EAI Commentary: The Abe Administration and Japanese Constitutional Revision

Editor's Note

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), led by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, officially announced its proposed constitutional amendments at a party convention on March 25. Regarding the controversial 'Self-Defense Forces' clause, a compromise was reached to maintain Article 9 of the current constitution while adding a new Article 9-2 to resolve the debate over the constitutionality of the SDF. However, it remains uncertain whether the amendment bill can be introduced within the year as originally planned and put to a national referendum in the first half of next year. Lee Jeong-hwan, a professor at Seoul National University, assesses that constitutional revision is directly linked to the political stability of the Abe administration, and with recent educational scandals weakening the centripetal force of Abe's leadership within the party, the possibility of constitutional revision is also diminishing.

Conclusion of Discussions by the LDP's Constitutional Revision Headquarters

On May 3, 2017 (Constitution Memorial Day), the 70th anniversary of the enforcement of the current Constitution of Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, through a video message, proposed 2020 as the target year for the enforcement of a new constitution and urged the political community to engage in discussions on constitutional revision. In response to Prime Minister Abe's proposal, the LDP has been holding discussions within its Constitutional Revision Headquarters to finalize the party's stance on key aspects of constitutional revision. On March 22, 2018, the LDP's Constitutional Revision Headquarters substantially finalized the draft articles for four key issues during a plenary meeting.

The four key issues discussed by the LDP's Constitutional Revision Headquarters are 'Self-Defense Forces,' 'State of Emergency,' 'Educational Fulfillment,' and 'Merger of Electoral Districts.' The rationale for revision for each issue is as follows: Regarding the 'Merger of Electoral Districts,' revision of Article 47 is necessary to address the issue of merging electoral districts that currently exist in two prefectures within the Upper House elections, specifically the problem of mergers that cross prefectural boundaries, requiring the election of one district representative from each prefecture (wide-area local government). In the case of 'Educational Fulfillment,' the focus is on revising Article 26, which pertains to the people's right to and obligation for education, to broaden the scope of the people's right to education. The provision concerning 'State of Emergency' is based on the rationale that in the event of a disaster such as an earthquake, it is necessary to postpone elections or grant special powers to the cabinet. The most crucial issue in Japan's constitutional revision discussions, the 'Self-Defense Forces,' is based on the rationale that the constitutionality of the SDF must be resolved through the revision of Article 9, which contains the provision on the non-possession of war potential.

On March 24, at a lecture for local assembly members held at the LDP headquarters, the Constitutional Revision Headquarters announced the draft amendments for the four key issues. The provision related to the 'Merger of Electoral Districts' was presented with the addition of the phrase to Article 47: 'It shall be possible to stipulate that in elections for all or part of the members of the House of Councillors, when the electoral districts are the respective areas of wide-area local governments, at least one member shall be elected from each electoral district.' For the 'Educational Fulfillment' provision, the proposal was to add a new paragraph 3 to Article 26, stating: 'The State shall endeavor to establish an educational environment, including ensuring opportunities for education for each individual regardless of economic reasons.' The provision concerning the 'State of Emergency' was finalized with the addition of Article 64, Paragraph 2: 'In cases where it is recognized that the proper conduct of a general election of members of the House of Representatives or a regular election of members of the House of Councillors is difficult due to a major earthquake or other extraordinary large-scale disaster, the Diet may establish special provisions regarding their terms of office,' and Article 73, Paragraph 2: 'In cases where special circumstances exist due to a major earthquake or other extraordinary large-scale disaster, the Cabinet may enact ordinances for the protection of the lives, bodies, and property of the people.' The most crucial provision in Japan's constitutional revision discussions, the clause related to the 'Self-Defense Forces,' was presented as the LDP Constitutional Revision Headquarters' proposal, with the addition of a new Article 9-2 stating: 'The provisions of the preceding Article (Article 9) shall not impede the measures necessary for the defense of Japan's peace, independence, and the safety of its people and nation, and the SDF shall be maintained as a force for such measures.'

The four key issues for constitutional revision proposed by the LDP's Constitutional Revision Headquarters differ in their background and the nature of the conflicts surrounding them. Firstly, the 'Merger of Electoral Districts' issue, related to electoral district problems, was discussed with broad consensus and without significant conflict, based on the shared understanding that at least one district representative must be elected from each prefecture in the regular Upper House elections. Secondly, the 'Educational Fulfillment' issue represents the LDP's adoption of the tuition-free education advocated by the Japan Innovation Party as its party platform. This issue strongly serves the purpose of securing the cooperation of the Japan Innovation Party for constitutional revision. However, the LDP's Constitutional Revision Headquarters adjusted the wording to avoid explicitly mentioning 'tuition-free.' Thirdly, regarding the 'State of Emergency' provision, which allows for election postponements or administrative actions by ordinance under special circumstances such as large-scale disasters, bypassing legislative action by the Diet, there was external opposition due to concerns about the potentially broad scope of the Cabinet's ordinance-making power. However, some conservative figures within the party argued for adjusting the wording to allow for broader application not only to disasters but also to situations like terrorism. While conflicts were not entirely absent for each issue, the discussions within the LDP's Constitutional Revision Headquarters primarily involved adjustments to wording, and there were no sharp ideological differences within the party.

In contrast, opinions within the LDP were not easily unified regarding the revision of Article 9 concerning the 'Self-Defense Forces.' Ultimately, at the plenary meeting on March 22, it was decided to delegate the decision on revising Article 9 to Hiroyuki Hosoda, the head of the Constitutional Revision Headquarters.

Debate within the LDP on Revising Article 9The debate within the LDP regarding the revision of Article 9 unfolded between the proposed amendment by the Constitutional Revision Headquarters, which maintains paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 9 while adding a new paragraph 2, and an amendment proposing the deletion of paragraph 2 of Article 9. In the discussions of the Constitutional Revision Headquarters, Hiroyuki Hosoda, the headquarters chief, and Masahiko Komura, the vice president and special advisor to the Constitutional Revision Headquarters, represented the former, while Shigeru Ishiba, the former Secretary-General, represented the latter. However, the amendment proposal from the Constitutional Revision Headquarters was already included in Prime Minister Abe's video message in May 2017. This indicates that there was an implicit consensus among the mainstream LDP, centered around Prime Minister Abe, to maintain Article 9 and add a new Article 9-2. The discussions within the Constitutional Revision Headquarters can be seen as an attempt to formalize this as party policy. However, a confrontational dynamic emerged when Ishiba raised fundamental issues during this process.

The most noteworthy aspect of the LDP's discussions on Article 9 over the past year is that the mainstream faction, led by Abe, opted for maintaining Article 9. The LDP already had a constitutional amendment proposal finalized as party policy. The 'Draft Constitution of Japan' released on April 28, 2012, on 'Sovereignty Restoration Day,' holds the status of the LDP's official amendment proposal. This 2012 draft proposed amending the current Article 9, Paragraph 2, which states, 'To achieve the purpose of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized,' to read, 'The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not preclude the exercise of the right of self-defense.' It also included the addition of a new Article 9-2 and the phrase 'maintain national defense forces.' In other words, the 2012 draft aimed to delete the prohibition on maintaining war potential and use the term 'national defense forces,' thereby formalizing the current SDF as a regular military force. This was decided as party policy during the opposition period when Sadakazu Tanigaki was the party leader, and the content of the 2012 draft was agreed upon and led by the current mainstream LDP faction, including Abe.

Compared to the 2012 draft, the maintenance of the entirety of Article 9 chosen by the current mainstream faction led by Abe has fundamental limitations. As long as the provision 'shall not maintain war potential' remains in Article 9, Paragraph 2, the SDF is not a military force. Furthermore, while the addition of Article 9-2 is the same, the provision regarding 'national defense forces' in the 2012 draft's Article 9-2 and the provisions regarding self-defense rights and the SDF in the 2018 Constitutional Revision Headquarters' draft articles differ in their substantive meaning. The current mainstream faction led by Abe aims to clearly remove the SDF from a state of unconstitutionality through constitutional revision.

Meanwhile, Ishiba is reviving the LDP's 2012 party policy, which explicitly defined the legal basis for the SDF as a de facto military force. He argues that as long as the provision prohibiting the maintenance of war potential remains, adding a constitutional clause for the SDF's existence will not resolve the fundamental conflict between the prohibition of war potential and the SDF.

The mainstream faction, fully aware of these issues, seeks to maintain the provision in Article 9, Paragraph 2, prohibiting the maintenance of war potential, for several reasons. Firstly, it is necessary to consider Komeito, the coalition partner. When amending the constitution, it is important to maintain the three fundamental principles of the current constitution: popular sovereignty, pacifism, and respect for fundamental human rights. For Komeito, which believes that human rights provisions such as environmental rights should be added to adapt to changing times, the deletion of Article 9, Paragraph 2, is an unacceptable change. Secondly, the fact that the current constitution does not impose significant restrictions on the actual military activities of the SDF, following the revision of the constitutional interpretation regarding the right to collective self-defense in 2014 and the revision of the security laws in 2015, also plays a role. This implies that changing the SDF to 'national defense forces' does not make a significant difference in terms of security. In other words, the pacifist nature of the current constitution has already been effectively nullified. Therefore, the LDP mainstream faction's position can be seen as aiming to remove the SDF from a state of unconstitutionality simply by adding a clause defining the SDF's existence, rather than changing it to a military force.

For Ishiba, who preferred the formalization of collective self-defense through the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution over the revision of the constitutional interpretation regarding collective self-defense, Abe's mainstream faction's approach of maintaining Article 9 and adding provisions for the SDF's existence in Article 9-2 can only be seen as a choice for a de facto circumvention of security issues.

Japanese Politics and the Possibility of Constitutional Revision

When Prime Minister Abe proposed the target year of 2020 for the enforcement of a new constitution in May 2017, he envisioned submitting a constitutional amendment bill centered around the LDP to an extraordinary Diet session in the fall of 2017, passing it through both houses, and then holding a national referendum in the first half of 2018. However, due to the Moritomo Gakuen and Kake Gakuen scandals that emerged in 2017, as well as the inappropriate remarks and actions of cabinet members including Tomomi Inada, the administration's approval ratings declined, leading to a crisis with the LDP's crushing defeat in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in July. As a breakthrough, Prime Minister Abe opted for dissolving the House of Representatives and calling a general election in the latter half of 2017. Although the constitutional revision schedule was delayed due to the early general election, the momentum for constitutional revision was maintained as the pro-amendment forces secured more than a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives election results.

The plan of the Abe mainstream faction within the LDP this year was to conclude internal discussions on constitutional revision before the party convention in March, finalize the party platform through the General Council, submit the amendment bill during the extraordinary Diet session in the fall, and hold a national referendum in the first half of 2019. The reason the LDP intended to conclude its internal discussions on constitutional revision by the party convention on March 25 is due to the schedule. The judgment was that the constitutional revision referendum must be held concurrently with the Upper House elections in 2019 at the latest. This reveals an intention to push forward with constitutional revision based on high approval ratings for the administration.

However, after the fabrication issue related to Moritomo Gakuen surfaced on March 2, the Abe administration began to falter, and its approval ratings plummeted. It was amidst this situation that the party convention was held. At the 85th regular LDP convention held on March 25 at the Grand Prince Hotel New Takanawa in Tokyo, Prime Minister Abe concluded his speech after boasting about the achievements of Abenomics and policy tasks such as improving productivity, raising wages, agricultural reform, and promoting tourism, and then emphasized the necessity of constitutional revision to resolve the issue of the SDF's unconstitutionality.

However, on the day of the party convention, former Secretary-General Ishiba questioned the internal party consultation process for constitutional revision. Shinjiro Koizumi, considered a next-generation contender within the LDP, also raised concerns about the decline in the administration's credibility due to the Moritomo Gakuen incident, stating that constitutional revision without public trust is impossible.

Constitutional revision is an issue directly linked to the political stability of the Abe administration. The high approval ratings for the Abe administration were based on the strong centripetal force of Abe's leadership within the LDP, but Prime Minister Abe is gradually losing that centripetal force. While Abe's victory in the LDP presidential election in September seemed certain at the beginning of the year, the situation is becoming less certain. This domestic political situation in Japan will further darken the prospects for constitutional revision. ■

Author

Lee Jeong-hwan_ Professor at Seoul National University. He obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. His main research areas are Japanese politics and economy, and Japanese foreign policy.

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