EAI Commentary: The Inauguration of Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’ and Its Political and Diplomatic Implications

[Editor's Note]

The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, marking the beginning of Xi Jinping's second term, concluded on October 24. Following the unprecedented move of enshrining 'Xi Jinping Thought' into the Party charter, and the promotion of Xi's close associates to key positions within the Politburo Standing Committee, Xi's power base has been significantly strengthened. However, this also entails greater political pressure, as the leadership must deliver concrete achievements commensurate with the rosy vision presented for the next five years. Therefore, Xi Jinping's second term is expected to focus more on domestic development and stability to realize the 'strong nation' plan, while simultaneously pursuing relatively low-cost and stable international relations, according to Professor Lee Dong-ryul of Dongduk Women's University.

Significance of the Inauguration of Xi Jinping's Second Term

The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China has ushered in Xi Jinping's second term. An unexpectedly strong Xi Jinping-centric system has emerged. Immediately upon the commencement of the second term, the unprecedented step of incorporating 'Xi Jinping Thought' (Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era) into the Party constitution was taken. Xi Jinping is now evaluated as having surpassed Deng Xiaoping in formal standing within the history of the Communist Party of China, and even being elevated to the level of the nation's founder, Mao Zedong, as only Mao Zedong's name is enshrined in the Party constitution alongside his ideology. The selection of members for the Politburo and its Standing Committee was also finalized at the First Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee. Out of 25 Politburo members, 15 were replaced, and out of the 7 members of the Politburo Standing Committee, 5 were replaced, with a majority of these being Xi Jinping's close associates. A solid power base has been established for Xi Jinping to unfold his 'New Era' over the next five years.

The strengthening of Xi Jinping's power does not align with the trajectory of China's political development. The system of collective leadership has regressed, and the practice of designating successors across generations (隔代指定), which ensured predictability and stability in power transitions, has not been upheld. Consequently, with the succession plan becoming ambiguous after the 20th Party Congress (2022), power succession remains a significant political challenge. Despite the departure from convention at the 19th Party Congress, it is noteworthy that the Party constitution was officially amended and the top leadership was reorganized through formal institutions and procedures. Furthermore, the presence of former General Secretaries Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao alongside Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress, who both emphasized the 'New Era,' symbolically confirmed that Xi Jinping's consolidation of power was decided through internal Party consensus. Therefore, while the institutionalization of politics through convention, which had been progressing since the Deng Xiaoping era, has partially regressed, the Xi Jinping system has become even more robust.

In essence, there is a shared absolute goal among the ruling elite to maintain and strengthen the one-party system of the Communist Party, and based on this consensus, the consolidation of power around Xi Jinping has proceeded. A consensus has formed that concentrating power in the new phase of the 'New Era' is necessary for the strengthening and development of the Communist Party system.

The Meaning and Challenges of the 'New Era' and 'New Ideology'

During the Mao Zedong era, revolution was the spirit and task of the times. From Deng Xiaoping onwards, the reformist leaderships of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao secured the legitimacy of the Communist Party's rule based on the myth of high-speed growth. However, under the Xi Jinping regime, as symbolized by the 'New Normal' (新常態), maintaining the growth myth has become practically difficult. An era has arrived where political reforms are needed to address the diverse needs and grievances within society that were previously masked by the growth myth.

Over the past five years, President Xi has sought to legitimize his rule not through political reform, but by emphasizing an anti-corruption campaign and the banner of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. However, both approaches entail certain limitations and risks. The anti-corruption campaign may face fatigue from its sustained implementation, and nationalism carries the inherent risk of being a double-edged sword. The Xi Jinping regime faces the daunting challenge of discovering new sources of legitimacy for its rule, and the result of this deliberation is manifested in the consolidation of strong leadership through the discourse of the 'New Era' and 'New Ideology.' In essence, the report of the 19th Party Congress fundamentally presents grand narratives and visions of 'completing socialism with Chinese characteristics' and 'the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,' thereby emphasizing the necessity of strengthening the Communist Party system with strong leadership. The task of the 'New Era' is to resolve the 'contradiction between the people's demand for a better life (美好生活) and unbalanced and insufficient development' and move towards 'common prosperity (共同富裕) and becoming a strong nation (强起来).' In other words, it aims to become a truly strong nation through qualitative development that responds to the changed demands of the people. In the future, China will leverage a series of upcoming milestones, including the 40th anniversary of reform and opening up (2018), the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China (2019), the comprehensive construction of a moderately prosperous society (2020), the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China (2021), and the 20th Party Congress (2022), to more firmly convey its will and capacity for national strengthening both domestically and internationally.

However, China now faces the political burden and challenge of achieving substantial and concrete results over the next five years of Xi Jinping's second term to meet the high expectations for the realization of the 'Chinese Dream.' Notably, unlike previous leaders, President Xi's early enshrining of 'Xi Jinping Thought' in the Party charter during his term may lead to ongoing debates about the substance and achievements of 'Xi Jinping Thought' over the next five years, which could also become a political burden.

While Xi Jinping's second term has commenced splendidly with the establishment of a strong power base and the presentation of a rosy vision, the challenges and tasks it faces are not insignificant. To substantially advance the 'strong nation' plan presented by Xi Jinping's second term, greater focus must be placed on domestic development and stability, and managing external risks to minimize them has become crucial.

Changes and Continuity in Xi Jinping's Second-Term Foreign Policy Strategy

Party Congresses ending in a year with '7' typically mark the inauguration of a second-term government, thus foreign policy strategies generally exhibit more continuity than change. Indeed, no new foreign policy discourse has been introduced compared to the report of the 18th Party Congress. However, a notable characteristic is the particular emphasis on establishing a 'new type of international relations' and a 'community of shared future for mankind,' while the concept of a 'maritime power' has not been mentioned.

Regardless of whether the consolidation of power around Xi Jinping stems from domestic vulnerabilities and a shared sense of crisis within the power structure, or conversely, from expectations for the realization of national resurgence, it is highly probable that the Xi Jinping second-term administration will prioritize domestic affairs over foreign policy and pursue relatively low-cost and stable international relations. In the long term, to foster an international environment conducive to China's rise and expand its influence in Asia, it is necessary to first manage the deteriorating regional situation.

Indeed, the 'maritime power' discourse emphasized in the 18th Party Congress report has disappeared, replaced by the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI). The 'maritime power' concept, in conjunction with the Obama administration's pivot to Asia strategy, not only intensified territorial disputes with various Asian countries but also created difficulties for China's maritime expansion as a development strategy. Therefore, it appears that China has opted for a geoeconomic approach, promoting the BRI as an alternative to alleviate the geopolitical competition and security dilemmas caused by the maritime power concept and strategy, while simultaneously persuading others that China's maritime expansion will create a public good in the form of a 'community of shared interests.'

On the other hand, as repeatedly emphasized in the report, President Xi's determination for national strengthening is firm, even to the extent of presenting specific timelines for the goal of 'rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.' Thus, if the protectionist tendencies of the Trump administration continue, there is an expectation that the Xi Jinping government could seize a significant strategic opportunity to expand its global leadership by circumventing direct confrontation with the United States. The report of the Party Congress emphasizes openness, international cooperation, internationalism, and contribution to humanity. China has stated that it will 'actively participate in the reform and construction of the global governance system and contribute China's wisdom and capabilities.' Following the Party Congress, Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized China's role and contribution to human society in a discussion forum. He stated, 'Through the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, we will provide a new path for the modernization of developing countries, offer China's solutions to global problems, and contribute China's wisdom to exploring better social systems.' He further emphasized, 'China will unswervingly follow a path of national strengthening that differs from traditional great powers.' In essence, China is further clearly expressing its intention to gradually expand its role and global leadership as a nation distinct from the United States, while avoiding direct confrontation with the U.S. as much as possible in the process of pursuing its national strengthening agenda.

However, while the vision of realizing the 'Chinese Dream' may help secure regime legitimacy, it also risks hindering the flexibility of Chinese diplomacy by excessively inflaming nationalist sentiments among the populace. This is already a reason why China maintains a hardline stance on issues defined as core interests, such as maritime territorial disputes. If, in the process of formulating a foreign policy strategy that seeks a stable surrounding environment to advance its rise, China faces renewed disputes with neighboring countries concerning core interests such as sovereignty and territory, a significant challenge will be how to reconcile the heightened expectations of the Chinese people with the vigilance of the international community. Therefore, China is likely to continue exhibiting complex and varied patterns of external behavior depending on the issue and context.

Simultaneously, the concentration of power in Xi Jinping may lead to swift and efficient policy decisions, but it also carries the potential to restrict diplomatic flexibility. For instance, when President Xi directly and clearly opposed the deployment of THAAD, it created a situation where no one could easily propose flexible solutions, leading to a stalemate in the THAAD conflict. That is, while the assertiveness of Chinese diplomacy may somewhat decrease as the stability of the Chinese system is secured, its rigidity may conversely increase.

New signs of recovery are also emerging in South Korea-China relations. A prolonged period of strained relations between South Korea and China is undesirable. Restoring relations is necessary, particularly to prevent conflicts over national interests from escalating into emotional confrontations between the publics of both countries, which are inherent in South Korea-China relations. While summit diplomacy is highly effective in demonstrating a swift recovery of relations, it must be guarded against interpreting the holding of summit meetings as an immediate restoration of bilateral relations. We must reflect on the lessons learned over the past four years regarding the vulnerability of a diplomatic approach overly reliant on the relationship between leaders. As a result of the concentration of power in President Xi following the 19th Party Congress, it appears difficult for South Korea-China relations to escape a pattern dominated by summit diplomacy in the future. Nevertheless, efforts to institutionalize the relationship between leaders by expanding it to national and public relations are important from South Korea's perspective. ■

Author

Lee Dong-ryul_ Professor at Dongduk Women's University and Director of the EAI Center for Chinese Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Peking University's School of International Studies and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Unification and an executive member of the Joint Research Committee of Korean and Chinese Experts. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, ethnic minorities in China, and Chinese nationalism. His recent works include "Changes and Continuity in the Foreign Policy of the Xi Jinping Regime," "China's policy and influence on the North Korea nuclear issue: denuclearization and/or stabilization of the Korean peninsula?" (co-edited) "Talking About China's Future" (co-authored) and "China's Territorial Disputes" (co-authored).

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