[EAI Commentary] Japan's House of Councillors Election, Abenomics, and Constitutional Revision

Predicted Victory for the LDP-Komeito Coalition

In the 24th ordinary election for the House of Councillors, held on July 10, for 121 of the 242 seats, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and its coalition partner Komeito emerged victorious. Of the 121 seats contested, the LDP secured 56 and Komeito won 14, bringing their total to 146 seats, including 76 uncontested seats, thus achieving a majority. The opposition, comprising the Democratic Party, Japanese Communist Party, Social Democratic Party, and the People's Life Party, which formed an electoral alliance in single-member districts, secured a total of 40 seats, maintaining 67 seats including 27 uncontested ones.

Results of the 24th House of Councillors Election

These results were largely anticipated. Pre-election media polls had already indicated a high likelihood of a fourth consecutive electoral victory for the Abe administration (House of Representatives in 2012, House of Councillors in 2013, House of Representatives in 2014, and House of Councillors in 2016), and the outcome did not deviate from these predictions.

Several points warrant attention in the results of this House of Councillors election. Firstly, the distribution of seats is significant: pro-revision forces now occupy 165 seats (including 4 independent members who support constitutional revision), surpassing the two-thirds majority threshold of 162 seats required for constitutional amendment. With forces officially pursuing constitutional revision now exceeding this threshold in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, conditions are ripe for substantive discussions on constitutional reform.

Meanwhile, although the LDP won, falling just one seat short of an outright majority with 121 seats, the opposition Democratic Party showed signs of recovery in terms of vote share compared to the 2013 House of Councillors election. Since the 2012 House of Representatives election, the primary factor determining Japanese elections has not been an increase in support for the LDP, but rather a withdrawal of support from the opposition (formerly the Democratic Party, now the CDP) and their failure to regain public trust. In the 2013 House of Councillors election, the Democratic Party garnered just over 7 million votes (on a proportional representation basis), performing worse than Komeito. In contrast, the CDP secured 12 million votes this time, demonstrating an improved performance. In terms of seats, they obtained 32, a better result than the 17 seats (10 in single-member districts, 7 in proportional representation) won in 2013. However, this is still less than half of the 23 million votes they received in the proportional representation segment in the 2007 House of Councillors election. Had the results of 2013 been repeated this year, the LDP would have secured a significantly larger number of seats, far exceeding an outright majority.

However, the alliance among anti-revision forces, centered around the CDP (CDP, Communist Party, Social Democratic Party, People's Life Party), faced limitations. In the 32 single-member districts where the four anti-revision parties formed an alliance, the LDP won 21 seats, while the opposition alliance secured 11. While this can be seen as a respectable showing for the opposition compared to the LDP's 29 victories in 31 single-member districts in 2013, the opposition's candidate unification strategy did not bring about significant changes nationwide, except in the Tohoku region.

Furthermore, the LDP's achievement of over 20 million votes in the proportional representation segment in the House of Councillors election, the first time since 2001, indicates that support for the LDP has increased alongside the opposition's recovery in vote share.

Assessment of Abenomics

In Japanese politics, House of Councillors elections, which are unrelated to cabinet formation, serve as a mid-term assessment of the incumbent government. The 2007 House of Councillors election strongly reflected a punishment for the LDP's inadequate response to growing economic inequality and its leadership deficit following the Koizumi administration. The 2010 election was characterized as a judgment on the policy confusion of the Democratic Party. The 2013 House of Councillors election, held just six months after the current Abe administration took office, saw expectations for Abenomics bolster support for the ruling LDP. In the 2016 election, the opposition sought to make the assessment of Abenomics and opposition to constitutional revision key issues.

Firstly, none of the economic growth targets promised by the Abe administration under Abenomics have been met. The pledge to achieve annual nominal growth of 3% through 2% inflation has proven to be an empty promise. Two factors contribute to Abenomics' failure to meet its economic growth targets. One is the economic slowdown caused by falling oil prices and the consumption tax hike. These factors, which run counter to the plan to boost consumption and investment through price increases, hindered the achievement of 3% nominal growth. However, a more fundamental reason is that achieving 3% nominal growth is inherently difficult due to structural factors such as an aging population and the resulting decline in the working-age population. If the Abe administration had separated growth from distribution and reduced distribution policies, public backlash against Abenomics in Japan might have intensified. However, the Abe administration succeeded in creating the impression that it was striving to harmonize growth and distribution through Abenomics, leading the Japanese public to expect or believe that this was the only viable path.

This situation makes it difficult for the opposition to present concrete and persuasive alternatives when evaluating Abenomics. The CDP's slogan, 'Economic revitalization starting with people,' frames Abenomics as pursuing only superficial growth that does not benefit the general public's welfare, but it fails to present a clear plan for its realization. In the 2007 House of Councillors election, the Democratic Party, under the slogan 'Livelihood First,' had concrete plans for increasing various welfare benefits through administrative efficiency, reforming neoliberal employment practices, and correcting social security reforms, which garnered public support. These policy proposals, differentiating the Democratic Party from the LDP at the time, framed the election as a choice between 'structural reform versus addressing inequality,' leading to their victory.

However, in the 2016 House of Councillors election, the CDP's core economic policies, such as strengthening childcare support, improving labor conditions, and enhancing support for the elderly, are not distinct from the current Abe administration's economic policies. This is because strengthening childcare support, improving labor conditions, and enhancing support for the elderly are all incorporated within Abenomics. Abenomics, with its growth-oriented approach centered on quantitative easing, clearly diverges from Koizumi's structural reforms and is linked to tangible efforts to connect growth with improvements in people's livelihoods. The Abe administration has continuously urged businesses to raise wages to link the yen's depreciation through quantitative easing and the resulting improvement in large corporations' performance to increased household consumption. Furthermore, by declaring the second phase of Abenomics in September 2015, it has set policy goals such as childcare support to increase the birth rate and reduce caregiving-related job separations, and improvements in employment systems. As seen in the 'Japan, Go to Hell' blog incident in the first half of this year, caused by the issue of children on waiting lists for daycare centers, the Abe administration's childcare policies lack substance. However, the fact that the current administration is pursuing concrete plans to translate growth into improvements in people's lives limits the CDP's ability to differentiate itself from the Abe administration. Exit polls from this House of Councillors election, the first to include 18-year-old voters, showed a strong tendency to support the LDP among teenagers and those in their 20s and 30s, indicating that the Abe administration's livelihood support plans related to Abenomics still resonate within Japanese society.

The limitations imposed by the perceived failure of the previous Democratic Party administration are significant for the CDP in appealing to the public with economic policies that differentiate themselves from Abenomics. The perception that the Democratic Party's push for welfare expansion was ultimately hollow still lingers in Japanese society, and unless new leadership emerges to change this perception, it is likely to take a long time for the CDP to regain power.

Constitutional Revision and East Asian International Relations

Meanwhile, Japan's opposition parties attempted to make the protection of the pacifist constitution a key issue in this election, highlighting that constitutional revision would become a reality if pro-revision forces secured two-thirds of the seats in the House of Councillors, following their success in the House of Representatives. However, the Abe administration pursued a strategy to avoid making constitutional revision, an unpopular issue in Japan, a prominent topic in the election. Despite opinion polls indicating that around 50% of the public opposes the Abe administration's attempts at constitutional revision, this opposition has not translated into political support for opposition parties.

Following the House of Councillors election, Prime Minister Abe expressed his intention to initiate discussions on constitutional amendment within the Diet's constitutional research committees. With the required majority secured in both houses of the Diet, discussions on constitutional amendment in Japan will now emerge as a pressing issue in Japanese politics.

However, several variables exist before discussions on constitutional revision can progress in Japan. On the favorable side for advancing revision discussions are the facts that support for constitutional revision within Japanese politics is not limited to the LDP, Komeito, the Innovation Party, and the Party for Japanese Kokoro, but also includes numerous supporters within the CDP, and that the United States actively supports it. Conversely, the absence of a consensus revision proposal among the LDP, Komeito, the Innovation Party, the Party for Japanese Kokoro, and the CDP, as well as the potential for explosive direct political participation, as seen during the deliberation process of the security-related laws concerning the exercise of collective self-defense in 2015, could act as negative factors in future attempts at revision. Therefore, without exogenous variables, discussions on constitutional revision in Japan are unlikely to accelerate easily. However, if unforeseen rapid changes occur due to territorial disputes with China in the East China Sea or North Korea's missile launches, the current composition of the Japanese Diet could provide a foundation for rapid progress in constitutional revision discussions.

Throughout the post-war period, discussions on constitutional revision have been ongoing in Japan, but the pacifist constitution remained a relative constant, as there had never been a situation where the required majority was secured in both houses of the Diet. However, the institutional foundation for passing a constitutional amendment bill through the Diet has now been laid, creating the potential for rapid qualitative and quantitative changes in Japan's military and security role in East Asia (including the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea).

Unlike issues related to historical perception and territorial disputes, it is difficult for the South Korean government to voice an opinion for or against Japan's constitutional revision. The process of amending a sovereign nation's constitution falls within the realm of its people's autonomous decision-making. However, even if Japan's constitutional revision proceeds unexpectedly rapidly, the South Korean government's stance on Japan's evolving military and security role must be clearly defined. During the deliberation process of the security-related laws in 2015, there was confusion between the South Korean and Japanese governments regarding the role of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in the Korean Peninsula during emergencies. Japan's military and security role on the Korean Peninsula is still (or perhaps forever) unacceptable to South Korean society. For the South Korean government, which is strengthening its security alliance with the United States, it is crucial to clearly communicate its position to the United States, which plays a central role in regional security in East Asia, regarding Japan's post-revision military and security role, and to establish this South Korean position as a constant. This will serve as a starting point for minimizing political turmoil within South Korea regarding discussions on Japan's future regional military and security role. ■

Author

Lee Jeong-hwanProfessor at Kookmin University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. His primary research area is Japanese politics and economics.

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