall structure in the future.

Various opinions, both supportive and opposing, have been voiced domestically regarding the structure and content of the Panmunjom Declaration, and most of them hold significant meaning. What is crucial is that the inter-Korean summit is merely the entry point for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue and its root cause, the North Korean problem. The meaning and success of these efforts will be determined as part of a larger package involving subsequent negotiations and changes. South and North Korea have outlined exchange and cooperation projects based on past agreements and national aspirations, without violating international economic sanctions against North Korea, and have reached a principled agreement on conventional arms reduction. However, for inter-Korean economic cooperation to reach a meaningful stage and for conventional arms reduction to lead to overall military confidence-building, the North Korean nuclear issue must be resolved. Furthermore, the North Korean nuclear issue can only be fully resolved through phased cooperation with the United States, followed by China, Northeast Asian countries, and the international community.

The North Korean nuclear program provides North Korea with various benefits. Foremost among these, as confirmed by North Korea's statements, are security guarantees and deterrence. In North Korea's terms, it is a firm countermeasure against the U.S.'s hostile policy toward North Korea. North Korea has consistently argued that it cannot abandon its nuclear weapons without concrete assurances that the U.S. hostile policy has been withdrawn, and has maintained the position that North Korea's denuclearization is impossible before global denuclearization, as U.S. nuclear strategy could ultimately threaten North Korea. However, at the Third Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea on April 20, North Korea presented the great victory of 'Byungjin' (parallel development of economy and nuclear weapons) and a new strategic line. It declared that peace had been secured through the completion of nuclear armament and that 'the completion of nuclear weaponization has been verified.' It officially declared that 'no further nuclear tests and test-firings of intercontinental ballistic missiles are necessary,' thereby freezing future nuclear and missile development. It also claimed that 'the suspension of nuclear tests is an important process for global nuclear disarmament.' The new strategic line also declared a focus on socialist economic construction.

Having experienced stringent economic sanctions based on firm international consensus, North Korea is acutely aware that socialist economic construction hinges on the complete abandonment of its nuclear weapons. Therefore, the decision of the plenary meeting could be interpreted as a strategic choice for economic construction that includes not only the freezing of nuclear and missile programs but also the dismantling of past and present nuclear capabilities. The challenge lies in whether Chairman Kim Jong-un can obtain the physical security assurances for his regime that would satisfy him and his ruling elite. Until then, North Korea will cautiously explore new paths, maintaining its current nuclear arsenal, to ascertain if a new parallel development of security and economic progress is truly possible. North Korea's strategic shift is open to the future, and while the inter-Korean summit is guiding North Korea toward a desired path, numerous challenges remain.

The North Korean nuclear program serves as a means to guarantee the military survival of the political entity of North Korea, its Juche ideology-based system, the dictatorial political system of the Kim Jong-un regime, and even Kim Jong-un's personal political and personal survival. It is not possible for external actors to guarantee all of these. North Korea itself has claimed that its system and regime are solid and that external guarantees are unnecessary. The problem is that the nuclear weapons developed for military survival have ultimately weakened North Korea's military, diplomatic, and economic standing, and furthermore, the domestic position of the Kim Jong-un regime. Consequently, if the North Korean nuclear issue is not resolved, there is a high probability that North Korea will internally lose the basis for guaranteeing all of these. Therefore, the Kim Jong-un regime will inevitably demand substantial compensation for the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons.

The issue of a peace regime has been discussed since the aftermath of the Korean War, with various proposals regarding its components and forms. Peace requires not only the passive security guarantee efforts of the conflicting parties but also active mechanisms for sustainable peace. Above all, a peace regime evolves with changes in the security environment. Discussions on a peace regime in the post-Cold War era and immediately after, in the 1990s, and today, are based on vastly different contexts. In the post-Cold War landscape, with the disappearance of former communist states, North Korea became a nuclear weapons state, underwent significant structural economic changes, and its relations with the international community deteriorated due to severe economic sanctions. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, heightened global vigilance against nuclear weapons led to increased U.S. concern and demands regarding North Korea's nuclear capabilities. The breakdown of previous agreements between North Korea and the U.S., and in the Six-Party Talks, during the implementation phase, has led to accumulated distrust and intensified emotional confrontation. The geopolitical value and orientation of North Korea, inevitably brought about by the North Korean nuclear issue, have also shifted with the currents of Northeast Asian and global affairs. The rise of China has sharpened U.S.-China competition, and the future of the Korean Peninsula has emerged as a critical arena for U.S.-China strategic confrontation. It is now more difficult to reach agreements in geopolitical competition between the two powers than when Kissinger and Zhou Enlai pursued a mini-détente on the Korean Peninsula in 1971 to achieve U.S.-China consensus. Despite a peace agreement, advancements in weapons technology could lead to the development of military hardware capable of covertly threatening adversaries, and the proliferation of information could increase the potential for espionage against opposing political systems. The political polarization within the U.S. and South Korea, North Korea's main counterparts, has also deepened, raising questions about the extent to which these democratic nations' governments will consistently uphold past agreements.

It will not be easy for North Korea to overcome the fear that 'even if the two Koreas declare an end to the war and the relevant parties, including South and North Korea, sign a peace treaty in exchange for complete denuclearization, the end-of-war declaration or peace treaty may become mere scraps of paper in a reality of international politics where a supranational judicial order does not function robustly, unlike domestic order' (Ha Young-sun, 2018). On July 6, 2016, North Korea proposed five principles for regime security: public disclosure of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea, withdrawal and verification of all nuclear weapons and bases in South Korea, cessation of deployment of U.S. nuclear strike capabilities, cessation of nuclear threats against North Korea and commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and declaration of the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea. Recently, it has been reported that North Korea has proposed the withdrawal and cessation of deployment of U.S. nuclear strategic assets. Even if North Korea obtains certain concessions in this process, it is practically impossible to physically and irreversibly neutralize the possibility of a U.S. nuclear attack. With its nuclear capabilities, the U.S. can easily launch a nuclear attack on North Korea even from its mainland. Therefore, North Korea's sense of security will be determined by the agreement, confidence-building, and verification of sincerity between North Korea and the U.S. during the peace regime negotiations. In other words, without the co-evolution of North Korea and the U.S., supported by South Korea and neighboring countries, it is structurally very difficult to realize an agreement that is close to impossible. Until then, it is highly predictable that North Korea, while retaining its current and past nuclear weapons, will attempt to draw the U.S. into nuclear disarmament talks by demanding a reduction in U.S. nuclear capabilities during peace regime negotiations. If North Korea were to easily lower its military security level solely based on diplomatic and economic guarantees for a peace treaty, without such persistent efforts, it would signify an unprecedented level of trust in the U.S.

The background to President Trump's high expectations and confidence regarding the North Korea-U.S. summit appears to be the North Korean leadership's stated commitment to complete denuclearization, conveyed by the South Korean government, along with various North Korea-U.S. contacts, including those involving Secretary of State Pompeo. President Trump, eager to achieve his most significant political accomplishment since taking office following the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, is strongly motivated to reach a principled agreement on complete denuclearization between North Korea and the U.S. The crucial question is whether President Trump can understand North Korea's deep-seated distrust and sense of threat, demonstrate empathy that satisfies North Korea, and provide the physical security assurances as a counter-benefit, with the same intensity as his desire for North Korea's denuclearization. The level of physical assurances will be determined in conjunction with the degree of trust between North Korea and the U.S., as well as the diplomatic and economic incentives the U.S. can offer.

Currently, strategists and North Korea experts in the U.S. harbor deep distrust of North Korea, coupled with emotional antagonism and distrust towards President Trump, leading to a strongly skeptical outlook on the outcome of the North Korea-U.S. summit. They view both scenarios—a successful summit leading to implementation or a breakdown resulting in deteriorating relations—with skepticism. Among U.S. experts, the prevailing view is that sustained economic sanctions against North Korea and North Korea's preemptive nuclear abandonment are the inevitable path forward. They predict that if the summit fails, the subsequent situation will worsen. Before negotiations commence, the U.S. is setting stricter denuclearization standards and demanding additional agendas and conditions beyond nuclear weapons, such as the dismantlement of biological and chemical weapons and addressing North Korean human rights issues, to maximize pressure on North Korea. This not only increases pressure on North Korea but also risks weakening the U.S.'s own negotiating position, as President Trump faces the mounting burden of achieving a meaningful outcome from the North Korea-U.S. summit that satisfies domestic U.S. demands while also being strategically sound.

The North Korea-China summit held in Dalian on May 8 is North Korea's response to the U.S.'s strengthened conditions for negotiations with North Korea prior to the North Korea-U.S. summit. Immediately after the summit, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that North Korea had called for the 'cessation of the hostile policy and security threats from the U.S.' Amidst increasingly stringent U.S. negotiation conditions, North Korea sought China's diplomatic support for the withdrawal of the U.S. hostile policy. If North Korea receives assistance from China, there is a greater possibility that China's desired conditions for establishing a peace regime will be incorporated into North Korea's demands. If China's demands influence North Korea's negotiation strategy at the North Korea-U.S. summit, the outcome of the summit will become even more unpredictable. Ultimately, the logic of a U.S. distancing itself from South Korea's expectations, and a China strengthening its position by aiding North Korea, is gradually gaining prominence.

The efforts of the South Korean government, including the planned South Korea-U.S. summit on May 22, need to be further intensified. Firstly, South Korea, along with the U.S., neighboring countries, and the international community, must make genuine efforts to persuade North Korea of the possibility of survival and prosperity for a denuclearized North Korea. When neighboring countries have prepared detailed, concrete, and sincere blueprints for the future of a denuclearized North Korea, and when they invest certain assets and incur sunk costs in these efforts, North Korea's trust in its negotiating partners will increase, leading North Korea to make realistic demands for regime security assurances. At the inter-Korean summit, the South Korean government conveyed a message of sharing and supporting North Korea's self-help efforts and sought to present a brighter vision of the world beyond the narrow and arduous path to denuclearization. The new economic map envisioned by the South Korean government likely enhanced North Korea's trust in South Korea, and these good-faith details will help resolve the 'devilish details' surrounding North Korea's regime security assurances by increasing trust. A peace regime can only be established through accumulated efforts by South Korea and its neighboring countries to value the potential of the negotiation process and forge new common ground.

Secondly, while contemplating the components of military security assurances for North Korea, diplomatic and economic assurances must also be provided. For North Korea to achieve complete denuclearization amidst stringent special inspections of its past and present nuclear programs, the maintenance of U.S. extended deterrence for South Korea, and the continued presence of U.S. Forces Korea, significant trust-building with North Korea is necessary. When both South Korea and the U.S. pledge not to attempt to undermine North Korea's military security or regime stability, and simultaneously make diplomatic and economic support efforts, North Korea's denuclearization process will be initiated. To this end, it is necessary to expand the ongoing bilateral summits into integrated multilateral discussions to create assurances for North Korea. This could include four-party summits involving South Korea, North Korea, the U.S., and China, as well as six-party summits in Northeast Asia, to provide external regime assurances to North Korea. Economically, a phased approach should be pursued, starting with low-level economic cooperation, preparing for diplomatic relations between North Korea and the U.S., and subsequently engaging in economic cooperation through international economic organizations.

Thirdly, as negotiations for a peace regime intensify, fierce competition will arise, including China's expansion of geopolitical interests, Russia's increased involvement in Northeast Asia, and Japan's pursuit of its own interests. It is crucial to guide the process to ensure that the balance of geopolitical interests among major powers is at least maintained, and ideally, that the resolution of the North Korean issue becomes a positive-sum game where all parties benefit. Notably, the current U.S.-China relationship, excluding the North Korean nuclear issue, offers almost no room for cooperation. If the security situation on the Korean Peninsula becomes unfavorable to China after the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, China could express opposition at any point during the peace regime negotiations. Conversely, if a model of U.S.-China cooperation emerges during the peace regime negotiations, it could develop and spread as a model for mitigating strategic distrust in overall U.S.-China relations. The South Korean government should bear in mind that South Korea's geopolitical interests lie in U.S.-China cooperation and consider emphasizing its middle-power diplomacy to lead a peaceful Korean Peninsula, thereby presenting a vision of a positive geopolitical future as a contingency measure. ■

* The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable discussions from the East Asia Institute's National Security Panel (NSP) in the preparation of this commentary.

Author

Jeon Jae-sung_ Director of the Center for International Relations at EAI and Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His primary research areas include international political theory, international relations history, the ROK-U.S. alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "The Threat of War and Peace Between South and North Korea" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

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