← Back · ← Home · ← Back to list
Ha Young-sun Column: The Three Faces of Kim Jong-un's New Year's Address and the Pyeongchang Olympics
| [Editor's Note] As is customary, North Korea's New Year's address was delivered on the first day of the year. In this address, North Korea expressed a firm resolve to strengthen its nuclear capabilities while extending an olive branch by indicating its willingness to participate in the Pyeongchang Olympics. Our government responded favorably, leading to increased expectations for improved inter-Korean relations, including the resumption of high-level talks. However, Ha Young-sun, Director of EAI, analyzes that the sustainability of this conciliatory mood hinges on how the differing perspectives on Olympic participation between the two Koreas are resolved. North Korea approached Olympic participation from the standpoint of strengthening its 'three major revolutionary capabilities,' whereas South Korea views it as part of North Korea's new survival strategy and hopes for improved relations. Ultimately, these differing perspectives will likely surface during the process of resuming joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises and North Korea's nuclear and missile tests, and genuine relationship improvement will only begin in earnest when both sides find a new path for coexistence in the 21st century, Director Ha emphasizes. Kim Jong-un's 2018 New Year's address simultaneously evokes expectations and concerns for inter-Korean relations. Having fought the Korean War in the early 1950s amidst a brutal adversarial relationship, the two Koreas have experienced both hopes and frustrations in their attempts at relationship improvement six times, from the July 4th Joint Communiqué in 1972 to the inter-Korean summit in 2007. To forge a new path, rather than repeating this historical pattern, it is paramount to interpret the New Year's address correctly. To truly understand the essence of the New Year's address, one must go beyond superficial readings such as content analysis or big data analysis and adhere to the principle of 'yi-ui-yeok-ji' (以意逆志), the core of Eastern hermeneutics, which involves attempting to understand the speaker's inner world. This means listening to the 'intent' (意) of the other's heart to discern the direction (志) in which their heart is moving. By reading the inner thoughts of Chairman Kim Jong-un as he reads the New Year's address, we can understand North Korea's intended direction for 2018 if we can perceive the horizon revealed in his address. The overall structure of the New Year's address does not present a new outlook, as it continues to frame last year's achievements and this year's goals within the context of strengthening the 'three major revolutionary capabilities'—domestic, unification, and international—which have been emphasized since the mid-1960s. First, the address extends New Year's greetings to three audiences: 'the entire populace and the officers and soldiers of the People's Army, our brethren in the South and overseas compatriots, and progressive peoples and friends worldwide.' It then summarizes 2017 as a year of 'brilliant achievements in building a socialist powerful nation' despite the worst hardships of 'anti-republic annihilation policies by the United States and its followers.' The most significant achievement highlighted is the 'historic accomplishment of completing the state nuclear force,' followed by progress in the five-year national economic development strategy and achievements in science and culture. In conclusion, all these accomplishments, achieved amidst 'sanctions and blockade maneuvers by the United States and its followers aimed at annihilating the Republic's sovereignty, right to survival, and right to development,' are presented as 'victories of the Workers' Party of Korea's revolutionary line.' However, North Korea's self-contradictory efforts to overcome its existential difficulties, brought about by its nuclear development, through further nuclear development are, in fact, exacerbating its regime security instability. In this context, Chairman Kim Jong-un proposes the slogan, 'Let us achieve new victories on all fronts of building a socialist powerful nation through a revolutionary general offensive!' using the victory in nuclear force construction as a springboard to strengthen domestic capabilities as the primary force for crisis resolution. The first front emphasizes strengthening the self-reliance and independence of the people's economy and improving people's livelihoods for socialist economic construction. It also points to the innovation of scientific technology and the operation and command of people's economic plans as shortcuts for self-reliant economic development. The second front addresses the comprehensive development of socialist culture. The third front states the intention to further solidify self-reliant defense capabilities. Specifically, in the nuclear weapons and rocket sector, it emphasizes accelerating the 'mass production and practical deployment of warheads and ballistic missiles whose power and reliability are guaranteed.' The fourth front highlights the power of political ideology. It declares a high-intensity struggle to eradicate outdated work methods and styles, including the Party's dominance and bureaucracy, and to establish a revolutionary Party spirit, by not tolerating杂 (miscellaneous) ideologies and dual discipline that deviate from the Party's ideology, and by strengthening the Party's monolithic unity. Next, North Korea places significant emphasis on strengthening unification capabilities as a supplementary force to navigate its immediate existential difficulties. Based on the strengthening of domestic capabilities, North Korea aims to enhance unification capabilities by: first, easing military tensions and creating a peaceful environment on the Korean Peninsula; second, actively fostering an atmosphere of national reconciliation and unification by opening avenues for dialogue, contact, and exchange with anyone, including the ruling party, opposition parties, organizations, and individuals in South Korea; third, emphasizing that inter-Korean authorities must uphold the banner of national independence and resolve all issues among the Korean people themselves; and fourth, stating that North Korea is willing to send a delegation to the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics and that inter-Korean authorities can meet for this purpose. Lastly, with the continuous development of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities and the strengthening of international sanctions and deterrence regimes, North Korea's efforts to enhance its international capabilities face practical limitations. Nevertheless, Chairman Kim Jong-un asserts that 'imperialist aggressor forces will be confronted based on the principle of nuclear standstill as a nuclear-possessing state' and that it will develop friendly relations with countries that are favorable to North Korea. As the three faces Chairman Kim Jong-un displayed in his New Year's address materialize as his survival strategy for 2018, South Korea must pursue the following North Korea policies in a unified manner, in close international cooperation, to successfully navigate the North Korean nuclear crisis and the issue of peace on the Korean Peninsula. First, for North Korea's participation in the Pyeongchang Olympics to serve as a stepping stone for improving inter-Korean relations, it depends on how the clear differences in perspectives between South and North Korea regarding the Pyeongchang Olympics are resolved. North Korea's participation in the Olympics is not due to a fundamental shift in its basic line but is aimed at strengthening its three major revolutionary capabilities. Conversely, South Korea hopes that North Korea's participation in the Olympics will be an opportunity to improve inter-Korean relations based on North Korea's new survival strategy. These differing perspectives will become apparent after the Olympics, during the process of resuming joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises and North Korea's nuclear and missile tests. Therefore, genuine improvement in inter-Korean relations will only begin in earnest when North Korea moves beyond the horizon of strengthening its three major revolutionary capabilities and begins to seek a new path for coexistence in the 21st century. Second, North Korea's efforts to base its survival strategy on the mass production and practical deployment of nuclear missiles in 2018 could lead to the risk of regime collapse, so it must recognize this and seek new alternatives. To assist in this from the outside, it is inevitable for South Korea, in cooperation with relevant parties including the United States and China, to maintain sanctions against North Korea's continuous strengthening of its nuclear capabilities. Simultaneously, the deterrence system in the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region against North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities must be rapidly completed to neutralize the political and military influence of North Korea's nuclear program. As North Korea's nuclear development leads to greater economic difficulties and its political and economic influence rapidly diminishes, South Korea and neighboring countries must more actively conceive and present a new comprehensive peace and prosperity system that can reliably guarantee the survival and prosperity of a denuclearized North Korea. Third, for North Korea to independently formulate a new 21st-century survival strategy best suited to its changing three major capabilities, internal self-help efforts, along with external assistance, are crucial. Economically, it has already undergone marketization changes, and socio-culturally, it has begun to tread the path of informatization driven by advancements in cutting-edge technology. Within the context of these civilizational changes, South Korea's North Korea policy must make long-term efforts to promote a denuclearized economy and parallel development line that is evolved to befit the 21st century on the political and ideological front. ■ Author Ha Young-sun_ Director of EAI, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington and has served as a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for International Affairs at Seoul National University, Director of the Center for American Studies, and President of the Korean Association of Peace Studies. His major works include 'Complex World Politics: Strategy, Principles, and a New Order,' 'New Era of Korea-Japan Relations and a Symbiotic Complex Network,' 'World Politics in Transition,' and 'The US-China Competition in Building the Asia-Pacific Order.' 〈EAI Ha Young-sun Column〉 is a commentary series planned to explore practical alternatives through Ha Young-sun's analysis and outlook on major foreign and security issues at home and abroad. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are solely the author's personal views and do not represent those of EAI. |
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
How can I help you?