[EAI Commentary] The U.S. Effort to Deter China's Expansion of Influence in the South China Sea

The first ruling on the South China Sea dispute by the arbitral tribunal under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), issued on July 12, has significantly empowered the United States, which has been in sharp confrontation with China over the South China Sea, no less than the Philippines, a party to the dispute. The ruling that China's so-called 'nine-dash line' violates UNCLOS and that no features in the Spratly Islands can generate an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf provides a legal basis for U.S. policy in the South China Sea. The U.S. has gained a justification to weaken China's soft power by attacking China, which refuses to participate in the arbitration and acknowledge its outcome, as a country that denies basic international obligations.

While the South China Sea dispute is directly between China and regional countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam, it is also a manifestation of the larger power struggle between the U.S., which has enjoyed a dominant position in the Western Pacific, and the rising China. The U.S. has avoided direct involvement in the territorial disputes themselves but has sought to check China's expansion of influence in the region by asserting freedom of navigation and overflight. This is because the U.S. believes that failing to deter China in the South China Sea would lead to a loss of its hegemonic position and the trust of regional countries in the Asia-Pacific.

The South China Sea dispute has been ongoing since the 1970s, but it gained momentum in 2009 when China submitted a note verbale to the UN including a map with the 'nine-dash line.' Following the launch of the Xi Jinping administration, China has regarded the South China Sea as a core national interest and has taken a series of high-handed actions, such as obstructing fishing and seabed resource exploration activities by the Philippines and Vietnam in the waters. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. has termed China's incremental actions a 'salami-slicing strategy' to dominate the South China Sea. U.S. security experts, concerned about China's rapid military buildup, have begun urging regional countries involved in territorial disputes with China to strengthen their coast guard activities and share maritime information in real-time.

The power struggle between the U.S. and China over the South China Sea accelerated in late 2013 as China began constructing artificial islands on features it effectively controls, such as coral reefs, and building airfields and military facilities. The U.S. proposed a freeze on such activities in the disputed South China Sea, but China did not cease its work. When China undertook expansion work on two islands in the Paracel Islands in April 2015, the U.S. and the Philippines responded with a joint maritime exercise involving 12,000 troops. In May, U.S. and Chinese vessels came close to a collision in the South China Sea. Since the U.S.-China summit on September 25, 2015, where President Obama and President Xi reaffirmed their differing stances on the South China Sea issue, the U.S. sent the destroyer USS Lassen into the 12-nautical-mile zone around Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands on October 27. China responded by tracking the U.S. destroyer and criticized the U.S. for escalating military tensions in the South China Sea as an external power. While physical confrontations between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea have subsided since the beginning of 2016, aftershocks continue, such as the U.S. destroyer USS Lawrence entering waters near the Spratly Islands in early May.

The U.S. views these military actions as indispensable for upholding 'freedom of navigation.' For the military superpower that is the U.S., freedom of navigation is a lifeline. While freedom of navigation should naturally be guaranteed in the South China Sea, this freedom is being threatened by China's excessive claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction. UNCLOS, often called the 'constitution of the sea,' stipulates that all states enjoy freedom of navigation on the high seas, and this freedom also applies within the exclusive economic zone of coastal states. However, the issue lies in the differing interpretations between the U.S. and China regarding whether military activities such as training exercises, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering are included in freedom of navigation. The U.S. believes that military activities are inherently part of freedom of navigation, whereas China argues that military activities within an exclusive economic zone require the permission of the coastal state.

Opinions are divided among U.S. experts regarding the appropriate extent of U.S. Navy activities in the South China Sea. Some argue for sending warships within a few nautical miles of disputed islands to send a strong signal against Chinese provocations or to persuade other countries to join freedom of navigation operations. Others advocate for supporting the self-defense capabilities of the South China Sea claimant states rather than direct intervention. Indeed, the U.S. has lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam, which is in a territorial dispute with China, and conducted joint military exercises in late May. Meanwhile, there is also the view that the U.S. should cease military activities to maintain the status quo of peace in the South China Sea and encourage cooperation, such as joint resource development, between China and the relevant parties to ease tensions.

Following the Philippines, the U.S. hopes that Vietnam and other claimant states will actively pursue legal solutions through international arbitration, moving beyond bilateral negotiations with China. However, these countries, which must maintain friendly relations with China, will ponder whether a ruling lacking enforcement power can truly induce a change in China's attitude or if it will merely exacerbate the conflict. Whether they choose a strategy of appealing to international law and tribunals, following the precedent set by the Philippines, will largely depend on the responses of the U.S. and China following this ruling. This is why we must pay close attention to the future actions of Washington and Beijing. ■

Author

Lee Suk-jong President of EAI and Professor at the Graduate School of Governance, Sungkyunkwan University. She holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Harvard University. She currently serves as a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA). She is also a member of The Trilateral Commission and the Council of Councils (CoC), actively working to build international networks for policy research. She has previously served as a Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute, a Visiting Fellow at the Northeast Asia Program of the Brookings Institution in the U.S., an Adjunct Professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and a Visiting Professor at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies. Her recent publications include "South Korea Aiming to Be an Innovative Middle Power," Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea's Role in the 21st Century (ed.), "Global Development Cooperation Governance and Korea" (ed.), and "The Demise of 'Korea Inc.': Paradigm Shift in Korea’s Developmental State."

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