[EAI Commentary] The 'Trump Phenomenon' and U.S. Foreign Policy in 2017

The much-discussed and controversial U.S. presidential primary race has concluded with the formal nomination of Donald Trump by the Republican Party on July 19 and Hillary Clinton by the Democratic Party on July 26. Consequently, the U.S. presidential election has now entered its main contest phase. Trump, an outsider candidate and real estate mogul known for his controversial remarks; Clinton, the first female presidential candidate from a major party. The matchup itself is intriguing, and regardless of who wins, the 2016 election, which will select a president with the prefix 'first,' will be recorded as 'historic' in American political history.

In the initial post-convention period, the political landscape appears to favor Clinton over Trump. Trump made remarks that seemed to defend Russia, which is suspected of hacking Democratic Party emails, and uttered disparaging comments about Muslim parents who lost their son in the Iraq War in 2004. Such statements, which could be interpreted as defending an adversary nation or insulting the military, are taboo in politics. His controversial remarks have crossed an unacceptable red line, not only limiting his appeal to a broader electorate but also causing a defection of his supporters.

Clinton and Trump are scheduled to hold three debates, beginning with the first on September 26. The general outcome of the election will likely be determined around the time of the second debate, scheduled for October 9. While there are still about two months until Election Day on November 6, and two months can be considered a 'lifetime' in politics, allowing for significant changes, it seems unlikely that Trump can catch up to Clinton, who has gained early momentum. Trump's campaign may have reached its limit. However, the unusual 'national mood' in the United States, manifested as the 'Trump phenomenon,' will significantly influence American politics and foreign policy in 2017, regardless of who occupies the White House. Therefore, even if there is no need to dwell on 'what if Trump wins,' analyzing the 'Trump phenomenon' is essential.

The most noteworthy aspect of the 2016 U.S. presidential election is the significant advancement of outsider candidates, such as Trump and Bernie Sanders, who are distant from Washington's mainstream, during the primary process of both the Republican and Democratic parties. Before the primaries, no mainstream politicians or experts predicted their strong performance. This is because the 'mainstream' underestimated the underlying changes occurring in American society and their political repercussions. The United States recovered relatively quickly from the global economic crisis triggered by the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 compared to other nations. Furthermore, it seemed that the crisis of the neoliberal economic order had been overcome. However, polarization was not an unfounded attack by the 'left,' and the expected 'trickle-down effect' was minimal. In fact, judging by indicators such as economic growth rate, employment rate, and stock prices, the U.S. economy is in good health. The problem, however, is that while the overall economic indicators are positive, middle-class incomes have actually decreased, the low-income population has increased, and the income polarization between high-income and low-income individuals has become entrenched, leading to the erosion of 'social mobility,' which American society prided itself on. The 'American Dream,' the idea that anyone can achieve upward mobility through hard work, is now just an empty slogan for the low-income population. Particularly, low-income white individuals perceived the causes of their suffering to be free trade policies that cost jobs, lenient immigration policies, costly foreign policy, and the ineptitude of Washington politics that failed to address their hardships. In contrast to the mainstream candidates of both parties who offered conventional promises, Trump and Sanders presented unconventional pledges that resonated with these voters. Despite their apparent opposition, Trump and Sanders share striking similarities in their policy proposals. First, both candidates advocate for a less interventionist foreign policy. While Trump's rhetoric on issues like ISIS and North Korea is aggressive, his stance is to resolve them through Russia and China rather than direct U.S. intervention. Sanders opposed the Iraq War, one of the few senators to do so, and, like Trump, suggested a reduced role for the United States on the international stage. Second, both candidates have declared a protectionist trade policy, arguing that free trade policies are responsible for the decline of the middle class and entrenched polarization. Third, both candidates emphasize the importance of robust social security and welfare programs. While this is expected from Sanders, who identifies as a democratic socialist, Trump also proposes maintaining and expanding healthcare programs like Medicare and Medicaid, and even introducing a healthcare insurance system similar to Obamacare. Furthermore, he discusses child tax credits and raising the minimum wage. Although the Republican establishment has historically viewed welfare policies as anti-market 'social engineering' and taboo, Trump is proposing a remarkably progressive social security system.

Even after World War II, there were instances in the United States where politicians advocating isolationist foreign policy, protectionist trade policies, or social democracy occasionally gained prominence. Pat Buchanan, who championed an isolationist foreign policy, secured second place in the 1996 Republican primaries behind Bob Dole, but later left the party and garnered only 0.4 percent of the vote as the Reform Party candidate in 2000. Howard Dean, who caused a stir in the 2008 Democratic primaries with progressive policies comparable to Sanders, criticizing John Kerry (current Secretary of State) as 'Bush Light,' was eliminated early in the primaries. The audiences listening to Buchanan and Dean were not particularly large, nor were they active voters. Fareed Zakaria, host of CNN's GPS, predicted at the beginning of the year, 'Most Americans supporting Trump are losers, and losers do not vote much in primaries or general elections, so the Trump phenomenon will quickly fade in the early primaries.' Contrary to his prediction, however, the previously silent 'losers' in America united and headed to the polls, now becoming a major 'constituency' that influences the election landscape. The fact that the 2016 Republican primary turnout reached an all-time high is highly indicative.

Trump's nomination as a candidate is not solely due to his uninhibited style, nor is it because the Republican field of candidates was weak. If Paul Ryan, the darling of the Republican Party who stood at the opposite pole of Trump on all policy issues, had run, would he have been nominated? Trump's nomination is more structural, stemming from a politically significant shift at the base of American society. In a situation of declining middle class and severe wealth disparity, progressive policies such as welfare enhancement would naturally gain support. In the 2012 South Korean presidential election, Park Geun-hye, recognizing the severity of the polarization issue, preempted the welfare discourse by first introducing welfare pledges. She 'clicked left' in response to the political climate. In the 2016 U.S. election, the Republican establishment continued to define welfare policies as anti-market, merely repeating the slogan 'the best government is a small government' like a mantra. Instead, with the far-right Tea Party faction gaining influence within the party, the Republican Party 'clicked right.' Trump's surge is a self-inflicted wound by the Republican establishment, which failed to accurately read public sentiment. Trump's surge is due to his offering pledges that the 'losers,' who have now become a major constituency, wanted to hear, regardless of their feasibility. Trump's rise is attributed to his 'content,' not his 'style.'

The constituency that shaped the primary race desires a reordering of national policy priorities. Their stance is that America's resources and energy should be used to address pressing domestic issues rather than being invested in international roles. A recent Pew Research poll indicated that nearly 60% of respondents believe the United States should focus more on its own problems and that other countries should resolve their own issues. The national mood in the United States has shifted towards being 'inward-looking,' and this mood is likely to create an unfavorable domestic political environment for the new administration, set to launch in 2017, to pursue an active foreign policy. Although the national mood in the U.S. is leaning towards isolationism in foreign policy and protectionism in trade, the principle that U.S. foreign and trade policies should be based on internationalism and free trade is also a 'national consensus' formed after World War II. If the former is the recently emerged 'popular consensus,' the latter is the bipartisan 'elite consensus' that has persisted for over 70 years. Since the rising popular consensus will be somewhat offset by the elite consensus, isolationist foreign policy and protectionist trade policies are unlikely to escalate to extreme levels.

Even if Trump becomes president, the broad framework of foreign, security, and military policy, as well as the structure of alliances, will likely remain unchanged. While it is said that 'U.S. foreign policy is what the president says it is,' the authority of U.S. presidents in foreign policy has been strengthened since World War II. However, under the U.S. system of separation of powers, the principle of 'checks and balances' is in effect. Therefore, even if Trump wishes to abruptly shift to an isolationist stance and abandon alliances, he will face institutional constraints. First, congressional approval will be necessary, and he will need to garner media support. The consensus of think tanks, known as the 'fourth estate,' must also be secured. Congress, the media, and think tanks share a consensus on America's internationalist foreign policy and alliance policies. To gain their support, Trump's foreign, defense, and alliance policies will inevitably converge to some extent with Clinton's. However, Trump will likely insist on his trade policy positions, and significant changes are indeed expected in this area. The reasons are twofold: First, U.S. voters generally react much more sensitively to trade policy, which they perceive as directly related to their economic interests, than to security, military, or alliance policies. Consequently, the national consensus on free trade is not as robust as the consensus on internationalist foreign policy or security alliances. Second, Trump is not an 'opportunistic protectionist' but a 'convinced protectionist.' Trump's protectionism has been remarkably consistent since the early 1990s. He has an empirical conviction that workers who struggled under his father's construction business have suffered due to free trade, and as a successful businessman, he is confident in his ability to negotiate favorable terms in international trade.

Even if Clinton becomes president, it is highly probable that trade policy will converge more towards Trump's position than what she herself deems appropriate. In fact, during the primary process, Clinton has become an 'outright' protectionist. As 'Secretary of State' Clinton, she had championed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a 'state-of-the-art' free trade agreement. However, last October, she expressed a hesitant stance, stating she had 'not carefully reviewed the text,' and after witnessing Trump and Sanders gain traction in the 'Rust Belt' states of the Midwest, which have a high concentration of declining industrial areas, she began to fundamentally revise her position on the TPP. Her loss in the Michigan primary in March was decisive. The day before the primary, polls predicted Clinton to lead Sanders by as much as 21%. However, pollsters sometimes fail to capture the fluctuations of angry public sentiment. The primary result was a victory for Sanders by a 2% margin. After losing Michigan, a Rust Belt state, to Sanders, Clinton clearly stated her opposition to the TPP ratification a few days later, and subsequently managed a narrow victory in the Ohio primary, another Rust Belt state and a crucial swing state. President Obama has expressed a strong desire to ratify the TPP during his term, but Clinton reiterated on August 11 that she would 'oppose it even if elected president.' Even during a lame-duck session, the chances of Congress approving it under the current circumstances are slim. This November election is not only for the presidency but also for all members of the House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate. Given the current climate, it is highly likely that a significant number of protectionists will be re-elected to Congress. Therefore, even if Clinton were to change her stance back to 'support' after becoming president, the ratification of the TPP by Congress appears difficult in the current situation. In fact, the Asia-Pacific alliance is one of the 'cheap' ways for the United States to pursue its pivot to Asia policy. Clinton will likely seek to maintain and expand the alliance framework, but given the demand to shift resources towards domestic issues, she will inevitably have to transfer more costs to her allies. Indeed, Obama himself has criticized some allies as 'free riders,' and Clinton has also emphasized fair cost-sharing by allies.

As Hillary herself admits, she is not a 'natural' politician like her husband, Bill Clinton, or Barack Obama. She is closer to a 'policy wonk.' As a 'policy maker,' Clinton is well aware of the importance of the pivot to Asia policy and understands that a pivot without the TPP is like 'hollow dumplings.' She would also likely want to actively engage in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. However, as a 'politician,' Clinton is in a domestic political situation where she must oppose the ratification, stating, 'This TPP is not the TPP I knew.' While her husband, Bill, achieved power by expanding his appeal with the slogan 'the era of big government is over!' and clicking right, his wife, Hillary, is aiming for the presidency by clicking extremely left in a national mood that has turned inward-looking. On the other hand, a controversial politician openly espousing closed Americanism and rejecting globalism has secured the Republican nomination. This indicates how much the domestic political situation has changed. Unlike China's 'new normal' (新常态), the United States, having regained its pre-economic crisis confidence, led many to anticipate 'Pax Americana 3.0' and 'the return of America.' However, as the veteran politician Tip O'Neill famously said, 'All politics is local.' Although there will be a readjustment between 'policy maker' Hillary and 'politician' Hillary after her inauguration, the inward-looking national mood will act as a limiting factor on America's active foreign policy. ■

Author

Kim Jae-cheonProfessor, Graduate School of International Relations, Sogang University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University and currently serves as the Director of the Institute for International Studies at Sogang University. His main research areas include U.S. foreign policy, ROK-U.S. relations, Northeast Asian international relations, and international security and peace. Recent research includes "The Fourth Nuclear Test and the End of Strategic Patience: An Analysis of Changes in U.S. North Korea Policy" (2016), "Turco-Iranian Alignment: Balancing or Bandwagoning with the US?" (2016), "Alliance Adjustment in the Post Cold-War Era: Convergence of Strategic Perceptions and Revitalization of the ROK-US Alliance" (2015), and "CIA Black Box" (2011).

EAI Commentary is a commentary series designed to provide a platform for experts from various fields to offer in-depth analysis and policy recommendations on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting.

EAI is an independent research institution, unaffiliated with any political faction. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not attributable to EAI and represent solely the views of the individual authors.