EAI Commentary: The Significance of General Secretary Xi Jinping's Attainment of "Core" Status

[Editor's Note]

The Sixth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was held in Beijing from October 24-27. In its communiqué, the CPC for the first time referred to General Secretary Xi Jinping as the "core," thereby publicly announcing the elevation of his status. Yang Gap-yong, a research professor at the Sungkyun China Research Institute, assesses that a consensus had formed regarding the need for strong leadership for China to achieve new progress, and that the elevation of Xi's status was a highly sophisticated political strategy by the Party, reflecting this social atmosphere. However, he argues that while securing "core" status has strengthened Xi's power, the strong tradition of emphasizing intra-Party consensus remains, making it premature to conclude that a one-man rule system has begun.

At the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (hereinafter referred to as the Sixth Plenum), the communiqué officially stated, "The Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core" (以習近平同志爲核心的黨中央). This expression signifies that Xi Jinping alone among the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee has established "core" status. Indeed, in early 2016, Li Hongzhong, then Secretary of Hubei Provincial Party Committee, argued that "Xi Jinping is the "leading core" of the CPC Central Committee, and Party members and cadres will "spontaneously defend the leading core of Xi Jinping" and take Xi Jinping as their model." Although the term "core" was used intermittently in relation to Xi Jinping thereafter, this was the first time the term "core" was used in an official capacity at a Central Committee plenary session. This announcement publicly proclaims the elevation of Xi Jinping's status both domestically and internationally, and signifies the materialization of discussions within the Party regarding the strengthening of Xi Jinping's power, which had been spreading widely. Furthermore, it foreshadows significant changes in China's elite politics, as it indicates an expansion and strengthening of Xi Jinping's role in leadership system reform and leadership succession at the 19th Party Congress (scheduled for the latter half of 2017) and the 20th Party Congress (scheduled for the latter half of 2022).

In Chinese politics, only three leaders have held the status of "core": Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin. Hu Jintao was referred to with the phrase "the Party Central Committee with General Secretary Hu Jintao as the center," so the term "core" was never officially used. During Hu Jintao's tenure, expressions like "the core of the fourth-generation leadership" or "the fourth-generation leadership collective with Comrade Hu Jintao as the core" (以胡錦濤同志爲核心的黨的第四代領導集體) were used once or twice, but these were brief mentions in foreign media or local newspapers, and the central authorities never officially referred to Hu Jintao as the "core." In light of these past precedents, the mention of Xi Jinping as the "core" of the Party Central Committee in the communiqué of the Sixth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee indicates the possibility that Xi Jinping's status could be elevated beyond that of Hu Jintao, potentially to the level of Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping.

This elevation of Xi Jinping's "core" status appears to be the result of steady, behind-the-scenes preparations. A broad consensus had been forming within Chinese politics about the necessity of "core" status, and behind-the-scenes efforts to promote this atmosphere had been ongoing. As early as January 29, 2016, during a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee to review and study the comprehensive report on the work of the Party groups of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, the NPC Standing Committee, the State Council, the CPPCC National Committee, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the work report of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee (聽取和研究全國人大常委會, 國務院, 全國政協, 最高人民法院, 最高人民檢察院黨組工作彙報和中央書記處工作報告的綜合情況報告), the term "core" was mentioned. At that meeting, for the first time at the Politburo level, the "four consciousnesses" – "political consciousness" (政治意識), "overall situation consciousness" (大局意識), "core consciousness" (核心意識), and "alignment consciousness" (看齊意識) – were publicly mentioned. Following this, as Party committee secretaries and scholars at various levels across the country engaged in related discussions, the discourse on the "core" naturally expanded. For example, on January 11, 2016, Wang Dongming, Secretary of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee, publicly stated at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee, "Let us firmly defend General Secretary Xi Jinping, this core" (堅決維護習近平總書記這個核心). Two days later, on January 13, Huang Xuejun, Secretary of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee, also used the same phrase at an expanded meeting of the Standing Committee of the Anhui Provincial Party Committee: "Let us take General Secretary Xi Jinping as the model, defend the authority of the Central Committee, and firmly defend General Secretary Xi Jinping, this core" (堅決維護習近平總書記這個核心). On the same day, Peng Qinghua, Secretary of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Regional Party Committee, also stated at an expanded meeting of the Standing Committee of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Regional Party Committee, "Let us firmly defend General Secretary Xi Jinping, this core." Subsequently, on January 15, 2016, Guo Jinlong, Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, stated at a meeting to study and implement Xi Jinping's remarks on democratic life: "We need a strong leadership core more than ever before" (我們比任何時候都更需要一個堅強的領導核心). Although Guo Jinlong is a provincial party committee secretary, he holds the position of a member of the Politburo, indicating that discussions about Xi Jinping's "core" status were already being informally circulated at the Politburo level. The culmination of these discussions at the local level can be seen as leading to the establishment of Xi Jinping's "core" status at the Sixth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee.

Discussions within the Communist Party of China about the necessity of a "core" have been ongoing for a long time. For instance, Mao Zedong emphasized, "The Communist Party of China is the leading core of the entire Chinese people. Without such a core, the socialist cause cannot triumph" (中國共產黨是全中國人民的領導核心. 沒有這樣一個核心, 社會主義事業就不能勝利), and Deng Xiaoping stated, "Any leadership group must have a core; leadership without a core is unreliable" (任何一個領導集體都要有一個核心，沒有核心的領導是靠不住的), highlighting the importance and necessity of a "core."

Looking back at the process by which Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin acquired "core" status in the history of the Communist Party of China, it appears that they all established this status after a certain period had passed or from a strategic perspective. Although Mao Zedong effectively seized Party, government, and military power at the Zunyi Conference in 1935, his "core" status was only formally established at the Seventh National Congress of the CPC in 1945. Deng Xiaoping gradually established his "core" status as reform and opening up progressed. However, Jiang Zemin was deliberately granted "core" status by Deng Xiaoping immediately upon taking power. At that time, due to domestic and international circumstances such as the Tiananmen Square incident, the Party's leadership and the legitimacy of its rule were shaken, so Jiang Zemin was strategically granted "core" status to provide him with a charismatic position commensurate with the institutional authority of the supreme leader of the Party, government, and military.

However, unlike Deng Xiaoping or Jiang Zemin, Xi Jinping can be seen as having established his "core" status through a four-year preparatory period, by fostering a consensus on "core" status from the grassroots level upwards. The crucial role played by Party leadership and governance, or Party management, in this process cannot be overlooked.

In the four years since taking power, Xi Jinping's actions can be seen as a process that has sufficiently demonstrated why the Communist Party of China needs a "core." During his tenure, through comprehensively deepening reforms, the promotion of the "Four Comprehensives" (四個全面), and emphasizing an active role in the international community, Xi has cultivated a social atmosphere where a new political core has emerged as an authoritative, powerful, and capable leader for China and the Communist Party of China.

Xi Jinping's personal "political awareness," stemming from observing the weaknesses in Hu Jintao's ability to manage state affairs during his tenure, is also believed to have played a significant role. With over 30 years having passed since embarking on the path of reform and opening up, Xi Jinping, facing the need to drive China's new leap forward through new momentum – in other words, "great reforms" – found that the necessity of strengthening leadership was already widely understood and accepted within Chinese domestic politics.

All of these processes signify that the time has come to revise the so-called Deng Xiaoping-style development strategy, which uses "growth" and "development" as its paradigm. This also represents a new challenge facing China in the form of "great reforms." Therefore, there was a widespread consensus that this is a time when "Xi Jinping-style" (習式) politics and ideology are needed, and socialism reinterpreted in a "Xi Jinping-style" manner is necessary. In light of this social atmosphere, Xi Jinping's attainment of "core" status can be interpreted as a prescription resulting from the Communist Party of China's realistic assessment in preparation for new changes in China.

However, even if such a social consensus on the "core" has been formed, a different approach is needed to address whether Xi Jinping's "core" status is necessary at this juncture, whether the establishment of "core" status directly signifies the strengthening of Xi Jinping's personal power, and whether the strengthened power will be projected as increased influence for Xi Jinping in the leadership succession process.

First, there is the question of timing: is now the right moment? Central Committee plenary sessions are held approximately once a year, and the Sixth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee can essentially be considered the last such meeting. This is because the Seventh Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, to be held next year, will be a meeting to decide and review practical matters in preparation for the 19th Party Congress. Therefore, the decision to establish Xi Jinping's "core" status in the name of the Party Central Committee at the last Central Committee plenary session of the first five-year term of Xi Jinping's administration can be seen as the result of a highly sophisticated political strategy that has crowned Xi Jinping with laurels in the name of the Party.

Second, although Xi Jinping has acquired "core" status, it is unlikely to translate into personal power consolidation in the immediate future. This is because, despite the consensus on the necessity of "core" status and its officialization, China still emphasizes a system of collective leadership. Furthermore, while Xi Jinping has elevated his authority to the level of "core" status, he has not negated the usefulness, necessity, or legitimacy of the system of collective leadership. Rather, in a situation where the nuance of granting Xi Jinping personal "core" status is coexisting with the strengthening of the collective leadership system, personal power consolidation in the short term is likely to enter a period of pause. Instead, the Party faces the dual task of defending the "core" status while simultaneously revitalizing the collective leadership system.

Ultimately, this means it is premature to assess that Xi Jinping's one-man rule has begun with the acquisition of "core" status, or that he can manipulate the succession plan using this status. This is because, in reality, both the strengthening of "core" status and the maintenance of the collective leadership system are necessary institutions in China, and they are bound to coexist for the time being from the perspective of legitimacy. Therefore, a highly complex political struggle awaits, focusing on how to create systemic and practical measures that harmonize individual authority and collective authority. While it is clear that Xi Jinping has secured an advantageous position to exercise strong leadership through the acquisition of "core" status, close observation is needed to determine whether his leadership will be consistently and stably implemented through the 19th and 20th Party Congresses.

In conclusion, the Sixth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee elevated Xi Jinping's status to "core" and empowered him. However, the Party remains within the traditional framework that emphasizes consensus, and this meeting has instead presented the Communist Party of China with the dual task of defending Xi Jinping's "core" status while simultaneously revitalizing the collective leadership system. ■

Author

Yang Gap-yong_ Research Professor, Sungkyun China Research Institute, Sungkyunkwan University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the School of International and Public Affairs at Fudan University. His main research areas include the durability of the Communist Party of China's rule, cadres, and elite politics, focusing on the internal dynamics and mechanisms of rule.

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