Why is Xi Jinping Abolishing the Term Limits for the State President?

[Editor's Note]

The National People's Congress (NPC), China's highest decision-making body, opened on March 5. In particular, an amendment to the constitution that abolishes the term limits for the state president is expected to be passed at this NPC, drawing global attention. Furthermore, with the passage of the constitutional amendment virtually certain, some view this as the effective commencement of a Xi Jinping-centric system. However, Professor Cho Young-nam of Seoul National University argues that even if the constitutional amendment is passed, allowing for long-term rule, it is difficult to interpret this as the collapse of the collective leadership system and the emergence of a one-man system. The collective leadership system can operate in various ways, and it is unlikely that the General Secretary will hold absolute power, especially during a period of reform.

A piece published in the People's Daily on February 26, 2018, surprised China researchers and media worldwide. The "Proposal for the Amendment of the Constitution by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China" was released, which included the deletion of the provision limiting the state president's tenure to two terms (10 years). Global media unanimously interpreted this as a "prelude to Xi Jinping's long-term rule" or a "return to lifelong tenure."

The first annual meeting of the National People's Congress (NPC), which begins a new five-year term, traditionally garners attention for two main agendas. First is the election of state leaders, including the Premier and Vice Premiers of the State Council, the Chairman and Vice Chairmen of the NPC, and the President and Vice Presidents of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate. This year, the Director and Deputy Directors of the newly established National Supervisory Commission will also be elected. Second is the national development strategy and policies for the next five years. The NPC primarily decides economic and social policies. Therefore, if the Party Congress is the General Secretary's stage, the annual NPC session is the Premier's stage, as the Premier is responsible for economic and social policies.

However, this year was different. The People's Daily published a special section titled "Xi Jinping, the People's Leader," focusing on Xi Jinping's remarks at various meetings of the NPC and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). It appears to be an official decision to use the term "Xi Jinping, the People's Leader," mimicking "Mao Zedong, the Great Leader." For reference, in 1977, Hua Guofeng was referred to as "Hua Guofeng, the Wise Leader." In contrast, Premier Li Keqiang was nowhere to be seen. Even on the opening day, when the Premier delivered the "Government Work Report," Wang Qishan, seated in the presidium, received more attention than Li Keqiang. Wang had stepped down from the Politburo Standing Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection at the age of 67 during the 19th Party Congress last year, but was widely expected to make a spectacular return as Vice President.

According to the Constitution, the State President has the authority to appoint and dismiss government leaders, including the Premier, award medals, issue amnesties, and declare states of emergency and war. While these powers seem significant on the surface, the position is largely honorary. Real power is exercised by the General Secretary of the Communist Party and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). In fact, the State President role was largely created for the necessity of state visits and international engagements. Would it be appropriate for Xi Jinping to make a state visit to South Korea with the title of General Secretary?

Then why is Xi Jinping taking the seemingly risky step of abolishing the term limits for the state president at this juncture? This measure has drawn significant domestic and international backlash, yet it offers little tangible benefit for strengthening Xi's power. The fact that this measure is a "risky step" can be confirmed by the actions of the Communist Party itself. In January of this year, the Party convened the Second Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee (19th Central Committee's Second Plenum) to discuss constitutional amendments and released a "Communique" on the results. However, while other amendments were included, the abolition of the term limits for the state president was conspicuously absent. This omission was deliberate, likely to avoid domestic and international backlash.

Wang Chen, Vice Chairman of the NPC, presented two justifications when explaining the draft constitutional amendment. First, "Party members, cadres, and the masses in many regions and organizations unanimously" requested the abolition of the term limits. Since the Politburo decided on constitutional amendments on September 29, 2017, and established a "Constitutional Amendment Task Force," opinions were solicited from within and outside the Party twice. The first instance, in November 2017, involved requesting opinions on constitutional amendments from major Party and government organs, resulting in 118 submissions. The second instance, in December 2017, involved distributing the draft constitutional amendment to major Party and government organs and elder statesmen for their opinions, also yielding 118 submissions. Through these processes, the Party Central Committee ascertained the demands from the grassroots, and because the calls for abolition were strong and unified, they decided to accommodate them.

Second, it is "conducive to strengthening and improving the state leadership system and upholding the authority and centralized, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core." The logic is as follows: The current Party Constitution has no term limits for the General Secretary and the Chairman of the CMC, but the Constitution has term limits for the State President. Since Jiang Zemin began concurrently holding the positions of General Secretary, State President, and Chairman of the CMC, the concurrent holding of these three top leadership positions has become customary (referred to as 'trinity' in China). However, the term limit for the State President creates an inconsistency in term regulations. Ultimately, to maintain consistency in term regulations, the constitutional provision limiting the tenure of the State President must be abolished.

The first justification cannot be verified and thus cannot be trusted. However, the fact that the draft constitutional amendment passed sequentially through the Politburo Standing Committee, the Politburo, and the Central Committee indicates that the political elite reached a consensus on this matter. Media reports suggest opposition from some elder statesmen like Jiang Zemin, but this remains unconfirmed. When Wang Chen mentioned the abolition of the term limits for the state president while explaining the draft constitutional amendment at the full NPC session, the delegates responded with thunderous applause, indicating their approval. While the official vote count is yet to be released, it is certain to pass with an overwhelming majority. The second justification lacks persuasiveness because the term regulations for the three positions can be unified through other means. Specifically, the Party Constitution could be amended to introduce term limits for the General Secretary and the Chairman of the CMC. However, Xi Jinping is not pursuing this path; instead, he is amending the Constitution to abolish the term limits for the State President. Meanwhile, Chinese authorities insist that this is not a "prelude to long-term rule" or a "return to lifelong tenure."

Instead, we can consider several other reasons. First, Xi Jinping seeks to legitimize his long-term rule through legal grounds. Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping exercised power based on 'personal authority' and extensive personal networks, making legal justification less critical. However, for Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping, who exercise power based on 'positional authority,' legal justification is crucial. Constitutional amendment is necessary for this reason. In the fourth collective study session of the Politburo held on February 24 of this year, Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of upholding the Constitution and governing according to law (依法治國: ruling the country based on law). He stated, "No organization or individual can possess privileges that transcend the Constitution and laws, and any act that violates the Constitution and laws must be prosecuted." Conversely, this implies that anything permitted by the Constitution and laws can be done. In other words, once the Constitution is amended, the State President can be re-elected indefinitely.

There is also the argument that the term limits for the state president were abolished due to the need for utilization on the international stage. Xi Jinping has presented the realization of the "Chinese Dream" of "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" as a national objective. At the last Party Congress, it was declared that China would surpass the United States as a global power by the mid-21st century. Indeed, the Xi Jinping administration has significantly increased its foreign affairs budget since beginning its second term and has greatly strengthened its diplomatic capabilities with figures like Wang Qishan and Yang Jiechi. The international stage has become a crucial arena for Xi Jinping's activities. In this context, if Xi Jinping were to step down as State President after the 20th Party Congress in 2022, he would have to operate on the international stage as General Secretary, which would be undignified. "

Another perspective suggests that the intention was to preempt the emergence of potential rivals. Xi Jinping can maintain his positions as General Secretary and Chairman of the CMC after the 20th Party Congress in 2022 by utilizing the current regulations. However, in this scenario, the State Presidency would have to be transferred to someone else. This individual could then criticize Xi Jinping's long-term rule and pressure him to step down early. A precedent for this occurred in 2002 when Jiang Zemin, serving his third term as Chairman of the CMC after the 16th Party Congress, was forced to step down two years later under pressure from Hu Jintao. Xi Jinping's intention is to preemptively eliminate such possibilities by pursuing constitutional amendments.

Furthermore, it can be argued that the constitutional amendment is being attempted to more forcefully advance the various policies that Xi Jinping is pursuing. Over the past five years, the Xi Jinping administration has punished approximately 440 officials at the vice-ministerial level and above for corruption, including over 100 generals. This represents a substantial 15% of the total 3,000 officials at this level. In the four months since the 19th Party Congress, 29 officials at the vice-ministerial level and above have been punished. While a strong anti-corruption policy may be a "blessing" for the public, it is a "misfortune" and "suffering" for Party and government officials. Consequently, vested interest groups, including Party and government officials, state-owned enterprise executives, and princelings, have entered a "arduous march," thinking, "We just need to endure for the next five years." The news of the abolition of term limits comes as a bolt from the blue to them, as the "arduous march" may not end in five years but could extend to ten years or more. Ultimately, as long as the Xi Jinping administration continues, the space for corruption among vested interests will shrink.

The same can be said for the military reforms boldly pursued by the current Xi Jinping administration. Initiated at the end of 2015 and having just taken its first steps, these reforms are not something that can be completed in a short period. While the initial goal of reducing the 2.3 million-strong military by 300,000 has been achieved, the truly difficult tasks lie ahead. Particularly, to fundamentally complete the 'modernization of the military' by 2035, strong leadership capable of pursuing reforms without wavering from a long-term perspective is necessary. Given the current situation, Xi Jinping is the only person who can accomplish such a feat. This is why not only the Communist Party elders and political elites, but also ordinary party members, agree to extend Xi Jinping's tenure.

Whether the concentration of power in Xi Jinping and the visible prospect of his long-term rule will be a blessing or a disaster for China cannot be definitively stated. Chinese media, pro-government scholars, and some overseas China experts evaluate this decision positively, citing the assurance of policy continuity and the establishment of strong leadership capable of efficiently and effectively pursuing difficult reform agendas. Conversely, there are also warnings that this move could lead to disaster. When a single individual monopolizes power for an extended period, the likelihood of flawed policies increases. This is because important policies are decided by one person rather than multiple individuals, and those around the leader are likely to conceal "uncomfortable truths" and present only information that pleases the supreme ruler. This was precisely what happened daily during Mao Zedong's era, resulting in the deaths of tens of millions of people.

Meanwhile, attention should not be solely focused on the abolition of term limits for the state president, overlooking other amendments. According to Wang Chen's explanation, a total of ten articles are being revised. Among these, focusing on the important points, Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era (hereinafter referred to as "Xi Jinping Thought"), along with the Scientific Outlook on Development, will be added as the guiding ideology of the state. This is as expected. The establishment of the National Supervisory Commission as a supervisory body is a very significant measure. With this, the state organs elected by the NPC will expand from "one government and two courts" (State Council, Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate) to "one government, one commission, and two courts" (State Council, National Supervisory Commission, Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate). It is important to note that the National Supervisory Commission will become a crucial institution, second only to the State Council.

However, a far more significant amendment is the insertion of the principle of "Communist Party leadership" into the Constitution, following its inclusion in the Party Constitution. The current Article 1 of the Constitution states, "The socialist system is the fundamental system of the People's Republic of China." To this sentence, "The Communist Party of China is the most essential characteristic of socialism with Chinese characteristics" will be added. This is in line with the strengthening of the principle of Party leadership through the amendment of the Party Constitution at the 19th Party Congress. The revised Party Constitution includes the phrase, "The Party leads everything in all fields, including Party, government, military, civilian, and academic, and in all regions, east, west, south, north, and central (Party leads everything)."

The Constitution is amended to reflect the times, and the insertion of the principle of Party leadership has become a very important indicator. Article 2 of the Constitution from the Mao Zedong era (enacted in 1975) stipulated, "The Communist Party of China is the leading core of the entire Chinese people." Through this, the principle that the Communist Party leads not only its members but the entire populace was legally justified. However, the Constitution from the Deng Xiaoping era (enacted in 1982) deleted this provision. Instead, it included the provision discussed above. This was a result of the Communist Party's self-reflection after the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). The argument was, how could the Party, which caused "great chaos" for ten years, have the audacity to impose this principle on the people again?

Now, Xi Jinping intends to reinsert the principle of Party leadership into the Constitution. This is an expression of confidence in the Communist Party and a manifestation of the will to maintain the current one-party system, with Party leadership at its core, for an extended period. With the great success of the reform and opening-up policy over the past 40 years, the Communist Party has been able to overcome the psychological trauma of the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, it is now judged that the principle of Party leadership can be applied not only to Party members but also to the entire populace. Furthermore, to solidify and maintain the one-party system that has achieved such results, the principle of Party leadership is to be enshrined in the Constitution. This is a declaration that China will absolutely not pursue political democratization in the future.

Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union introduced free competitive elections in March 1989, leading to the formation of a new People's Congress. Furthermore, the second session of the People's Congress in December of the same year abolished Article 6 of the Constitution, which stipulated the "leading status" of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, thereby opening the path to a multi-party system. It was at this session that Gorbachev was elected President of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the Soviet Union began to pursue political democratization in earnest, and the results are well known, requiring no further explanation. Thus, the collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union began in earnest with the deletion of the Party's "leading status" from the Constitution. The addition of the principle of Party leadership to the Constitution is an expression of the determination to absolutely prevent such an event from occurring in China. In this way, the Communist Party of China is moving against the tide of world history. It remains to be seen what consequences this movement will bring.

Finally, the assertion that the current constitutional amendment has led to the collapse of the existing "collective leadership system" and the emergence of a "one-man system" or "absolute power" is still not tenable. Just as there are various types of authoritarian regimes, there are various types of collective leadership systems. In China's case, a "one-man system" or "absolute power" was only possible during the Mao Zedong era. In contrast, the period after Deng Xiaoping has been characterized by a collective leadership system. However, the collective leadership systems of each era have differed in their actual operational methods. This difference arises from the varying power dynamics between the General Secretary and other members of the Politburo Standing Committee. To immediately label an increase in the General Secretary's authority as a "one-man system" or "absolute power" without considering this distinction is simplistic thinking. Of course, if the General Secretary's authority were to be strengthened to the level of Mao Zedong's power, a "one-man system" could emerge. However, this is unlikely during a period of reform. For detailed insights, please refer to my forthcoming book, "Elite Politics in China." ■

Author

Cho Young-nam_ Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Seoul National University and has served as a visiting researcher at the Center for Modern Chinese Studies, Peking University, and as a visiting scholar at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University. His main research areas include the evolution and development of Chinese politics during the reform era, the Chinese political system, and the political development of China and Northeast Asian countries. His representative works include "Reform and Opening Up: China in the Deng Xiaoping Era 1" (2016), "Factions and Struggles: China in the Deng Xiaoping Era 2" (2016), "The Tiananmen Square Incident: China in the Deng Xiaoping Era 3" (2016), "China's Dream" (2013), "Dancing with the Dragon" (2012), and "Rule of Law and Political Reform in China" (2012).

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