EAI Commentary: ROK-US Relations in the Face of 'America First'

Editor's Note

On November 8, Donald Trump, the Republican candidate, was elected the 45th President of the United States, defying the expectations of many experts. Given that President-elect Trump consistently emphasized "America First"—prioritizing U.S. national interests—during his campaign, significant changes are anticipated in ROK-US relations, according to Son Byung-kwon, a professor at Chung-Ang University. He particularly stresses the possibility of the next administration employing a high-pressure diplomacy by simultaneously placing key pending issues such as the cost-sharing for the ROK-US Combined Forces Command, the transfer of wartime operational control, and the ROK-US FTA on the negotiation table and linking them. However, he adds that policy direction could vary depending on who is appointed to key positions, which could also be a variable.

In the recent U.S. presidential election, Republican candidate Trump demonstrated impressive competitiveness in the Midwestern states of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, which had been strongholds for Democratic victories in past elections, defeating the seasoned Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton to win the presidency. This outcome, a result of the concentrated anger of white laborers yearning for change, propelled Trump, an outsider to Washington politics, to victory on the so-called "coalition of restoration" (The Atlantic, June 23, 2016, online edition), ending eight years of Democratic administration. Clinton, who was reportedly plagued by the email scandal throughout the election, failed to become the first female president of the United States, facing distrust and anger towards Washington politics, an image of a politician colluding with Wall Street elites, and limitations in mobilizing voters.

Rather than predicting how the divided American society will move forward, our greater concern lies in assessing the impact of Trump's victory on Korea and preparing for it. Korea needs to urgently prepare for an uncertain future where the ROK-US relationship may shift from a tacit understanding of a blood alliance to a subject of thorough negotiation and calculation.

Since participating in the Republican primaries, Trump has made numerous statements regarding U.S. domestic politics and economy, relations with neighboring countries, and foreign and trade policies. Many of these were fragmented and spontaneous, made to fit the immediate atmosphere. Some were beyond common sense, some were contradictory, and some were unverifiable. While it is natural for various statements to emerge during a presidential campaign, Trump's choice of language and terminology differed qualitatively from that of established politicians.

It appears somewhat risky to take the statements of Trump, who possesses such a unique character, at face value and use them to forecast future ROK-US relations. Basing an outlook on ROK-US relations on his contradictory and spontaneous remarks would likely result in merely listing inconsistent points. Furthermore, it would be somewhat unreasonable to forecast the bilateral relationship by compiling statements made by those referred to as his close associates regarding pending ROK-US issues. While individuals like Senator Jeff Sessions and former DIA Director Michael Flynn have been mentioned as Trump's foreign policy confidants, there is no discernible "Trump foreign policy team" or a cohesive think tank, nor is there a clear grand strategy for foreign policy. It is possible that the foreign policy team is hastily assembled and lacks a grand strategy for the time being, or that a dysfunctional team composed of conflicting ideas and based on patronage may be formed.

Therefore, a safer approach would be to roughly infer the broad framework of Trump's foreign policy by examining the important terms or phrases he has consistently mentioned, his relatively well-organized foreign policy speeches, and the Republican Party platform that reflects compromises and agreements between traditional party policies and the candidate. Then, within that framework, we can extrapolate future ROK-US relations. What, then, are the consistent and persistent themes reflected in the terms Trump emphasized most during the election campaign, related speeches, and the party platform?

The core term Trump emphasized most during the election campaign was "America First." Simply put, Americanism symbolized by "America First" is a policy that prioritizes 'American national interests' above all else. What are the content and form of these 'American national interests'? Based on Trump's everyday remarks, foreign policy speeches, and the Republican platform, 'American national interests' primarily encompass the economic interests of American workers and U.S. national security. For a leader like Trump, who prefers concrete, tangible, and short-term results and seeks to negotiate and bargain based on these outcomes, abstract concepts like the promotion of American democratic values are likely to be relegated to a lower priority. Concrete economic interests such as securing jobs for American workers and ensuring fair wages, as well as security interests such as protecting American citizens from terrorism and maintaining military superiority, would constitute the 'American national interests' that President-elect Trump prioritizes.

In essence, the "America First" pursued by President-elect Trump implies that the U.S. (or narrowly, the Trump administration) must be able to walk away from the negotiating table at any time if it deems necessary, block import goods that threaten American jobs (as stated in the Republican platform's "Winning Trade Policy"), and prioritize diplomacy over war, selectively engaging only in winnable conflicts (Foreign Policy speech at The National Interest journal on April 27, 2016). In this regard, President-elect Trump's policies clearly exhibit isolationist tendencies. The Trump administration must possess the capacity to reject any policy or measure that infringes upon its sovereign right to protect its national interests. Participation in multilateral institutions to pursue long-term interests or create new norms is only possible after securing the sovereign right to exercise this U.S. veto power. To President-elect Trump, "globalism is a false song... the nation-state is paramount... international institutions are merely shackles on America" (Speech on April 27, 2016).

The pursuit of national interests prioritized by "America First" under President Trump's administration will inevitably send shockwaves through ROK-US relations. From a perspective that prioritizes short-term profit and loss calculations, the ROK-US alliance, which requires the continuous presence of U.S. forces and entails potential sacrifices of U.S. troops and additional military resources in times of contingency, would be considered a significant loss as long as it does not directly impact the security of the U.S. mainland across the Pacific. For such a non-beneficial alliance to be maintained, the minimum condition would be for the ally to bear all costs of the U.S. military presence. Logically, President-elect Trump's calculation would lead to the conclusion that if the ally does not accept this, the U.S. can simply withdraw its forces from the host country. In this context, the ROK-US alliance may transform from a traditional military bond into an object of negotiation and profit-and-loss calculation following the advent of the Trump administration.

This logic of "America First" will not be an exception in ROK-economic relations. During the election campaign, Trump consistently advocated for the abolition of the TPP and the renegotiation of NAFTA, and pointed out the unfairness of the ROK-US FTA. Any free trade agreement that reduces American jobs and lowers wages for American workers is unacceptable as it violates 'American national interests.' Countries exporting goods that reduce American jobs and lower American wages would likely be perceived by him as harboring significant unfair trade practices, such as government subsidies, currency manipulation, violations of working conditions, disregard for workers' rights, and failure to meet international trade standards. Therefore, the U.S. must be able to impose severe punitive measures, such as retaliatory tariffs, on such practices at any time. The conclusion of free trade agreements that do not meet these criteria is itself a 'concession of American sovereignty' and is 'unfair,' thus making such agreements subject to abolition, renegotiation, or additional negotiations. The ROK-US FTA is no exception.

Author

First, there may be a process of modifying or learning on the part of President-elect Trump himself. After meeting with President Obama immediately after his election, President-elect Trump showed room for change, suggesting that some aspects of Obamacare might remain. He is likely well aware that campaigning and governing are different, and as a result of updated information and learning about the Korean Peninsula situation, campaign pledges such as a hasty troop withdrawal or a complete renegotiation of the Korea-U.S. FTA may be revised.

Regarding these major issues, the roles of security experts surrounding the peninsula and policy decision-makers will also be important. That is, who joins Trump's foreign policy team could influence the next administration's foreign and Korean Peninsula policies. Given President-elect Trump's utilitarian tendencies, he may be resistant to incorporating ideological elements into foreign policy (Trump's intermittent but friendly remarks towards Putin of Russia or Kim Jong-un of North Korea can be seen as an episode showcasing this highly de-ideologized tendency). However, considering the lack of a foreign policy expert talent pool in his current campaign team, it is possible that many individuals from the previous Bush administration will be appointed. If so, ideological coloring may be added to the overall foreign policy of the future Trump administration, and in such a case, North Korea and China policies would become even tougher than during the Obama administration.

As President-elect Trump, who calls himself a master negotiator, is involved, the response of the opposing country can also greatly influence the Trump administration's foreign policy and Korea-U.S. relations. If he judges that dialogue and negotiation are effective, he may maintain a smooth relationship as long as the cost-benefit calculation is favorable. However, if he determines that negotiations are not effective, the Trump administration may pursue diplomacy aimed at maximizing its negotiating leverage. Such 'smart diplomacy' is realized through the exercise of power and the maximization of unpredictability, and in this process, conflicts may arise between the U.S. and the negotiating party. The Trump administration may adopt an aggressive diplomatic approach by placing the burden-sharing of defense costs, the transfer of wartime operational control, and Korea-U.S. trade relations on the negotiation table simultaneously and linking all issues, necessitating preparations for such a scenario.

Finally, the Trump administration's foreign policy and Korea-U.S. relations could differ depending on who holds the ultimate decision-making authority for each foreign policy issue. In the case of Korea-U.S. relations, there are various policy advisors and stakeholders, including the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State, U.S. Forces Korea commanders and diplomats stationed in Korea, relevant subcommittees of the Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee, members of the Korea-U.S. Interparliamentary Council, and experts on Korea-U.S. or East Asia relations at think tanks. Therefore, if their roles are emphasized, there may not be significant changes in Korea-U.S. relations, although an increase in South Korea's defense cost-sharing contributions would be entailed. However, if President-elect Trump deems a specific issue important, he is highly likely to make the final decision himself, and his unique personality traits could come into play, which is a cause for concern. Ultimately, the division of decision-making authority and its extent between the group of Korea-U.S. relations experts within the U.S. political, governmental, and academic circles and President Trump will likely influence Korea-U.S. relations.

President-elect Trump lost to candidate Clinton by about 600,000 votes in the popular vote count but won the Electoral College by winning Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania by a narrow margin of only about 110,000 votes combined. This means that more people opposed his becoming president than supported him, and the disastrous consequences that domestic and foreign policies ignoring this message from the election results might bring are eloquently demonstrated by the aftermath of the previous Bush administration's eight-year term.

President-elect Trump is an individual who succeeded in a "big sale" in the 2016 U.S. presidential election through a divisive 'exclusionary election strategy,' and he may even position himself not as a traditional institutional president but as a new type of 'movement president' in American politics, unprecedented in the past. President-elect Trump boasts of possessing the demeanor of a bold but cool negotiator, yet he frequently displayed an uncontrolled, impulsive personality during the election campaign. For the Trump administration's foreign policy to aim for an acceptable level of "America First," maintain cooperative relations with the international community amidst tensions, and simultaneously demonstrate sustainability amidst changes through medium-range adjustments in Korea-U.S. relations, it must be an administration that prioritizes negotiation skills over impulsive tendencies. However, the situation could become very difficult if President-elect Trump, as a movement president, exerts his unique temperament during domestic or international crises. In the unlikely event that he is seized by the impulse to substitute domestic "internal anxieties" (內憂) with external "foreign troubles" (外患), the U.S., as well as the Korean Peninsula and the world, could be engulfed in a far greater turmoil than during the 43rd Bush administration. However, the difficulty lies in the fact that it is as unpredictable as his election as to what the omens or preconditions for such a situation might be. ■

Author

Son Byung-kwon_ Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Chung-Ang University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan. His main research areas include U.S. politics, U.S. foreign policy, and comparative legislative and party systems. Recent works include "Causes of Distrust and Conflict in the ROK-US Alliance: With a Focus on the Roh Moohyun Era" (2016), "The Parliamentary System of a Unified Korea" (2015), and "The Tea Party Movement and the Reshaping of Republican Conservatism" (2013).

EAI Commentary is a commentary series designed to provide a platform for discourse where experts from various fields can offer in-depth analyses and policy recommendations on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting.

EAI is an independent research institution, independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not attributable to EAI and represent solely the views of the individual author.