Analysis of Agreements from Inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. Summits and Future Tasks

[Editor's Note]

The inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. relations have been rapidly developing since the Pyeongchang Olympics. Following the inter-Korean summit in April, a North Korea-U.S. summit was held in May, triggered by the visit of our special envoy to Pyongyang. Professor Jeon Jae-sung of Seoul National University assesses that these agreements are the result of the parties recognizing that there is no alternative to negotiation as the North Korean nuclear issue has worsened, and also the result of our government's careful engagement with the core of the issue in this context. However, Professor Jeon adds that the possibility of North Korea further advancing its nuclear and missile development remains, and the situation could change depending on sanctions relief and shifts in North Korea-China relations during future negotiations. Therefore, the international community must pursue a strategy of parallel pressure and engagement while continuing concrete discussions on the incentives North Korea would receive upon abandoning its nuclear program.

The next three months are likely to be recorded in history as a crucial period that will change the fate of the Korean Peninsula. Since the early 1990s, as the Cold War began to wind down on a global scale, North Korea has been seeking survival and exploring the possibility of a grand bargain with the United States through negotiations. The history of bilateral contact between North Korea and the U.S., which began with the high-level meeting between Kim Yong-sun and Cantor in January 1992, saw the visit of Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok to Washington in 2000 and Secretary of State Albright's visit to Pyongyang as events that brought the North Korea-U.S. agreement to the brink. Now, 18 years later, a new opportunity has arisen.

The agreement to hold inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. summits is a structural outcome of the worsening North Korean nuclear issue, leading the parties to recognize that there is no alternative to negotiation, and a result of the South Korean government's careful approach to the core of the issue in this situation. North Korea sought various benefits by securing the capability to launch nuclear missile attacks against the U.S. mainland, but in reality, it only deepened sanctions and diplomatic isolation, significantly diminishing the prospects for the success of its dual-track strategy. Despite China's active participation in sanctions against North Korea and the establishment of a progressive government in South Korea, sanctions against North Korea and ROK-U.S. cooperation have continued. It is certain that North Korea's economy will rapidly deteriorate within the next one to two years. The U.S. has also discussed military options, but given that North Korea's willingness and capability for military response cannot be disregarded, it is moving towards a situation where it must pursue negotiations while maintaining sanctions and diplomatic isolation. The end of the North Korean nuclear issue is, in fact, a problem whose answer is already determined in terms of North Korea's denuclearization, regime guarantees for North Korea, and peace on the Korean Peninsula. The process of off-the-table negotiations to lead the on-the-table negotiations between the parties favorably has been more important. Former President Truman once said that if there is an unsolvable problem, it is better to worsen it than to solve it. The North Korean nuclear issue has a structural aspect where a solution is found only when it becomes so urgent and critical that it cannot possibly worsen further.

South Korea's task is to prevent a catastrophic outcome at the end of a vicious cycle of unresolved problems. As the situation worsened, the Moon Jae-in administration emphasized peace and highlighted the importance of diplomatic solutions. In the absence of basic trust, structural deterioration does not automatically lead to a solution. The Moon Jae-in administration continuously emphasized dialogue, disregarding domestic conservative opinions and skeptical views from the international community led by the U.S., in order to gain North Korea's trust. This was a strategy to increase audience costs by incurring political costs and building trust. This is because North Korea came to trust the sincerity of the Moon Jae-in administration after observing that it was willing to bear political costs.

Among the six points brought by the South Korean special envoy to Pyongyang, points 1, 2, and 6 (holding inter-Korean summit, establishing a hotline between leaders, and sports and cultural exchanges) related to inter-Korean relations will be relatively easy to implement. The more difficult points are 3, 4, and 5: if point 5 (suspension of further nuclear and missile tests by North Korea) can be agreed upon as a starting point for negotiations, the core issues are how to proceed with point 3 (declaration of denuclearization will) and point 4 (North Korea-U.S. dialogue). North Korea declared the completion of its nuclear and missile development at the end of last year and announced a strategy to focus on economic development starting this year; under the dual-track strategy, economic development is pursued while maintaining the status of a nuclear state. It is extremely difficult to ascertain whether North Korea has truly decided to revise the maintenance of its nuclear state status, one pillar of its dual-track strategy, and adopt a new strategy for economic development within the approximately two months since the New Year's address was delivered. It is virtually impossible to determine at this moment whether North Korea has judged that the cost of possessing nuclear missiles is overwhelmingly high due to economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, and has therefore decided to negotiate for its nuclear missiles at the highest possible value and focus on economic development.

North Korea still has the option of advancing its nuclear and missile development. Its New Year's address even mentioned mass production and deployment. If North Korea acquires the capability to launch nuclear missiles targeting the U.S. mainland and proves it through testing, the U.S. will not only be unable to launch a preemptive strike against North Korea but also, as public opinion in the U.S. favoring negotiations with North Korea intensifies, North Korea will be able to engage in negotiations with the U.S. under more favorable conditions. However, it is believed that North Korea is engaging in negotiations because it is currently difficult to secure the technology for re-entry due to economic sanctions and strong maritime blockades. If its economic situation improves from April onwards and opportunities for technological development are secured, it would be rational for North Korea to break off the current negotiations to negotiate under better conditions later. The biggest problem for North Korea in terms of economic hardship is China's participation in sanctions; if China attempts to ease sanctions and promote stronger North Korea-China relations as North Korea-U.S. dialogue progresses, North Korea's need to conclude the current round of negotiations will decrease. If international sanctions and pressure, including maritime blockades, are also eased, North Korea could anticipate the next round of negotiations based on more advanced nuclear missile capabilities.

U.S. officials and experts, well aware of this situation, are also cautious about President Trump making too many promises at the North Korea-U.S. summit scheduled for May. There are growing concerns that the summit, a significant gift, should not be given without preconditions of North Korea's denuclearization actions, and that if working-level negotiations after the summit fail, the room for negotiation will further shrink. If North Korea's sincerity is deemed untrustworthy after the summit, the U.S. will more seriously consider military options rather than diplomatic ones. In particular, voices calling for action before North Korea secures the capability to attack the U.S. mainland may grow louder.

South Korea's task from now on is to make it clear that if the negotiation process starting in April fails, the possibility of diplomatic compromise will diminish, and it will not benefit anyone. Whether North Korea has made a strategic decision to abandon nuclear weapons and pursue economic development is an important question, but policy cannot be formulated by fixating on its intentions. Intentions change continuously with capabilities, and new judgments are made as circumstances change. Even if North Korea is currently focused on buying time and reaping benefits during the negotiation phase, it must be changed through the future process. Director of the National Intelligence Service Suh Hoon stated in an interview with Chosun Ilbo during his visit to the U.S., "When doing these things, we do not judge based on the other party's intentions. It is important to extract meaningful elements from what the other party says and make them implementable." This statement aptly captures the essence that the negotiation process is about shaping and changing the other party's intentions. He also mentioned that North Korea has not specified what it demands in return for denuclearization, which is also something that must be developed through future negotiations. Even if North Korea is currently eyeing opportunities for continued development of nuclear missiles, if the cost of abandoning nuclear weapons is overwhelmingly high, new prospects can emerge during the negotiation process.

To this end, it is necessary to transition from the current pressure-centric strategy to a strategy of parallel engagement. The international community, led by the U.S., has pursued maximum pressure and engagement, but engagement at this level has essentially been limited to seeking diplomatic solutions at a basic level. The international community has only engaged in abstract discussions about a bright future if North Korea abandons its nuclear program, without discussing concrete incentives for North Korea. In the September 19 Joint Statement, the five surrounding countries offered energy provision, economic cooperation, and discussions on a peace regime in a separate forum, but detailed engagement programs were not subsequently elaborated. During the Kim Dae-jung administration, South Korea pursued the Sunshine Policy, but North Korea ultimately retains the negative lesson that its system would collapse if it shed its clothes under South Korea's sunshine.

When discussing strategies for the North Korean nuclear issue, what is truly important in discussing an exit for North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons is what future awaits North Korea when it opens that exit. Chairman Kim Jong-un will seek a situation where North Korea is treated as a normal member of the international community, is presented with a concrete blueprint for economic development, and his political foundation is maintained even without nuclear weapons. In fact, as the economy develops, North Korean society will change, and internal criticism of the North Korean dictatorial regime will intensify, so the development of North Korea and the maintenance of Kim Jong-un's power are not necessarily complementary. In such a situation, abandoning nuclear weapons means managing threats from neighboring countries as well as challenges from within in the long term.

South Korea and its neighboring countries must first accurately understand these concerns and clarify the extent to which they can provide incentives as requested by North Korea. Over more than 20 years of the North Korean nuclear issue, North Korea is likely to have a full understanding of the content and sincerity of various guarantees that South Korea and its neighbors can offer, so thorough preparation is necessary. If the specificity and sincerity of engagement are conveyed, the likelihood of North Korea forming new intentions for denuclearization negotiations will increase.

The inter-Korean summit is not only a venue for discussing bilateral issues but also a place to confirm South Korea's framework and capabilities in leading the international community, especially the U.S. strategy going forward. In a situation where concrete programs for sanctions relief and inter-Korean exchange and cooperation cannot be agreed upon before the North Korea-U.S. summit, it is more important to communicate South Korea's vision for concrete engagement strategies that it will lead after denuclearization and the vision that North Korea can guarantee. As significant preparatory contacts between North Korea and the U.S. will likely occur during the preparations for the inter-Korean summit, South Korea must closely discuss future programs with the U.S. in addition to preparing for the inter-Korean summit.

The North Korea-U.S. summit will serve as a confirmation of principles, as it will be the starting point for North Korea's denuclearization and the normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations. A principled agreement will be reached on complete denuclearization and regime guarantees for North Korea. The issue is that while a relatively concrete roadmap for denuclearization has been prepared due to the long discussions on the North Korean nuclear issue, the specifics of regime guarantees for North Korea are unclear, with no concrete roadmap that the U.S. can offer and North Korea can accept. It is unclear whether North Korea's regime guarantees mean merely prohibiting U.S. military action against North Korea, transitioning the armistice regime to a peace regime, establishing a guarantee system to maintain a peace regime, or further, guaranteeing North Korea's economic development and its integration into the international community as a member, and even supporting the survival of the Kim Jong-un regime as a dictatorship. The U.S. response is also uncertain in this situation.

Furthermore, it is difficult to predict President Trump's personal negotiation goals and methods. President Trump prioritizes U.S. interests first and seeks political achievements through decisive agreements to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, so it is currently difficult to know at what level he will pay the price for denuclearization. The fact that President Trump's approach to the North Korean nuclear issue itself is uncertain, in addition to the existing challenges of sequencing denuclearization with regime guarantees and economic assistance, and the 'word for word,' 'action for action' approach, is a concern for South Korea. The policies of President Trump regarding the North Korean nuclear issue are difficult to imagine, as the various policy foundations pursued by the U.S. during the post-Cold War era, such as a U.S.-centric global security system through alliances, the liberal international economic order supporting it and promoting U.S. long-term interests, ideological diplomacy emphasizing the spread of human rights and democracy, and cautious coexistence with other great powers, are all undergoing rapid changes.

From the perspective of prioritizing U.S. interests, the most important thing is to eliminate the threat of nuclear missiles to the U.S. mainland, and it is unclear to what extent North Korea's demands will be met in return. The worst-case scenario is providing North Korea with military regime guarantees in exchange for weakening the ROK-U.S. alliance and eliminating the North Korean nuclear threat to the U.S. This would amplify the security anxieties of South Korea and Japan. If the U.S. prioritizes the security of its allies and its commitment to continue supporting South Korea and Japan in the future East Asian security structure is strong, it will consider methods of regime guarantees within the framework of maintaining the existing ROK-U.S. and ROK-Japan alliances. Various international guarantees for a peace regime, diplomatic relations between North Korea and the U.S., and peace on the Korean Peninsula, which were discussed in the past Four-Party Talks, will be discussed, and China's strategy will also be an important variable. The Six-Party Talks are also likely to be utilized as a main forum for discussion, and a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula can only be effectively established with the foundation of geopolitical cooperation among the four major surrounding powers.

What South Korea desires is not only the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and guarantees for a peace regime, but also sustainable peace, inter-Korean exchange, and ultimately, unification. To this end, not only the establishment of a peace regime in terms of security but also the future development direction of North Korea are crucial. The environment for unification will be built when North Korea maintains political stability for a certain period and gradually develops an open system as a member of the international community. Making the current denuclearization talks part of a longer-term roadmap is South Korea's main task.

In cooperation with the U.S., South Korea must first thoroughly discuss a roadmap that ROK and the U.S. will share in concrete working-level consultations after the North Korea-U.S. summit. Communication between the ROK and the U.S. must ensure that the U.S. response to North Korea's denuclearization occurs within the scope of fully securing South Korea's security interests. Second, even if the summit is suspended or encounters difficulties due to differences between North Korea and the U.S. after the summit, as in the past, we must secure a clue to overcome them. We must maximize the possibility of diplomatic solutions so that mutual trust does not collapse and agreement on principles is not undermined. In particular, a foundation for continuous cooperation with China must be laid. Third, rather than simple denuclearization of North Korea or short-term regime guarantees, various opportunities for persuasion must be created so that the U.S., and especially President Trump, can share South Korea's vision for the long journey beyond denuclearization. Although it is very difficult to expect changes in the current geopolitical structure regarding the division of the Korean Peninsula, the journey towards unification must be clarified, considering the national interests that unification will bring to South Korea. Fourth, even if denuclearization is realized, South Korea's diplomatic difficulties will continue in the context of U.S.-China competition. The regional strategy and the Korean Peninsula strategy must be linked so that South Korea's mediation capabilities and the mechanism for U.S.-China cooperation can be extended to other security issues in East Asia, realizing successful cases of strategic cooperation between the U.S. and China during the denuclearization process. ■

Author

Jeon Jae-sung_ Director of the EAI Center for International Relations and Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, international relations history, ROK-U.S. alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "Threats of War and Peace Between the Two Koreas" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

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