[EAI Commentary] President Trump's Asia Trip: An Assessment of U.S. Asia Strategy

[Editor's Note]

President Trump's first trip to Asia since taking office has concluded. While expectations were high that the trip would reveal the contours of the U.S. strategy for Asia, it did not offer concrete details. Nevertheless, Professor Jeon Jae-sung of Seoul National University notes that the introduction of the "Indo-Pacific region" concept as a new, comprehensive regional strategy to replace the Obama administration's "Asia Rebalance" strategy is noteworthy. However, Professor Jeon points out that currently, only the economic aspects are highlighted, and the strategy lacks explicit details regarding the future relationship with China, the importance of alliances, and multilateral economic cooperation, making it difficult to consider it a well-structured regional strategy at this stage.

President Trump's Asia trip garnered significant attention due to expectations that it would showcase the Trump administration's approach to Asian strategy. The U.S. presidential election had focused primarily on domestic issues, particularly the economy, leaving Asian strategy unclear. During his state visits to three countries and participation in three major regional multilateral forums, President Trump presented the outline of the U.S. strategy for Asia. Upon concluding his trip on November 15, President Trump summarized its objectives as follows: first, to rally nations to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue; second, to build a free and open Indo-Pacific region; and third, to establish fair and reciprocal trade norms.

Regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, President Trump used the phrase "rallying nations to resolve" rather than simply "resolving the North Korean nuclear issue," emphasizing the urgent need for action given the escalating threat. The term "free and open Indo-Pacific region" had begun to be used by key cabinet members, including Secretary of State Tillerson, prior to the trip. President Trump stated that the goal is to strengthen economic partnerships in this region, enabling sovereign nations and their citizens to respect each other and escape foreign domination and economic dependence. The importance of achieving fair and reciprocal trade was also emphasized, given the U.S. annual trade deficit of $800 billion. The message conveyed was that all countries must adhere to the rules when trading with the United States, and that the U.S. seeks fair competition in Asia while protecting its values and security.

While still abstract, the most intriguing aspect in the medium to long term is the U.S.'s comprehensive Asian strategy. The term "free and open Indo-Pacific region" can be seen as a replacement for the Obama administration's so-called "Asia Rebalance" strategy. Under an overall strategy of reduction, the Obama administration had established and pursued a policy of giving relative importance to Asia, which had emerged as a key region for U.S. security and economic strategy, and allocating more policy resources to it. President Trump, while emphasizing security and economic conditions in Europe and the Middle East, is now presenting a concept of establishing a new security and economic architecture for the Indo-Pacific region to advance U.S. interests.

The term "Indo-Pacific region" is known to have been first proposed in 2007 by Gurpreet Khurana, a former Indian Navy officer and current Director of the National Maritime Foundation in New Delhi. Subsequently, following strategic dialogues between India and Japan, Prime Minister Abe used this concept in a speech to the Indian Parliament several months later. During his visit to India, Prime Minister Abe emphasized both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean as oceans of freedom and prosperity. Around 2010, the United States also began using this concept at the government level. For example, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton mentioned working with the Indian Navy in the Pacific and emphasizing the Indo-Pacific region for global trade and commerce. Around 2013, Australia's defense white paper used the phrase "Indo-Pacific region" to emphasize its importance for economic and military strategy. In a sense, China's perception of this series of developments as a containment strategy against it is natural. China has shown vigilance, perceiving a containment encirclement forming across the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

China, which has risen to prominence, is pursuing its Belt and Road Initiative while simultaneously implementing a two-ocean policy spanning the Indian and Pacific Oceans. India, as the third-largest economy in Asia and the seventh-largest globally, has also turned its attention to Asia. It has transitioned from its past "Look East Policy" to an "Act East Policy," strengthening its economic and security ties with Asian nations. Japan, too, is pursuing a security and economic strategy connecting India and Australia, while also strengthening its ties with Southeast Asian countries. Amidst these trends, the U.S.'s adoption of the "free and open Indo-Pacific region" concept is sufficiently significant to attract considerable attention.

During his visit to India, Secretary Tillerson mentioned the Indo-Pacific region, expressing the perception that the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are inseparably linked in terms of security and economy. While the core concept of the "Indo-Pacific region" is the connection between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, it inherently implies that India must be a part of Asia's security and economic architecture. There is still a long way to go to integrate India, which is not currently a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and has not joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, into the Asian security framework. It is also uncertain how India, known for its independent stance in bilateral and multilateral treaties and a difficult negotiating partner, will act as a member of the U.S.-led Asian strategy. This is because India, with its considerable national strength, seeks to pursue an independent course amidst the strategic competition between the U.S. and China.

It remains unclear what content the "free and open Indo-Pacific region" emphasized by President Trump will entail and what specific strategies will be pursued in the future. Following his summit with President Trump on November 6, Prime Minister Abe mentioned the Indo-Pacific region in a joint statement and welcomed countries wishing to be part of this initiative. In the overall context, it is difficult to dismiss the impression that the U.S. is supporting Japan's regional concept. However, it is also difficult to argue that Japan's Indo-Pacific regional concept prioritizes encircling and containing China. During a press conference in Japan, President Trump referred to China as a "great friend," suggesting that Japan will likely be closely watching the future direction of U.S.-China relations, and more specifically, the Trump-Xi Jinping partnership. Currently, President Trump is emphasizing cooperation with China on issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem and U.S.-China economic relations. In this atmosphere, President Trump is unlikely to desire the Indo-Pacific regional concept to lead to anti-China sentiment. Japan also shows a possibility of pursuing strengthened relations with President Xi Jinping, who is promoting a new type of international relations strategy and a strategy towards neighboring countries following the 19th Party Congress.

At present, the Indo-Pacific region concept mentioned by President Trump should be viewed as having a strong economic dimension. On November 10, President Trump, attending the APEC summit, elaborated on the Indo-Pacific concept at the CEO summit in Da Nang, Vietnam. The "free and open Indo-Pacific region" entails independent sovereign nations sharing diverse cultures and dreams, and collectively aspiring to develop in prosperity, freedom, and peace. This can be seen as an "Indo-Pacific dream" led by the U.S., in contrast to the "China Dream." President Trump extensively emphasized the historical ties between the U.S. and Asia, particularly not only with Northeast Asia but also with Southeast Asia and India. He congratulated India on its 70th anniversary of independence and praised its remarkable economic growth as the world's largest democracy. What is particularly emphasized here is the economic aspect. The U.S. will pursue prosperity and security with Indo-Pacific nations, with the core principle being fairness and reciprocity. President Trump criticized the imperfections of the World Trade Organization (WTO), pointing out that U.S. interests have been sacrificed. He stated that just as other countries prioritize their own interests, the U.S. will prioritize its own interests. Ultimately, the U.S.'s "Indo-Pacific dream" is strongly underpinned by the logic of economically prospering with countries that share rules that advance U.S. interests.

Considering these points, the characteristics of the Asian concept presented by President Trump thus far can be summarized as follows: First, the emphasis on a "free and open Indo-Pacific region" is unlikely to be a spontaneous utterance and appears likely to continue for the time being. This is a regional concept shared not only by the U.S. but also by Japan and India. European countries, too, with expanding trade with China and observing China's Belt and Road Initiative and two-ocean policy, cannot help but emphasize the linkage between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Furthermore, many countries fully recognize the importance of maritime freedom and sea lanes, as well as the security domain.

Second, given the nature of the Trump administration, the concept of a "free and open Indo-Pacific region" is difficult to consider a well-structured regional strategy. President Trump is facing difficult domestic political issues, such as allegations of Russian collusion during the election campaign, and is in a position where he must solidify his standing through domestic economic revitalization and job creation. The situation is so urgent that he needs to achieve short-term economic gains to be remembered as a president who successfully pursued global and regional security strategies. Moreover, President Trump's personal disposition is vastly different from previous presidents, making it unlikely that he would engage in medium- to long-term considerations of geopolitical and geo-economic linkages or the foundations of U.S. hegemony. The Indo-Pacific region concept is being put forward primarily as a means for U.S. economic revitalization and is more likely to be framed within bilateral economic agreements with countries that agree with President Trump's trade principles. In the absence of multilateral economic architectures like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it remains uncertain how the U.S. will engage with the Asian regional economy without multilateral cooperation.

Third, in this process, the establishment of a comprehensive future strategic relationship with China is being delayed or ignored. Following his visit to China, President Trump's press conference emphasized the North Korean nuclear issue and U.S.-China economic relations, while completely omitting important regional security issues such as the South China Sea and the East China Sea. It is questionable whether an awareness of strategic competition and conflict between the U.S. and China, such as the Thucydides Trap, is even reflected. By focusing solely on securing U.S. interests in immediate issues, the $250 billion trade investment agreement and fair trade with China are more important matters. It is difficult to know what strategic blueprint the Trump administration has for future U.S.-China relations.

Fourth, the importance of alliances in the Indo-Pacific regional strategy is difficult to ascertain. President Obama's "Asia Rebalance" strategy was based on principles such as prioritizing alliances, strategic cooperation with major countries including China, market economy, and democracy. It is unclear what strategic resources the "free and open Indo-Pacific region" will be based on in detail, and the role of alliances is particularly ambiguous. President Trump stated that countries that act according to the rules set by the U.S. will be close economic partners, while those that do not will not fare well. In a situation where issues such as intellectual property protection, opposition to unfair subsidies, and improvement of cyber theft and unfair competitive practices are important, the traditional concept of alliances for joint response to security threats has indeed faded. While President Trump emphasized the importance of alliances and past alliance relationships during his visits to South Korea and Japan, he did not significantly mention a vision for alliances or their importance in the future Asian landscape. For President Trump, the concept and reality of security threats are unclear. President Trump stated, "It's not true that economic security is closely linked to national security," and added, "Economic security is national security itself," a direct and significant remark.

For South Korea, the impact of President Trump's Asia trip on the future of the North Korean nuclear issue is a critical concern. Regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, several key points revealed during this trip can be considered. First, President Trump views the North Korean nuclear issue as a matter of U.S. homeland security and considers it extremely urgent. However, he still shows limitations in viewing the North Korean nuclear issue as a matter of Northeast Asian international politics, such as the future of the Korean Peninsula or North Korea's future strategic status, or as a geopolitical issue surrounding the Korean Peninsula. It is also not clearly linked to the Indo-Pacific regional strategy discussed earlier. President Trump is focused on confirming the ultimate goal of denuclearization and maximizing isolation, pressure, and sanctions against North Korea. In this process, concerns about protecting the U.S. homeland from North Korean nuclear missiles are prioritized over historical and strategic considerations of the Korean Peninsula's division and the North Korean issue.

Second, the Trump administration has presented "maximum pressure and engagement" as its strategy toward North Korea. While maximizing pressure was emphasized during this trip, a precise strategic picture regarding engagement is lacking. Engagement encompasses various aspects, including considerations for North Korea's future strategic status, conditions for medium- to long-term peace with North Korea, and diplomacy for denuclearization. President Trump's Asia trip was a good opportunity to signal the direction of the U.S.'s future medium- to long-term strategic relationship with North Korea, but it cannot be said to have fully achieved its objectives.

Third, despite the above, the conditions for initiating dialogue with North Korea appeared to be eased. While the phrase "all options are on the table" was mentioned, it was rarely invoked, and sanctions and pressure were discussed as the primary policy tools. There was almost no mention of military means. Around the time of the trip, key cabinet members, including the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense, continuously mentioned dialogue with North Korea. One might expect that a more accurate assessment of the specific damage that military means would inflict on allies such as South Korea and Japan would have been made.

Fourth, in his address to the South Korean National Assembly, President Trump criticized North Korea's dictatorship and specifically mentioned its human rights situation. He also introduced the concept of a "civilization line," excluding North Korea from the sphere of civilization. This perception could become a basis for difficulties when substantive dialogue with North Korea begins in the future, as human rights sanctions are a possibility, yet a calm strategy and negotiations based on interests are necessary for engagement with North Korea. At the same time, the fact that criticism of North Korean politics did not lead to mentions of military means can be viewed positively.

Fifth, attention should be paid to how U.S.-China dialogue for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue will be concretized into future policies. Controversy has already arisen regarding the "freeze-for-freeze" proposal between the U.S. and China, and China's Liaison Department Minister Song Tao's visit to Pyongyang has taken place. Despite President Trump's visit to China, differences in stance between the U.S. and China regarding the North Korean nuclear issue still exist and will require considerable time to resolve. It is difficult to expect that President Trump's Asia trip will create a decisive opportunity for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. The U.S. approach still shows a distance from China's strategy and South Korea's concerns. President Trump also emphasized "unity among nations for resolution" more than the phrase "resolving the North Korean nuclear issue." South Korea must, on one hand, analyze the progress of the U.S. regional strategy in Asia and understand its impact on South Korea's national interests. On the other hand, it must view the North Korean nuclear issue as part of the Korean Peninsula's strategic issues and North Korea's problems, and respond to unfolding situations under the framework of a comprehensive North Korea strategy comprising pressure, sanctions, and engagement. ■

Author

Jeon Jae-sung_ Director of the EAI Center for International Relations and Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, international relations history, the ROK-U.S. alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "Threats of War and Peace Between the Two Koreas" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

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